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Rapid growth threatened by governance issues
Copyright Oxford Analytica Ltd. 2005. No publication or distribution is permitted without the express consent of Oxford Analytica.
EVENT: The economy expanded by 8.1% during the first nine months of the year, the government announced on October 3.
SIGNIFICANCE: The short- and medium-term prospects for the economy are good. However, flaws in Hanoi''s development strategy and its governance capacity pose risks *****stained rapid growth in the longer term.
ANALYSIS: Government figures released on October 3 show that real GDP grew by 8.1% year-on-year during the first nine months of the year compared with 7.4% in the same period last year. Underpinning the higher growth figure was a strong performance in manufacturing and services, notably tourism. Exports also grew rapidly, although they were in part boosted by high oil prices.
Oil prices have also caused inflation to rise. Annual inflation was 6.8% in the first nine months of this year, above the National Assembly''s target for the year of 6.5%. The economy has the capacity to grow at 7.5% or higher in the short- and medium-term, though inflation will need careful management if overheating is to be avoided ( see VIETNAM: Fiscal reform bodes well for growth - December 21, 2004 ).
The release of new economic data coincides with other important political and economic developments:
WTO membership The government is continuing negotiations to enter the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It had hoped to join by the end of this year although this is now unlikely. The US government, which is the chief negotiator, has said that there are still many issues that need attention ( see VIETNAM/US: WTO hopes dominate Khai visit - June 23, 2005 ). Hanoi officials have declined to follow in the footsteps created by China''s protracted negotiations on the grounds that their country is tiny by comparison and much more vulnerable in the face of obligations undertaken in order to secure WTO membership.
Party congress Preparations are underway for the Tenth Communist Party Congress, which is expected early next year. A plenary session of the Central Committee will take place before the end of the year to discuss party appointments, including to the Politburo. Party General-Secretary Nong Duc Manh will remain in his post while President Tran Duc Luong and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai will signal that they will resign their positions.
Five-year Plan At the Congress, the Party will approve a five-year economic and social development plan for 2006-10. Last month, the government issued a draft version for circulation in official circles. The plan offers a window onto some of the policy questions due to be discussed at the Congress and provides an insight into the government''s economic strategy:
It sets an annual GDP growth target for 2006-2010 of 7.5-8.0% compared with a target of 7.5% set for 2001-2005.
It seeks to raise the average annual per capita income from 600 dollars to 950-1000 dollars by 2010 -- the level the government believes it must achieve to qualify as a middle-income country.
Beyond macroeconomic targets, the Five-year Plan focuses on:
accelerating international economic integration and enhancing corporate competitiveness;
developing science and technology, and reforming the country''s education and training systems (as a necessary precursor to industrialisation);
addressing the problem of inequality, while at the same time developing a social security system; and
strengthening the rule of law, especially focusing on public administration reform and tackling corruption.
The economic targets, while ambitious, are not unrealistic. However, in some areas they lack focus and some of the document''s language raises questions about the precise nature of the economy the government is seeking to develop:
Industrial policy allows for experimentation but lacks strategic thinking aimed at developing key sectors where the country enjoys a comparative advantage.
The government has defended the absence of a small number of priority sectors saying this will come later. However, early identification of these priorities is required if Vietnam is to move up the manufacturing value-chain.
Private sector While the Plan addresses the development of the private sector, more attention is devoted to reforming state enterprises. Taken in conjunction with other policy statements, it is clear that the government intends state enterprises to continue playing a leading role in economy for the foreseeable future ( see VIETNAM: Government rethinks its divestment strategy - February 14, 2005 ).
At the Party Congress, the government is likely to amend its statutes to allow party members to engage in private business. Many are already so engaged, even though officially it is against Party statutes. Reforms will continue to be implemented under the overall ideological rubric of a "market economy with socialist characteristics", as Party jargon puts it.
Outlook The main concern about the Five-year Plan is whether the government is capable of implementing it. Governance is the crucial issue:
While the government has committed itself to improving the legal and regulatory framework, this could easily degenerate into yet more red tape or create fresh opportunities for corruption ( see VIETNAM: Government focuses on corporate graft - January 6, 2005 ).
Corruption will need to be tackled effectively if Vietnamese firms are to compete internationally as the economy opens up.
The National Assembly is due to pass a new law on corruption this month. However, the real issue is the extent to which those in senior positions in the Party and government can be disciplined -- and prosecuted -- should they engage in corrupt practices. This seems unlikely in the short-term.
CONCLUSION: The targets and broad direction of the next Five-year Plan will allow strong economic growth to be maintained. However, corruption at the highest levels of the Party and government must be stamped out if the economy is to achieve its full potential.

VIETNAM: Anti-corruption law is on its way
Copyright Oxford Analytica Ltd. 2005. No publication or distribution is permitted without the express consent of Oxford Analytica.
EVENT: The National Assembly will pass the country''s first anti-corruption law this month.
SIGNIFICANCE: The government recognises that failure to tackle graft could ultimately destabilise the regime. However, its commitment to implementing the law remains doubtful, given the vested interests of senior officials and inter-agency rivalries.
ANALYSIS: Vietnam''s first anti-corruption bill was introduced during the October-November parliamentary session. Following debate in the National Assembly, the government is now in the process of considering legislators'' suggested amendments, ahead of the bill''s formal passage.
The new law, which will replace a 1998 ordinance on corruption, has taken 18 months to draft, and involved extensive domestic and international consultations. Based on the advice of the United Nations Development Programme and the Swedish International Development Agency, the law focuses on public, rather than private sector corruption, reflecting the belief that -- for countries starting out in the fight against graft -- public institutions are a priority.
The law proposes key initiatives, including:
establishing an asset declaration system for public officials;
enshrining citizens'' rights to greater access to public information, in order to foster transparency in government practice, and to engage civil society in the fight against corruption; and
creating a high-level anti-corruption steering committee, almost certainly to be under the direct authority of the prime minister.
Control The issue of who should control the anti-corruption steering committee generated much debate:
There was a proposal that the anti-corruption steering committee should fall under the direct authority of the Communist Party, which the party rejected;
Another suggestion was that the committee should come under the authority of the National Assembly, which was dismissed by its chairman, Nguyen Van An, who argued that this could result in the parliament inappropriately interfering with the executive branch.
However, when the prime minister heads the committee, he will be subject to parliament scrutiny.
Government seriousness There are question marks over the seriousness of the government in tackling corruption and the prospects for the law''s implementation. All levels of government and society in Vietnam are affected by corruption, both petty and serious. However, the government has managed to contain the problem to some degree, when compared with the situation in neighbouring Cambodia, for example, which is far worse ( see SOUTH-EAST ASIA: Graft still on the rise - November 8, 2005 ). Nevertheless, the government is aware that widespread corruption in Vietnam could weaken public trust in the regime and undermine political stability ( see VIETNAM: Rapid growth threatened by governance issues - October 6, 2005 ). It signed the UN Convention on Corruption in 2004 and its plan to introduce an anti-corruption law signals its concern about the adverse effects of endemic corruption. Hanoi''s willingness to address the issue was also evident earlier this year, when a series of senior officials and ministers were convicted on corruption charges ( see VIETNAM: Government focuses on corporate graft - January 6, 2005 ).
Nevertheless, despite the recent number of corruption case highlighted in the media, particularly powerful figures consistently remain out of reach. Le Kha Phieu, former party general secretary, confirmed this when he said recently that during his tenure he was prevented from investigating specific corruption cases that involved influential officials.
Implementation problems There are concerns about the practical aspects of implementing the new law:
Ambiguity At present, the law is quite general, lacking detailed provisions on the roles and responsibilities of government agencies. For example, the steering committee''s function and how its jurisdiction compares to other authorities tackling corruption -- such as the Government Inspectorate and the State Au*** Office -- remains ambiguous. The Government Inspectorate led the drafting of the law, but the State Au*** Office is intended to fulfil an independent au***ing role, since it was taken out of the government and placed under National Assembly control.
Collusion More detailed work is needed to establish a viable asset declaration system. The government has opted for a decentralised system, in which employers will collect information about the assets of senior officials. However, there are concerns about collusion between employers and their staff, particularly involving senior-ranking personnel. The case has been argued that the government has intentionally designed a decentralised system precisely because it is likely to be less effective than a centralised asset declaration agency.
Citizens'' rights The law is unlikely to deliver immediate results in terms of enabling citizens to play a larger role in fighting corruption, despite enshrining their right to access public documents. For example:
there is scope within the law for the state to make exceptions about the public availability of information;
most Vietnamese are likely to fear the consequences of identifying official corruption and are thus unlikely to come forward with allegations; and
discussion of the anti-corruption law includes debate over the need to protect whistleblowers, but such protections remain a distant prospect.
Rivalry There are too many organisations charged with playing a leading role in the fight against corruption, and a lack of inter-agency coordination could undermine their effectiveness. For example, there is an apparent rivalry between the Government Inspectorate and the State Au*** Office, both of which are operating in secret and competing for influence, rather than working together to curb corruption.
CONCLUSION: Despite the expected passage of an anti-corruption law, it will take considerable time for the government to establish a credible and transparent anti-graft regime. The fight against corruption is likely to be long, with limited successes and persistent infighting. However, passage of an anti-corruption law is an important measure, even if its impact on Vietnam''s public institutions will only be apparent over the longer term.

VIETNAM/CHINA: Relations firm amidst problems
EVENT: A new four-lane highway linking Guangxi to the north of Vietnam is expected to open next week.
SIGNIFICANCE: Relations between Vietnam and China are stronger than they have been for more than a decade and a project such as this helps tie their economies together. However, history has taught Hanoi that it needs to be cautious in its dealings with its giant neighbour: territorial issues remain and China''s strong trade performance is a source of concern.
ANALYSIS: Hanoi engaged in some classic balancing diplomacy during 2005. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai visited Washington in June and Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Hanoi in November. Vietnam wants to position itself midway between these poles of economic and diplomatic power: it wishes to develop good relations with both but not to be too close to either.
This is particularly important in the run up to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party, due in April. The congress will approve a new five-year development plan and announce key personnel changes, though Party General Secretary Nong Duc Manh will retain his position ( see VIETNAM: Investors take a shine to bond issue - October 25, 2005 and see VIETNAM: Rapid growth threatened by governance issues - October 6, 2005 ).
''Learn from China''? The relatively healthy state of Sino-Vietnamese relations -- compared with the 1980s and early 1990s -- is in part founded on the strategic goal both countries have in managing relations with the United States see VIETNAM/US: WTO hopes dominate Khai visit - June 23, 2005 ). However, it also reflects the fact that China and Vietnam are both led by communist parties that are committed to economic reform. This shared experience provides a bond -- though not necessarily a straightforward one:
While many of the challenges facing the two countries are the same, major differences in size between the two countries (Vietnam has a population of 85 million compared to China''s 1.3 billion) often impose different developmental choices.
Relations between Hanoi and the country''s economic powerhouse, Ho Chi Minh City, illustrate the way in which Vietnam''s size requires different reform policies from those in China. Ho Chi Minh City has not been permitted the same level of autonomy that many Chinese cities have enjoyed mainly because it is too important for the national economy to be allowed greater leeway, especially in fiscal matters. While Hanoi has just one Ho Chi Minh City, Beijing has the option of building scores of economic powerhouses, even though there are also debates about the merits and dangers of autonomy in the Chinese context.
While the process of ''learning from the other'' often appears to be one-way (ie Vietnam learns from China), this is an oversimplification: both countries exchange experiences, and Hanoi declines to emulate every major reform initiative unveiled in Beijing.
Indeed, Vietnam is keen to avoid some aspects of China''s reform experience. For example:
Vietnamese officials say privately that they are not as willing to sacrifice equality in pursuit of rapid economic growth (though theory and practice differ even in Vietnam);
they are determined to avoid the problem of rural unrest on the scale that has occurred in China; and
they believe that China has set a hard act to follow in terms of WTO accession, whose obligations Hanoi would be unable to shrug off with relative impunity in the way that China may be able to (because it is too big an economic power to confront).
Economic ties Reform experience aside, trade and investment ties have grown rapidly during the past decade as China seeks to develop commercial ties with South-east Asia.
Two-way trade totaled just 32 million dollars in 1991. Last year, it was 7.2 billion dollars, up 48% on 2003, on official Vietnamese statistics.
Cumulative Chinese investment (excluding Hong Kong) totaled 710 million dollars at the end of August, spread between 346 projects and placing China fourteenth among countries investing in Vietnam.
Preliminary data point to a surge in Chinese investment this year and a number of new preferential (ie government-backed) deals were signed during Hu''s recent visit. The two sides have pledged to boost two-way trade to 10 billion dollars by 2010, which is certainly achievable.
However, this rapid trade growth is proving problematic. Vietnam imports far more from China than it exports, and is running a large trade deficit, estimated at 2 billion dollars in 2004. The subject was raised during Hu''s visit, and China has pledged to encourage its companies to buy more from Vietnam while also increasing investment in the country. Hanoi has yet to try and restrict Chinese imports. This reflects a range of factors:
Even if it were possible to curb the influx of Chinese goods, it would be politically controversial, and hence a step Vietnam would be reluctant to take. The border with China was temporarily closed during the SARS crisis in 2003, but that was for exceptional reasons.
Vietnamese leaders recognise that their country has no choice but to try and compete with China. This is possible since the majority of Vietnam''s exports to China are primary products while Chinese imports include a higher share of cheap manufactured goods.
Vietnam is beginning to benefit from the attention of foreign companies that have already invested in China and are now keen to spread their risk. North Vietnam is proving a viable alternative, and Hanoi is keen to encourage this development.
Territorial disputes Disputes over shared land and sea borders, and rival claims to islands in the South China Sea continue to cast a cloud over Sino-Vietnamese relations:
Land and maritime borders In 1999, the two sides signed an agreement on the demarcation of their land border, which was ratified in 2000. The same year, they sealed an accord on the demarcation of the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf and on joint fishing in the area. However, these agreements proved controversial -- especially in Vietnam -- and they were not ratified until 2004. During Hu''s visit, both sides pledged to try and finish demarcating their land border by 2008. Further talks are needed before the territorial waters and fishing agreements are implemented.
South China Sea There have been a number of positive developments concerning the disputed claims to islands in the South China Sea ( see SOUTH-EAST ASIA/CHINA: China makes its presence felt - September 16, 2005 ) . In March, Chinese and Vietnamese state oil companies signed a joint agreement (along with a company from the Philippines) to explore for oil and gas in the Beibu/Tonkin Gulf. Beijing and Hanoi have pledged to honour existing agreements and avoid unilateral action that might complicate matters. Shortly before Hu''s visit to Vietnam, Defence Minister Pham Van Tra visited China, where he signed an agreement allowing the Chinese and Vietnamese navy to conduct joint patrols in the Beibu/Tonkin gulf. While these are significant developments, they took place in the context of Vietnam''s desire to balance relations between Beijing and Washington: Vietnam has recently started receiving ship visits from the US navy, for the first time since the Vietnam War.
CONCLUSION: While content with the general trend of improvement in Sino-Vietnamese relations, Hanoi will want a reduction in its trade deficit with China next year. This depends to a large extent on the capacity of Vietnamese firms to penetrate the Chinese market. Hanoi and Beijing will seek to address their outstanding territorial disputes on a ''live-and-let live'' basis by pursuing the joint development of resources, though their failure to resolve vexed questions of sovereignty will continue to cast a shadow over their relationship.

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