Bắc Hàn sẽ sử dụng vũ khí hạt nhân như nào?

Theo tôi, khả năng Tàu bỏ TT là rất thấp. Tàu vẫn đang trong thời gian giấu mình, họ sẽ không từ bỏ vùng đệm TT để tự mình biến thành đối tượng sát sườn, trực tiếp của NTT, NB và Mỹ ở vùng Đông Á. Khả năng Mỹ bỏ Đài Loan để được xơi TT cũng khó. Vì Đài loan là điểm mấu chốt trong vành đai chiến lược kiềm chế Tàu, đối tượng cạnh tranh chính của Mỹ trong thế kỉ 21. Nếu Tàu có được Đài loan, sự bành trướng của họ xuống vùng Đông Nam Á và Tây Thái Bình Dương chỉ còn là vấn đề thời gian. Mỹ sẽ không cho phép điều đó xảy ra.
Khả năng Mỹ tập kích chiến lược vào các mục tiêu hạn chế tại TT cũng ít có khả năng, khi mà: Một chưa có một bằng chứng cụ thể về nuke ở nước này. Hai là vì thử tiềm lực nỏ thần của bố con ông Kim. Ba là phản ứng quốc tế nhất là từ phía Tàu và Nga. Theo tôi, sẽ không có một cuộc tập kích nào nếu không có sự bật đèn xanh của Tàu, khả năng này là rất khó xảy ra. Giả sử cuộc tấn công xảy ra mà không có sự thông qua của Tàu. Tàu sẽ phản đối kịch liệt tại HĐBA và ĐHĐLHQ. TT cho phép vào kiểm tra các địa điểm hạt nhân của mình, chứng minh được là chúng chỉ phục vụ hoà bình, sau vụ Iraq, tiếp đến vụ này Mỹ sẽ không còn biết ăn nói sao nữa, Tàu từ đó nổi lên như một đầu tàu của lực lượng hoà bình trên thế giới. Chưa hết, TT viện vào quyền được trả đũa để phòng đám nỏ thần của mình vào các mục tiêu, quyền lợi của Mỹ và đồng minh ở Đông Á. Chưa biết hậu quả thế nào.
Quay lại khả năng TT dùng nuke. Theo tôi, TT chẳng có quả nuke nào hết. Ông Kim chỉ dùng chiêu bài này, gần giống với chính sách tung hoả mù của Israel, để bắt Mỹ ngồi xuống ghế, cùng bàn với mình, tháo dần phần nào sự phong toả của Mỹ. Lý do TT không có nuke chính là do, Tàu không muốn TT có nuke. Tàu thừa hiểu khả năng TT biến thành một Đông Âu thứ 2 không phải là xa mờ. Cung cấp nuke cho TT, không may TT sập, nuke của Bắc Hàn, nền kinh tế Nam Hàn gộp lại làm một, ông kẹ Mỹ đứng ở đằng sau. Bắc Kinh khó mà yên tĩnh. TT có được nuke từ Nga? Theo tôi, khó. Vì đã từ lâu Bắc Kinh đã thay thế Matxcơva trong vị thế người đỡ đầu cho lãnh thổ của ông Kim. Sự khống chế của Bắc kinh sẽ cản trở những giúp đỡ chiến lược của Matxcơva cho Bình nhưỡng.
Vấn đề Triều Tiên hiện nay. Theo thiển ý của tôi, sẽ chưa lắng xuống, chừng nào chưa có những biến chuyển trong đường lối đối ngoại của Mỹ và Tàu, từ đó gây ảnh hưởng đến các nước liên quan. Chỉ có Nam Hàn và Nhật Bản đang lo lắng và Bắc Triều Tiên chẳng còn gì để mất.

Tự kiểm duyệt vì sự tồn tại của BOX Quân Sự, vì tình hữu nghị giữa các dân tộc và vì chính sách "Đại Đông Á về người Á" (Xem LỊCH SỬ THẾ GIỚI Cuốn III THỜI CẬN ĐẠI, Chương VII: ĐẠI CHIẾN THỨ NHÌ, từ trang 251 đến trang 268 của NGUYỄN HIẾN LÊ - THIÊN GIANG. NXB-VHTT VIỆT NAM ấn hành tháng 01 năm 2000).
Vì ... "Sự vĩ đại của thánh Ala và sự sáng suốt của đấng tiên tri mô ha mét soi sáng con đường chúng ta bốt bài." ...
(theo Random Walker tại tọa độ http://ttvnol.com/toanhoc/368663/trang-6.ttvn)
Xin đầu hàng RW và về với "Chính nghĩa Quốc gia"!
Được lan0303 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 00:37 ngày 16/02/2005

Theo to thay BH lam nhu vay van hay hon cu tuyen bo lam cho nguoi ta nghi gi mac ke

Korean People''s Army Air Force
Air Force Equipment
Air Bases
References
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity NORTH KOREA COUNTRY HANDBOOK, May 1997 [PDF 5.5 Mb]
''On Guard for Peace and Labour''Vladislav Morozov, Sergey Uskov (Ufa, Russia)Mir Aviatsiyi (Aviation World) magazine, #14 (1997/2) (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996)

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The air force became a separate service in 1948. The air force adapted Soviet and Chinese tactics and doctrine to reflect North Korea''s situation, requirements, and available resources. Its primary mission is air defense of the homeland. Secondary missions include tactical air support to the army and the navy, transportation and logistic support, and insertion of special operations forces. A large force, the air force also can provide limited support to ground forces.
DPRK operational thinking reflects both Russian doctrine and North Korean experiences with heavy UN bombing during the Korean War; it relies heavily on air defense. The DPRK houses a large percentage of its military industries, aircraft hangars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel stores, and even air defense missiles underground or in hardened shelters.
North Korea''s pre-war airfields were destroyed and not repaired during the war. By the end of 1953, the Corps of Chinese Volunteers was withdrawn from Korea and KPA units took control of positions at 38th parallel. A major reorganization of all the KPA armed services began, accompanied by massive acquisitions of new weapons systems from the USSR. Some ten airfields were constructed for the NKAF at that time. In 1961, USSR and KPDR signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Military Cooperation with many ad***ional secret protocols that even now are classified. In accordance with these protocols, in 1961-62, the NKAF received MiG-19 supersonic fighters and S-25 "Berkut" SAM''s. The KPA received airborne and artillery chemical ordnance and began training for combat under chemical and radiation contamination con***ions. After 1965 the North Koreans began receiving MiG-21F fighters and S-75 "Dvina" SAMs.
The Soviet and Chinese-made equipment the NKAF is armed with comprises mostly obsolete types that are not suitable for the modern combat environment. However by the beginning of the 1980''s, the NKAF began a new round of modernization: in ad***ion to 150 MiG-21''s, the NKAF received from the USSR a batch of 60 MiG-23P fighter-bombers and MiG-23ML close-support fighters and from China - 40 Q-5 Fantan ground attack planes (There is some discprenancy about this number. One source lists North Korea as receiving 150 Q-5''s while most others believe that number to be 40). These elite 56th Guards and 57th Fighter Regiments are equipped with MiG-29 and MiG-23 and are based near Pyongyang to defend the capital.
During the 1980s, the NKAF substantially increased its helicopter inventory from 40 to 275. Helicopters in service include Mi-2/HOPLITE, Mi-4/HOUND, and Mi-8/HIP. In 1985, the DPRK circumvented U.S. export controls to buy 87 U.S.-manufactured Hughes helicopters. These helicopters are considerably more advanced than those received from the Russians. Although the DPRK has the civilian version, they probably have modified some of them to carry guns and rockets. Because the ROK produces the same model helicopter for its armed forces, the DPRK could modify their Hughes helicopters to resemble the ROK counterparts to confuse CFC air defenses during SOF operations.
In 1992, the air force comprised about 1,620 aircraft and 70,000 personnel. At that time there were three air combat commands under the direct control of the Air Command at Chunghwa, one air division (the Eighth Air Division, probably headquartered at Rang) in the northeast, and the Civil Aviation Bureau under the State Administration Council. The three wings under the Air Force headquarters of the KPA each had one fighter regiment, one bomber regiment, one An-2 aircraft regiment, one helicopter regiment, and one anti-aircraft rocket regiment. Each wing was capable of waging independent operations. The air combat commands, consisting of different mixes of fighters, bombers, transports, helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, and surface-to- air missile (SAM) regiments, were created by integrating and reorganizing existing air divisions during the mid- to late 1980s. Decentralized command and control gave more authority to regional commands.
At the national level, air defense was once the responsibility of the Air Defense Command, a separate entity from the air force, but which probably was collocated with the Air Force Headquarters in P''yongyang. However, that function probably was transferred to the air force in the late 1980s. The air combat commands appear to have primary responsibility for integrated air defense and are organized with semiautomated warning and interception systems to control SAMs, interceptor aircraft, and air defense artillery units.
The First Air Combat Command, in the northwest, probably headquartered at Kaech''n, is responsible for the west coast to the border with China, including P''yongyang.
The Second Air Combat Command, headquartered at Toksan, covers the northeast and extends up the east coast to the Soviet border.
The Third Air Combat Command, headquartered at Hwangju in the south, is responsible for the border with South Korea and the southernmost areas along the east and west coasts.
As of 1996 the North Korean air force consisted of six air divisions under the direct control of the national Air Command: three are composed of fighter wings, two of transportation wings, and one for fighter training.
North Korea has approximately seventy air bases, including jet and non-jet capable bases and emergency landing strips, with aircraft deployed to between twenty and thirty of them. The majority of tactical aircraft are concentrated at air bases around P''yongyang and in the southern provinces. P''yongyang can place almost all its military aircraft in hardened--mostly underground--shelters. North Korean aircraft are sheltered in underground hangars and plenty of runways are available. In the KPDR there is absolutely no private vehicle ownership but many highways with concrete surfaces and arched reinforced concrete tunnels (for example the superhighway linking Pyongyang with Wonsan), that in case of hostilities are sure to be used as military airfields. It thus seems highly improbable that the NKAF would be knocked out in one strike. North Korea deployed about fifty percent of its fighters in the front area which makes a possible surprise attack to all areas of South Korea. In 1990-91, North Korea activated four forward air bases near the DMZ, which increased its initial southward reach and decreased warning and reaction times for Seoul.
More than 420 fighters, bombers, transport planes, and helicopters were redeployed in October 1995, and more than 100 aircraft were moved forward to the three air bases near the DMZ. More than 20 Il-28 bombers were moved to Taetan which shortened their arrival time to Seoul from 30 minutes to 10 minutes. Over 80 MiG-17s redeployed to Nuchonri and Kuupri are able to attack Seoul in 6 minutes. By these redeployments North Korea intends to make a first strike with outdated MiG-17s and the second strike with mainstay fighters such as MiG-21s and Su-25s.
North Korea produces no aircraft itself, although it does produce spare parts for many of its aircraft. The small village named Tokhyon on the way to Uiju from Sinjuiju is the home to North Korea"s largest munitions factory that produces aircraft. There is another aircraft plant in a suburb of Ch"ongjin, North Hamgyong Province. But it is far smaller than the Tokhyon plant in its size and history.
The North Korean aircraft fleet of Soviet and Chinese manufacture is primarily of 1950s and 1960s technology, with rudimentary avionics and limited weapons systems capability. In the mid- to late 1980s, the Soviet Union supplied a variety of a limited number of more modern all-weather air defense and ground attack aircraft. Most ground attack regiments have older model Soviet and Chinese light bombers and fighters with limited range and combat payloads.
In November 1999 the US Government imposed sanctions on the firms directly involved in the transactions -- the Kazakhstan-owned Uralsk Plant Metallist and the private Czech firm Agroplast and against certain Agroplast officials. The contract signed on 14 October 1998 stipulated that 40 MiG-21 aircraft be delivered to Agroplast, a Czech firm acting as an intermediary for North Korea. The US Government did impose and then waive sanctions against the Kazakhstan Government, which had been cooperating closely with the US in the investigation follow up on this sale. The government candidly admitted that the transfer occurred contrary to official government policy. In March 1999, an international scandal followed the discovery of six disassembled MiG-21s and their spare parts aboard a Ruslan transport aircraft at Baku city airport. Kazakhstan had transferred lethal military equipment, specifically about 40 MiG-21 fighter aircraft, to North Korea. The Kazakhstani government finally admitted that the MiGs were sold to North Korea and that five shipments of a total of 30 MiG-21s had successfully taken place.
P''yongyang was rather late in recognizing the full potential of the helicopter. During the 1980s, the North Korean armed forces increased their helicopter inventory from about forty to about 300. In 1985, North Korea circumvented United States export controls to indirectly buy eighty-seven United States manufactured civilian versions of the Hughes MD-500 helicopters before the United States government stopped further deliveries. Reports indicate that at least sixty of the helicopters delivered were modified as gunships. Because South Korea licenses and produces the MD-500 for use in its armed forces, the modified helicopters were useful in North Korea''s covert or deceptive operations. The transport fleet has some Soviet transports from the 1950s and 1960s.
The air force has a marginal capability for defending North Korean airspace and a limited ability to conduct air operations against South Korea. Its strengths are its large numbers of aircraft, a system of well-dispersed and well-protected air facilities, and an effective, if rudimentary, command and control system. Its weaknesses include limited flight training; forced reliance on outside sources for aircraft, most of its missiles, radars, and associated equipment; and maintenance problems associated with older aircraft. The effectiveness of ground training--on which the pilots heavily depend--is difficult to judge because there is no information on P''yongyang''s acquisition or use of sophisticated flight simulators.
Pilot proficiency is difficult to evaluate because it is crudely proportionate to hours and quality of flight time. Although the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense''s Defense White Paper, 1990 states that flight training levels are 60 percent of South Korea''s, other sources believe the figure is closer to 20 to 30 percent. Lower flight times are attributed to fuel shortages, a more conservative training philosophy, and perhaps a concern for older airframe life expectancies or maintenance infrastructure capacity. The training of pilots on the NKAF''s most modern aircraft is much more significant than "seven flying hours per year" sometimes claimed in the West. But air crew are being trained in accordance with outdated procedures and, with lack of fuel, have very little experience.
Operational thinking reflects both Soviet doctrine and the North Korean experience of heavy bombing during the Korean War. The result has been in reliance on air defense. Military industries, aircraft hangars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel stores, and even air defense missile systems are placed underground or in hardened shelters. North Korea has an extensive interlocking, redundant nationwide air defense system that includes interceptor aircraft, early warning and ground-controlled intercept radars, SAMs, a large number of air defense artillery weapons, and barrage balloons.
Important military and industrial complexes are defended by antiaircraft artillery. Point defenses are supplemented by barrage balloons. North Korea has an exceptionally large number of antiaircraft sites. The largest concentration is along the DMZ and around major cities, military installations, and factories.
The bulk of North Korean radars are older Soviet and Chinese models with vacuum-tube technology, which limits continuous operations. The overall early warning and ground controlled intercept system is susceptible to saturation and jamming by a sophisticated foe with state-of-the-art electronic warfare capabilities. Nevertheless, the multilayered, coordinated, mutually supporting air defense structure is a formidable deterrent to air attack. Overlapping coverage and redundancy make penetration of North Korean air defenses a challenge.
The transport fleet has some 1950s- and 1960s-vintage former Soviet transports, including more than 270 An-2/COLT light transports and 10 An-24/COKEs. The COLT''s ability to land on short, rough strips, makes it especially suited for the task of transporting SOF units. It can hold 10 combat troops and cruise at 160 kilometers (km) an hour. The NKAF has at least six COLT regiments and at least six regiments of attack and transport helicopters.
The DPRK, with over 8,800 AA guns, combined with SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5, and handheld SA-7 and SA-16 surface-to-air missiles, has constructed one of the world''s most dense air defense networks. In the mid- 1980s, the former Soviet Union supplied SA-3/GOA surface-to-air missiles to the DPRK. The SA-3 provides short-range defense against low- flying aircraft. In 1987, the former Soviet Union provided SA-5/GAMMON surface-to-air missiles that gave Pyongyang a long-range, highaltitude, surface-to-air missile capability. The SA-2 GUIDELINE system provides medium-range, medium-altitude point defense for cities and military airfields, as well as a barrier defense along the DMZ.
SA-2 and SA-3 battalions are concentrated along the coastal corridors, while most SA-5 GAMMON battalions are located near the DMZ and are extended north to cover Pyongyang.
Air Force Order of Battle, 1992
Number
Strength 70,000
Organization
Air combat commands 3
Air division 1
Interceptor regiments 12
Ground attack regiments
Il-28 3
Su-25/7 1
MiG-19/A-5 2
MiG-15/17 2
Transport regiments
An-2 6
Unspecified 6
Helicopter regiments 6
cai gi day vay ta , bac nao bit dich cho anh em coi

North Korea Air Force Equipment
SYSTEMS Inventory
1990 1995 2000 2002 2005 2010
Personnel 70,000 82,000 86,000 86,000 86,000 86,000
Bomber 80 80 80 80 80 80
H-5 Il-28 80 80 80 80 80 80
Fighter 700 523 +525 +525 +525 +525
J-5 Fresco
MiG-17 Fresco
230 110 107 107 107 107
J-6 Farmer
MiG-19 Farmer
160 130 +100 +100 +100 +100
J-7 Fishbed
MiG-21 Fishbed
160 120 150 150 150 150
MiG-23 Flogger
45 45 45 45 45 45
MiG-29 Fulcrum
25 25 30 40 40 40
Q-5 40 40 40 40 40 40
Su-7 Fitter
20 18 18 18 18 18
Su-25 Frogfoot
20 35 35 35 35 35
Attack Helicopter - 80 24 24 24 24
Mi-24 Hind
- 80 24 24 24 24
Hughes MD-500
60 60 60 60 60 60
Transport 280 300 ~318 ~318 ~318 ~318
An-2 / Y-2 Colt
250 282 ~300 ~300 ~300 ~300
An-24 Coke 10 6 6 6 6 6
Il-14 5 - - - - -
Il-18 5 2 2 2 2 2
Il-62M 4 4 4 4 4 4
Tu-134 2 2 2 2 2 2
Tu-154 4 4 4 4 4 4
Helicopter 237 283 282 282 282 282
Hughes MD-500 27 27 27 27 27 27
Mi-2 Hoplite
100 140 139 139 139 139
Mi-8 Hip / Mi-17 Hip H
70 15 15 15 15 15
Z-5
40 48 48 48 48 48
Training 210 193 228 228 228 228
CJ-5 / CJ-6 / Yak-18
150 187 187 187 187 187
FT-2 MiG-15 Fagot
50 35 35 35 35
MiG-19 Farmer
+ - - - - -
MiG-21 Fishbed
10 6 6 6 6 6
H-5 + - - - - -
MISSILES
AAM AA-2 ATOLL
+ + + + + +
AA-7 APEX
+ + + + + +
SAM SA-2 GUIDELINE
72 240 ~45 15 15 15
SA-3 GOA
~32 36 7 2 2 2
SA-5 GAMMON
~72 24 2 2 2 2
SA-7 GRAIL
SA-14 GREMLIN
SA-16 GIMLET
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

cái này là Navy
Navy
SYSTEMS Length Inventory
1990 1995 2000 2002 2005 2010
SUBMARINES 26 26 26 26 26
SS PRC Type-031/Sov Romeo 76.6 25 22 22 22 22 22
SS Whiskey (Sov) 75.2 21 4 4 4 4 4
SSM Yugo 20.1 4 __
SMALL SUBMERSIBLES 65 65 65 65 65
SSC Sang-O __ 21 26 26 26 26
SSI __ 45 45 45 45 45
FRIGATES 3 3 3 3 3 3
FF Soho 73.8 1 1 1 1 1 1
FFL Najin 102.1 2 2 2 2 2 2
CORVETTES 3 6 5 5 5 5
PG Sariwon 61.5 3 4 3 3 3 3
Tral __ 2 2 2 2 2
MISSILE CRAFT 42 43 43 43 43 43
PTG Soju 42.1 10 15 15 15 15 15
PTG Osa (Sov) 38.6 12 8 8 8 8 8
PRC Huangfeng 38.8 4 4 4 4 4 4
PTG Sohung 25.6 6 6 6 6 6 6
PTG Komar 25.5 10 10 10 10 10 10
TORPEDO CRAFT 198 103 103 103 103 103
PT Shershen 34.7 3 3 3 3 3 3
PT Sinnam 24.8 __ __ __ __ __ __
PT Sin Hung 23 40 40 40 40 40 40
PT P-4 19.3 __ __ __ __ __ __
Ku Song __ 155 60 60 60 60 60
PATROL CRAFT 169 158 158 158 158 158
PG T Class 62 __ __ __ __ __ __
PG Mayang 60 __ __ __ __ __ __
PC Taechong I/II 60.2 / 60.8 12 13 13 13 13 __
PC Hainan 58.8 4 6 6 6 6 __
PC Chodo 42.7 3 3 3 3 3 __
PC/PT/PTG/WPC Chong-Ju 42.6 __ 6 6 6 6 __
PC SO-1 42 16 18 18 18 18 __
PC Shanghai II 38.8 12 12 12 12 12 __
PC K-48 38.1 __ __ __ __ __ __
PB Chongjin 26 __ __ __ __ __ __
PB Chaho 26 __ __ __ __ __ __
PB/PT P-6 25.5 __ __ __ __ __ __
PB Shantou 25 __ __ __ __ __ __
Others 110 100 100 100 100 100
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 25 23 23 23 23 23
MSI Yukto I/II 24 / 21 __ __ __ __ __ __
AMPHIBIOUS 10 10 10 10 10
LCU Hantae 47 __ 10 10 10 10 10
LCM Hungnam 17 15 15 15 15 15 15
LCU Hanchon 35.7 15 15 15 15 15 15
LCPA Kong Bang I/II/III 23 / 21 / 18.5 __ __ __ __ __ __
LCP Nampo 26 __ __ __ __ __ __
LCPA Nampo A/B 17 __ __ __ __ __ __
LCVP Nampo 130 100 100 100 100 100
ACV Kongbang 130 130 130 140 140 140
SUPPORT & MISCELLANEOUS
AT/F 2 2 2 2 2 2
WPB Yongdo 16.3 __ __ __ __ __ __
WPB Kimjin 18 __ __ __ __ __ __
ASR Kowan 84 __ __ __ __ __ __
AS 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ocean AGHS __ 1 1 1 1 1
Inshore AGHS __ 3 3 3 3 3
COASTAL DEFENSE WEAPONS
Silkworm 6 6 6 6 6 +
GUNS
M-1931/-37 + + + + + +
SM-4-1 + + + + + +
M-1992 + + + + + +
M-1937 + + + + + +

Naval Bases
Homeport Number Type
Yellow Sea / West Sea Fleet
Namp''o
Ch''o-do
Haeju
Kwangyang-ni
Pip''a-got
Sagon-ni [Sagot]
Sunwi-do
Tasa-ri
Yomju-gun
Yongwi-do
East Coast Fleet
Changjon
2 TAECHONG I PC
2 TAECHONG II PC
2 SARIWON PG
6 CHONGJIN PB
6 CHAHO PB
10 SINHUNG PT
6 SOJU PTG
2 S.O.1 PC
Munch''on
6 CHAHO PB
9 SINHUNG PTH
6 SINHUNG PT
2 HANCHON LCU
10 NAMPO LCP
1 CHONGJU PT
6 CHONGJIN PB
Mugyepo
1 NAJIN FFL
1 SOJU PTG
2 S.O.1 PC
1 TAECHONG II PC
1 CHONGJU PC
3 SINHUNG PTH
1 HANCHON LCU
10 NAMPO LCP
Mayang Do
10 ROMEO SS
10 YUKTO I MSI
1 YUKTO II MSI
1 KOWAN ASR
Ch''aho-nodongjagu
10 ROMEO SS
1 HANCHON LCU
Najin
5 SOHUNG PTG
6 CHAHO PB
3 SINHUNG PTH
14 SINHUNG PT
4 HANTAE LCU
Puam Dong
40 NAMPO LCP
3 SINHUNG PTH
4 SINHUNG PT
Songjon-Pando
6 SANG-O SSC
50 YUGO SSM
40 KONG BANG LCPA
Toejo Dong
1 SOHO FF
1 MAYANG PG
2 CHONGJIN PB
3 SINHUNG PTH
8 SINHUNG PT

tóm lại em lấy mấy caúi đó ở đây
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-crisis.htm

ĐỌC ? VÀ YÊN TÂM:
Điều 9, hiến pháp mới của Nhật Bản được Thiên Hoàng công bố ngày 3-11-1946 và có hiệu lực từ ngày 3-5-1947 quy định:
?oNhân dân Nhật Bản chân thành mong muốn một nền hoà bình, an ninh và chính nghĩa trên toàn thế giới, vĩnh viễn trừ bỏ việc phát động chiến tranh hoặc các hành động vũ lực trên thế giới, hoặc dùng uy hiếp vũ lực để giải quyết tranh chấp quốc tế. Để đạt mục đích đó, Nhật Bản không duy trì hải, lục, không quân và các lực lượng chiến đấu khác, không công nhận quyền tham gia chiến tranh với bất cứ nước nào.?
(xem LỊCH SỬ THẾ GIỚI HIỆN ĐẠI 1917-1995 . NXB-GIÁO DỤC VN, tháng 4 năm 2003, trang 294)
Vì ... "Sự vĩ đại của thánh Ala và sự sáng suốt của đấng tiên tri Mô ha mét soi sáng con đường chúng ta bốt bài." ...

BTT đang tiếp tục củng cố tiềm lực quân sự,theo VOA thì BTT đã phát triển một loại phi đạn Scud mới có tầm bắn 1000km gấp đôi loại scud củ ,độ chính xác cũng được cải thiện hơn.Còn về vũ khí hạt nhân thì theo cơ quan tình báo của NH thì BTT có thể sản xuất VKHN nhưng gặp khó khăn về phường tiện phóng các loại vũ khí đó.
Được Bradley sửa chữa / chuyển vào 06:54 ngày 16/02/2005