Đại tướng VÕ NGUYÊN GIÁP

Đại tướng VÕ NGUYÊN GIÁP

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Bài Phỏng vấn của CNN với Đại tướng.
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When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it. But Ho Chi Minh said that this is only victory of the first step: we have yet to fight the Americans.

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap is perhaps the most important figure in the early history of communist Vietnam -- with the exception of Ho Chi Minh. At the end of World War II, Ho named Giap commander in chief of the ********* forces fighting French colonial rule. Giap orchestrated the defeat of the French at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1953 and remained minister of defense of the newly independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam. He was the chief North Vietnamese military leader in the subsequent war against U.S. forces. This interview, which was conducted in May 1996, has been translated from Vietnamese.

On the battle of Dien Bien Phu:

The Dien Bien Phu campaign is a great and first victory of a feudal colonial nation, whose agricultural economy is backward, against the great imperialist capitalist which has a modern industry and a great army. Thus, it means a lot to us, to people all over the world, and to other countries. This is also how Ho Chi Minh saw it.

We see the Dien Bien Phu victory as the victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of the Americans --because in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 80 percent of the war expen***ures were spent by the Americans. The Americans had their hands in it. So the Dien Bien Phu defeat was a defeat for both the French and the Americans. But whether the Americans had drawn the lessons from that, I don''t think so. That''s why the Americans continued in South Vietnam. ...

When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it. But Ho Chi Minh said that this is only victory of the first step: we have yet to fight the Americans. It was very clear then.

On the United States'' involvement in Vietnam:

In 1945, some Americans parachuted into our war zone [for a] meeting [with] our late President Ho Chi Minh. ... Back then, President Roosevelt''s attitude was that the U.S. did not want to see events like the war with France coming back to Indochina, but later this attitude was changed. After the August Revolution in 1945, the relationship between Vietnam and the U.S. could have been good, and we wished that it had been good.

Then only the intelligent people or those with vision and wisdom, such as Eisenhower, ... saw the impracticality of the [domino] theory. And any mistakes were due to following the domino theory. They thought that if the theory was put into practice here, it would become the pivotal location for [preventing] the spread of communism to the whole Southeast Asia. So Vietnam was made the central location to check the expansion of communism, and this was what President Kennedy believed, and it was mistake. ...

The Americans sent advisers to each and every division in the South Vietnamese [army] before 1965. In 1965, they started to commit big forces. We discussed among ourselves in the Politburo whether at that point it was ... a limited war. We decided that it was already a limited war. We discussed it in the Politburo that with America bringing in gigantic forces was to carry out a new campaign, with the American forces committed, it was not good for America but it would be very hard for us to fight. The struggle would be very fierce but we already concluded that we would win the war. ...

On fighting technologically superior U.S. forces:



When American combat forces were committed, it was a myth that we could not fight and win because they were so powerful. ... [We survived] because of our courage and determination, together with wisdom, tactics and intelligence. During the attacks of B-52s, we shot down a few B-52s and captured documents. One of them was a order by the [U.S.] air command about the targets to be bombed in and around Hanoi and the positions of [our] forces. Some [of the figures] were correct, [but] some were wrong because of our deception [measures]. And our conclusion was that with such anti-air-power measures, the B-52 is not an effective way to fight. ...

We had to resort to different measures, some of which are quite simple, like hiding in man-holes and evacuating to the countryside. And we fought back with all our forces and with every kind of weapon. We fought with anti-aircraft artilleries and with small guns, even though [it was] sometimes solely with the strength of our local force. An 18-year-old girl once said that she followed routes every day and studied the patterns of American flights and when they would attack. I told her that she is a philosopher to understand that, because only philosophers talk about principles. Later she used small gun to shoot down an aircraft from a mountainside. That is an example of the military force of the common people. ... We had ingenuity and the determination to fight to the end.

I appreciated the fact that they had sophisticated weapon systems but I must say that it was the people who made the difference, not the weapons. There was also a human factor involved. [As to] whether they were tempted to use nuclear weapons during the war: there was a time during the Dien Bien Phu campaign in which the Americans were going to use nuclear weapons, and this is back in 1954 during the Eisenhower era. We were also aware of possible use of nuclear weapons and we were prepared for it. But whether the Americans could really use nuclear weapons was a question of international politics, and it also depended on the American allies. But looking at the intertwined forces, as the situation was, the result [of a nuclear blast] would not be good, and the Americans had to think hard. If nuclear weapons were used on locations where the Vietnamese troops were concentrated, it [would] also [affect] American troops.

On the Ho Chi Minh Trail:

The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a very extensive system; it started with a trail but later became a road. Many roads, actually: the Western road system and the Eastern road systems, criss-crossing here and there. And also there were the extensive systems of gas pipelines and communications lines, and routes on rivers and across the sea. We did everything possible to keep the whole system going. I visited many important points which were subjected to many B-52 bombings 23 out of 24 hours a day; we had many teams working toward maintaining the operation, including a team made up of women who had to use iron rings to defuse the [unexploded] bombs. ...

We made big sacrifices. I visited a dozen girls who maintained the route in Dong Lap of Nghe An Province; they showed me how they invented camouflage to cover the lamps so that those in vehicles can see, but the planes could not see. They urged us to move fast; and they all died during the bombing. There was danger of the trail being cut off, but it never really was cut off. With a long procession of vehicles, and with the bombing from the B-52s, it was very difficult, but we had to use both courage and wisdom. There are some routes that the Americans did not know about, but if they had used a telescope they would have seen the routes quite clearly. But we did not use those routes. We used some secret smaller trails as a detour and we went during the day.

On the Tet Offensive:

The Tet Offensive is a long story. ... It was our policy, drawn up by Ho Chi Minh, to make the Americans quit. Not to exterminate all Americans in Vietnam, [but] to defeat them.

It could be said [Tet] was a surprise attack which brought us a big victory. For a big battle we always figured out the objectives, the targets, so it was the main objective to destroy the forces and to obstruct the Americans from making war. But what was more important was to de-escalate the war -- because at that time the American were escalating the war -- and to start negotiations. So that was the key goal of that campaign. But of course, if we had gained more than that it would be better.

And [after Tet] the Americans had to back down and come to the negotiating table, because the war was not only moving into the cities, to dozens of cities and towns in South Vietnam, but also to the living rooms of Americans back home for some time. And that''s why we could claim the achievement of the objective.

On the U.S. leadership during the war:

In general, I must say they were the most intelligent people, with certain talents such as military, political and diplomacy skills. They were intelligent people. That was the first point that I want to say. The second point I want to say is that they knew little about Vietnam and her people. They didn''t understand our will to maintain independence and equality between nations even though these are stated in President Jefferson''s manifestation. And so they made mistakes. They did not know the limits of power. ... No matter how powerful you are there are certain limits, and they did not understand it well. ...

The people in the White House believed that Americans would definitely win and there is not chance of defeat. There is a saying which goes, "If you know the enemy and you know yourself, you would win every single battle." However, the Americans fought the Vietnamese, but they did not know much about Vietnam or anything at all about the Vietnamese people. Vietnam is an old nation founded in a long history before the birth of Christ. ... The Americans knew nothing about our nation and her people. American generals knew little about our war theories, tactics and patterns of operation. ...

During the war everyone in the country would fight and they [would] do so following the Vietnamese war theory. We have a theory that is different from that of the Russians and that of the Americans. The Americans did not understand that. They did not know or understand our nation; they did not know our war strategies. They could not win. How could they win? As our president said, there was nothing more precious than independence and freedom. We had the spirit that we would govern our own nation; we would rather sacrifice than be slaves.
Now that the normalization between our two countries have been established, we hope for better relations, but it should be based on equality. Otherwise, if America is at advantage simply because she is richer, it will be unacceptable for us. Now we hope that American leaders can understand Vietnam and her people better.

Cite from: http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/11/interviews/giap/

Khi trái tim chẳng cháy thành ngọn lửaNhư buổi đầu tiên gặp mắt em nhìn

An Officer and a Gentleman:
General Vo Nguyen Giap as
Military Man and Poet
Cecil B. Currey
...............................Asian military captains have had an alternate role to play within their societies. They are expected to be more than battlefield victors, in part, perhaps, to offset the blood they had shed, for soldiery has never ranked very high among the professions of the East. We have read of Chinese warriors who were artists, and who, with brush and ink, could produce simple ideograms of startling beauty. We know of Japanese generals who were adepts in the tra***ional tea ceremony of their land or who left memorable inscriptions in the three lines and seventeen syllables of haiku, or who quietly cultivated the stone and sand gardens within the walls of their home. On the field of battle they might be filled with blood-lust; in the quiet of their homes they sought harmony with nature.
For the last several years I have been studying the career of Senior General [D''ai T''o''ng] Vo Nguyen Giap. It is he of whom I will speak here. I have met and talked with Giap, interviewed his compatriots and buried myself in the requisite sources. I have recently completed a manuscript biography of him, and thus know him and his background fairly well. He is not a nice man, but then neither were other warriors from Attila the Hun and Timur the Lame to Napoleon, Zhukov, Patton and MacArthur. Nice men do not become legendary generals; they teach Sunday school classes or become professors of history or military chaplains.
Giap is best known for his fanatical obsession with freeing his homeland from western domination and uniting it under the communist rule of Ha Noi; for staggering battlefield losses he was willing to absorb in furtherance of those ends; and for his skill as a logistician as he moved men and supplies across impossible terrain in sufficient numbers to accomplish his goals. His icy exterior overlay a temper so fiery the French described him as a "snow-covered volcano" and, sometimes, even Ho Chi Minh had difficulty keeping him within bounds.
There is, however, another and less well known aspect of General Giap. Insofar as westerners are familiar with his prolific writings, we are apt to recall the turgid prose, repetitive, clichéd harangues, slogans, occasional fictions and sweeping generalizations of People''s War, People''s AmyI (New York: Praeger, 1962), or Big Victory, Big Task (New York: Praeger, 1967).
His voluminous speeches, regularly given to captive audiences, were stultifying, with titles so awesome they could have been drafted only by a communist or by a college professor preparing for a presentation at a major history conference. One such address, given in 1971, is much like many others he offered. Giap labeled it: "Let Us Step Up the Task of Reviewing, Studying, and Developing Vietnamese Military Science as a Positive Contribution to Defeating the U.S. Aggressors." It had an introduction and five lengthy parts and liking the sound of his own voice, he went through each portion with meticulous care so those in the audience would not miss any of his thoughts on the subject. His audience was undoubtedly aghast with appreciation at his thoroughness and we can imagine how their brows must have wrinkled in anticipation as he neared the end of his lengthy tirade.
Many of his publications have similar titles: The Party''s Great Experiences in Leadership Over Armed Struggle and the Building of Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ha Noi: Su That Publishing House, 1961), "The Brilliant Victories and Great Power of the People''s War in the Local Areas" (Ha Noi: Hoc Tap, Vietnamese Studies #8, Aug 1969), Victory of the People''s War Against the War of Destruction in the Towns and Industrial Centers of Socialist Viet Nam (Ha Noi: People''s Army Publishing House, 1972), or Viet Nam People''s War Has Defeated the U.S. War of Destruction (Ha Noi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1969).
There is, however, another and less well known aspect of General Giap''s public declamations. Although he normally felt it to be his duty to extol the virtues of socialism (one wonders how his mind escaped total paralysis as he spewed forth such nonsense), and call for objectives such as "one hectare per laborer, three hogs per hectare," when the setting was right and he wished to do so, he could speak with beauty and grace, his words suddenly devoid of their usual communist jargon.
He has a real ability as an orator, a writer, a poet, and he has occasionally called upon that talent. In 1980, in a visit to a historical site in Hai Hung province to celebrate the sixth hundredth birthday of Nguyen Trai, one of the comrades of the famous Vietnamese hero, Le Loi, Giap reminisced about his own days as a warrior. He told how he had drawn inspiration from the example of Nguyen Trai.
In his graceful tribute to Nguyen Trai, Giap said that he, like the ancient poet, was "very proud of his beautiful country with its imposing mountains and rivers, its abundance of produce, proud of its old civilization and unique lifestyle, proud of its brilliant and heroic history of resisting foreign aggression." His choice of words was better that day, free from the constraints of mind-numbing cant that usually beset them. Then he rose to even greater heights.
Remembering his life in the back country wilderness of Viet Nam as he and his ********* warriors fought the First Indochinese War against the French, Giap told how "the mountains and rivers [then] appeared fresh and new." He elaborated, in a lyric moment of memory: "The chirp of a bird, the petal of a flower, a gentle breeze, a few drops of rain, a gust of wind in the spring, all of these could stir the soul of a poet." And in that moment, for at least the second time in his life, this pur et dure Communist doctrinaire became a poet. In Haiku-like lines, he declaimed:
Talents were like leaves in the autumn,
and heroes appeared like the dawn."
and again:
When a herdsman played his flute,
The moon rose higher in the sky.
"Literature," Giap said that day in closing his tribute to Nguyen Trai, "can and must elevate a man''s soul." It was one of his finest hours.
My interest in these matters came about as a result of long years of acquiring war poetry and reading to my students the verse of soldiers of the Great War. Over time I added examples from the American Civil War, World War II and the Viet Nam war. Then while researching the life of Vo Nguyen Giap, I came across a paper in his file at the Indochina Archives (University of California, Berkeley) that provided for me a new dimension to him whom I studied. Inside a slim volume by Viêt Ph''o''ng entitled We Fight Yankees, Therefore We Exist ([np: np, nd]) appeared a reprint of a poem said to have been found on the body of a dead northern Vietnamese soldier. The man had recopied it from some other source and, because it bespoke emotions within his own heart, kept it with him. The page was charred and bloodstained when found on his body. The soldier''s copy indicated it had been composed by Giap.
The poem expresses a man''s romantic, emotional statement of longing for an absent loved one, yearning for reunion, while simultaneously declaiming the necessity of fulfilling his warrior''s responsibilities of battle and possible death.
Giap might well have written such sentiments. He had experienced romantic tragedy in his own personal life.
In early 1939, Giap married the diminutive Dang Thi Quang Thai, daughter of his good friend and benefactor, Professor Dang Thai Mai. In after years, friends observed that he was never happier in his life, before or after, than during those few months which followed his wedding.
As war broke around them, Giap and Quant Thai kept their heads down and tried to maintain a reasonably normal life. In May 1939, four months before the German war machine exploded across the fields of Poland, Giap and Quang Thai conceived a child. On 4 January, 1940, Quang Thai gave birth to a baby girl. Giap have his daughter the beautiful name of Hong Anh, or "red queen of flowers."
Those quiet days lasted only a few months. In April, 1940, the communist party''s Central Committee decided to send Giap and a comrade to safety in China where they might there plan for the launching of a future guerrilla movement within Viet Nam. Quang Thai was to remain behind.
The newlyweds said their good-byes on the bank of Ha Noi''s West Lake one Friday afternoon, 3 May 1940. Giap taught at the private lycée, Thang Long [Rising Dragon] in the city. By leaving on a Friday, he would have the entire weekend to make good his escape from the watchful eyes of the French colonial Sûreté Nationale de l''Indochine''s Deuxieme Bureau. Only when he failed to show for classes the following Monday morning would anyone begin to raise questions about his absence and even then several more hours would pass before police could be notified and an alarm raised.
Giap held the baby as he and Quang Thai walked beside the lake. He urged his wife to go underground as quickly as possible so no harm would come to her or Hong Anh. Quang Thai cried quiet tears as they slowly walked back from the lake down Co Ngu Road. At last they broke apart and went their separate ways. They would never see one another again.
Like many others before and since, they paid in blood for their devotion to a cause. In May 1941 Quang Thai was arrested by the 2eme Bureau in her home town of Vinh, chief city of Nghe An province. Only moments before the police arrived, she entrusted Hong Anh, now one-and-a-half years old, to Giap''s mother.
The French took Quang Thai back to Ha Noi and jailed her at Hao Lo [literally: the Oven] prison, known years later by American flyers as the "Hanoi Hilton." She was tried before a military court for conspiracy against the security of France and sentenced to life imprisonment. While in Hao Lo she was tortured to the edge of sanity and perhaps beyond. Unable to endure the pain any longer, she allegedly killed herself while in her cell by swallowing her giai rut, a kind of soft belt material. U.S. intelligence sources later claimed she died another way: the French hung her by the thumbs and beat her to death.
Giap had no chance to communicate with Quang Thai after his flight from Ha Noi in 1940. Throughout the years of the war he lived in hiding in the far northern reaches of Viet Nam as he developed ways of combating the Japanese and French. It was not until 15 April 1945, when he traveled to Bac Giang for a meeting of the Central Committee that he received word of his wife. He later wrote that he looked forward to the meeting: "I thought I would at last have news from my family from whom I had not heard for all these years. I had written letters but didn''t know if they ever arrived and I was thinking it would not be long until I had news."
Terrible news awaited him at Bac Giang. An old comrade, Truong Chinh, casually turned to him during a group conversation and, as an example of the danger in which they all lived, recalled the case of Giap''s wife: "Thai was caught because she didn''t have time to find someone to care for the baby. She died in prison before we could do anything."
Giap felt his blood chill. He finally asked, "You say Thai is dead?"
"What?" Truong Chinh replied. "You didn''t know?"
Giap sat quietly, speechless for long minutes. Then he silently rose and left his fellows, desperate to find a way to accept the idea of the death of his wife. He later wrote that he looked forward to the meeting: "I thought I would at last have news from my family from whom I had not heard for all these years. I had written letters but didn''t know if they ever arrived and I was thinking it would not be long until I had news."
Terrible news awaited him at Bac Giang. An old comrade, Truong Chinh, casually turned to him during a group conversation and, as an example of the danger in which they all lived, recalled the case of Giap''s wife: "Thai was caught because she didn''t have time to find someone to care for the baby. She died in prison before we could do anything."
Giap felt his blood chill. He finally asked, "You say Thai is dead?"
"What?" Truong Chinh replied. "You didn''t know?"
Giap sat quietly, speechless for long minutes. Then he silently rose and left his fellows, desperate to find a way to accept the idea of the death of his wife.
Those were Giap''s experiences with personal heartbreak. From them he might well have drafted the lines which are attributed to him in the dead soldier''s copybook. He thus becomes, unexpectedly, another example of the Eastern general who knows more than the art of war.
Kiss
The earth bore you here.
To bring beauty.
The earth bore me here
To love you deeply.
In love people kiss.
The sweetness they would not miss.
My heart is passionate for you
Still I must go to battle.
My love, it is possible
That I may die in combat
The lips torn there by bullets
Might never be kissed [again] by yours.
Even if I die, my love,
I love you, though I am unable
To kiss you with the lips
Of a slave.
?"Vo Nguyen Giap
My thanks to Ho Thi Xuan Hong (whose name means "Spring Rose"), Nguyen Hai Quoc, and his father, Nguyen Khac Niem, for their translation of Giap''s poem.
Đọc đầy đủ, xin mời vào: http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Currey_Giap.html
Khi trái tim chẳng cháy thành ngọn lửaNhư buổi đầu tiên gặp mắt em nhìn

VO NGUYEN GIAP, a history teacher turned communist revolutionary, stands as one of the master theorists and practitioners of modern guerrilla warfare.
Trained on the fields and in the tunnels of battle, Giap was successful in defeating France and the United States. In both cases, Giap defeated an enemy that had superior technology and firepower. How was it possible for this David to beat two military Goliaths?
Military history teaches us that in ad***ion to firepower, military doctrine is critical in executing the art of war. Giap''s training in guerrilla warfare, augmented with a passionate hatred for his country''s occupiers, led him to conceive a strategy that essentially wore down the enemy''s will to fight.
Details of Giap''s life have long been shrouded in mystery and perhaps intentional obfuscation. Apparently born in 1912 in Quang Binh Province, details of his family are sketchy. Some reports indicate his family were peasants, others suggest they were educated mandarins. He went to school in Hue and Hanoi and in 1934 he joined the Indochinese Communist Party which had been formed in 1930 by Nguyen That Thanh (later known as Ho Chi Minh).
In 1939 Giap married his first wife, Dang Thi Quang Thai. Later that year the French outlawed the communist Party and shortly after the birth of his daughter, Hong Anh, Giap left his family and homeland to study and train in Mao Zedong''s China.
In 1941, the French arrested Quang Thai and convicted her of conspiracy against the security of France. She was jailed in the prison known as Hao Lo ("the oven") which Americans came to know, in later years, as the "Hanoi Hilton." Again, reports are inconsistent regarding the fate of Giap''s wife. Some suggest she killed herself in prison, other accounts claim the French tortured her to death. Reports also suggest the French killed Giap''s daughter, two sisters, and his father. The source of Giap''s passionate hatred for the French is clear.
While still in China, in 1941, Giap, along with Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong and other Vietnamese nationalists created the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong-Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam). Members of the league were known as the Vietminh. In 1944, Giap returned to Vietnam to begin fighting the Japanese and Vichy French occupiers.

The chaos in Vietnam that resulted when Japan was defeated in World War II led the Vietminh, on December 2, 1945 to declare Vietnam a free and independent state. France, reasserting itself after the Japanese withdrawal, viewed Vietnam as independent but only within the French union of nations. The French would allow Vietnam a certain amount of control over domestic affairs, but France would control foreign policy and all defense-related matters.
By 1946, these different interpretations of independence resulted in a considerable amount of Vietminh guerrilla activity, especially in the North (Tonkin) area of Vietnam. In early 1947 the French succeeded in driving off the Vietminh during the siege of the ancient capital city of Hue. But for the next six years the Vietminh would utilize guerrilla warfare tactics in an attempt to drive the French out of Vietnam.
What is known as the First Indochina War ended on May 7, 1953 when Vietminh forces under the command of General Giap overran the French garrison at Dienbienphu. Of the 15,094 French troops only 73 escaped. 5,000 died and 10,000 were captured. Giap''s force consisted of some 70,000 troops organized into four divisions. Ad***ionally, Giap''s force had superior firepower, including antiaircraft guns. When after nearly six months of siege, Giap ordered the final direct assault on the garrison, the French occupants were starving and out of ammunition. Giap and the communists had won an important victory. In what would become a trademark feature of the communists'' struggle in Vietnam, the victory had cost a lot of lives. Giap''s army, reportedly, sustained casualties in excess of 25,000 soldiers.

Giap''s defeat of the French at Dienbienphu led to France''s final withdrawal from Vietnam. However, the political situation only became more complicated as the country was divided into a communist-controlled North and a non-communist South, divided at the 17th parallel.
Giap''s victory at Dienbienphu made him the leading military commander in North Vietnam. The goal of the communists was to reunite the country as one socialist state. Subsequent to the departure of the French the United States took on an increasingly deeper involvement in preventing the communist takeover of the South. Giap utilized the guerrilla tactics employed against the French against the new enemy, and though it cost an inhuman number of lives his strategy was successful.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s the tactic of "limited armed struggle" was once again employed by the Lap Dong ("Workers Party" as the Vietnamese Communist party was then called). The North Vietnamese utilized South Vietnamese communists organized as the ********* to harass and assassinate political figures in the South in an attempt to destabilize the American-backed government of Ngo Dinh Diem. In 1959 more than 1,000 officials were killed by ********* warriors. By 1961 an estimated 4,000 had died as a result of ********* attacks. The first American soldiers died in Vietnam when on July 8, 1959 ********* guerrillas attacked a military base in Bien Hoa, northeast of Saigon, killing a Master Sergeant and a Major in the compound''s mess hall.
The Second Indochinese War, what Americans call the "Vietnam War" was waged for 20 years. Four American presidents fought the war and 57,690 American soldiers died fighting. Through it all General Giap presided over the military operations. He also presided over the deaths of an estimated 600,000 North Vietnamese and ********* warriors.
Giap remained commander-in-chief of the communist forces until 1972 after the Eastertide Offensive in which his troops sustained wide-scale casualties in a major initiative against South Vietnam. Relieved of direct military command, Giap was called back to Hanoi and appointed Minister of Defense.
In 1975, Vietnam was finally reunited as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Giap''s long struggle for communist unification was completed.
Today, Giap is a revered national hero in Vietnam. In 1995 Giap met, for the first time an old adversary, former United States Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. Newspaper accounts reported that upon meeting McNamara the 80+ year-old Giap said:
I heard about you long ago
Khi trái tim chẳng cháy thành ngọn lửaNhư buổi đầu tiên gặp mắt em nhìn

General Vo Nguyen Giap: "Once Again We Will Win"
This excerpt is part of an essay published in a Vietnamese journal in 1966. General Giap was the architect of the North Vietnamese victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The original title was "The Entire People Resolutely and Unanimously Step Up Their Great Patriotic War to Defeat the Aggressors."
The American Imperialists'' scheme is to prevent the collapse of the puppet army and administration, to launch offensives aimed at wiping out the revolutionary forces in the South, especially the Liberation Armed Forces, to strive to consolidate the areas still under their control and gradually to carry out pacification by priority sectors, to attack the liberated zones and to wrest back some of the lost areas, to seek every means to encircle and isolate the southern theater. At the same time, they intend to intensify sabotage warfare against the North and carry on deceptive "peace offensives." Banking upon a force of over seven hundred thousand men, to be increased eventually, they hope to realize the above-mentioned scheme by means of more radical and efficacious measures. They reckon that they can gradually win military and political successes, secure a position of strength to end the war with a solution favorable to them, or if need be, to prolong or expand the aggressive war. ...
First of all, the United States imperialists are the enemy not only of the Vietnamese people but also of progressive people throughout the world. In the present situation, whereas the socialist camp is growing, the national liberation movement surging, the workers'' movement in the capitalist countries and the movement for peace and democracy developing, the forces of imperialism are continually declining. In the over-all relation of forces in the world the American imperialists are not in a strong but in a weak position and have to scatter their forces to cope with the situation everywhere. That is precisely why they cannot send to South Vietnam whatever number of troops without reckoning with their difficulties in every field in the world, right in the United States, and in the Vietnam theater.
The dispatch of an expe***ionary force for the invasion of our country is itself fraught with most fundamental dangers that they cannot overcome. ...
The introduction of American troops into the South aims at preventing the collapse of the puppet army and administration and at creating favorable con***ions to consolidate and strengthen the puppet forces. But the United States imperialists openly invade the South of our country at a moment when the puppet army and administration are seriously weakening. At this point, the more open is the United States aggression, the more isolated and differentiated the puppet army and administration, and the sharper the contradictions between the United States imperialists and their placemen. Those people in the puppet army and administration who still have some national feeling will become more conscious of the real situation, and the number of those who cross over to the people''s side will increase. Consequently, the introduction of more United States troops, far from retrieving the predicament of the puppet army and administration, aggravates the mercenary army''s destruction and disintegration, and the puppet administration''s collapse in the face of our people''s resistance. When the American imperialists'' crack troops are defeated by our people, the disintegration and collapse of the puppet army and administration will be all the more inevitable.
The strong points of the United States imperialists are limited, whereas their weak points are basic ones. As the aggressive war goes on, the latter will become more visible and more serious and will surely lead the American imperialists to ignominious failure.
Above are the American imperialists'' strong and weak points after some hundred thousand enemy troops have been introduced into South Vietnam. On our side, we do not enjoy the advantages attached to a country with a wide territory and a large population, but our people are resolved to carry on their just patriotic war to defend our life and wrest back our independence and freedom. In this fierce and protracted revolutionary war against such a cruel enemy as American imperialism, our force has developed unremittingly and has many a time put him into confusion. Weak in equipment and technique and in economic potential, we have absolute political and moral superiority, a correct leadership, the strength of an entirely united people, the invincible people''s war, and the sympathy and strong support of people throughout the world. It is certain that, as we fight, we will score ever greater victories and become stronger. These are the fundamental factors accounting for our people''s final victory in the sacred liberation war for national salvation against United States aggression. Whatever the number of expe***ionary troops that the aggressors may bring in, they can in no way escape the inevitable: they will be defeated; the ultimate victory will be ours.
First, our Party has a correct revolutionary line. This line is the condensed expression of the clever and creative combination of Marxist-Leninist general principles with the correct practice of our revolution. This is the line of the people''s national democratic revolution progressing to socialism in a former colonial and semi-feudal country. Our Party''s line has been tested in our people''s long and heroic revolutionary struggle and has led our revolution from one victory to another. In the light of this line, Vietnam has been the first colony to rise up and defeat the mighty army of an imperialist power-France-to liberate itself, the North of our country is also the first state to take the path of socialism in Southeast Asia. ...
Our compatriots in the South have closed their ranks in the fire of the revolutionary struggle, fighting for twenty years, now overcoming countless difficulties and braving a cruel enemy with a fin-n resolve to march forward, to fight, and to win. Today our people in the South have the National Liberation Front, a broad organization with a correct line and a program which enjoys great prestige at home and abroad. Starting the fight with spikeboards and mantislike guns, they have built big and heroic Liberation Armed Forces comprising three categories of troops, having high combativeness, skillful strategy and tactics, versed both in guerrilla warfare and large-unit operations and cre***ed with wiping out big units of the puppet and American forces. The heroic Liberation Armed Forces have developed everywhere and have been conducting ever more powerful operations throughout the South Vietnam theater, from the Ben Hal River to Ca Mau Cape, from the Western Plateaus to the delta countryside and even in the vicinity of big towns. At present the liberated zone accounts for the majority of the population and territory of the South; the Front''s policies are being gradually applied there, a new life under an independent and democratic regime is being built, and, in fact, the liberated zone has become the image of tomorrow''s entirely liberated South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the people in the North are steadily progressing to socialism with an ardent love for the fatherland and for socialism and with an unprecedented political and moral unity. The North, thanks to its excellent political system and its strong economic and national defense potential, is not only a source of inspiration but also a solid rear for our entire people''s struggle for national salvation against the United States imperialists. This is a favorable con***ion which did not exist in our former resistance against the French colonialists.
Since the extension of the war to the North, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam''s army and people have been resolutely fighting and have initially foiled the enemy''s sabotage air warfare. In response to the call of the Party Central Committee, the government, and President Ho Chi Minh, our people in the North have launched a strong movement for national salvation, carrying out production and fighting at the same time to defend the North, give wholehearted and all-out support to the liberation revolution in the South, and make a substantial contribution to the common victory of the whole nation.
The Vietnamese people have a tra***ion of unity and unbending resistance against foreign invasion, but if we look back to its millenary history as well as to the revolutionary struggle of the past many years, we shall realize that never have they united so firmly and so broadly as today, and never has their will to fight off the aggressors and defend the country been promoted *****ch a degree.
In our country, people''s war has developed according to the general laws of all revolutionary wars and also to the specific laws of the Vietnamese society and theater of operations. Hence, it is a revolutionary war waged by a whole people on all planes, a revolutionary war fought by a small nation in a narrow and thinly populated country, having an underdeveloped economy, relying on the strength of an entire people united in the struggle. With it the people will finally beat an enemy originally many times stronger.
Generally speaking, people''s war in Vietnam is revolutionary armed struggle developing on the basis of the political struggle of the masses brought to a high level. The boundless strength of the revolutionary masses has pervaded the revolutionary armed forces and has given them an extraordinary capacity to fight and to win. Moreover, the outstanding characteristic of people''s war in our country at the present stage is that, in its very process, armed struggle and political struggle are very closely coordinated, supporting and stimulating each other. ...
from: http://www.nv.cc.va.us/home/nvsageh/Hist122/Part4/Giap.htm
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Có trang này hay thì ko cho mình copy: http://www.carpenoctem.tv/military/giap.html
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Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap was, and is, the only PAVN figure known at all well outside of Vietnam, the only PAVN general mentioned in most counts of the Vietnam war, and the only Vietnamese communist military leader about whom a full length biography has been written. The disparity between General Giap and the others-the lone figure standing in the forefront of a legion of shadowy Vietnamese communist generals-assures him a prominent place in Vietnam''s history. But history''s judgment on him, as general, is yet to be rendered.
The three horses pulling the chariot of war are leadership, organization and strategy. The ideal general in any army would posses to perfection each of these in careful combination. Evaluating the performance of General Giap, therefore, must be in terms of his performance as leader, organizer and strategist, all three. While the jury is still deliberating, this much about him seems reasonably clear: he was a competent commander of men but not a brilliant one; he was a first rate military organizer once the innovative conceptual work was past, a good builder and administrator of the military apparat after the grand scheme had been devised; as a strategist he was at best a gifted amateur.
Giap of course, is a legend, with a larger-than-life image which the party and State in Hanoi, as well as the world''s press, have enthusiastically contributed. His metaphoric appellation is Nui Lua, roughly "volcano beneath the snow" meaning a cold exterior but boiling within, an apt description of his personality according to those who know him. Associates also have described him as forceful, arrogant, impatient and dogmatic. At least in earlier years, he was ruthlessly ambitious and extraordinarily energetic, with a touch of vanity suggesting to interviewers that he should be considered an Asian Napoleon. He is said to be fiercely loyal to those of his political faction who grant him unreserved loyalty. He once told an associate that he took a "Darwinian view" of politics, and is said always to have been indifferent to arguments or reasoning based mainly on dogma. He always has been surrounded by political enemies and the victim of decades of sly whispers campaigns so common in Vietnam. (A typical whisper: General Dung, not Giap, planned the final successful at the battle of Dien Bien Phu because Giap had been struck down by diarrhea.)
Vo Nguyen Giap was born, by his account, in 1912 in the village of An Xa, Quang Binh province, although other reports say he was born into a peasant family, but former associates say his family was impoverished mandarin of lower rank. His father worked the land, rented out land to neighbors, and was not poor. More important as a social indicator in Vietnam, his father was literate and familiar with the Confucian classics. Giap, in manner and in his writings, demonstrated a strong Confucian background. At 14, Giap became a messenger for the Haiphong Power Company and shortly thereafter joined the Tan Viet Cach Mang Dang, a romantically-styled revolutionary youth group. Two years later he entered Quoc Hoc, a French-run lycee in Hue, from which two years later, according to his account, he was expelled for continued Tan Viet movement activities. In 1933, at the age of twenty-one, Giap enrolled in Hanoi University. He studied for three years and was awarded a degree falling between a bachelor and master of arts (doctorates were not awarded in Vietnam, only in France). Had he completed a fourth year he automatically would have been named a district governor upon graduation, but he failed his fourth year entrance examination.
While in Hanoi University, Giap met one Dang Xuan Khu, later known as Trung Chinh, destined to become Vietnamese communism''s chief ideologue, who converted him to communism. During this same period Giap came to know another young Vietnamese who would be touched by destiny, Ngo Dinh Diem. Giap, then still something of a Fabian socialist, and Diem, who might be described as a right wing nationalist revolutionary, spend evenings together trying to proselytize each other.
While studying law at the University, Giap supported himself by teaching history at the Thanh Long High School, operated by Huynh Thuc Khang, another major figure in Vietnamese affairs. Former students say Giap loved to diagram on the blackboard the many military campaigns of Napoleon, and that he portrayed Napoleon in highly revolutionary terms.
In 1939, he published his first book, co-authored with Trung Chinh titled The Peasant Question, which argued not very originally that a communist revolution could be peasant-based as well as proletarian-based.
In September 1939, with the French crackdown on communist, Giap fled to China where he met Ho Chi Minh for the first time; he was with Ho at the Chingsi (China) Conference in May 1941, when the ********* was formed.
At the end of 1941 Giap found himself back in Vietnam, in the mountains, with orders to begin organizational and intelligence work among the Montagnards. Working with a local ban*** named Chu Van Tan, Giap spent World War II running a network of agents throughout northern Vietnam. The information collected, mostly about the Japanese in Indochina, went to the Chinese Nationalist in exchange for military and financial assistance which in turn, supported communist organization building. Giap had little military prowess at his command, however, and used what he did have to systematically liquidate rice landlords who opposed the communist.
On December 22, 1944, after about two years of recruiting, training and military experimenting, Giap fielded the first of his armed propaganda teams, and forerunner of PAVN. By mid-1945 he had some 10,000 men, if not soldiers, at his command.
During these early years, Giap led Party efforts at organization busting which, with the connivance of the French, emasculated competing non-communist nationalist organizations, killing perhaps some 10,00 individuals (although these figures come from surviving nationalist and may be exaggerated). One of the liquidation techniques used by Giap''s men was to tie victims together in batches, like cordwood, and toss them into the Red River, the victims thus drowning while floating out to sea a method referred to as "crab fishing." Giap''s purge also extended to the newly created ********* government: of the 360 original National Assembly members elected in 1946, only 291 actually took their seats, of whom only 37 were official opposition and only 20 of these were left at the end of the first session. Giap arrested some 200 during the session, some of whom were shot. He also ordered the execution of the famed and highly popular South Vietnamese ********* leader, Nguyen Binh. Giap sent Binh into an ambush and he died with a personal letter from Giap in his pocket. He also was carrying a diary which made it clear he knew of Giap''s duplicity, but Binh went to his death in much the same manner in which the old Bolshevik, Rubashov, in darkness at Noon. Giap later confessed to a friend, "I was forced to sacrifice Nguyen Binh."
With the ********* war Giap faced his most challenging task, converting peasants cum guerrillas into fully trained soldiers through a combination of military training and political indoctrination. He built an effective army. Colonial powers always controlled the colonial countryside with only token military forces; they controlled the peasants because the peasants permitted themselves to be controlled. Giap built an army that changed that in Indochina.
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In military operations in both the ********* and Vietnam Wars, Giap was cautious and so meticulous in planning that operations frequently were delayed because either they or the moment was premature. Giap''s caution and policies led his opponents to underestimate both his military strength and his tactical skill. Although as someone noted, in war everyone habitually underestimates everyone else. Historians, particularly French historians, tend to case Giap in larger than life terms; they write of his flashing brilliance as a strategic and tactical military genius. But there is little objective proof of this. Perhaps the French write him large as a slave for bruised French ego. Giap''s victories have been due less to brilliant or even incisive thinking than to energy, audacity and meticulous planning. And his defeats clearly are due to serious shortcomings as a military commander: a tendency to hold on too long, to refuse to break victory to intoxicate and lead to the to the taking of excessive and even insane chances in trying to strike a bold second blow; a preoccupation, while fighting the "people''s war," with real estate, attempting to sweep the enemy out of an area that may or may not be militarily important.
Giap always was at his best when he was moving men and supplies around a battlefield, far faster than his foes had any right to expect. He did this against the French in 1951, infiltrating an entire army through their lines in the Red River Delta, and again in advance of the Tet offensive in 1968 when he positioned thousands of men and tons of supplies for a simultaneous attack on thirty-five major South Vietnamese population centers. If Giap is a genius as a general at all, he is, as the late Bernard Fall put it, a logistic genius. General Giap''s strategic thinking early in the Vietnam War, from 1959 until at least 1966, was to let the NLF and PLAF do it by the ********* War book. Cadres and battle plans in the form of textbooks were sent down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Southern elements were instructed in the proper mobilization and motivation techniques, centered on the orthodox dau tranh strategy that had worked with the French and in which Giap had full faith. Certain adjustments might be necessary with respect to political dau tranh and some minor adaptations of armed dau tranh might be required, his writings at this time indicated but essentially the necessary doctrine was in existence and was in place.
What changed Giap''s thinking, and his assumption that the war against the Americans could be a continuation of the war against the French, was the battle of Ia Drang Valley,the first truly important battle of the war. Giap''s troops veterans of Dien Bien Phu, when thrown against green First Cavalry Division soldiers, experienced for the first time the full meaning of American-style conduct of war: the helicopters, the lightweight bullet, sophisticated communications, computerized military planning, an army that moved mostly vertically and hardly ever walked. Technology had revolutionized warfare, Giap acknowledged in Big Victory, Great Task, a book written to outline his strategic response to the U.S. intervention. The answer he said, was to match the American advantage in mass and movement or, where not possible, to shunt it aside. He was still searching for the winning formula when suddenly he was handed victory. The South Vietnamese Army which had stood and fought under far worse con***ions in January 1975, under minor military pressure, began to collapse. Soon in could not fight coherently. Giap was handed a victory he neither expected at the time nor deserved. How much command responsibility Giap had in the last days of the war, in 1975, is debated - much direction had passed to General Dung but is unimportant in terms of distributing laurels, since none was deserved by any PAVN general.
After the Vietnam War General Giap slowly began to fade the scene, withdrawing gradually from day-to-day command of PAVN. General Dung began to take up the reins of authority. Giap was given a series of relatively important short term tak force assignments. He supervised the initial assumption by PAVN of various production and other postwar economic duties. He reorganized and downgraded the PAVN polotical commissar system, as the battle organized Reds and Experts tilted ever more clearly towards the latter. He defended PAVN''s budget against the sniping attack of cadres in the economic sector.
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When the ''Pol Pot problem" developed truly serious dimensions in late 1977, giap returned to the scene. He spent most of 1978 organizing an NLF style response for Kampuchea, that in creation of a Liberation Army, a Liberated Area, a radio Liberation, and a standby Provisional Revolutionary Government. This was the tried method, but by its nature, slow. Apparently the politburo judged it did not have time for protracted conflict, and so in 1978 opted in favor of a Soviet-style solution: tanks across the border, invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. Giap opposed it, although evidence of this is mostly inferential, holding that a quick military solution was not possible, that Pol Pot would embrace a dau tranh strategy against PAVN and the result would be a bogged down war. Giap proved to be painfully correct and, for the sin of being right when all others are wrong in a collective leadership decision-making process, was eased out of Politburo level politics. Apparently all factions ganged up on him, but his removal was designed to eliminate Giap as factional infighting without tarnishing Giap the legend. It appears he did not resist this power play as he might have done, with possibly bloody consequences, which may be a tribute to his better judgements.
Today Giap still is on the Vietnamese scene, but plays a lesser role. He has taken upon himself the task of lifting Vietnam by its technological boot straps, has become the leading figure in the drive to raise the country''s technical and scientific capability. This requires, among other things, soliciting continued Soviet assistance, something Giap is able to do well because of the regard for him in the USSR. He confers frequently with Soviet advisors in Hanoi and in the Soviet Union; in 1980 he went to Moscow three times in a nine-month period.
General Giap has been a prolific writer and he continues to publish although Big Victory, Great Task is more innovative and original. His most interesting book is Dien Bien Phu, while his worst certainly is Once Again We Will Win, his initial assessment of what was required to defeat the Americans which is virtually devoid of correct factual and technical judgments
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Chủ đề 53 trang nói về Đại tướng Võ Nguyên Giáp
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Vo Nguyen Giap
(ca. 1912- )
Vietnamese General
As a master of modern guerrilla warfare, Vo Nguyen Giap achieved the independence and unification of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam despite the efforts of the Japanese, the French, the Americans and his own countrymen. Giap''''s military operations remain influential in developing nations as methods and models for combating far more powerful opponents.
Many "facts" about Giap''''s life, especially his early years, are clouded in shadows, myths, and deliberate fabrications. Most reliable sources fix his birth date as sometime in 1912 in Quang Binh Province in the then French Indochina area known as Annam. Although Giap later claimed to be from a peasant family, apparently his father was actually a low-ranking mandarin scholar. Giap studied at both Hue and Hanoi before becoming a history teacher. There is also evidence that Giap briefly studied to be a lawyer, but there is no substantiation so the claims that he earned doctorates in political science and law.
During most of the 1930s, Giap remained a schoolteacher while actively participating in various revolutionary movements. He joined the Communist Party in 1934 and assisted in founding the Democratic Front two years later. All the while, Giap was a dedicated reader of military history and philosophy, revering Napoleon I and Sun Tzu.
When France outlawed communism in 1939, Giap fled to China, where he studied guerrilla warfare under Mao Zedong with fellow Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh. In 1941, Giap joined Ho and other Nationalists to form the Vietminh Front and in 1944 returned to Vietnam to resist the Japanese and Vichy French occupation. When Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, Giap became minister of defense and army commander in chief under Ho, who took advantage of the situation to seize the Hanoi government. But Giap and Ho had to flee when the French colonial officials returned and continued their Vietminh guerilla war in the jungle. Giap''''s zeal for independence may also have come from his hatred of the French, who had imprisoned and/or executed his first wife, his child, his father, two sisters, and other family members.
During the next eight years, Giap developed the strategy that would eventually defeat the French and later the Americans and South Vietnamese. Giap, with Ho''''s support, formed a three-phase plan for gaining independence. In Phase I, Giap''''s forces would conduct guerrilla and terrorist operations to control as much of the population as possible. In Phase II, guerrilla forces would consolidate into regular units to attack isolated government outposts. In the climactic Phase III, large units would form to establish full military control over an area, allowing and encouraging the civilian population to rise up in support of the revolution.
For the rest of his military career Giap would be consistently successful in conducting Phases I and II of his strategy but would succeed only once in executing Phase III. Against the French, Giap and his Vietminh triumphed in small-scale operations. As long as they did not allow the French to engage them in a set-piece battle, the Vietminh prevailed. In 1950 Giap overzealously tried to implement Phase III and conduct conventional warfare against the French in the Red River Valley, near Hanoi. When the French decisively defeated him, Giap again withdrew to the jungles and mountains, reverting back to Phase I and II operations.
After the loss in the Red River Valley, Giap adopted the philosophy that the Communist forces could afford to lose longer than the French, and later the Americans and South Vietnamese, could afford to win. Giap was able to convince his troops that they might have to fight and sustain heavy casualties for two or more decades to achieve victory.
For three years the French attempted to lure Giap into another major battle. In November 1953 they finally presented a target that even the patient Giap could not refuse when they established a series of outposts in the Dien Binh Phu Valley, two hundred miles west of Hanoi. Believing that the surrounding mountains protected their remote defensive bases - so isolated the only way to resupply was by air - the French hoped to tempt Giap into massing his forces for a showdown on the valley floor.
The French got their decisive battle, but not the way they planned. Giap proved his brilliance as a logistician when he had his troops disassemble artillery pieces and antiair weapons, mostly supplied by China and the Soviet Union, and packed them over the mountains onto the high ground overlooking the French garrison. Thousands of men with no more than bicycles for transportation delivered the tons of supplies and munitions necessary for a long siege.
Giap concentrated seventy thousand to eight thousand soldiers, along with two hundred heavy guns, against the French garrison, which totaled fifteen thousand men. Since weather and Vietminh gunners prevented all but a few deliveries of resupplies, the French retreated to the interior posts, while the Vietminh advanced through tunnels and trenches and under support of superior artillery. On May 7, 1954, the French surrendered. Of the original force, five thousand were dead. Of the ten thousand who surrendered, half were wounded. Estimates of Communist casualties exceeded twenty-five thousand, but Giap had won his Phase III battle. In leaving Indochina, the French negotiated a partition that separated the Communist North from the democratic South.
In 1959 Giap and the North Vietnamese began supporting Communist guerrillas in the south known as Vietcong. Giap continued his three phases of warfare, remaining reasonable successful with I and II in fighting the superior arms and numbers of the South Vietnamese and their American allies. As long as he remained patient, Giap fared well. In 1965, however, he challenged the first American combat divisions with North Vietnamese divisions across the border into neighboring sanctuaries.
Giap again attempted Phase III in the Tet Offensive of 1968 and in the Dien Bien Phu-like siege of Khe Sanh. In less than six weeks the Americans and the South Vietnamese virtually annihilated the Vietcong and seriously depleted the North Vietnamese. Reverting back to the first two phases, Giap and the North Vietnamese eroded American support for involvement in the war until the United States withdrew most of its troops. In 1972 Giap again revived Phase III in the Easter Offensive. South Vietnamese troops, supported by American air power, once again shredded the Communist offensive. The Losses were so great that the Communists removed Giap from command and returned him to Hanoi as minister of defense. When the Communists finally defeated South Vietnam and reunited the country into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1975, the tactics were Giap''''s, but he was not in command.
Giap, who never trained as a military leader, nonetheless proved himself as a master at accomplishing victory against tremendous odds. His tactics were simple, and he allowed his subordinate commanders much latitude. In the end, his willingness to fight as long as necessary and sustain as many casualties as required gained him victory and unification of his country. Within Vietnam today he is a "national treasure," while around the world he is the master of guerrilla warfare. Giap''''s career and successes continue to have a significant impact on military and political decisions, particularly in the United States. The United States compares every military deployment to its possibilities of becoming "another Vietnam."
Được portalvn2000 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 14:47 ngày 07/04/2004

Hihi, vừa có người phê bình về chuyện này xong. Thôi, rút kinh nghiệm vậy. Mấy bác có ai muốn đọc thì cứ đọc, kiểu đọc hiểu thui. Hẹn tuần sau sẽ post bài của ông thầy dạy vẽ tui nói về ông Giáp, có thể có hình thầy vẽ ông nữa. Tiếng Dzịt hẳn hoi nhé
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