Chiến thuật chống tank hiện đại bằng RPG

Chi tiết về Smerch


300 mm 9M55K1 Rocket Projectile with Sensor-Fuzed Submunitions Scattering Cluster Warhead
9M55K1 RP is designed to engage from atop formations of armoured materiel including tanks.

Technical specifications
Weight 800 kg
Length 7600 mm
Warhead weight 243 kg
Warhead length 2049 mm
Number of submunitions 5
Weight of submunitions 15 kg
Weight of the explosive in a submunition 4.5 kg
Homogeneous armour piercing ability
at angle of 30° 70 mm
Range of fire
- max
- min
70 km
20 km
Weight of a canister with 2 RP 1934 kg

Được gulfoil sửa chữa / chuyển vào 09:00 ngày 02/04/2005

Posted 3/29/2005 11:07 PM Updated 3/29/2005 11:10 PM
Tanks take a beating in Iraq
By Steven Komarow, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON â?" The U.S. military''s Abrams tank, designed during the Cold War to withstand the fiercest blows from the best Soviet tanks, is getting knocked out at surprising rates by the low-tech bombs and rocket-propelled grenades of Iraqi insurgents.

Abrams'' heavy armor is up front, however, insurgents sneak up from behind, fire from rooftops above and set off mines below.
Courtesy, USMC AFP
In the all-out battles of the 1991 Gulf War, only 18 Abrams tanks were lost and no soldiers in them killed. But since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, with tanks in daily combat against the unexpectedly fierce insurgency, the Army says 80 of the 69-ton behemoths have been damaged so badly they had to be shipped back to the United States. (Related graphic: Upgrading the Abrams tank)
At least five soldiers have been killed inside the tanks when they hit roadside bombs, according to figures from the Army''s Armor Center at Fort Knox, Ky. At least 10 more have died while riding partially exposed from open hatches. (Related story: Tanks adapted for urban fights they once avoided)
The casualties are the lowest in any Army vehicles, despite how often the Abrams is targeted â?" about 70% of the more than 1,100 tanks used in Iraq have been struck by enemy fire, mostly with minor damage.
The Army will not discuss details of how tanks have been damaged by insurgents, lest that give tips to the enemy. "We have been very cautious about giving out information," says Jan Finegan, spokeswoman for Army Materiel Command.
Commanders say the damage is not surprising because the Abrams is used so heavily, and insurgents are determined to destroy it.
"It''s a thinking enemy, and they know weak points on the tank, where to hit us," says Col. Russ Gold, who commanded an armored brigade in Iraq and now is chief of staff at the Armor Center.
Because it was designed to fight other tanks, the Abrams'' heavy armor is up front. In Iraq''s cities, however, insurgents sneak up from behind, fire from rooftops above and set off mines below.
A favorite tactic: detonating a roadside bomb in hopes of blowing the tread off the tank. The insurgents follow with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and gunfire aimed at the less-armored areas, especially the vulnerable rear engine compartment.
It''s "a dirty, close fight," says an article in Armor, the Army''s official magazine of tank warfare, by a group of officers led by Maj. Gen. Peter Chiarelli of the 1st Cavalry Division.
"Be wary of eliminating or reducing ... heavy armor" as the Army modernizes, the officers warn, arguing it is crucial against insurgents'' "crude but effective weapons."
The Army says most of the "lost" tank hulls can be rebuilt and returned to battle someday. Meanwhile, the Army is upgrading the Abrams, including better protection for the tank''s engine compartment.

http://www.usatoday.com/news/graphics/M1A1/flash.htm
http://www.usatoday.com/news/graphics/M1A1/flash.htm

Các nhà quân sự Mỹ chẳng những đau đầu vì M1 mà cả vì những phàn nàn của lính Mỹ về xe chiến đấu "Striker" nữa cơ ạ. Đúng là các chú patizan Iraq đã tìm hiểu được điểm yếu của kẻ thù để đánh lại mặc dù không có ưu thế vè vũ khí. Em có 1 bài nói về các yếu điểm của xe tăng M1 lấy trên net, dịch tạm cho các bác xem thử:
Người Mỹ đã nói rất nhiều về tăng M1A1"geaeral Abram" như 1 con "quái vật" bất khả chiến bại với mục đích gây cho quân lính đối phương sự mất tự tin vào bản thân và vào vũ khí của họ. Nhưng đây là một sự quảng cáo quá mức. Quả thật, tăng chủ lực M1 "General Abram" và các đời cải tiến M1A1HA và M1A2 có giáp bảo vệ phía trước khá dày 550-770mm khi chống lại đạn sabot và 800-1100 mm khi chống lại đạn lõm. Nhưng đây chỉ là nơi giáp bảo vệ dày nhất, chiếm tỷ lệ nhỏ hơn 50% vỏ tăng. Nhưng các vùng còn lại có giáp yếu hơn bị vũ khí chống tăng mà bắn trúng thì lại không được công bố. Các số liệu thí nghiệm tăng M1A1HA với giáp tăng cường sử dụng ural nghèo cho thấy lớp giáp bảo vệ tăng cường đã được đánh giá quá cao mặc dù nó cũng ko hơn 550-600mm khi chống lại đạn sabot ở khoảng cách 100m và 800mm đối với đạn lõm.
Thực tế, "quái vật" khủng khiếp này cũng có các điểm "gót chân Asin" của nó:
- ở sườn là các vùng hông xe với vỏ thép dày 30mm và tấm diềm dày 8mm thận chí có thể bị xuyên thủng bằng các loại RPG kiểu cũ hay đạn pháo 30mmcủa súng 2A42/2A72 trên xe BMP-2 , vùng sau tháp pháo, vùng sau xe...

Hình 1 - các yếu điểm của vỏ giáp bên sườn xe tăng M1A1
- Phía trước là toàn bộ ổ đỡ pháo và vùng được đánh dấu tam giác xung quanh pháo

Hình 2 - các yếu điểm ở phần giáp phía trước tăng M1A1
Hình 3 - Sự bố trí vỏ thép trên tăng M1A1
Vùng xanh lá cây - dày 20-70mm
Vùng đỏ - dày từ 600-700mm
Vùng vàng - dày tới 80mm
Phần vỏ tăng phía trên tương đối yếu nên các xe tăng và xạ thủ chống tắng được khuyên bắn vào đó. Ngoài các vũ khí chống tăng hiện đại, có thể chiên đấu chống tăng M1 bằng các loại súng chống tăng cũ (chẳng hạn như dùng RPG-7 với đầu đạn lõm multiblocks...., RPG-7, PR-7V, PR-7VM được kiến nghị dùng để bắn vào lớp vỏ bên sườn xe được đánh dấu ở hình 1 và thậm chí cả ở phần sau tháp pháo). Vùng mà tăng có thể hở sườn từ góc bắn 38-90o). Đạn RPG-7VL và RPG-7VR (xuyên được giáp dày 500-700mm) có thể bắn vào điểm bất kỳ trên phần vỏ bên sườn và vào các yếu điểm của giáp phía trước.

Hiện tại Nga đã chào hệ thống Smerch cải tiến có tầm bắn đến 90 km
SMERCH, Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS), Upgrade INFORMATION
SMERCH MLRS upgrade.
The upgrade was aimed at automation of control processes by means of installation on the combat vehicle of an automated fire control system.
This allowed to provide complete combat autonomy of the MLRS, to automate crew functions, to achieve unaimed targeting (without human aid), to reduce the combat vehicle crew number to 3 people and that of the transporter - loader vehicle - to 2 people.
Combat standards of common targets defeat from combat position and from the move have decreased by 5-6 times. Expen***ure of rounds has also been considerably decreased.
MLRS now includes rocket projectiles of 70-90 km range with thermobaric warhead, with shaped-charge fragmentation submunitions warheads and with remote anti-tank mine scattering warheads.
The MLRS can be mounted on MAZ-543 or TATRA chassis.
At customers request all system`s vehicle can be TATRA chassis mounted.
The Combat Vehicle comprises a 12-tube launcher system. Salvo firing time is 38 seconds. Manpower killing zone by a salvo fire of one combat vehicle is 67,2 ha.
For formations control an automated control system "Slepok-1" is used. The core part of the control system is a modular command vehicle MP32M1. Command vehicles vehicles have three communication channels, 2-3 power supply sources, communications equipment coding aids, up-to-date information support. Automated control system "Slepok-1" is integrated with small-size reconnaissance and surveillance complex comprising Pchela-1 Remote-Controlled Unmanned Vehicle.
Pchela-1 detects an enemy objective in a certain area, transmits information to the ground remote control post that automatically determines the objective`s coordinates. By means of data transmission facilities the information is forwarded to the MLRS command post. Basing on the data received automatic development of targeting information is performed and the objective is being defeated. The time required to defeat objective after its detection is about 2-3 minutes. Thereat Remote-Controlled Unmanned Vehicle can be used for spotting and objective defeat results surveillance.
Complex use of SMERCH MLRS and small-size reconnaissance and surveillance complex allows to detect and to defeat targets at ranges up to 90 km in real time. Thereat combat standards are decreased by 6-10 times while expen***ure of rounds decreases by 30-50%.

Cả hệ thống Grad cũng có cải tiến cho tầm bắn lên 40 km
GRAD, Multiple Launch Rocket System
(MLRS), Upgrade INFORMATION
GRAD MLRS Upgrade is designed to destroy enemy motorized infantry and infantry units in concentration area, on the move and in combat formations, artillery and mortar batteries, air defense units, manpower and unarmored military equipment, logistical objectives, light-tonnage vessels, remote laying of minefields.
The system consists of: combat vehicle, unguided rocket projectiles (RP), transport vehicle, automated fire control system KAPUSTNIK-B, positioning system, training equipment, armament and equipment maintenance and repair vehicles, spare parts tools and accessories.
Killing zone by a salvo fire of one combat vehicle (in 20 seconds) is: for manpower - 2,5 ha; for unarmored military equipment - 1,8 ha. To destroy (up to 30%) moving tanks on a 1km part of the frontline it is necessary to fire up to 90 unguided rocket projectiles with antitank mines.
Combat vehicle BM-21 is equipped with automated fire control system and combat control and communications means. This equipment and means provide unaimed combat vehicle targeting and complete combat autonomy.
To control formations an automated control system KAPUSTNIK-B is used. Command vehicles have three communication channels, 2-3 power supply sources, communications equipment coding aids, up-to-date information support. To provide defeat of targets in real time the automated control system is integrated with small-size reconnaissance and surveillance complex comprising Pchela-1 Remote-Controlled Unmanned Vehicle.
As the result the integral index of GRAD MLRS combat effectiveness has increased by 60% while expen***ure of rounds on common targets has reduced by 1,5-3,0 times.
Characteristics of rocket projectiles (RP)
Projectile type Caliber
mm Weight
kg Length
mm Warhead weight
kg Range of fire
km
1. RP 9M521 with increased power HE-fragmentation warhead 122 66 2840 21,0 Up to 40
2. RP 9M522 with separableHE-fragmentation warhead 122 70 3037 25,0 37,5
3. RP 9M218 with shaped-chargefragmentation submunitionsscattering cluster warhead 122 70 3037 25,0 30
4. RP 9M28K with distant AT-minesscattering cluster warhead 122 57,7 3019 22,8 13,4
5. RP 9M217 Sensor-Fuzed SubmunitionsScattering Cluster Warhead 122 70 3037 25,0 30
6. RP 9M519 set for radio-jamming in the short-waves and ultra-short waves bands 122 66 3025 18,4 18,5
7. RP with smoke-screenslaying warhead 122 66 2950 20,2 20,2
8. RP with HE-fragmentation warhead 122 66,6 2870 18,4 20,1

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Bạn coa bài hay quá-Nhưng RPG-7V1 có khả năng xuyên thép 7,5 cm đấy và Mỹ cũng có chương trình SEP cho Tank M1A2 SEP Abrams Tank
Further M1A2 improvements, called the System Enhancement Program (SEP), are underway to enhance the tank''s digital command and control capabilities and to to improve the tank?Ts fightability and lethality. In FY 1999, the Army began upgrading M1s to the M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) configuration. In 1994, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Land Systems to design system enhancements to the M1A2, and awarded GDLS another contact in 1995 *****pply 240 of the enhanced M1A2s, with delivery scheduled to begin in 1999. M1A2 SEP started fielding in 2000. It adds second generation forward looking infrared technology to the gunner?Ts and commander?Ts thermal sights. This sensor also will be added to older M1A2s starting in FY 2001.
A multi-year contract for 307 M1A2 Abrams Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) tanks was awarded in March 2001 with production into 2004. The current Army plan allows for a fleet of 588 M1A2 SEP, 586 M1A2 and 4,393 M1A1 tanks. The potential exits for a retrofit program of 129 M1A2 tanks to the SEP configuration between 2004 and 2005. Initial fielding of the M1A2 to the Army''s 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, was complete by August 1998. Fielding to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Ft. Carson, Colorado ended in 2000. Fielding of the M1A2 (SEP) began in spring 2000 with the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and continues. Rolling over of the 1st Cavalry Division?Ts M1A2 tanks to new M1A2 (SEP) tank began in 2001 and continues.
The M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Package), is the digital battlefield centerpiece for Army XXI. It is the heavy force vehicle that will lead Armor into the next century and transition the close combat mission to the Future Combat System (FCS). The M1A2 SEP is an improved version of the M1A2. It contains numerous improvements in command and control, lethality and reliability. The M1A2 System Enhanced Program is an upgrade to the computer core that is the essence of the M1A2 tank. The SEP upgrade includes improved processors, color and high resolution flat panel displays, increased memory capacity, user friendly Soldier Machine Interface (SMI) and an open operating system that will allow for future growth. Major improvements include the integration of the Second Generation Forward Looking Infared (2nd Gen FLIR) sight, the Under Armor Auxiliary Power Unit (UAAPU) and a Thermal Management System (TMS).
Increased funding for Stryker and Future Combat Systems (FCS) came as a result of Army decisions in 2002 to terminate or restructure some 48 systems in the FY ?~04-?T09 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) long-term spending plan. Among the systems terminated were: United Defense?Ts Crusader self-propelled howitzer and the A3 upgrade for the Bradley Fighting vehicle, GD?Ts M1A2 Abrams System Enhancement Program, Lockheed Martin?Ts Army Tactical Missile System Block II and the associated pre-planned product improvement version of Northrop Grumman?Ts Brilliant Anti-armor (BAT) munition, Raytheon?Ts Stinger missile and Improved Target Acquisition System, and Textron?Ts Wide Area Mine.

The 2nd Generation Forward Looking InfraRed sighting system (2nd Gen FLIR) will replace the existing Thermal Image System (TIS) and the Commander''s Independent Thermal Viewer. The incorporation of 2nd Gen FLIR into the M1A2 tank will require replacement of all 1st Gen FLIR components. From the warfighter perspective, this is one of the key improvements on the SEP. The 2nd Gen FLIR is a fully integrated engagement-sighting system designed to provide the gunner and tank commander with significantly improved day and night target acquisition and engagement capability. This system allows 70% better acquisition, 45% quicker firing and greater accuracy. In ad***ion, a gain of 30% greater range for target acquisition and identification will increase lethality and lessen fratricide. The Commander?Ts Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) provides a hunter killer capability. The 2nd GEN FLIR is a variable power sighting system ranging from 3 or 6 power (wide field of view) for target acquisition and 13, 25 or 50 power (narrow field of view) for engaging targets at appropriate range.

The UAAPU consist of a turbine engine, a generator, and a hydraulic pump. The generator is capable of producing 6 Kilowatts of electrical power at 214 Amps, 28 vdc, and the hydraulic pump is capable of delivering 10 Kilowatts of hydraulic power. The UAAPU can meet the electrical and hydraulic power to operate all electronic and hydraulic components used during mounted surveilance operations and charge the tank''s main batteries. The UAAPU will reduce Operational and Support cost by utilizing the same fuel as the tank at a reduced rate of 3-5 gallons per operational hour. The UAAPU is mounted on the left rear sponson fuel cell area and weighs 510 pounds.
Another improvement in the M1A2 SEP is the Thermal Management System (TMS) which keeps the temperature within the crew compartment under 95 degrees and the touch temperature of electronic units under 125 degrees during extreme con***ions. By reducing the temperature in the crew compartment for the crew and electronic units, this increases the operational capability for both soldiers and the vehicle. The TMS consists of an Air Handling Unit (AHU) and a Vapor Compression System Unit (VCSU) capable of providing 7.5 Kilowatts of cooling capacity for the crew and Line Repairable Units (LRUs). The AHU is mounted in the turret bustle and the VCSU is mounted forward of the Gunner''s Primary Sight (GPS). The TMS uses enviromentally friendly R134a refrigerant and propylene glycol/water mixture to maintain the LRU touch temperature at less than 140 degrees Fahrenheit. The TMS is mounted in the left side of turret bussel and weighs 384 pounds.
The Army requires that all systems operate in the Army Common Operating Environment (ACOE) to improve combined arms operations. Digitization and information dominance across the entire Army for tactical elements is accomplished using Force XXI Battle Command for Brigade and Below (FBCB2) software. In Abrams, FBCB2 software is hosted on a separate card that enables situational awareness across the entire spectrum of tactical operation. It improves message flow, through 34 joint variable message formats, reports ranging from contact reports to logistic roll ups, as well as automatically providing vehicle location to friendly systems. The SEP allows for digital data dissemination with improved ability to optimize information based operations and maintain a relevant common picture while executing Force XXI full dimensional operation. This enhancement increases capability to control the battlefield tempo while improving lethality and survivability. Finally to ensure crew proficiency is maintained, each Armor Battalion is fielded an improved Advanced Gunnery Training System (AGTS) with state-of-the-art graphics.
Changes to the M1A2 Abrams Tank contained in the System Enhancement Program (SEP) and "M1A2 Tank FY 2000" configuration are intended to improve lethality, survivability, mobility, sustainability and provide increased situational awareness and command & control enhancements necessary to provide information superiority to the dominant maneuver force. The Abrams Tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle are two central components of the dominant maneuver digital force.
System Enhancement Program upgrades are intended to:
improve target detection, recognition and identification with the ad***ion of two 2nd generation FLIRs.
incorporate an under armor auxiliary power unit to power the tank and sensor suites.
incorporate a thermal management system to provide crew and electronics cooling.
increase memory and processor speeds and provide full color map capability.
provide compatibility with the Army Command and Control Architecture to ensure the ability to share command & control and situational awareness with all components of the combined arms team.
Ad***ional weight reduction, embedded battle command, survivability enhancement, signature management, safety improvement, and product upgrade modifications to the M1A2 will comprise the "M1A2 Tank FY 2000" configuration fielded to units of the digital division beginning in FY 2000.
The M1A2 IOT&E was conducted from September-December 1993 at Fort Hood, TX and consisted of a gunnery phase and a maneuver phase. The Director determined that the test was adequate, the M1A2 was operationally effective, but not operationally suitable and unsafe. That assessment was based on poor availability and reliability of the tank, instances of the uncommanded tube and turret movement, inadvertent .50 caliber machine gun firing, and hot surfaces which caused contact burns.
FOT&E #1 was conducted in September-October 1995 in conjunction with the New Equipment Training for two battalion sized units. Despite assurances from the Army that all corrective actions were applied, numerous instances of uncommanded tube and turret movement, Commander''s Independent Display (CID) lockup and contact burns continued during FOT&E #1. The follow-on test was placed on hold and the Army "deadlined" the two battalions of M1A2 tanks at Fort Hood for safety reasons. The PM isolated 30 "root causes" of the safety problems and completed hardware and software upgrades in June 1996 which were assessed in FOT&E #2.
The M1A2 TEMP was approved during 2QFY98. This TEMP includes a coordinated plan for FOT&E #3 of the M1A2 in conjunction with the IOT&E of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle in FY99 at Fort Hood, TX. This combined operational test will consist of 16 force-on-force battles between a Bradley Fighting Vehicle System-A3/M1A2 SEP combined arms team and M1A1/ Bradley-ODS combined arms team. Ad***ionally, it will serve as the operational test for the 2d Generation FLIR. This approach implements the Secretary of Defense theme of combining testing in order to save resources and ensure a more realistic operational environment.
The Army and DOT&E completed vulnerability assessment efforts and concluded that the "M1A2 Tank FY 2000" is a significant change from the original M1A2 design and will require a system-level survivability evaluation. This evaluation will rely on full-up system level testing of two systems, component and sub-system level testing, modeling and simulation, existing data, and previous testing to assess susceptibility and vulnerability of the "M1A2 Tank FY 2000" and its crew to the expected threat and to assess battle damage repair capabilities.
The M1A2 Abrams Tank with the corrective actions applied by the Program Manager during FY96 is assessed to be operationally effective and suitable. The availability, reliability, fuel consumption, and safety problems observed in previous testing have been corrected. FOT&E #2 was adequately conducted in accordance with approved test plans and the Abrams TEMP. There were no observed instances of the uncommanded tube and turret movement, inadvertent .50 caliber machine gun firing, and hot surfaces which caused contact burns in previous testing.
The largest area of technical risk to the program is the development of the Embedded Battle Command software which is intended to provide friendly and enemy situational awareness and shared command & control information throughout the combined arms team. This software is being developed as a Horizontal Technology Insertion program and will be provided to the weapon systems and C2 nodes of the combined arms team in FY00. This development schedule is high risk and could adversely impact the M1A2 schedule.
In late 2002 the Army experienced a tragic accident involving the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank. While the crew of the M1A2 was operating the vehicle, a failure within the vehicle''s Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) main system occurred which resulted in an NBC filter fire. One soldier died and 9 others received injuries. While there are numerous factors involved in this accident, the primary cause of the NBC Filter fire is an air cycle machine seizure, caused by dirt ingestion.
The M1A2 tank provides various warnings and cautions to crewmembers in the case of an NBC system problem. These warnings and cautions are displayed visually at the Commander''s Integrated Display (CID) and at the Driver''s Integrated Display (DID); ad***ionally, an Audio tone is transmitted to each crewman via the Vehicular Intercommunication Set (VIS). The audio warning is generated from the tank''s Analog Input Module (AIM) by way of the 2W119-5 wiring harness (Y-cable) which is connected to the driver''s station, full-function, control box (AN/VIC 3). This Y-cable must be connected to the driver''s control box at the J3 connector with the driver''s CVC plugged into the P4 end of the Y-cable. Failure to properly hookup the 2W119-5 cable will not interfere with vehicle communications, but it will result in NO NBC warning tone being heard. In ad***ion to the accident vehicle, several other M1A2 tanks at this installation were found to have the same incorrect connection. Commanders should ensure that each M1A2 in their command is inspected to ensure that this system is correctly connected. The NBC system should not be used until the inspection is complete.
If an NBC warning message is given (visually or audio), crews should immediately press NBC MAIN pushbutton on the CID to turn off the NBC main system. Continued use of the NBC main system will result in an NBC filter fire.
The NBC system is a critical component of the M1A2; it provides crews with increased protection when operating in a combat environment. This system requires proper servicing and checks as outlined in the technical manual. Ensure that all NBC sponson bolts and hardware are properly mounted and secure at all times. Failure to do so can result in the build up of dirt and dust within the NBC sponson box with the potential of damaging the Air Cycle Machine (ACM) and other components.

Vâng nếu ai nói trên đời có vũ khí bất khả tiêu diệt , vô địch thủ , quá siêu đẳng không ai làm theo nổi là nói xạo . đã là do con người chế ra thì con người có khả năng tiêu diệt , người này làm được sau thời gian người khác cũng làm tốt thôi . Vấn đề ngoài thực tế là xác xuất bị tiêu diệt cao thấp mà thôi . Thường sau mổi khi tank bị cháy người ta kéo về nghiên cứu chổ yếu và tìm cách đề phòng . Hình của Bác về chổ yếu của M1 em thấy đúng lắm vì khi em xem bài về việc cải tiến M1 mới đây nhất thấy họ cũng nói y vậy và gắn giáp phản lực vào những chổ yếu có thể gắn . Em có vài tấm hình về việc tăng khả năng sống sót cho M1 trong tác chiến thành phố . cải tiến khá đơn giản thôi bác ạ . Chổ trên nóc vẫn không nghe nói gì và vẫn là chổ yếu .

vài cải tiến về khác ...

Cái chổ bị bắn một lổ to là thùng đựng đồ bên ngoài tháp pháo được dùng như giáp rổng chống đạn HEAT . chổ đó chịu RPG tốt . hình ấy trong Army-technology cũng có đấy Bác .