Buồn quá nói chuyện chơi tý.

Buồn quá nói chuyện chơi tý.

Hì ,lâu ngày nói chuyện tào lao chút cho không khí sông động nhỉ.
Mới kiếm được cái bảng so sánh này

hì,nếu mà nói tào lao thì 2 chú này mà đánh nhau chơi thì chắc là trái đất có thêm nhiều hồ nước ngọt lắm nhỉ.
Đây là một trong các đồ chơi của Nga:

Để đối phó,Mỹ và Nhật quyết tâm đào tạo và xây dựng một hệ thống phòng không xuất sắc,đây là hình chụp lén buổi đào tạo đó.

Và đây là thế hệ tên lửa phòng không ARROWS mới nhất của US,công trình được hợp tác xây dựng với NAM CỰC dựa trên nền tảng lý luận khai quật được ở ngoại thành thủ phủ NAM CỰC.





I will waiting 6 years later for you,Jenny

Bac suu tam duoc qua ten lua da qua. Neu co vai thu khac, post cho anh em xem voi nhe.
minhkhanh

Bác nguoiradikhongve, arrow là của Israel sản xuất mà

Forza Internazionale FC
Honors :
13 Scudettos, 2 European Cups, 3 UEFA Cups,
3 Italian Cups, 1 Intercontinental Cup, & 1 Italian Super Cup.

Forza Internazionale FC
Honors :
13 Scudettos, 2 European Cups, 3 UEFA Cups,
3 Italian Cups, 1 Intercontinental Cup, & 1 Italian Super Cup.

Hì,bác nhìn lộn rùi,ARROW là của Isael,còn cái này là ARROWS của Mỹ ,mới mà,hehehehehehhe

I will waiting 6 years later for you,Jenny

Xin lỗi bác nguoiradikhongve nhé!!!
Tên lửa ARROW hay ARROWS thì cũng là của Israel chứ chẳng có chuyện Mỹ nhúng tay vào chuyện này đâu. Xin bác xem xét lại cho một chút!!! Cũng có thể chúng em sai nhưng em tin là Mỹ chẳng phải là cha đẻ của ARROW hay ARROWS!
[red]CHANCE FAVORS THE PREPARED MIND!!![red]

Nếu bác cần thì em post nguyên bài báo có tên ARROWS của Israel lên cho bác xem nhé:
The Forward (October 11, 2002)
The Arrows in Israel's Quiver
by Robert O. Freedman
As Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein continues to oppose free and unfettered United Nations inspections of suspected sites of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, public attention has focused on the increasingly likely possibility of a United States attack on Iraq, and possible retaliation by Iraq against Israel. What has received much less attention, however, is the possibility that not only Iraqi-allied Palestinian groups but also a heavily armed Hezbollah, with artillery positions in Lebanon near Israel's northern border, may join in the battle, thus putting northern Israel in jeopardy. Managing such potentially explosive situations while at the same time coping with an escalating Palestinian intifada would be a test of Israel's deterrence skills.
On the surface, Iraq would appear to be less of a threat to Israel in 2002 than it was during the first Gulf War in 1991. Many of its long-range Scud missiles were destroyed during the war or during subsequent U.N. inspections, while at the same time Israel now has both improved Patriot anti-missile missiles as well as new Arrow anti-missile missiles. Especially if American and British commandos strike early to knock out whatever long-range missiles Iraq has left in its Western desert, conventional missile attacks against Israel should be less of a problem than in 1991.
A dilemma emerges, however, if Iraq attempts to utilize chemical or bacteriological weapons against Israel. Such weapons are rather hard to put in missiles, so they would have to be delivered by modified combat jets or crop dusters. Aside from the fact that many Palestinians, and possibly some Jordanians would be killed if such attacks were successful, one also wonders how many such aircraft would be actually able to penetrate Israeli air space - especially if Israel receives advance notice of a U.S. attack, as the Bush administration has promised, and there is tacit cooperation between the Israeli and Jordanian air forces (still a possibility, despite the intifada).
Besides anti-missile missiles and air force, as well as passive defense measures such as smallpox inoculations and the widespread distribution of gas masks, Israel might be able to prevent an Iraqi attack through deterrence - the threat of a massive retaliation if Iraq strikes Israel. However, as former Israeli ambassador to the United States David Ivri noted in The New York Times on September 22, and as several of us argued 11 years ago during the Gulf War, Israel's deterrence posture was badly hurt by its failure to retaliate when struck by 39 Iraqi Scuds in 1991. At the time, Israel's leaders did not want to hinder the anti-Iraqi Arab coalition that was of political help to the U.S. in fighting Iraq (although once the war was won, Israel could have retaliated but did not). Now, it could be argued, the U.S. might again pressure Israel not to retaliate lest the Arab world be further inflamed by Israeli action. Nonetheless, the threat of a massive Israeli attack against an Iraqi city such as Baghdad, possibly with Israel's own weapons of mass destruction, might deter the Iraqis - if Israel's deterrence threat can be believed. Both Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and President Moshe Katzav, backed by widespread support in the Israeli Jewish public, have threatened retaliation, but the question remains whether Saddam Hussein will be deterred.
Even if Iraq is deterred, or its attacks fail because of Israeli defensive measures, there are several other problems that could erupt if the U.S., as expected, goes to war against Iraq. First, Palestinian allies of Iraq, such as the Arab Liberation Front, may seize the opportunity to attack Israel. However, if Israel maintains its occupation of the main West Bank cities, and declares martial law in the territories if the U.S. attacks Iraq, it should be possible to contain that threat.
A more serious threat lies on Israel's northern border with Lebanon. Over the past several years, Hezbollah has amassed a significant amount of long-range artillery close to Israel's border with Lebanon. Hezbollah takes orders from Syria, which occupies Lebanon with 35,000 troops and which allows Hezbollah to operate freely in South Lebanon, and is heavily influenced by Syria's ally Iran, which provides the weaponry and the Shiite religious ideology to Hezbollah. Consequently, it will be necessary to deter both Syria and Iran. But how can this be done? Syria is led by a young and untried political leader, Bashar Assad, who has yet to consolidate his power. One way to deter Assad might be to threaten a massive attack on Syrian military positions in Lebanon, which would force Syria to choose between all-out war with Israel - a war for which Syria appears unprepared - or a humiliating capitulation to the Israelis that could threaten Assad's position in Syria, as well as Syrian control in Lebanon. Indeed, Syria's occupation of Lebanon increasingly is being challenged not only by Lebanon's Christians but also by some of its Sunni Muslims and Druze. If, however, Hezbollah is not deterred and launches artillery attacks against Northern Israel, Israel might utilize the opportunity to respond, in part, by destroying Lebanon's efforts to divert water from the Wazzani River, an important tributary of the Hatzbani River. The Wazzani diversion project has become a serious problem for Israel at a time of increasingly severe drought, and Israeli commentators have speculated that the Lebanese, possibly under Syrian prodding, have begun the diversion project at this time to take advantage of the tension surrounding a possible U.S. attack on Iraq.
Deterring Iran would probably be more difficult than deterring Syria. This is in part because of the escalating domestic political conflict in Iran between the virulently anti- Israel conservatives, who facilitated the shipment of weapons to the Palestinians aboard the Karine-A arms ship, and the reformists, who are less hostile to both Israel and the United States. But on one issue, the conservatives and reformists appear united: the desire to make Iran a nuclear power by developing the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor complex. Israel could threaten to destroy the complex as a deterrent measure and, given the fact that Israel has missile-firing submarines as well as a sophisticated air force bombing capability, such an operation would appear to be within Israel's abilities.
When asked about such a possibility following a recent lecture in Washington, former Israeli chief of staff Shaul Mofaz would only say that Israel has passed on "the proper messages" to Iran and to Syria. Whether the Syrians and Iranians take these messages seriously will be an important test of Israel's deterrence capability.
[red]CHANCE FAVORS THE PREPARED MIND!!![red]

Khổ bác quá,tui đang nói chuyện chơi mà bác đem vào nguyên cái bài anh văm làm gì,ai mà chả biết là arrow của Israel,cái bài này có bác post rùi mà,bác nóng nảy thế,coi kỹ lại bài viết của tui đi nhé
I will waiting 6 years later for you,Jenny