Chúng ta có thể giải phóng miền Nam vào năm 1972?

(tiếp)
Lục tìm trên mạng có khá nhiều thông tin từ phía NVN, nhưng không thể biết rõ đâu là nguyên tác và tính xác thực của nguồn tin (tham khảo):
http://lv62.homeip.net/soibien/hk-motdoimuxanh-3.htm
Theo thông tin này (tác giả xưng danh là nguyên lữ đoàn trưởng lữ 258 TQLC, Ngô Văn Định) thì để chiếm lại thị xã QT, từ 27/7 sư TQLC NVN đã có 3.500 người chết chưa kể số bị thương (khoảng 70 người chết/ngày), rõ ràng họ ít thương vong hơn sư dù, nhưng không hề rẻ. Nhiều người đã nói để chiếm lại thị xã phía NVN mất tổng cộng khoảng 8.000 lính dù và TQLC. Tôi cho rằng con số là gần thực tế.
Về phía BVN, không rõ đã có thống kê chưa? Khi vào Quảng Trị năm 2000 tôi được cho biết rằng con số BVN mất trong trận này khoảng 11.600.
Với con số thương vong như vậy, số chết và bị thương thì gần như cả 2 sư dù và TQLC của NVN đã bị loại khỏi vòng chiến đấu. Sự bổ xung liên tục đã giữ 2 đơn vị này không biến mất. Phía BVN cũng vậy, trong các cuốn lịch sử các sư đoàn 325, 320B đều nói hai trung đoàn 95/325 và 48/320B đến ngày 15/9 đã chuyển hoạt động sang hướng khác! Sự thực có lẽ là: 2 đơn vị đó và nhiều đơn vị khác đã thương vong gần hết tại chiến trường thị xã QT.
Về tác động của chiến trận tới hòa đàm Paris:
Chiến trận kéo dài quá lâu, đến khi NVN chiếm được thị xã, họ phải trả giá quá đắt. Như một nghịch lý, Mỹ vạch ra ?oVN hóa chiến tranh? để rút quân, NVN phải tự lo với chi phí và sự dính líu ít hơn, nhưng để giữ NVN nguyên trạng thì Mỹ phải ?oMỹ hóa? quân đội giống Mỹ không có lính Mỹ đó và phải yểm trợ cho NVN thậm chí còn hơn cả Mỹ!
Với BVN qua đây cũng bộc lộ nhiều sai lầm và thiếu kinh nghiệm trong chiến tranh qui ước. Cái giá họ phải trả để cố giữ miếng ?okê cân? - thị xã, cũng rất đắt. Nhưng người ta cũng thấy được sức chịu đựng gian khổ của binh lính BVN trong những hoàn cảnh bi đát.
Tất cả những cái đó chứng tỏ ?oVN hóa chiến tranh? có hạn chế, và cứ tình hình này chiến tranh có thể giằng dai. Mỹ đã nghiên cứu xong. Họ đã giội gáo nước lạnh lên Tổng thống NVN khi chấp nhận dự thảo Hiệp định - tháng 10/1972 do BVN đưa ra.
Bây giờ trên mạng có nhiều bài của các cựu binh NVN, họ nói về các ?othiên thần mũ xanh, mũ đỏ? đầy gan dạ và dũng cảm. Cựu binh BVN cũng vậy, họ nói về các anh hùng của mình trong 81 ngày. Các thiên thần và anh hùng làm người đọc mờ mắt. Ngoài những chuyện nghe có vẻ luẩn quẩn, người ta muốn nhìn thấy bản chất.
Để kết thúc, xin trích 2 câu về ?olực lượng?, đã thể hiện bản chất vấn đề theo cách nhìn của 2 nhân vật:
?oCách mạng thành bại, xét cho cùng, là so sánh lực lượng quyết định. Xét lực lượng so sánh là phải xét kết quả tổng hợp của các yếu tố vật chất và tinh thần, của các lực lượng chính trị, kinh tế, văn hóa mà mỗi bên sử dụng để chống lại đối phương.? - Bí thư thứ nhất ĐLĐVN, BVN Lê Duẩn.
?oĐánh giặc không có phép lạ, đánh giặc là phải tương quan lực lượng, đánh giặc là phải có bom, có đạn, có phương tiện. Ngoài ý chí chiến đấu ra, ngoài cái gan dạ ra thì cũng phải thực tế một chút, gan dạ không thể ôm người ta để cắn, gan dạ không thể thắng được ở thời buổi này?" - Tổng thống VNCH, NVN Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ?" trong bài diễn văn cuối cùng, ngày 21/4/1975.
Được xuan5nam sửa chữa / chuyển vào 13:38 ngày 29/10/2005

Bài phân tích của bác xuan 5 nam rất hay, xin phép chuyển sang chủ đề này để có thể phân tích kỹ hơn toàn diện chiến dịch năm 1972. Hy vọng chúng ta ko đi vào vết xe cũ giống như topic Thành cổ Quảng Trị.

Mình nghĩ là ta nên tách rời cách nhìn của 2 phía (về tình hình, về thương vong để tránh phản ứng).
Về tài liệu của NVN. Có lẽ tài liệu khả tín nhất của của ông Ngô Quang Trưởng. Xin trích đăng bài của ông ở đây phần nói về cuộc chiến tại Quảng Trị:
Following is from the book "The Easter Offensive of 1972" by
Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong from the Indochina Monographs
series, published by the US Army Center Of Military History.
=======================================
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972
by Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong
===================================
The Initial Battles
The enemy offensive began at noon on 30 March with artillery
concentrations directed against strongpoints and firebases of the
3d Division. This fire was well-planned and accurate. It was easy
for the enemy to determine the exact locations and dispositions of
ARVN troops since these positions had been used by both U.S. and
ARVN forces for many years. Ad***ionally, the enemy''s long-range
130-mm field guns just north of the DMZ had the key ARVN positions
in this area well within their fields of fire. These deadly
concentrations pounded Camp Carroll, Mai Loc, Sarge, Holcomb, A4,
A2, Cl, C2 and Dong Ha Combat Base while elements of the 56th and
57th Regiments were still displacing toward their new locations,
FSBs Carroll and Charlie 1 respectively.
These artillery fires were followed by and coordinated with ground
attacks; spearheaded by tanks, and came from the north across the
DMZ and from the west through Khe Sanh. (Map 3) From the north,
the enemy push consisted of four spearheads. Two of them were
directed against positions of the 56th Regiment in the vicinity of
FSB Fuller and FSB A4. The other two moved along and parallel to
Route QL-l and were directed against the 57th Regiment''s positions
at FSB A2 and FSB Al. Meanwhile, from the west, the NVA drive was
directed against the 147th Marine Brigade at Nui Ba Ho, FSB Sarge
and FSB Holcomb. As confirmed later, enemy forces conducting these
initial attacks included elements of the NVA 304th and 308th
Divisions, three separate infantry regiments of the B-s Front, two
armor regiments, five artillery regiments and at least one sapper
battalion.
The unexpected assault across the D~Z caught the forward elements
of the 3d Division in movement, only partially settled into
defensive positions they had not been in for some time, locally
outnumbered three-to-one, and out-gunned by the enemy artillery.
The ARVN defenses in the DMZ area were designed to counter
infiltration and local attacks. There were no positions prepared to
give the depth to the battlefield that would be required to contain
an attack of the size and momentum of the one that had now fallen
upon them.
Enemy attacks increased in intensity during the next day. All
firebases along the perimeter of the 3d Division received heavy
artillery fire. The 56th, 57th and 2d Regiments and the marine
battalions were all in contact with attacking forces. Nui Ba Ho
was evacuated late in the evening and Sarge was overrun during the
early hours of 1 April, forcing the marines to fall back to Mai
Loc. Enemy pressure forced elements of the 56th Regiment near FSB
Fuller and those of the 2d Regiment near ~e Gio to withdraw south
of the Cam Lo River. By evening of 1 April, all strongpoints along
the northern perimeter had been evacuated, including FSB Fuller and
FSB Khe Gio. The withdrawal from Al, A4, and other strongpoints,
including those manned by RF troops, was orderly and executed in
accordance with plans and consistent with the tactical situation.
However, serious mistakes were committed at A2 and C1 where two
artillery batteries were located. The failure of these two bases
to obtain prime movers forced the destruction and abandonment of 12
artillery pieces (six 105-mm and six 155-mm howitzers). By this
time, the 56th Regiment had withdrawn to Camp Carroll and was under
attack. The 57th Regiment had fallen back to north of Dong Ha and
the 2d Regiment to Cam Lo. The marine units, meanwhile remained at
Mai Loc and FSB Pedro. As a result of intense enemy artillery fire
on Quang Tri Combat Base, the 3d Division Headquarters was
relocated to the citadel in Quang Tri City.
At 1800 hours on 1 April, General Giai ordered an immediate
reorganization of defensive positions. His concept was to take
advantage of natural obstacles such as the Cua Viet and Mieu Giang
Rivers and establish a line of defense south of these rivers. All
divisional forces north of Dong Ha were ordered to withdraw south.
The RF and PF units were to hold a line on the southern bank of the
Cua Viet River from the coastline to approximately 5 kilometers
inland; the 57th Regiment would establish its positions westward
from that point to Dong Ha. The city and its immediate vicinity
were placed under control of the 1st Armor Brigade whose major
component, the 20th Tank Squadron, had been hastily thrown into
combat as it was about to complete training at Camp Evans. West
from Dong Ha and south of the Mieu Giang River, the 2d Regiment was
given responsibility for a line at Cam Lo, reinforced with an
armored cavalry squadron. Next to the 2d Regiment was the 56th,
reinforced with the 11th Armored Cavalry Squadron which was ordered
to hold Camp Carroll. This defensive line then extended southward
to join the 147th Marine Brigade''s AO around Mai Loc. Marine
battalions were also ordered to occupy the high ground along Route
QL-9 between Cam Lo and Mai Loc, secure Quang Tri Combat Base and
continue operations near FSB Pedro. (Map 4)
The 3d Division1s defense on 2 April appeared to be well-
organized. The disposition of divisional forces was good and the
division head-quarters had fairly tight control over its
subordinate units. General Giai personally supervised the
division''s organization for defense and his conspicuous presence at
some forward positions restored and greatly stimulated morale and
self-assurance among his troops. During the following days, the
forces that manned the Cua Viet River line -- the 57th Regiment,
the 1st Armored Brigade and particularly the RF and PF -- fully
demonstrated their combat capabilities and were all up to their
assigned tasks. They repeatedly repelled the enemy''s attempts to
cross the river and inflicted heavy losses. The new 20th Tank
Squadron also proved effective in its confrontation with NVA tanks,
preventing them from approaching river-crossing points at Dong Ha.
To the west and southwest, the marines held firmly their positions
at the two major bases, Mai Loc and Pedro. They seemed unaffected
by their initial setbacks at Sarge, Nui Ba Ho and Holcomb.
The day of 2 April was marked by several tragic events. It began
with simultaneous enemy attacks against Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.
Again, bad weather precluded effective use of tactical air
throughout most of the day. From morning to late evening, enemy
tanks and infantry forces repeatedly tried to approach Dong Ha from
the north. They were engaged by our 57th Regiment, the 20th Tank
Squadron, the 3d Marine Battalion, U.S. Naval gunfire and were
repulsed at every attempt to cross the Dong Ha bridge. The chaotic
stream of refugees fleeing the combat scene along Route QL-1 since
early morning deeply affected the morale of the 57th Regiment''s
troops who broke ranks around noon and withdrew south in disorder.
If there had been a plan to evacuate civilians from the battle
area, and if that plan had been well executed with suitable control
and transportation, the troops of the 57th would have probably
remained on position. But when they saw the disorder and panic
among these refugees - among whom were their own families and
relatives - the panic was contagious. When General Giai received
word of what was happening, he immediately flew to the position.
His presence there restored the confidence of the soldiers and they
returned to their units. To stall the enemy''s armor-infantry
drive, the Dong Ha bridge was destroyed by ARVN engineers at 1630
hours.
Camp Carroll to the west, in the meantime, had been surrounded by
enemy troops since early morning. Troops of the 56th Regiment at
the camp valiantly endured heavy artillery fires and resisted
repeated assaults by enemy infantry but received little effective
artillery or air support since fire support coordination was poorly
planned. The regimental commander, Colonel Pham Van Dinh, who had
often proven his courage and devotion (he was the officer who
restored the national colors at the Hue Citadel during the 1968
offensive) was despondent The division was giving him no support
and the corps seemed to have forgotten about him. Seeing that his
situation was hopeless and wanting to save as many of his soldiers
lives as possible, he called his staff together and announced that
he would surrender the command. He ordered his S-2 to carry a
white sheet to the main gate of the compound and hang it there.
This done, radio contact was made with the enemy and arrangements
for the surrender were made. Fifteen hundred ARVN troops were
captured along with 22 artillery pieces, including a 175-mm battery
and numerous quad-50''s and twin-40''s, the largest artillery
assemblage in the entire MR-l. The 56th Regiment no longer
existed.
The loss of Camp Carroll made the defense of Mai Loc nearby extre-
mely precarious. The 147th Marine Brigade commander decided that
this base could not be held and upon his request, General Giai
authorized its evacuation. The marines fell back to Quang Tri
late in the after-noon. And so, repeatedly over the last three
days these marine elements had been forced to withdraw and the 3d
Division''s AO was shrinking accordingly from both directions, the
north and the west. These with-drawals had been orderly but the
brigade had suffered such heavy losses during the battles of the
first few days that immediately upon reaching Quang Tri it was
ordered to proceed directly to Hue for regrouping and refitting.
It was replaced by a fresh unit, the 369th Marine Brigade which
immediately set up a new defense around FSB Nancy.
This rotation had a revitalizing effect on the marine troops in
the combat zone. It proved to be a vital factor which contributed
to the maintenance of a high level of marine combat effectiveness
throughout the enemy offensive. Unfortunately for the ARVN troops
of the 3d Infantry Division, the 1st Armor Brigade, and the ranger
groups which came as reinforcement, rotation seldom occurred.
Next time, Holding the Line ....

Following is from the book "The Easter Offensive of 1972" by
Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong from the Indochina Monographs
series, published by the US Army Center Of Military History.
=======================================
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE OF 1972
by Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong
===================================
Holding the line
After four days of arduous fighting and tragic setbacks, the
friendly situation on the Quang Tri front remained critical.
However, there were high hopes that the new defense line would
stand firmly. Despite severe blows, both ARVN regular and
territorial forces seemed to hold extremely well along this new
line. To their cre***, they had stopped the NVA invasion - for the
time being. They had performed their task well, not through
reliance on U.S. air support but with their own combat support. In
fact, prolonged bad weather continued to preclude effective
tactical air support and severely curtailed the use of helicopter
gunships. But U.S. naval gunfire was helpful; so were B-52 strikes
which were conducted five or six times a day against suspected NVA
troop concentrations and avenues of approach.
The loss of Camp Carroll and Mai Loc resulted in heavy personnel
and materiel sacrifices and had an adverse psychological impact on
South Vietnam, but did not seem to dampen either the morale or the
self-assurance of the defending forces. In the week that followed,
the feeling of self-assurance among ARVN troops on the firing line
increased. Every attempt by the enemy to break through was
thoroughly defeated. According to unit reports, several enemy
attacking formations were broken up, scattered and forced to
withdraw in utter disorder under the shattering fire of our
infantry, armor and artillery.
The enemy now withdrew to regroup and only scattered contacts and
attacks by fire occurred throughout the 3d Division''s area of
responsibility. Although the weather continued to prevent the full
use of U.S. tactical air support, the ARVN defense line held.
In the meantime three ARVN ranger groups the 1st, 4th and 5th,
arrived to reinforce the defense of Quang Tri. As the weather
showed some signs of improving, the I Corps commander gave serious
consideration to a counterattack which was to be launched as soon
as tactical air could apply its full weight. His preoccupation
with plans for a counterattack diverted the I Corps staff from
reorganizing the defense in depth, an effort that should have been
first priority under the circumstances. This failure to recognize
this proved to be a serious error that subsequently led to the loss
of Quang Tri City.
Apparently, General Lam was overly influenced by the arrival of
reinforcements. First to arrive was the 369th Marine Brigade,
followed by the Ranger Command with the three groups of three
battalions each, all freshly arrived from Saigon. General Lam
believed that with these ad***ional forces he could not only hold
the two northern provinces but also retake the lost territory in a
short time.
With this conviction, General Lam repeatedly rejected the 3d
Division commander''s requests for reinforcement to consolidate the
defense of Quang Tri. But General Giai was insistent and finally
the I Corps commander reluctantly sent him first one ranger group,
then another. Eventually, all four ranger groups in MR-i were
deployed to Quang Tri and attached to the 3d Division. The
attachments were intended to provide General Giai with full
operational control and unity of command.
However, despite its growing span of control, the 3d Division
never received ad***ional support i~ logistics and signal
communications essential for the effective exercise of command and
control. This problem was recognized at the time by the I Corps
staff which recommended that the control burden placed on General
Giai should be reduced. This could have been accomplished by
placing the Marine Division under the command of I Corps, and by
giving the Marine Division and the Ranger Command each the
responsibility for a separate sector. But for reasons known only
to General Lam, these recommendations were brushed aside. Perhaps
General Lam did not feel certain he could handle the Marine
Division commander who, during LAM SON 719, had failed to comply
with his orders but still came out unscathed. As a result the
Headquarters, Ranger Command, under Colonel Tran Cong Lieu, was
left in Da Nang without a specific assignment while the Marine
Division Headquarters in Hue was not under I Corps command. This
state of things provided ad***ional problems for the 3d Division
commander who frequently found that the orders he gave to his
attached units had no effect until the subordinate commander had
checked and received guidance from his parent headquarters. This
was especially true if the orders required a difficult operation.
But General Lam seemed oblivious to the 3d Division commander''s
problems. His mood was optimistic. He believed that I Corps had
enough forces to stop NVA units at the present line of defense
while he and his staff were working on a plan to launch a
counteroffensive.
General Lam''s optimism was justified by the events of 9 April. On
that day, the enemy launched a second major effort, again from the
north and the west. But once again, the defense succeeded in
driving back all attacks. The 1st Armor Brigade, the 258th Marine
Brigade and the 5th Ranger Group all reported success. Several
enemy tanks were knocked out by the marines using LAW rockets and
by the tank guns of the 1st Armor Brigade. FSB Pedro, which had
been overrun that day was retaken the next day after 3d Division
troops had repulsed three major attacks. Once more, the enemy had
failed to break through the ARVN line of defense even though he had
thrown into his effort major elements of the 304th and 308th NVA
Divisions and two armor regiments. At the end of the day, the 3d
Division 5 perimeter, which ran from the coast-line along the Cua
Viet River westward through Dong Ha then veered south to join FSB
Pedro and the Thach Han River, was still intact.
By this time, General Giai''s personal responsibilities and span of
control had expanded far beyond that normally expected for a
division commander. As a division commander, he found himself
exercising command over two infantry regiments of his own,
operational control over two marine brigades, four ranger groups,
one armor brigade plus all the territorial forces of Quang Tri
Province. The 3d Division commander1s span of control thus
included nine brigades containing a total of twenty-three
battalions, in ad***ion to the territorial forces. His
responsibilities also included supervising and providing protection
for I Corps artillery and logistic units operating at Dong Ha, as
well as monitoring the status of the provincial and district
governments in Quang Tri. He was pleased and stimulated by the
total trust the I Corps commander had vested in him.
Strange as it may seem, General Lam seldom felt the urge to visit
his subordinate commanders in the field or the I Corps frontline
units. He monitored the progress of battles through reports and he
issued directives and orders from his headquarters. He never
personally observed the 3d Division line of defense to determine
the problems being faced by unit commanders. Apparently, he did
not think the situation serious enough to warrant his presence.
ARVN success during 9 and 10 April buoyed his optimism even more
and led to his conviction that the time had arrived for a
counterattack. As conceived by his staff, the plan called for an
attack across the Cua Viet River in order to retake the district of
Gio Linh and the entire area north to the DMZ. He was convinced
that such an attack was within I Corps capabilities and would halt
North Vietnam''s invasion. If it succeeded, his counter-attack
might well force the enemy to withdraw all forces north of the DMZ.
Although the counterattack plan was thoroughly discussed and
considered, it was finally discarded. For one thing, the amount of
forces required for success in the northward drive would greatly
weaken the western flank of the defense where the enemy was
stronger. If the western flank should fail to remain intact, then
Quang Tri City would be in serious jeopardy. Therefore, General
Lam, after considerable deliberation, decided that the
counteroffensive effort should be directed westward instead of to
the north. He planned to re-establish the former line of defense
in the west by launching an all-out attack to regain, phase line by
phase line, such bases as Cam Lo, Camp Carroll and Mai Loc. At the
same time, he ordered participating units to clear all enemy
elements from their zones of advance before moving on to the next
phase line. The counteroffensive was called Operation QUANG TRUNG
729, in an allusion to the same historical event the Communists
exploited in naming their offensive. The imperial name of Nguyen
Hue was Quang Trung; the operation was scheduled to begin on 14
April.
General Giai issued the orders to the 3d Division and its attached
units and QUANG TRUNG 729 began. There was no great surge of
infantry and armor crossing the line of departure, however. On the
contrary, the weary troops on the western flank were already in
close contact with the enemy, as they had been for two weeks, and
were unwilling or unable to advance. NVA artillery fire was
devastating and attrition in the ARVN ranks was heavy. By the end
of the first week of the operation, no unit had advanced more than
500 meters from the line of departure. With his limited command and
control facilities, General Giai found it impossible to coordinate
a strong well-supported attack in any part of the zone.
Furthermore, it seemed that by this time he was not aware of the
deteriorating state of morale among his subordinate commanders and
their troops. These commanders had lost confidence in their
ability to carry the attack to the enemy and, because General Giai
was unable to exercise personal command over so many dispersed
units, his subordinates were able to delay preparations for the
attack by claiming logistic problems, personnel attrition, troop
fatigue and every other possible reason to procrastinate. Although
they sent General Giai daily reports of their attempts to advance,
the line of contact remained unchanged. The orders they had to
clear the zone of all enemy before advancing to the next phase line
required a cautious, slow moving attack in any case, and provided
them with ample justification for their inability to move faster.
Along with the reports General Giai received from his commanders
describing their efforts to clear the enemy from their zones, came
many requests for airstrikes against enemy concentrations, strikes
that were necessary to soften the enemy before the ARVN battalions
could begin the advance to the west. As the days wore on, the
battalions in contact also flooded 3d Division headquarters with
reports of heavy enemy attacks-by-fire and high friendly
casualties. QUANG TRUNG 729 did not resemble an offensive, but
rather had settled into a costly battle of attrition in place in
which the ARVN battalions were steadily. reduced in strength and
effectiveness by the enemy''s deadly artillery fire. Morale
continued to deteriorate and General Giai was unable to restore it;
neither was he able to prod his battalions out of their holes and
bunkers and into the attack. It seemed that the subordinate
commanders knew that their units lacked the strength to break
through the NVA formations facing them, that the enemy''s artillery
would surely catch them in the open and destroy them, and that the
coordinated fire and logistical support they would need to carry
the attack was beyond the capability of the 3d Division or I Corps
to provide.
It was during this time that the failure of I Corps to establish
an effective command and control system became a serious problem.
The Marine Division Headquarters and the Ranger Command, which had
been sent to I Corps expressly to provide control over their
organic units, continued to be left out of combat activities and
received no specific assignments or responsibilities. But as
parent headquarters of the marines and rangers committed to the
combat zone, they contributed much to the confusion of command and
control by elaborating on General Giai''s orders or by questioning
and commenting on everything concerning their units. They were not
the only ones to do his, however. General Lam himself frequently
issued directives by telephone or radio to individual brigade
commanders, especially to the 1st Armor Brigade commander (who
belonged to the same branch) and who rarely bothered to inform
General Giai about these calls. General Giai often learned of
these directives only after they had been implemented and these
incidents seriously degraded his authority. Distrust and
insubordination gradually set in and finally resulted in total
disruption of command and control at the front line in northern MR-1.
After two weeks of continuous rain and heavy cloud cover, which
seriously impeded the use of tactical air support, the weather
began to improve. With an accelerated tempo as if to make up for
time lost, U.S. aircraft of all types daily swarmed in the skies
over Quang Tri. Air sorties by B-52''s, tactical aircraft, gunships,
increased steadily each day striking all suspicious targets. This
upsurge restored the morale and self-assurance of the ground troops.
On 18 April, enemy activity increased substantially with attacks--
by-fire and infantry-armor probes. This became the enemy''s third
major effort to take Quang Tri. All ARVN and marine units reported
contact and indirect fire. At 1830 hours, a coordinated enemy
attack was launched against the western sector of the 3d Division.
>From all positions, units reported movements of enemy tanks.
Within the space of three hours, the U.S. Air Force responded with
tactical air and B-52 missions diverted from elsewhere with such
devastating strikes that the enemy attack was completely disrupted.
This provided ARVN units with an opportunity to pass to the
offensive and fully initiate the counteroffensive, QUANG TRUNG 729.
But nothing happened; at daybreak, the troops still clung to their
trenches and made no significant effort to move forward.
The fact that another major effort by the enemy had been
effectively stopped deluded the I Corps commander into thinking
once more that the situation in Quang Tri was under control. But
the inertia developing among ARVN units should have alerted him to
the pressing requirement for reorganizing his positions and
rotating weary combat units. This need totally escaped him. The
enemy''s demonstrated ability to conduct a sustained offensive on
the other hand should also have stimulated a major ARVN effort to
implement a coordinated defense plan if Quang Tri was to be held.
But this effort was not made.
The following week saw the defense line at Dong Ha and along the
Cua Viet River **** in because of a tactical blunder. This came
about when reports were received that the enemy was infiltrating
from the west and threatening to cut off the supply route between
Dong Ha and Quang Tri Combat Base. On his own initiative, the 1st
Armor Brigade commander directed his 20th Tank Squadron on the Cua
Viet line to pull back south along Route QL-l in order to clear the
enemy elements there. As soon as they saw the tanks move south,
ARVN troops were gripped with panic, broke ranks and streamed
along. Before the 3d Division commander detected what was
happening, many of his troops had already arrived at Quang Tri
Combat Base and the Cua Viet defense, which was one of our
strongest lines of defense from which the courageous ARVN troops
had repeatedly repelled every enemy attack for nearly a month, had
been abandoned. It was virtually handed to the enemy on a platter
because a tactical commander had taken it upon himself to initiate
a major move without reporting to his superior and without
foreseeing the consequences of his actions.
Once again, by sheer physical intercession, the 3d Division
commander succeeded in reestablishing order, although not for long.
Much precious time had been lost. By the time he had finally
regained control of the situation, there was no way to push his
units back to Cua Viet to restore the lost positions. He was
compelled to regroup them west of Quang Tri City and develop a new
defense line north of the Thach Han River. This new line
surrounded and protected the Quang Tri Combat Base whose importance
as a logistic support center had greatly diminished in view of the
dwindling supplies still available there.
On 23 April, the 147th Marine Brigade returned to Quang Tri Base
to take over its defense after a rest and refitting period in Hue.
The 258th Marine Brigade redeployed to Hue but its 1st Battalion
remained at FSB Pedro and came under operational control of the
147th.
During the days that followed, the morale of ARVN troops
deteriorated rapidly. They were exposed to the daily poundings of
enemy artillery and assaults by enemy tanks. They became
vulnerable to the intense tempo of conventional warfare. They had
to spend long nights, tense, sleepless, agonizing at the prospect
of enemy infantry assaults which could surge forward from the dark
at any moment. The near-total inertia of ARVN troops at night made
it possible for the enemy to rest and recuperate at almost any time
he chose. Therefore, short lulls during the fighting were
invariably the time enemy troops chose to rest. ARVN troops in the
meantime were constantly kept on the alert, under tension day and
night, their energy sapped by fear and uncertainty while often
defending a combat base of dubious tactical value.
Quang Tri Combat Base, north of the Thach Han River, was in fact a
bad choice for defense from a tactical point of view. As the month
of April was drawing to its end, so were the supplies at this base.
Consequently, the 3d Division commander decided then to evacuate
this base and withdraw south of the river. He worked on the
withdrawal plan by himself; he consulted only the division senior
adviser. General Giai feared that if his subordinate commanders
learned of his plan, they were apt to wreck it through hasty
actions. He also deliberately withheld this plan from the I Corps
commander. He simply wanted to be cautious, to get things done.
But it was this action that alienated him from the I Corps
commander and the growing distrust that developed between them
added a further dimension to the events which eventually led to the
fall of Quang Tri City.

The Fall of Quang Tri City
The final NVA actions that contributed to the fall of Quang Tri
City occurred during the last week of April. By this time, the
effect of strain and shock from four weeks of conventional warfare
on ill-prepared ARVN troops had taken its toll on unit discipline
and effectiveness. Gone were the last remaining shreds of self-
assurance and cohesiveness. Units of the 3d Division fought on
without much conviction and were practically left to fend for
themselves. The division''s sector was shrinking with every passing
day. (Map 5)
During this time enemy attacks from the west near the boundary of
Thua Thien Province cut off Route QL-l to the south and interdicted
all friendly vehicular traffic over a seven kilometer stretch.
This isolated I Corps forces in Quang Tri Province and completely
severed the lifeline which sustained them in combat. The I Corps
commander''s first reaction to this situation was a series of
directives to ARVN logistic units to push supply convoys through
the enemy road blocks. Next, the 3d Division commander was
repeatedly ordered to clear Route QL-l from the north. These
orders compelled General Giai to divert an armored cavalry squadron
from its vital frontline role near Quang Tri to conduct operations
to the south. Finally, the I Corps commander deployed a fresh
marine battalion which was committed to the defense of Hue to clear
Route QL-l from the south. These movements severely exhausted fuel
and ammunition supplies so critically needed in Quang Tri but were
unsuccessful in reopening this vital lifeline.
The weather was particularly bad on 27 April and the enemy took
advantage of it. Actions on that day signaled the beginning of the
NVA push to capture all remaining territory held by ARVN troops in
Quang Tri Province. Along the 3d Division''s new defense line,
which had shrunk to the immediate vicinity of Quang Tri City to
the east, north, and west, units either reported contact with enemy
troops or received enemy artillery fire. Throughout the day all
forward elements of the division were under fire and engaged by
tank-supported enemy infantry. Most units lost some ground but
were holding precariously. At the end of the day, most elements of
the 1st Armor Brigade were pushed back to within two to three
kilometers of Route QL-l while enemy artillery fire concentrated
heavily on the Quang Tri Combat Base. In response to the 3d
Division commander1s declared tactical emergency, U.S. tactical air
and B-52 bombers braved adverse weather to stop the enemy advance
on Quang Tri.
The next day, 28 April, enemy tanks approached the Quang Tri
Bridge, about two kilometers southwest of Quang Tri City, which was
the responsibility of the 2d Regiment The armored cavalry
squadron, which had been sent to reinforce the 2d Regiment was
holding the bridge but it was forced to pull back. Elements of the
1st Armor Brigade also experienced setbacks during the day and had
withdrawn to within one kilometer north of Quang Tri Combat Base.
The brigade commander meanwhile had been wounded and evacuated.
With his departure, discipline crumbled and the 1st Armor Brigade
troops fled south along Route QL-l, passing through a road block
set up by the 147th Marine Brigade.
The 57th Regiment in the meantime had become ineffective. Its
commander had no knowledge of the status of his two battalions that
had been near Dong Ha City. The only troops he had with him were
those of a reconnaissance platoon. Throughout the night, men
continued to flow south. The only effective unit still defending
Quang Tri Combat Base was the 147th Marine Brigade and it was
under heavy and continuous 130-mm gun fire.
By 29 April, the situation in Quang Tri Province had become
critical. The enemy''s renewed initiative pointed toward another
major effort. On their part, ARVN unit commanders at this time
were extremely concerned about fuel and ammunition shortages.
Several howitzers had already been destroyed after all available
ammunition was expended The ARVN effort to reopen Route QL-l
meanwhile progressed at a snail''s pace for lack of coordination and
positive effort; its outlook was not promising. Quang Tri was kept
resupplied by helicopters which took extreme risks approaching the
city, especially by way of Route QL-l.
In the face of this pending tactical disaster, on 30 April,
General Giai summoned subordinate commanders to his headquarters
and presented his plan to withdraw south of the Thach Han River.
Basically, the plan consisted of holding Quang Tri City with a
marine brigade, establishing a defense line on the southern bank of
the Thach Han River with infantry and ranger troops and releasing
enough tank and armored cavalry units for the pressing task of
reopening Route QL-l to the south. All units were to move during
the morning of the next day, 1 May. Informed of General Giai''s
withdrawal plan, General Lam tacitly concurred although he never
confirmed his approval. Neither did he issue any directives to the
3d Division commander.
In the morning of 1 May, however, General Lam called the 3d
Division commander and said that he did not approve the withdrawal
plan. He issued orders to General Giai to the effect that all
units were to remain where they were and hold their positions "at
all costs." He also made it clear to General Giai that no
withdrawal of any unit would be permitted unless he personally gave
the authorization. General Lam''s eleventh-hour countermand turned
out to be a reiteration of President Thieu''s directive which had
just been received from Saigon. This decision was being taken
presumably because the Paris peace talks had just been resumed
after being boycotted by the RVN delegation since the beginning of
the NVA invasion.
It was easy to pick up the telephone and countermand an order. In
the field and under heavy enemy pressure, these conflicting orders
inevitably resulted in a nightmare of confusion and chaos. General
Giai did not even have sufficient time to countermand his own
orders and at the same time impart the new orders to each of his
subordinates through a lengthy series of radio calls. Furthermore
all brigade and regimental commanders were not in a position to
carry out the new orders. Some of them claimed that their units
had already moved to new positions according to plan; others
bluntly refused to change a course of action which had already been
initiated. General Giai persisted in convincing them to comply
with the new instructions received from I Corps. He reiterated the
new orders and emphasized that each unit must comply. He also
rescinded a previous order to relocate his command post and
remained in Quang Tri City.
And so within the space of four hours, the ARVN dispositions for
defense crumbled completely. Those units to the north manning
positions around Quang Tri Combat Base streamed across the Thach
Han River and continued their way south with the uncontainable
force of a flood over broken dam. The mechanized elements that
reached Quang Tri Bridge were unable to cross; the bridge had
already been destroyed. They left behind all vehicles and
equipment and forded the river toward the south. On the southern
bank of the river, infantry units did not remain long in their new
positions. As soon as they detected ARVN tanks with-drawing south,
they deserted their positions and joined the column. But this
column did not progress far. Tanks and armored vehicles began to
run out of fuel and one by one they were left behind by their crews
along Route QL-l. The only unit that retained full cohesiveness
and control during this time was the 147th Marine Brigade which was
defending Quang Tri City. Finally the brigade commander decided
for himself that the situation was hopeless and he too ordered his
unit to move out of Quang Tri at 1430 hours leaving behind the 3d
Division commander and his skeletal staff all alone in the
undefended city''s old citadel.
Finally, when he learned what was happening, the 3d Division
commander and his staff officers boarded three armored vehicles in
an effort to catch up with his own withdrawing column of troops.
This occurred while U.S. helicopters came in to rescue the
division''s advisory personnel and their Vietnamese employees.
The 3d Division commander''s attempt to join his column failed.
Route QL-l was clogged by refugees and battered troops, and all
types of vehicles, military and civilian, frantically finding their
way into Hue under the most barbarous barrages of enemy
interdiction fire. General Giai was forced to return to the old
citadel and later he and his small staff were picked up by U.S.
helicopters. When the last "jolly green giant" lifted off at 1655
hours with the 3d Division''s senior adviser aboard, it was fired
upon by enemy small-arms. At that time, the first NVA troops had
already penetrated the Quang Tri Citadel. Quang Tri City belonged
to the enemy: it was the first RVN provincial capital to fall into
Communist hands during the war.
On Route QL-l, the tidal wave of refugees intermingled with troops
continued to move south. The roadway became a spectacle of
incredible destruction. Burning vehicles of all types, trucks,
armored vehicles, civilian buses and cars jammed the highway and
forced all traffic off the road while the frightened mass of
humanity was subjected to enemy artillery concentrations. By late
afternoon of the next day, the carnage was over. Thousands of
innocent civilians thus found tragic death on this long stretch of
QL-l which later was dubbed "Terror Boulevard" by the local press.
The shock and trauma of this tragedy, like the 1968 massacre in
Hue, were to haunt the population of northern MR-l for a long, long
time.
Several ARVN units and the 147th Marine Brigade meanwhile managed
to maintain some order in the midst of chaos and fought their way
to the vicinity of Hai Lang. The 5th Ranger group, followed by the
1st and 4th moved on south to clear an enemy blocking unit. They
were joined by the 1st Armor Brigade which took up night positions
four kilometers southwest of Hai Lang. By late evening, remnants
of the 3d Division found their way to the vicinity of Camp Evans
where General Giai had arrived. He was attempting to reestablish
his headquarters and reorganize his units.
On 2 May, the 1st Armor Brigade attempted to move south on Route
QL-l but came under heavy and continuous artillery fire. These
Armor forces finally closed on Camp Evans approximately 25
kilometers south during the early afternoon. The 147th Marine
Brigade meanwhile was also subjected to the same attack from the
direction of Hai Lang as it moved southward at dawn. With tactical
air support and the assistance of some tanks, this brigade during
the late afternoon passed through the 369th Marine Brigade
defensive positions on Route QL-1 at the My Chanh River.
The entire province of Quang Tri was now in enemy hands. This
provided North Vietnam with the opportunity to accelerate its push
into the province of Thua Thien and toward Hue.
Next section: CHAPTER III, Stabilization and Counteroffensive

CHAPTER III
Stabilization and Counteroffensive
The Defense of Hue
During the month of April while the 3d ARVN Infantry Division and
its attached units were battling the NVA 304th and 308th Divisions
in Quang Tri Province, the 1st ARVN Infantry Division fought back
several attempts by the NVA 324B Division to gain control of the
western and southwestern approaches to Hue City in Thua Thien
Province. Hue City was undoubtedly the prime target of enemy
efforts in this area. But the seesaw battles that in fact had
begun in early March then continued throughout the months of April
and May without any solid gains from either side clearly indicated
that this was only a secondary front designed to contain the 1st
Infantry Division and support the main effort in Quang Tri.
The 1st Infantry Division and territorial forces of Thua Thien
Province acquitted themselves admirably in the performance of their
tasks. Although their exploits remained on the fringe of the
limelight which was being focused on Quang Tri and An Loc at that
time and seldom mentioned by the press, their valiance and combat
effectiveness enabled I Corps to keep the enemy in check on this
western flank and maintain overall tactical balance throughout the
most critical weeks of the enemy''s Easter offensive. When this
offensive was about to enter its second week and as ARVN
reinforcements were being poured into Quang Tri Province to hold
Dong Ha and the Cua Viet line, the 1st Division was maintaining a
firm line of defense in the foothills area west of Hue. This line
extended from Camp Evans in the north, where the 1st Regiment
Headquarters was located, continued through FSB Rakkasan, then
southeast through FSBs Bastogne and Checkmate and linked up with
FSB Birmingham, the command post of the 54th Regiment. The 3d
Regiment was kept in reserve to add depth to the defense. FSB
Veghel meanwhile had been evacuated since the outbreak of the
invasion.
The area around FSB Bastogne and FSB Checkmate, which straddled
Route 547 leading east toward Hue, was under intense enemy
pressure. By the second week of April, both bases were unable to
be re-supplied by road. Enemy pressure was especially heavy on the
high ground northwest of Bastogne and east of Route 547 which had
been interdicted. On 11 April, the 1st Regiment of the 1st ARVN
Infantry Division attempted to clear Route 547 but encountered
strong and determined resistance from the NVA 24th Regiment which
held fast in spite of heavy ARVN artillery fire and B-52 strikes.
Attempts to re-supply the beleaguered fire sup-port bases by
helicopters and air drops were only partially successful while the
increasing number of wounded caused by daily enemy attacks-by-fire
presented a critical medical evacuation problem.
The situation around FSB Bastogne and FSB Checkmate became serious
during the last two weeks of April. Enemy attacks-by-fire and
ground attacks had increased considerably and all five defending
battalions were down to 50 percent of combat strength. However, as
the weather improved, extensive VNAF and U.S. tactical air support
kept the positions from being overrun. The enemy in the meantime
had brought heavy artillery to the vicinity of Route 547 and these
guns presented an increased threat to Hue City.
on 28 April, elements of the 29th and 803d Regiments, NVA 324B
Division, attacked FSB Bastogne. Three hours later, they overran
this fire-base forcing a withdrawal to the east of FSB Birmingham.
Consequently, FSB Checkmate became vulnerable and was also ordered
evacuated during the night. The loss of these bases exposed Hue
City to a direct threat of enemy attack. Intelligence reports
indicated that the NVA 324B Division was being reinforced in
preparation for the push toward Hue. At the same time, there was a
significant buildup of enemy personnel and supplies in the A Shau
Valley and the 66th Regiment, NVA 304th Division, was reported
moving to the FSB Anne area, probably on its way to Thua Thien
Province.
With the fall of Ouang Tri City and the major part of the province
on 1 May, the enemy''s pressure naturally shifted toward Hue. On
that day, he launched a heavy ground attack against FSB King and
rocketed Camp Eagle, location of the 1st Division Headquarters. By
early evening on 2 May, FSB Nancy, the last friendly base in Quang
Tri Province was forced to evacuate under heavy pressure after
receiving enemy artillery and ground attacks throughout the day.
Marine elements had to fall back to south of the My Chanh River
where they established a new defense line guarding the northern
approach to Hue City. This was the last withdrawal during the
Easter invasion by the forward edge of the I Corps battle area in
MR-l.
The first days of May thus found South Vietnam''s strategic posture
in one of its bleakest periods during the entire war. North of
Saigon, An Loc, the provincial capital of Binh Long Province, was
under heavy siege. In the highlands of MR-2, the defense of Kontum
City was becoming increasingly precarious. In northern MR-l, all
of Quang Tri Province now lay in enemy hands; and Bastogne, the
strongest bastion covering the western flank of Hue City had just
****d in.
Since the beginning of the offensive, the enemy''s pressure in Thua
Thien Province had been relatively light. But the fall of Quang
Tri Province was a serious psychological blow that deeply affected
the morale of troops and the local population. Confidence in the I
Corps ability to defend and hold Hue was shattered and on 2 May,
the exodus of panicky refugees toward Da Nang began to usher in
disorder and chaos. In Hue City, throngs of dispirited troops
roamed about, haggard, unruly and craving for food. Driven by
their basest instincts into mischief and even crime, their presence
added to the atmosphere of terror and chaos that reigned throughout
the city.
It was amidst this confusion and despondency that I was ordered by
President Thieu on 3 May to take command of I Corps. I had served
in I Corps under General Lam and the disaster that occurred there
was no surprise to me. Neither General Lam nor his staff were
competent to maneuver and support large forces in heavy combat.
Now this fact was apparent to President Thieu and, because my Corps
area was in a stable con***ion and enjoyed the President''s
confidence, he selected me to replace General Lam. I had been
following events in I Corps since the offensive began and expected
to be called upon. I had already selected the staff I would take
with me when the President told me of his decision. From my
headquarters of IV Corps in Can Tho, I flew to Hue that very
afternoon with a few staff officers of my own whose abilities and
dedication had earned my respect. My arrival in Hue was not unlike
the return of a son among the great family of troops and fellow-
countrymen of this city whom I had the privilege of serving not
very long ago as commanding general, 1st ARVN Infantry Division. I
was gratified to discover that the trust they had always vested in
me was still lingering. This reassurance was what I needed most in
this bleakest hour of history.
On 4 May, I immediately set about to restructure command and con-
trol. A Forward Headquarters for I Corps was established at Hue.
It was staffed by senior officers who had solid military
backgrounds, both in the field and in staff work, a rare assemblage
of talents from all three services and service branches. I had
wanted to make sure that they knew how to use sensibly and
coordinate effectively all corps combat components and supporting
units in a conventional warfare environment. I placed particular
emphasis on developing an efficient Fire Support Coordination
Center (FSCC) which was to streamline the coordinated, effective
use of all U.S. and ARVN fire support. A Target Acquisition
Element (TAE) was also organized to exploit the tremendous power of
the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval gunfire.
The establishment of I Corps Forward brought about a restoration
of confidence among combat units. They all felt reassured that
from now on they would be directed, supported and cared for in a
correct manner. The U.S. First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC)
under Major General Frederic J. Kroesen and his successor, Major
General Howard H. Cooksey was most cooperative. Both gentlemen
honored me with their esteem and friendship which I highly valued.
Together we worked on outstanding problems of common interest with
a pervasive spirit of teamwork, openness and enthusiasm.
On 5 May, I initiated a comprehensive plan for the defense of Hue.
The plan was simple in its basics; its merit lay in the clear-cut
as-signment of missions and responsibilities to each I Corps
subordinate unit. By that time, the only remaining forces capable
of effective combat north of the Hai Van Pass were the Marine
Division with its three brigades and the 1st Infantry Division of
which only two regiments were left (the 54th Regiment had been
seriously mauled in the battles for Bastogne). The Marine
Division, under its new commander, Colonel Bui The Lan, was
responsible for the area north and northwest of Thua Thien
Province; its mission was to block all enemy attempts to penetrate
Hue. (1) The 1st Infantry Division, still under Major General
Phu, was made responsible for the area south and southwest of Hue,
defending the approaches from the A Shau Valley. (Map 6) In
ad***ion to their primary defensive missions, both divisions were
given a free hand to conduct limited objective attacks in order to
destroy enemy force concentrations in their sectors of defense. My
concern at the time was to provide for a defense in depth, to
economize force, to create a realistic chain of command, establish
strong reserves for each major unit, and integrate the regular and
territorial forces, which so far had operated with little
coordination, into the corps defense plan. I believed that my
concept for operations would respond to all of these immediate
requirements.
Following the implementation of this plan, I also initiated a
program called "Loi Phong" (Thunder Hurricane) which, in essence,
was a sustained offensive by fire conducted on a large scale. The
program scheduled the concentrated use of all available kinds of
firepower, artillery, tactical air, Arc Light strikes, naval
gunfire for each wave of attack and with enough intensity as to
completely destroy every worthwhile target detected, especially
those files of enemy personnel
((1) The division''s former commander, Lieutenant General Le Nguyen
Khang, was offered the command of II Corps by President Thieu but
he declined. He was later appointed Assistant Chief of the JGS for
Operations.)
and materiels that were streaming toward staging areas near Hue.
We hoped that his program would afford us the time required to
complete the process of rebuilding and refitting those units which
had disintegrated during the month of April.
By 7 May, our dispositions for defense in depth were well. in
place. Each unit, in the forward area as well as in the
intermediate echelons, knew exactly what to do. The stabilization
of the battlefield had an immediate effect on Hue City. Discipline
and order were restored. Stragglers were picked up, placed under
control and rehabilitated. Although the fighting was still raging
and the situation far from secure, the population of Hue felt
reassured enough to stay in place; even those who had evacuated
began to return to the city. Life in the ancient capital began to
return to normalcy.
In the meantime, spirited by their recent gains, NVA forces were
endeavoring to build up their combat strength and prepare for an
all-out drive against Hue. Probing attacks began in all sectors as
our intelligence continued to report movements of enemy tanks,
artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons converging on Hue. Having
lost one division in the defense, I Corps required ad***ional
forces to meet the next challenge.
At my request, the Joint General Staff began to attach to my com-
mand the airborne forces which were being re-deployed from other
battle areas in MR-2 and MR-3. The first of these, the 2d Airborne
Brigade, arrived in Hue on 8 May and was immediately deployed to
reinforce the northern sector at My Chanh, under the operational
control of the Marine Division. Soon, in keeping with the
increased tempo of enemy activities, the JGS committed another
airborne brigade, the 3d, to MR-l on 22 May. I updated my plan of
defense as soon as the Airborne Division Headquarters arrived and
was placed under my control. I assigned it, minus its 1st Brigade
but reinforced with the 4th Regiment of the 2d Division, an area of
responsibility northwest of Hue, sandwiched between the 1st
Division and the Marine Division. The division''s headquarters,
under Lieutenant General Du Quoc Dong, was located at Landing Zone
(LZ) Sally. Meanwhile, the Marine Division assumed control of the
1st Ranger Group which had just been reorganized and refitted in Da
Nang.
The rest of the month of May was a period of holding and refitting
for I Corps forces. During this time, both the 1st Division and
the Marine Division launched a series of limited but spectacular
attacks from their forward positions. The Marine Division took the
lead with a heliborne assault on 13 May during which two battalions
of the 369th Brigade landed in the Hai Lang area, 10 km southeast
of Quang Tri City, using helicopters of the 9th U.S. Marine
Amphibious Brigade. After landing, the marines swept through their
objectives and returned to their defenses at My Chanh. Caught by
tactical surprise in his rear area for the first time, the enemy
resisted weakly and incurred extremely heavy losses.
To compete with the marines, on 15 May, the 1st Infantry Division
helilifted troops into Bastogne, caught the enemy off guard and
retook the firebase while elements of its two regiments cleared the
high ground south of the base and FSB Birmingham. A linkup was
made the next day and ten days later. FSB Checkmate was back in
friendly hands.
News of the reoccupation of these key strongpoints boosted the
morale of ARVN troops and deeply moved an exultant populace. Never
before had the solidarity between troops and the population in MR-l
been expressed with such effusion and spontaneity. The morale of I
Corps troops rose to a high peak despite the lack of any organized
program of motivation.
The fighting abated for about a week after the recapture of FSB
Bastogne, then resumed on 21 May when the enemy struck in force
against the marine sector in an attempt to regain the initiative.
With a concentrated armor-infantry force, supported by several
calibers of artillery, the enemy succeeded initially in breaking
through the northeast line of defense. After intense fighting that
lasted throughout the next day, the 3d and 6th Marine Battalions
finally drove back the enemy and by nightfall restored their former
positions along the My Chanh River. Even while these battles were
being fought, the Marine Division completed plans for another major
assault. In close coordination with the 9th U.S. Marine Amphibious
Brigade, naval gunfire and B-52 strikes, and the support of ARVN
and marine artillery units, on 24 May the 147th Marine Brigade
conducted an amphibious landing at My Thuy (Wunder Beach), 10
kilometers north of the defense line and simul-taneously made a
heliborne assault into Co Luy, 6 kilometers west of the coastline.
Both elements swept through the enemy-held area and returned to the
My Chanh line after several days of operation. This exploit was
truly a historic event for the Marine Division which planned and
executed an assault from the sea for the first time.
During the same period, the Airborne Division (-) which shared in
the responsibility of defending the northwestern approached to Hue,
made it possible for the Marine Division and the 1st Division to
become more and more aggressive. By the end of May, the 1st
Airborne Brigade arrived in Hue bringing the Airborne Division up
to full combat strength. And so, within the space of less than one
month, the defense posture of friendly forces in MR-l had fully
stabilized and became even stronger as May drew to its end.
It was quite a change from the bleakest days of early May when Hue
lay agonized amidst chaos, terror, and uncertainty. Now there was
cause to believe that Hue would hold firm in spite of the enemy''s
desperate but unsuccessful efforts to break through the marines''
line. On 28 May, in front of the stately Midday Gate which opened
on the Old Imperial Palace at Hue, President Nguyen Van Thieu
affirmed this belief when he crowned the Marine Division''s
successes with a new star pinned on the shoulder of its commander,
Colonel Bui The Lan. General Lan solemnly vowed to take back Quang
Tri City from the enemy.
Refitting and Retraining
In conjunction with the efforts to defend Hue, an accelerated
program of refitting and retraining was initiated for those ARVN
units which had suffered severe losses or had disintegrated during
the month--long enemy offensive. No effort was spared to reshape
these shredded elements into combat-worthy units again. This was a
high priority task dictated by I Corps force requirements to
fulfill its mission and meet the challenge of regaining the lost
territory.
ARVN casualties and material losses were severe. Several units
had deteriorated *****ch an extent that they needed to be rebuilt
from scratch. The 1st Armor Brigade alone had 1,171 casualties and
lost 43 M-48''s, 66 M-41''s and 103 M-113''s. A total of 140
artillery pieces were either lost or destroyed; this meant that
about 10 ARVN artillery battalions had been stripped of all their
equipment. The 3d Infantry Division had only a skeletal
headquarters staff and the remnants of its 2d and 57th Regiments.
All ranger groups suffered about the same casualties which amounted
to over one half of their former strength.

Refitting efforts progressed rapidly and efficiently due to the
dedication of ARVN logistic units under the Central Logistics
Command and naturally, the quick and effective response of the U.S.
logistic system under the supervision of MACV. Most equipment and
material losses were quickly replaced. Among the most critical
items were 105-mm howitzers, trucks and armored vehicles,
individual and crew-served weapons, gas masks and other supplies
such as artillery ammunition, fuses and claymore mines. All of
these items were rushed to Da Nang by U.S. C-141 and C-5A aircraft
or by surface ships. As a result, during this critical period no
combat unit ever ran out of ammunition although the rates of
expen***ure had risen dramatically, especially in 105-mm and 155-mm
HE.
To accelerate the retraining process, programs were shortened. A
two-week quick recovery training program was conducted at each unit
by ARVN and U.S. mobile training teams, usually at battalion level
with all officers and NCOs attending. This program included both
the theory and practice of marksmanship, handling of individual and
crew-served weapons, reconnaissance and tactics. Particular
emphasis was placed on the use of anti-tank weapons, especially the
TOW missile, the first issue of which arrived on 21 May.
Initially, the training for this missile was conducted by Americans
from the 196th Infantry Brigade. Eventually, when this brigade
returned to the U.S. training was continued at the Hoa Cam Training
Center in Da Nang under ARVN instructors. Artillery units, in
ad***ion to the two-week quick recovery program, also underwent
special training courses on crater analysis and counter--battery
fire, all conducted by U.S. Army targeting assistance teams
dispatched from Fort Sill.
Several units, such as the 20th Tank Squadron, the 56th Regiment
and the territorial forces (about 6,000 men) were required to
undergo a complete refitting and retraining cycle. To facilitate
control these units were assembled at two training centers, Dong Da
at Phu Bai and Van Thanh on the outskirts of Hue. General Giai,
who no longer had a command, was in Da Nang on 5 May when he was
placed in arrest. Quite unfairly, but fully consistent with the
practice in the ARVN, General Giai was held personally responsible
for the defeat of his division. Although I would have been happy
to have had General Giai resume command of the reconstituted 3d
Division, I had no choice in the matter. I was barely able to save
the name of the division, for I received many calls from the Chief
of Staff, General Manh, who told me that President Thieu wanted the
3d removed from the rolls - it was "bad luck" -- and to call the
reconstituted division the 27th. The 3d Division, which was almost
completely reconstituted immediately after the fall of Quang Tri,
underwent a complete retraining program at Phu Bai. On 16 June, it
relocated to Da Nang where security was more conducive to the
rehabilitation process. While undergoing retraining there, it also
assumed the defense of the city and an airbase complex relieving
the U.S. 196th Infantry Brigade.
In general, the refitting and retraining process produced
excellent results which, in a certain sense, were comparable to
successes being achieved by our combat units defending Hue. The 3d
Division in particular recovered rapidly under the strong
leadership of its new commander, Brigadier General Nguyen Duy Hinh.
Its return to the combat scene was truly a phenomenal achievement,
according to unbiased comments by the RVN and U.S. military
authorities.(2)
((2) On1y a year later, in 1973, the 3d Infantry Division was
rated by the Joint General Staff as the best among ARVN divisions.
Its com-mander was also the only division commander to be promoted
to the rank of Major General during the year.)
As the month of June drew to its end, I Corps forces had regained
their former combat strength. They were now fully prepared to take
on the challenge of driving the enemy from Quang Tri Province.
Next: Quang Tri Retaken ...

Quang Tri Retaken
One of the primordial tasks I Corps had to face immediately after
the fall of Quang Tri was to regain the initiative. This was my
primary concern when I took command. It was not an easy task,
given the heavy losses, the deteriorating morale, and the
precarious situation prevailing throughout the country at that
time. The enemy was experiencing some problems too. His rapid
success in Quang Tri, which he exploited skillfully, had advanced
his forces too far ahead of his logistical capabilities. He needed
time to resupply in the forward areas and meanwhile, air strikes
against his supply points and lines of communications were slowing
this effort.
Stalling the NVA drive in MR-l was just the first step. To hold
back the onrushing tide, our lines of defense had to be
consolidated and our forces re-deployed and reorganized to exploit
their offensive capabilities. Simultaneously and of equal
importance, our troops had to be motivated by strong leadership not
only to recoup their morale but also to become aggressive and
imbued with an offensive spirit. This was what I began demanding
from subordinate commanders, and as the situation improved, I
encouraged them to plan limited offensive operations to keep the
enemy off-balance. These operations, which were conducted during
the months of May and June with a combination of heliborne assaults
and amphibious landings, were well executed and achieved excellent
results. Their effect on the enemy, coupled with devastating
strikes by the U.S. Air Force and Navy, was astounding. Now off-
balance and on the defensive, enemy forces were more concerned with
their safety than the continuation of the offensive which was
stalled. Our limited offensive operations had bought us enough
time to prepare for the long-awaited big push northward.
The I Corps offensive campaign, code-named LAM SON 72, was
designed primarily to retake Quang Tri Province. It was conceived
not as a blitzkrieg but as a coordinated and phased campaign
combining the consolidation of the defense of Hue with successive
offensive operations from our forward positions at the My Chanh
line, first to destroy enemy forces, then to reoccupy Quang Tri
City and finally to restore the provincial government. During the
initial phase, our forces would attack to seize dominating terrain
from which they could employ their fires to destroy all the enemy
in zone. They would bypass political objectives, such as district
towns unless it became necessary to enter them to destroy the enemy.
Preparations for the offensive were divided into three stages.
During the first ten days of June, we repositioned forces across
the front. From 11 to 18 June, the 1st Division launched an attack
west in the direction of FSB Veghel while the Marine and Airborne
Divisions conducted limited objective operations north of My Chanh
to probe the combat strength of the enemy. From 19 to 27 June, a
deception plan was initiated to confuse the enemy as to the timing
and direction of the main effort. Under this plan, our forces made
preparations for a fictitious airborne assault on Cam Lo and an
amphibious landing on Cua Viet to cut off the enemy''s supply lines
and strike into his rear areas. Finally, two days before the big
push, an intensive offensive by fire was to be conducted with 3-52
strikes, tactical air and naval gunfire and artillery against enemy
troop concentration areas, supply storages and gun positions. LAM
SON 72 was to be initiated on 28 June with a two-pronged attack
northward coordinated with a supporting effort southwest of Hue.
The Airborne Division would make the main effort, attacking on the
southwest side of QL-l toward La Vang, while the Marine Division
would make the secondary effort along Route 555, moving toward
Trieu Phong. The 1st Division, meanwhile, was to pin down enemy
forces southwest of Hue. South of Hai Van Pass, in coordination
with the northward push the 3d Division was to continue ensuring
the defense of Da Nang by conducting economy-of-force operations
concurrent with its training and refitting program. In the
meantime, the 2d ARVN Division was to conduct search and destroy
operations in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces.
The plan was submitted simultaneously to Saigon by I Corps
Headquarters and FRAC about two weeks before D-day. A day or so
later, General Cooksey my senior adviser, told me that MACV had
reviewed my plan and suggested that it would be better if I would
continue limited spoiling attacks and consider a counteroffensive
at a later date. This disturbed me greatly, for my troops were
eager to go. I was ready, and it was a good, carefully worked-out
plan. I decided to present it personally to the President, feeling
confident that he would support it. He needed a victory in MR-l to
strengthen his political support.
I flew to Saigon and explained the plan in detail to the
President, the Prime Minister, General Quang (the Presidentts
national security deputy) and General Vien. President Thieu
listened, then, taking a purple grease pencil, drew an arrow on my
map, suggesting a spoiling attack. The Prime Minister agreed,
commenting on the French attack on the "street without joy."
Discouraged, I folded my map and flew back to Hue.
I worried about this all night and very early the following
morning called General Quang and told him that I would present no
more plans to Saigon. If they wanted me to do anything, they
should give me a Vietnamese translation of whatever plan they
wanted me to execute and I would comply. The President called me
about 0900 and told me that he was concerned about my plan -- that
he ~e1t it was too ambitious --but that he would like me to return
to Saigon and show it to him again. This I did the next day and,
after a brief discussion, the President approved the plan.
LAM SON 72 began on 28 June as planned. Both the airborne and
marine spearheads made good progress but slower than we expected.
Enemy resistance was moderate during the first few days except for
a few regimental-size clashes that occurred when our forces crossed
the enemy 5 first line of defense north of the My Chanh River.
However, as the enemy fell back and our forces advanced near the
Thach Han River, his resistance became heavier.
On 7 July, the first airborne elements reached the outskirts of
Quang Tri City where they clashed violently with the enemy
defenders. The enemy was determined to hold fast and his forces
were supported by heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar
fire. To relieve the pressure on the paratroopers and also to
interdict the enemy''s line of communication with the city, along
which he continually brought in more troops, I ordered the Marine
Division to helilift a battalion two kilometers northeast of the
city. This battalion was unable to make any progress, however; it
was stopped by enemy infantry and armored elements.
By this time, the enemy''s determination was all too clear; he
planned to hold Quang Tri City to the last man. The enemy''s
ferocious resistance was such that Quang Tri City suddenly became a
"cause celebre" that attracted emotionally-charged comments by
public opinion throughout South Vietnam. Although it had not been
a primary objective, it had become a symbol and a major challenge.
The enemy continued reinforcing; he was determined to go all out
for the defense of this city. The ARVN drive was completely stalled.
I Corps'' position at this juncture was a difficult one. Pushed by
public opinion on one side and faced with the enemy''s determination
on the other, it was hard-pressed to seek a satisfactory way out.
My final assessment was that we could not withdraw again from Quang
Tri without admitting total defeat; our only course was to
recapture the city. Therefore, I directed a switchover of zones
and assigned the primary effort to the Marine Division. The
offensive then took on a new concept but the mission remained the
same. I concluded that if the enemy indeed chose to defend Quang
Tri City and concentrated his combat forces there, he would give me
the opportunity to accomplish my mission employing the superior
firepower of our American ally.
I modified the plan accordingly. (Map 7) The Marine Division had
the mission to destroy enemy forces in the city. To economize its
forces, the division was to establish a firm defense line along
Phase Line Gold and from there to launch limited attacks against
enemy forces up to the limit of the Cua Viet River (Phase Line
Blue). The Airborne Division was to secure the Thach Han line and
support the marines'' effort. Its mission was to destroy the NVA
304th Division, reoccupy FSB Barbara and FSB Anne, interdict enemy
supply lines from the west and protect Route QL-l, the I Corps main
supply line.
Because of the enemy''s determined defense, the recapture of Quang
Tri City became a long, strenuous effort which carried into
September. By that time, total enemy forces in Quang Tri and Thua
Thien Provinces alone reached the incredible proportions of six
infantry divisions, the 304th, 308th, 324B, 325th, 320B and 312th.
The 312th Division had been re-deployed from Laos and introduced
into Quang Tri along with troop reinforcements for the other
divisions. The showdown was inevitable. But the balance of forces
was lopsided; the enemy had more than enough strength to contain
South Vietnam''s three divisions, even though they were our best ones.
In spite of continuous, violent clashes and the enemy''s ferocious
artillery fire which averaged thousands of rounds daily, I Corps
forces were able to keep the offensive momentum going. This was
possible because we rotated the frontline units, giving them a
chance to rest and refit. The balance of forces, however, still
favored the enemy heavily, which at times raised the question of
whether we should reinforce MR-l with ad***ional troops.
Consideration was even given to deploying an infantry division from
MR-4, but the idea was finally rejected as neither feasible nor
absolutely necessary. The military situation throughout South
Vietnam during that critical period was such that the redeployment
of a major unit would have seriously weakened the losing military
region.
But neither the enemy''s opposition nor the protraction of the
campaign seemed to affect I Corp''s tactical posture and
determination. I believed that it was just a matter of time because
all the ingredients for our success were there: a firmly
established command and control system, a dedicated staff, and
adequate support. The drawn-out contest between our forces and the
enemy for this coveted objective might even be advantageous to us;
if we had succeeded in retaking Quang Tri during the very first few
days of the campaign, the battle area would not have attracted a
sizable enemy force. Those six NVA divisions might have been
diverted to the western approaches to Hue. This is what I feared
most because our defenses in that rough terrain were more
vulnerable. But concentrated as they were at Quang Tri, the enemy
divisions presented lucrative targets for the combined fires of
artillery tactical air and B-52''s.
When the offensive campaign entered its tenth week in early
September without a decisive outcome in sight, I decided that the
delay had been long enough. Enemy forces by that time had been
reduced considerably by the volume of firepower delivered by B-
52''s, tactical air, artillery and naval gunfire; I was personally
convinced that a new major effort by I Corps stood a good chance
for success. A victory at this juncture would not only reinforce
the RVNVS military posture --the enemy had been defeated at An Loc
and Kontum -- it could also bring about excellent returns in a
political sense.
On 8 September, therefore, I Corps launched three separate oper-
ations *****pport its major objective, retaking Quang Tri City.
The Airborne Division advanced and reoccupied three key military
installations formerly under ARVN control at La Vang, south of the
Quang Tri Old Citadel. From these positions, the paratroopers were
able to provide excellent protection for the southern flank of the
marines. The next day, the Marine Division initiated the main
effort, attacking the Old Citadel. At the same time, U.S. and RVN
forces conducted an "incomplete" amphibious assault on a beach
north of the Cua Viet River; the purpose was diversionary. At
first, the enemy1s determined resistance slowed the marines1
progress, but elements of the 6th Marine Battalion penetrated one
side of the citadel''s walls on 14 September. During the following
day, more marines were injected into the breach and other marine
spearheads repeatedly assaulted the eastern and southern faces of
the citadel. During the night of 15 September, the marines
regained control of the citadel. Finally, in the morning of 16
September, the RVN flag was raised on the citadel amidst the cheers
of our troops. This was a day of exalting joy for the entire people
of South Vietnam.
By late afternoon of the next day, the marines had eliminated the
last NVA remnants within the citadel and expanded control over
the entire city which was now reduced to heaps of ruin. During
the last ten days of fierce assaults on the citadel, 2,767 enemy
troops were killed and 43 captured. Marine casualties during this
time averaged 150 a day.
After Quang Tri City was retaken, the level of enemy activities
throughout northern MR-i dropped off markedly, especially in the
marines'' sector. This low activity level continued until 30
September when the Airborne Division again launched attacks to
reoccupy FSB 3arbara and FSB Anne. The paratroopers'' attacks met
with fierce enemy resistance Their progress was slowed not only by
heavy enemy artillery barrages but also by drenching monsoon rains.
As October drew to its end, however, the Airborne Division finally
reoccupied FSB Barbara and shifted its effort toward FSB Anne to
the north.
In the meantime, the 1st Infantry Division sustained its
initiative in Thua Thien Province. In ad***ion to defending Hue,
the division had the mission to conduct offensive operations to
extend its area of control to the west and southwest. Activities
in the 1st Division''s sector were moderate during early June. They
were mostly concentrated on the areas of FSB''s Birmingham,
Bastogne and Checkmate and along Route 547. By the end of June,
however, enemy pressure bacame heavier.
During July, FSB Checkmate was subjected to heavy enemy attacks
during which it was overrun and retaken several times. Toward the
end of the month, FSB Bastogne also came under enemy control. For
the first time in five months of hard fighting and under constant
pressure, the 1st Division began to show some signs of weariness.
Still, it held on to and maintained its line of defense. To help
the division regain its vitality and aggressiveness, I decided to
reinforce it with the 51st Regiment. Then, in early August, with
the strong support of B-52 strikes and U.S. tactical air, the
division successively retook Bastogne and Checkmate. During this
month, as the enemy gradually lost his initiative, the 1st Division
began to launch attacks to enlarge its control toward the west.
Taking advantage of its renewed determination, the division even
took back Veghel, the remotest fire support base to the southwest
on 19 September. From then on, the NVA 342B Division completely
lost its aggressiveness and avoided serious engagements. When
October arrived; uninterrupted monsoon rains forced the 1st
Division to revert to the defensive. Activities during this time
plunged to the lowest level since the beginning of the enemy''s
Easter offensive.
>From the time I Corps began offensive operations in Quang Tri
Province to the end of July, the three provinces south of the Hai
Van Pass were able to maintain reasonable control despite the low
strength of friendly forces. Although sparsely used, B-52 strikes
continued to be directed against a number of selected targets.
However, as friendly forces in northern MR-l approached Quang Tri
City and were concentrating their efforts on this objective, the
enemy suddenly chose to initiate several heavy attacks, especially
in the area of the Que Son Valley, against elements of the 2d ARVN
Infantry Division. This move was in all probability intended to
alleviate our pressure on Quang Tri. Da Nang Air Base was also
heavily rocketed many times. Enemy pressure was particularly
strong on remote district towns in the foothills areas. Some of
them were overrun after protracted sieges.
In the face of the enemy''s mounting pressure, the 2d Infantry
Division, now under Brigadier General Tran Van Nhut, was directed
to concentrate its effort on the southernmost province, Quang Ngai,
where the threat posed by the NVA 2d Division was increasing.
Meanwhile, the 3d Infantry Division was assigned the mission to
clear the pressure that the NVA 711th Division was exerting in the
Que Son Valley and also to retake the district town of Tien Phuoc
in Quang Tin Province. Despite superior enemy forces, both ARVN
divisions were determined to fulfill their missions and performed
extremely well. The successful operation conducted by the 3d
Division to retake the district town of Tien Phuoc in particular -
its first major engagement since its battered with-drawal from
Quang Tri not long ago - truly marked its regained stature and
restored to some extent the popular confidence vested in it.
Toward the end of October, the overall situation in MR-l was
completely stabilized. As the possibility for a negotiated cease-
fire increased with every passing day, the people of Quang Tri,
Thua Thien and Hue in particular rejoiced at the prospect of peace.
But they all realized the great price that had already been paid
for this possible cease-fire. Peace certainly would not have been
obtained without the heroic exploits and sacrifices of the Marine
Division, the Airborne Division and the 1st Division on all the
battlefields of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. These exploits remained
forever engraved in their minds.

Role of U.S. Air and Naval Support
During the entire period of the enemy''s Nguyen Hue offensive
campaign in MR-l, the support provided by the Vietnamese Air Force
and Navy was marginal although they were employed to the maximum of
their limited capabilities. Therefore, when the fighting broke out
with great intensity and such a large scale, ARVN units had to rely
mostly on support from U.S. Air Force and Naval units. This
support was effective and met all of I Corps requirements.
Before April 1972, U.S. air activities in MR-l were at a low
level. Any 24-hour period with more than 10 tactical air sorties
was considered a busy day. When the enemy1 5 offensive began,
however, U.S. air sorties increased dramatically. At one time,
these sorties numbered 300 or more per day. Despite almost
continuously bad weather during the month of April, air support was
substantial and contributed initially to slowing down the advance
of enemy forces and eventually stalling it altogether. B-52
strikes also increased remarkably during this period, averaging in
excess of 30 missions a day. These strikes caused the most damage
and greatest losses to enemy support activities. They were also
used to provide close support to ARVN ground forces on several
occasions. In ad***ion *****pport provided the U.S. Air Force, I
Corps forces also received much assistance from the U.S. Army 11th
Combat Aviation Group whose activities were closely coordinated
with those of ARVN units. This group provided essential support
with troop lift logistical support and gunships.
During the early days of the enemy''s invasion of Quang Tri, U.S.
Air Force fire support missions were not only impeded by inclement
weather but also by disorderly retreats of certain ARVN units.
Since it was difficult for tactical aircraft to locate accurately
friendly positions under those circumstances, large no-fire areas
had to be established and this reduced the effectiveness of air
support. As the weather gradually improved, and after the friendly
line of defense had stabilized, air strikes became most effective
against areas of enemy troop concentration, enemy tanks and
artillery and lines of communication.
The NVA air defense effort increased during their invasion. At
first SAM sites were located in the DMZ area along with
antiaircraft guns but as NVA forces advanced south, they were also
displaced south to the vicinity of Cam Lo and Route QL-9. Coverage
by these missiles and guns thus extended to include our My Chanh
line of defense. Throughout this forward battle area, enemy
antiaircraft machineguns, artillery and SA-2 missiles were deployed
in a dense pattern.
During May, coordination procedures for the use of air support
were vastly improved after the relocation of I Corps Air Operations
Center to Hue where it was co-located and operated in conjunction
with the Fire Support Coordination Center. This provided much
better coordination and timely control. In ad***ion, tactical air
control parties (TACP) were also deployed to operate alongside
division tactical command posts. This newly arranged system of
coordination and control, added to I Corps'' gradual restoration of
tactical initiative, greatly expanded the use of air support which
totaled in excess of 6,000 sorties for the month. Enemy positions
and artillery emplacements, particularly 130-mm guns, suffered
severe losses; most spectacular were the results achieved through
the use of laser-guided bombs and the technique of radar-guided
bombing using aerial photo coordinates.
As to naval gunfire, its support was modest during the first day
of the enemy invasion since only two destroyers, the USS Straus and
USS Buchanan, were operating offshore MR-l during late March. When
the offensive broke out, however, all naval gunfire ships in the
vicinity were immediately dispatched to the area and began
providing support for the beleaguered 3d Division units. The level
of naval gunfire support increased with every passing day. At one
time during the month of June, there were as many as 38 destroyers
and 3 cruisers on the naval gunline. The limited range of their
guns however, still precluded the bombardment of targets located
far to the west of Route QL-l. After the arrival of the heavy
cruiser USS Newport News with her eight-inch guns during May,
however, the destructive power and effective range of U.S. naval
gunfire increased considerably.
Naval gunfire was particularly beneficial to the Marine Division.
With its all-weather capabilities, naval gunfire responded
perfectly to every support requirement within its range. During
the period of I Corps stabilization and counteroffensive, the
number of ships available for support varied from eight to 41 and
the number of rounds fired ranged from a high of 7,000 to a low of
1,000 daily. For the control of fire, forward observer teams were
attached to I Corps major units such as the infantry divisions, the
1st Ranger Group, and the Marine and Airborne Divisions and to the
sectors of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai in southern NR-l.
In general, fire support available from U.S. and RVN sources was
plentiful for I Corps throughout the enemy offensive. But the
judicious and timely use of it proved to be a difficult problem in
coordination and control The establishment of a fire support
center at Hue in May 1972 was a step in the right direction. For
the first time, it enabled I Corps to integrate and make the most
effective use of all U.S. and RVN fire support available. Because
of its smooth operation, the center contributed significantly to
the ultimate success of I Corps. It could be regarded as the
symbol of effective cooperation and coordination, not only between
U.S. and RVN elements, but also among our various services and
service branches.
---- END ------
Phần sau là nói về trận chiến ở Kun Tom. Có lẽ để sang một
topic khác.

Cái gì đó nhỉ !!
chú này bị shock sinh ra loạn ngữ mất rùi