Asean, Trung Quốc, Biển Đông và Việt Nam

Anh em chú ý:
Hoàng Sa trong lòng Tổ quốc
21h35', tối nay 30/6/2011 trên VTV1
(lên tivi thì biết quay cái gì nhỉ)

Tình hình là lạm phát của TQ cao hơn VN nhiều, nhưng do chính phủ nó tính cái rổ thế nào đó mà bảo có 6%. Nhà đất cao hơn VN không nói rồi, giá gạo và rau mới khủng khiếp - 20% trong 1 tháng ở các tình mất mùa hạn hán
http://mikepiro.com/tag/chinese-food-inflation/

xóa. iem nhầm!

..."mother" kiếp...

Miền nào cũng có cái hay cái dở. Cái căn bản là phải lai tạo một chút nó mới lành tính và không evil được...

Miền Bắc thì giỏi, lãnh đạo tốt nhưng bảo thủ và gia trưởng. Nhiều khi sai nhưng không chịu nhận là sai...hỏng

Miền Nam thì thật thà, hoà đồng nhưng vô tổ chức. Không có cái nhìn vĩ mô thì cũng hỏng...

Tóm lại, chỉ còn người miền Trung là sáng dạ và có suy nghĩ tích cực cho dân tộc (lịch sử đã chỉ rõ qua các danh tài)...

...chính vì vậy, nên đưa người miền Trung làm lãnh đạo, còn Bắc và Nam đưa xuống làm cu li hết...

Lạm phát bên nó, giá cả tăng cao là nguy cơ cho người VN mình. vì nó sẽ tăng cường gom hàng từ VN

Ko hẳn chỉ trường đại học ngoài Bắc mới có khả năng tuyển sinh cao học bạn à?

Bạn kê thêm vài vị chức danh được cho là quan trọng nữa xem?

Làm mặt dày phát biểu xuông ko ai để ý? Làm chóp bu mà tầng lớp kế thừa không có, còn ý nghĩa sao? Bạn xem tin thời sự trong nước lúc CTN, TT phát biểu ở HN rồi nhìn gương mặt mấy chú ngồi phía dưới, và lúc phát biểu khi vào Trung hoặc Nam sẻ thấy rỏ điều này.

Mình chỉ nghe và cảm nhận chứ ko có ý gì xấu để tổn thương miền nào cả, ý chính là đều là người Việt nên được cân nhắc như nhau.

Các bạn nên nhìn sự thật diễn ra ngoài đời nhiều hơn chứ suy luận logic lý thuyết cũng ko đúng lắm về xã hội thực.

Hỏi thẳng thế này : Vậy thì toàn bộ lãnh đạo đều là người MN thì Sprayboom mới cho là ổn chứ hả ?

Thượng tầng kiến trúc của Hệ thống ch.ính tr.ị VN ta có những vị trí nào nhỉ :

4 vị trí tối cao :

TBT : MB
Nguyên thủ : MN
CP : MN
QH : MB

Đẹp nhá, 50/50

Ngoài ra này: Thống đốc ngân hàng nhà nước : MN

Vị trí Bí thư thứ nhất TW Đoàn - lãnh đạo Thanh niên hiện nay là MN


Vậy thế nào đây, có ý kiến gì về B-N nữa không? tôi thấy bạn giống tôi cái avatar rồi đấy!


Đề nghị Mod quét sạch và triệt để các bài có tính phân biệt B-N, xóa cả bài này của tôi đi

TQ cũng là nước sáng chống bão giông chiều ngăn nắng lửa, mấy vùng đó sau đợt hạn vừa rồi thì mưa to gây ngập lụt và lốc xoáy. Phải lo đánh nhau với Trời mới đúng.

Không rõ VN có đủ sức tăng sản lượng lương thực không? Dùng đòn xuât khẩu quan trọng ngang dầu mỏ để kiềm chế nó.

Mie, các bác bàn chuyện ngoài lề thì đi ngủ mie nó cho béo mắt , Bắc với Nam, Trung cái éo gì, bọn xâm lược thì nhăm nhe la liếm Việt Nam trong khi các bác cãi nhau B - T - N bên nào lãnh đạo giỏi, thế 3 miền là 3 khu tự trị à, không phải đều là con dân Việt Nam ???? Mk, cãi nha xong rồi lại ngồi tự hỏi why Việt Nam luôn bị bọn banh trướng bắt nạt ??? Em thấy các bác cũng giống báo lá cải rôi đấy mồm thì hô đoàn kết, rảnh rỗi là quay ra xét nét nội bộ

bác nào rỗi dịch cái này cho a ce đọc nha:

Another Step in China's Aircraft Carrier Development


Summary
China is preparing to put its first aircraft carrier, the Shi Lang, to sea on July 1, according to unconfirmed reports. Beijing overcame significant challenges in terms of training and technology to reach this point, and it has many more ahead, including a complete doctrinal shift toward carrier escort and protection. Ultimately, the carrier’s trials mark a significant, albeit mostly symbolic, stage in China’s naval development and have significant implications for China’s neighbors.

Analysis
Rumors are circulating that the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier hull originally intended to become the Varyag and now in Chinese possession will be put to sea under its own power July 1, the 90th anniversary of the Communist Party of China. Still unnamed — in fact, it is still called the Varyag by official Chinese releases — the ship is referred to as the Shi Lang in the West, after a Chinese admiral who invaded and pacified Taiwan under the Qing Dynasty in 1683. The event has been in development for many years and is an important, if largely symbolic, moment in a development effort that still has years to go.

Shi Lang: History and Current Status
China’s interest in carrier aviation dates back to at least 1985, when it acquired the Australian HMAS Melbourne (R21). China acquired two completed Soviet Kiev-class helicopter carriers, which it studied but never deployed operationally, before it purchased the Varyag in 1998.

The incomplete hull of the Varyag had been launched in Ukraine (as had her sister ship, the still-active Russian Kuznetsov) before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it languished at port for years after. In 1998, a Macanese company with ties to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) bought the hull, without engines, ostensibly for use as a casino. It took four years to get the Turkish government to agree to allow the hull to be towed through the Bosporus and Dardanelles and from there to China with Beijing’s apparent involvement.

The hull spent several stints, including from 2005-2010, in a Chinese dry dock in Dalian. Construction equipment and materiel continued to clutter the deck as late as the week of June 19. These initial sea trials will likely be intended simply to run the Shi Lang through the basics — testing its power plant and handling, among other things. Ensuring that the basic shipboard systems function properly is no small task, particularly as the carrier was built to Soviet and then rebuilt to Chinese specifications, with years of rust and neglect in between.

Radars, masts and other communications equipment have clearly been installed on the large island superstructure (the structure above the flight deck that contains most of the command and control operations of the carrier), but the operational status of these systems is unknown, particularly in terms of aviation-specific capabilities. Also unknown is the status of the arresting wires, which are critical in decelerating the aircraft upon landing on the carrier. These components, as well as the crew training and proficiency necessary to manage and run a flight deck, are essential precursors to recovering and launching fixed-wing aircraft in particular. The challenges for a country new *****ch practices should not be understated. Fixed-wing carrier-based aviation is a complex and unforgiving business even on a calm day at sea, so it could well be years before the Shi Lang, its sailors and PLAN pilots are ready to attempt China’s first fixed-wing landing under less-than-ideal con***ions.

STRATFOR’s expectation has long been that whatever Chinese intentions are in the long run, the Shi Lang will out of necessity be a training ship, at least at the outset. This continues to be our expectation. While Chinese pilots have been training to land on mock carrier decks ashore and have almost certainly been training to do so in simulators, it will be some time before an operationally trained and experience cadre of naval pilots will be available to man a squadron of carrier-based fighters.

The carrier-based fighters themselves remain an issue. A deal with Russia to buy Su-33 Flanker-D aircraft, the carrier-capable variant of the vaunted Su-30 Flanker design, collapsed after China reduced the number of aircraft it ordered and after Russia accused China of stealing the design. An Su-33 is thought to have been acquired from Ukraine, and a carrier-capable variant of the Chinese copy of the Flanker (the J-11), known as the J-15, has been spotted with Chinese insignia and folding wings.

But whether the J-15 is ready for service — and whether Chinese copies have been precise enough to endure the hardships of carrier landings and shipboard life — remains an open question. China has proven repeatedly its ability to master sophisticated Western techniques in manufacturing. Though fixed-wing flight operations are a daunting proposition, the Chinese ability to learn quickly is not to be underestimated. Regardless, a sudden and massive expansion of Chinese carrier-based aviation capabilities is unlikely.

Costs and Challenges
The progress with completing the Shi Lang was not smooth or without controversy. Not all within the PLAN believe completing the carrier, building more carriers, building or acquiring carrier-capable aircraft, and training the crews, maintainers and pilots necessary to field a capable squadron is worth the enormous cost. This leaves aside the need to train multiple squadrons for multiple carriers, which will be necessary before China can have a carrier and its air wing ready to deploy at any moment and sustain a presence at sea.

For a country first entering the realm of carrier aviation, the Soviet model hardly is an ideal basis. The Kuznetsov and the Varyag were only designed and completed at the end of the Cold War, and they remain early attempts to match more sophisticated Western designs and capabilities. Many are quick to point out the superiority of airborne early warning, cargo and anti-submarine capabilities found in a more advanced and capable carrier air wing. So although China will eventually have its own carrier, it still faces significant costs to develop these technologies and capabilities before it can compete with the carriers of other nations.

Moreover, there are other challenges beyond the carrier itself, such as developing the capability to protect it. This requires a broad spectrum in investment in escorts and capabilities, from expensive air warfare capabilities to anti-submarine escorts — as well as the replenishment capabilities *****stain them. This includes food and fuel — the transfer of which the Chinese are well practiced, due to similar operations off the coast of Somalia — as well as aviation fuel, ammunition and spare parts for the aircraft embarked.

In ad***ion to all of these platforms and the expertise required to employ them, there is the doctrinal shift toward escorting and protecting the carrier and the capabilities it provides. This is an enormous shift for the Chinese, who have long focused their efforts on a sort of guerrilla, asymmetric warfare at sea — anti-access and area-denial efforts to prevent or at least slow the approach of foreign (namely U.S.) carrier strike groups to within striking distance of Chinese shores in a crisis.
The Underlying Rationale


(click here to enlarge image)

China has become heavily reliant upon seaborne trade, particularly through the energy and commo***ies that fuel its economy and growth. This is a reliance that makes it extraordinarily difficult for Beijing to accept American dominance of the world’s oceans. Indeed, it is the recognition of superior U.S. blue-water capabilities that led to China’s anti-access and area-denial efforts. If China wants to be better able to protect these far-away sea lanes, it will need to invest heavily now and in the future in more advanced blue water capabilities like naval aviation.

Aside from trade security concerns, China also has more local and immediate challenges — far more than the United States does in its own near abroad — particularly in the South China Sea. Disputed territory and prospectively lucrative natural resources have led to intensifying competition even over islands that are little more than rocky outcroppings. So aside from competing with the U.S. Navy, China must contend with less capable neighbors, which increasingly are investing in anti-ship missiles, patrol submarines and other capabilities that could endanger a poorly defended capital ship of the Shi Lang’s size. And intensifying naval competition in the region could only accelerate tensions and the acquisition of further arms. Sinking large capital ships like the Shi Lang is increasingly cheap and easy, while protecting them from such threats is ever more complex and expensive.

Ultimately, rumored sea trials by the Shi Lang carry significant symbolism, particularly for China’s neighbors. The trials are a point in a long-established trajectory of China’s efforts to extend its naval reach. These efforts are enormously expensive and have already come at a significant cost, particularly with regard to the PLAN’s remarkably weak capacity for sealift and amphibious force projection compared to its regional competitors. But such efforts are important for China, a country that is looking into the more distant future and sees a strategic need and a looming competition with the world’s naval superpower.
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Bộ trưởng ngoại giao Philippine Albert del Rosario sẽ thăm China từ ngày 7 đến 9 tháng 7.[r23)]