Binh chủng đặc công

không nên áp đặt tình cảm chủ quan một cách quá đángnhư vậy. Chúng ta phải nhìn vào sự thật cho dù sự thật đó có làm ta đau lòng. Chhúng ta cũng đã nhìn nhận, nhân dân ta đã phải hi sinh rất lớn mới dành đuọc độc lập, thắng lợi cuối cùng là gì!
Về vụ xuong trắng. Bạn nào có tư liệu có thể cho biết là có hay không thế thôi?

Em không đồng ý với bác datvn. Còn nhiều từ khác để diễn đạt mà. Em có cảm tưởng, khi viết những dòng đó, tác giả nói về những bộ xương của nhưng người lính đặc công với một sự "sung sướng" ( Nếu có gì không phải, mong bác TrieuTien bỏ quá cho). Cho dù đứng ở phía nào trong cuộc chiến nhưng cũng không thể dửng dưng trước đồng loại như vậy được.
Gió hãy nói rằng tôi luôn nhớ em
Gió hãy nói rằng tôi mong có em
Gió hãy nói rằng tôi....yêu em.........thế thôi.........

Tớ biết chắc chắn có mấy vụ như vậy nhằm vào các sân bay Thái lan (căn cứ cho máy bay Mỹ) vào những năm 65-70.
You nào có thông tin chi tiết về vụ này không ?

You có chắc chắn thì post lên coi, tui chờ dài cổ rồi đây này
Đừng tung tin vịt nhé

Lang tu Yen Thanh

Bác post đi, chuyện đặc công VN sang Thái là có thật đấy, đặc công là việt kiều tại Thái hồi hương thì phải. Nhưng hình như là đánh xong thì ít về được lắm.
........
Ta còn em đường lượn mái cong
Ngôi chùa cũ,
Tháng năm buồn lệch xô ngói âm dương
Ai đó ngồi bên gốc đại,
Chợt quên ai kia
Đứng đợi bên đường.
...
MTH@
Được mth sửa chữa / chuyển vào 15:51 ngày 14/03/2003

Cái vụ này chắc là không có đâu! Quân đội ta luôn dựa vào nhân dân trong chiến đấu! mà sang Thái thì! Tuy nhiên tôi nghĩ chắc phải có tình báo để nắm các quy luật cất hạ cánh của máy bay Mỹ.

Một trận đánh của đặc công
http://www.americal.org/sixtymin.shtml
Sixty Minutes of Terror
By Al Hemmingway
"Sixty Minutes of Terror" by Al Hemingway was originally published in the March, 1996 issue of VFW magazine. Permission for its posting on the ADVA web page has been received from the VFW. We are grateful to Mr. Hemingway and to Mr. Richard Kolb, E***or-in-Chief, VFW magazine, for their assistance. Comments can be sent to Mr. Kolb at the VFW, 406 W. 34th St., Kansas City, MO, 64111 or call 816-756-3390.
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Though the Vietnam War was winding down for the U.S. Army in 1971, the enemy attack on Fire Support Base Mary Ann in March claimed 30 American lives in one hour of no quarters combat.
"Most of us didn't talk about it when we came home", said Ed Newton of Sawyer, Kan, and a veteran of the 46th Infantry. "In my opinion, the media blew it all out of proportion when they mentioned the drugs and sleeping on duty. It's time we set the record straight and tell the truth about Mary Ann." Indeed, it is. In the early morning hours of March 28, 1971, an estimated 50 sappers from the 2nd Co., 409th NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Main Force Sapper Bn quietly neared their objective --FSB (Fire Support Base) Mary Ann-- a remote outpost of the 196th Light Inf. Bde. (LIB), 23rd Infantry (Americal) Div, located in the western highlands of Quang Tin Province in Military Region I of South Vietnam.
Precarious Position
Mary Ann's purpose was to provide a protective shield for Da Nang and other coastal hamlets. Also, it was a jumping off point for operations designed to disrupt the flow of men and materiel coming down the Dak Rose Trail. Erected on top of a ridge, it "occupied two camel humps with a shallow saddle in between." A series of ridges and hills enveloped the outpost on three sides and thick jungle obscured the field of observation. Described as a "shantytown," 30 hootches, bunkers and other buildings were sprinkled over its interior. The base was 546 yds. in length, 82 yds. wide across its saddle and 136 yds. wide at both ends Twenty two bunkers, constructed from metal conex shipping boxes, were placed across the outer perimeter. Most of the headquarters buildings were situated at the southeast side of the base: the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (BTOC) Company Command Post (CP), communications bunker, a sensor monitoring station, ammunition storage bunkers, three mess halls, artillery liaison centers, battalion aid station (BAS) and fuel storage area. The northwest end of the camp held two 155mm howitzer parapets, the fire direction center (FDC) and the artillery CP. Also a quad .50 caliber machine gun team was placed along the perimeter together with a detachment from a searchlight unit. One line company from the 196th LlB was rotated from the field to Mary Ann approximately every two weeks and was responsible for its security while there.
On the Perimeter
In all, 231 Americans and 22 South Vietnamese (ARVN) soldiers defended Mary Ann on that fateful night. Among them were C Co., 1st Bn., 46th Inf.; an 18-man Recon platoon; communications personnel, clerks and cooks from HQ Co.; and an eight-man contingent from the 4.2-inch mortar platoon. That crew was there assembling the remainder of the mortar ammo to take to FSB Mildred. (No heavy mortars were present that night on Mary Ann. Two mortars were sent to Chu Lai for repair, and the other two went to Mildred.) There, too, were 81mm mortar crews from B and D companies, and members of the 3rd Bn., 82nd Field Artillery (FA): Btry. B, 1st Bn., 14th FA; two men from Bty. G, 29th FA; and four from Btry. G, 55th FA, manning the searchlight jeep and quad .50, respectively. Mary Ann had been spared an all-out attack. With the war winding down, no one believed the NVA would hit such an insignificant outpost. "There was a false sense of security at Mary Ann," said John Patrick, an infantryman with C Co., 1st Bn.,46th Inf. "It was very lax all the time.'' But on this fog-shrouded evening, NVA sappers, their bodies covered with charcoal and grease to make them more difficult targets in the darkness, quietly slipped through Mary Ann's perimeter and, crouching low in three- to six-man teams, made their way through the base's unsuspecting defenders.
Struck with a Vengeance
They wasted no time. Under the protective umbrella of a mortar barrage, sappers struck the vulnerable BTO with a vengeance. Lt. Col. William P. Doyle, the battle-hardened battalion commander, was awakened when 82mm mortar shells landed with a resounding thud just outside his bunker. To make matters worse, the sappers tossed CS gas into the BTOC. Choking and unable to see, Doyle was knocked down when a satchel charge exploded. Regaining his composure, he drew his .45 pistol and pumped a round into a sapper's chest just before another satchel charge was heaved at him. The force of that explosion threw him to the ground, leaving him unconscious. Coming to, Doyle struggled to stand up, only to have a third, explosion go off in the BTOC. As a result, Doyle was again knocked out. He eventually made his way out of the burning BTOC and linked up with Capt. Paul S. Spilberg, who had choppered into Mary Ann several days before with a three-man training team from Chu Lai. While the BTOC was being destroyed, C Co.'s CP was also being hit hard. Capt. Richard V. Knight, the company's popular commander, was killed outright. 1st Lt. Daniel J. Mack, executive officer, was struck in the right leg by an AK-47 round, shredding his calf muscles. He feigned death while a sapper ripped the watch off his wrist. Spec. 4 Carl D. Carter, a radio operator, was buried under sandbags when a wall of the bunker collapsed on him. He went undetected as the NVA sprayed the room with automatic weapons fire. Not so lucky was Sgt. Ronald J. Becksted, an easy-going NCO, who was killed instantly as he tried to escape the CP. Spec. 4 Thomas Simmons was also gunned down, but survived. Staff Sgt. John C. Calhoun was hit three times and was lying near Pfc. Michael S. Holloway, who was frantically trying to tie a tourniquet to Calhoun's leg. As enemy sappers approached, both faked death. Calhoun survived, but Hollaway was killed. As the NVA moved on, one let loose a burst and Calhoun was wounded two more times. Mary Ann was struck with such ferocity that its defenders were unable to mount any type of counterattack. Many grunts, who were asleep in their hootches, were either shot trying to escape or buried alive when the satchel charges were hurled into their quarters.
Mounting Resistance
A few soldiers managed to avoid the initial onslaught. Tripping over the body of a dead sapper in the confusion, Spec 4 David Tarnay picked up his AK-47. As he carefully maneuvered about, he saw an enemy soldier in the wire attempting to leave. Tarnay took careful aim, killing him. Sgt. Maj. Carl N. Presser and Pfc. John A. Bruno killed another sapper trying to flee the area. When the NVA returned fire, Presser and Bruno manned the quad .50, while Spec. 6 Freddic Fillers, the chief cook, commandeered an M-60 machine gun. Between the two weapons, the trio let loose hundreds of rounds. At least three more sappers were cut down trying to make their way to safety. A Night Hawk Huey gunship with a starlight scope aboard, was the first air-craft on the scene The chopper, flown by Capt. Norman Hayes, was from Trp. D, 1st Sqdn., 1st Cav. Hayes had to fly his helicopter at a higher altitude due to the thick smoke coming from the burning hootches at Mary Ann. But the gunship did score kills. "(We). ..could actually see the VC/NVA in the wire...It looked like they were trying to take people out of the wire...We engaged, and I know that anything we fired on ceased firing at us," said Hayes. In the end, however, only 15 NVA bodies were found. Evidence indicated the enemy dug a few hasty graves to bury their dead before withdrawing. Unfortunately, by the time reinforcements arrived, the assault was over. It had lasted just an hour. The results were disastrous: 30 GIs killed and 82 wounded. Twenty-four grunts and six artillery men were dead. Maj. Gen. James L. Baldwin, commanding general of the Americal Division, arrived on the scene at dawn. "The firebase was a shambles," he wrote in a letter home, "with things burning all over the place...There were many [soldiers] who were sitting around with rather dazed looks on their faces, and another group which was actively and energetically trying to pick up the pieces. There were no in-betweens."
Intelligence & Negligence
The consequences of the attack were quickly felt, In the aftermath of an investigation, Baldwin and Col. William S. Hathaway, the 196th LIB commander, were relieved of duty. Both would retire soon afterward. A host of other officers were repremanded, including the hard-driving Lt. Col. Doyle. He remained in the service until his retirement, but never received another promotion. Many felt Baldwin's reprimand unjust. "It was a political thing," said Capt. John Strand, CO of A Co., 1st Bn., 46th Inf. "Scapegoats were needed...What happened to Baldwin was wrong, but it's not hard for me to understand given how big organization's work." Spec.4 Ed Newton also felt "it was not right what they did to Baldwin. Hell, he was the division commander. It was a brigade and battalion problem. The day before we got hit they had us pull in a11 the sensors from around the perimeter. "Kim, our Kit Carson scout, warned us we were infiltrated. He said the enemy was posing as ARVNs on the base. One ARVN officer even inquired about the easiest way to get off the firebase to fish. We tbought that was strange and nobody told him. In fact, the night of the attack, we took fire from the ARVN position. When we returned fire, it stopped. Not one ARVN came out to help us. And the enemy left them alone. "We tried to tell the officers what Kim had said, but they didn't listen to us. It was poor intelligence and gross negligence--plain and simple." Allegations of drug use also have hovered over the performancc of the GIs at Mary Ann. One author wrote that "some [were] perhaps immersed in the cloudy mellowness of a marijuana high..." just prior to the attack. A soldier even complained to his congressman about the drug abuse in his company. Platoon Sgt. Bill Walker, who was in charge of bunkers 15 through 22, has a different viewpoint: "Everyone was awake when I made my rounds. There was no pot in my bunkers. And I know what pot smells like. One soldier, manning a bunker by the trash dump, was dozing. l stayed with him for a few minutes to make sure he was awake, then I returned to my bunker. Not two minutes later, everything hit the fan." Gary L. Noller, then a sergeant and RTO with B Co. 1st Bn., 46th Inf, recalled: "The belief that the enemy would not waste its time attacking a force that was soon leaving anyway led to a false sense of security and while drugs were present on Mary Ann, they were used only by a minority of soldiers."
Why Mary Ann?
Why had the enemy made such a determined effort to overrun Mary Ann? It was late in the war and Vietnamization was progressing steadily. Gls were being replaced by ARVN units. Timothy Baldwin, son of Gen Baldwin, who has done extensive research on Mary Ann to clear his deceased father's name, may have found the answer: "The 1/46th was causing too much trouble from...Mary Ann." Just two weeks before the assault, the Unit had unearthed a large enemy cache. Sfc. Edward "Pop" Manson, platoon sergeant of the 4.2-inch mortar platoon, agrees: "Charlie was after Company C...thcy got the CO (Knight) in his bunker, too... " Baldwin interviewed several Mary Ann VC veterans: they had no idea the Americans were about to abandon the firebase and turn it over to ARVN. "The VC," Baldwin wrote, normally known for their superb intelligence-gathering, had failed on this issue."
Recognizing Hardships
In Sappers in the Wire: the Life and Death of Firebase Mary Ann, noted author Keith W. Nolan counters many bogus claims."Unfortunately, we historians got it wrong," he wrote. "I do not mean to whitewash what happened at Firebase Mary Ann with such a remark, for the incident was a tragic disaster with much to teach today's soldiers about vigilance. "What I do mean to say is that commentary which tars the 1/46th Infantry as a 'mob' ... is grossly exaggerated. Most of the draftees on Mary Ann had already proven themselves in combat. And yet, however reluctantly, there were still soldiers Like that in the l96th lnfantry out fighting the war. Their hardships should be recognized. "Author [Geoffrey] Perret got it right when he wrote that these troops who had faith in nothing much, least of all in men like Johnson and Nixon, still served their country a lot better than it served them."

Bác này nghĩ thế nào ấy chứ. Ai nói là Bộ Đội Đặc Công của Vn ko biết nhảy dù cơ chứ . Bác chưa thấy thì bác đâu . Cách đây 2 năm em đưọc tận mắt chứng kiến các chiến sĩ Đặc Công của Trung Đoàn 198 , hiện đang đóng quân tại địa phận tỉnh Bình Phước . Em đã được chứng kiến mà vì em sống 2 ngày trong doanh trại của Trung Đoàn 198 .
Mong bác nghĩ lại ạ .
Với lại nghe bác gì nói VC nó làm sao ấy , nghe xúc phạm lào sao ấy bác ạ .

Я 'С.""А "УoАЮ z Т.'.

Sáng tháng 5 trời trong xanh quá .
Bốn phương tụ về Ba Đình

Nói VC có gì là xúc phạm nhỉ, chỉ để phân biệt thôi, giống như nói ********* hay Việt gian vậy
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