Giới thiệu về Su-27SKM và Su-30MK2

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Hì hì-Chúc vui vẻ
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Soviet 27 fighter planes formations passes through hole imagination
http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2006-03/16/content_4307489_4.htm

Thanks!
Tiện đang vào mạch này, các bác cho tớ hỏi:Không biêt sthông tin theo link này có chuẩn không? UAV của Mẽo làm ăn thế này thì chết:
Giai đoạn 2001-2002 tại Afghanistan:
Triển khai 2 Global Hawk, mỗi cái giá 15 triệu, destroyed cả 2-100%
Predator 12 cái (4.5 triệu/cái), 6 cụ đi (50%)
http://www.cursor.org/stories/dronesyndrome.htm

Sukhoi Su-27IB/32/34 "Fullback" ****pit shots

Tiện đây các bác cho hỏi, không biết sơn máy bay có khó không mà máy bay việt nam nhìn củ chuối và cũ kĩ thế nhỉ ?

Chắc nó không bay qua đâu. Quảng cáo đểu thôi.

Tiện thể bàn về việc tranhn cãi giữa Mỹ và đồng minh về F-35 , mình có tìm được bài về việc tại sao Úc mua F-35 và trong bài đó có nhắc tới Su-30MK -nhưng lại không tàng hình-Thực tế Sukhoi có trương trình máy bay tiêm kích đánh chặn đa năng mới là máy bay tàng hình có thể mang vũ khí chiến lược tầm xa như R-33 M , R-37 M trong khoang vũ khí dưới bụng máy bay và trong rõ ràng là Su-35 cải tiến.
Why Australia Went With the F-35
November 18, 2005: The Royal Australian Air Force?Ts decision to go ahead with buying the F-35 might be surprising, but not when one looks at what the alternatives had been. The Australians had been considering ten options for the future of the RAAF. These options were a mixture of proven capability (like the F-15E and F-16), and the cutting edge (like the Eurofighter, F-22, and robotic warplanes, or UCAVs). Yet, not all of them made the cut. What is unique about the RAAF competition is the frank discussion of the pros and cons of the contenders that emerged. Usually, not a lot of information is released, either for the sake of the country doing the buying (in order to avoid tipping off potential opponents) and the companies involved (in order to preserve a chance at future sales by keeping competing aircraft firms from knowing weaknesses in another design).
Australia is planning to replace both its F-111s and F-18s with the F-35. The F-35 is a stealthy multi-role aircraft with a top speed of 1,900 kilometers per hour, and a combat radius of over 1,100 kilometers. The aircraft comes in at anywhere from $37 million (the U.S. Air Force?Ts version) to $48 million (the U.S. Navy?Ts carrier version). Why was the F-35, which is not yet in service, chosen over other aircraft, some of which have been proven in combat (like the F-15 and F-16), or which have had most of the bugs worked out (Rafale, Su-30MK, Gripen, F/A-18E/F)?
The answer is what Australia was looking for ?" they wanted a modern, multi-role fighter that could last a long time (the planned retirement date is 2040). They also wanted stealth, good sensors, and long range. Looking these requirements over helps explain why some planes did not make the cut.
The F-15 and F-16 were state of the art through the 1970s and 1980s, but fell behind the Rafale and Eurofighter, and are slated to be replaced with the F-22 and F-35, respectively. To an extent, the F-18E/F also fell victim, even though it had much in common with RAAF F-18s currently in service.
The Rafale had two problems. The biggest was interoperability. Australia and the United States have fought together in a number of major conflicts dating back to World War I. There is very little expectation that this will change, and Australia wants to simplify matters like logistics. What also plagued the Rafale, as well as the Gripen and Eurofighter were issue with stealth (not enough), and sensors (the small radomes raised concerns). The Gripen also failed on range.
The F-22 was one of the planes considered. Performance and logistics were not issues ?" cost was. The F-22 was coming in at $150 million a plane, and it was optimized for the air-to-air role, with the attack capability added on after many of the parameters were set. The most expensive variant of the F-35 comes in at $48 million. So, for the price of one F-22, one could get three F-35Cs or close to four F-35As (the variant Australia is purchasing). One F-22 can beat one F-35, but one F-22 would have a much difficult time beating three F-35Cs or four F-35As ?" and it cannot be in three or four places at once.
Two the competitors were never serious possibilities. The first was the Su-30MK, which was non-stealthy, had serious inter-operability issues, and would have been extremely controversial. In essence, there were some questions as to why it was even considered despite its range and powerful sensor suite. The other competitor quickly wiped out were unmanned air combat vehicles (UCAVs). The Australians figured that UCAVs would eventually supplement manned combat aircraft, but would not suffice as replacements.
The last aircraft standing was the F-35. While it is a paper airplane, it is well under way, and Australia will be able to get a version of the F-35 that will meet its requirements through 2040. Other countries will also be buying at least one variant of the F-35, including the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, and the Netherlands. The F-35 will likely be the F-16 of the early 21st century.

Về F-35 thì có lẽ còn bàn nhiều-Lầu năm góc thì muốn đua ngay vào chiến đấu không cần thử toàn bộ còn quốc hội Mỹ lại cắt giảm chi phí cho chương trình F-35.Độ tàng hình của F-35 chưa được xác dịnh không hiểu RCS là bao nhiêu chỉ biết là so với F-22 thì gấp 7-8 lần, còn RCS của F-22 thì có nhiều con số còn trên thực tế như thế nào thì khó có ai mà biết được, hiên tại Mỹ vẫn chưa cho F-22 ra khỏi địa
phận nước Mỹ mặc dù không quân Mỹ sắp nhận phi đội thứ 2.Mỹ muốn triển khai phi đội 3 và 4 ở Guam nhưng chắc chưa được phép... bạn nào có tin hay thì post lên đi .
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended slowing funding for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter due to "signifigant developmental risk" and the likelyhood of cost and scheduling overruns.
Concerns over the maturity of the design of the aircraft prompted the GAO to recommend delaying funding for production and production capability until after the three different versions have been proven in flight testing. According to published reports, low rate initial production is scheduled to begin in 2007, flight testing of production representative prototypes in 2009, and testing of a fully configured aircraft should begin in 2011.
Lockheed Martin, the aircraft''''''''s manufacturer, and the Pentagon have expressed their confidence in the design and technology being used in the F-35.
The F-35 program is worth approximately $256 billion for the 2,593 aircraft slated for purchase by the U.S. and Great Britain alone. Other countries involved in the project include Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark and Norway.
-Rađa ANAPG 81 của F-35

-Hệ thống quang điện tử của F-35

-Lắp vũ khí cho F-35-Các bạn để ý đến hai ảnh dưới là tên lửa mới cho F-35 )



-Buồng lái của F-35 ( các bạn chú có một màn hình rộng quét rõ nét địa hình- Đó là nhờ quang điệt tử với radar AESA đồng thời có cần điều khiển ở tay trái -của Nga từ đời Su-27SM2 có thêm cần điều khiển ở tay phải ) )
http://www3.ttvnol.com/uploaded2/gulfoil/f35_technology_****pit.jpg

Được gulfoil sửa chữa / chuyển vào 19:41 ngày 20/03/2006

F-35 chiến đấu ( in actions )



Được gulfoil sửa chữa / chuyển vào 17:00 ngày 20/03/2006

Máy bay tiêm kích đánh chặn của Sukhoi

Lại tranh cãi tiếp về F-35 mà mình lại muốn bàn về Su-27SM2.Ai thích thì đọc.
JSF stealth won''t be reduced
BY: Michael Fabey, Air Force Times
03/20/2006
Foreign press reports that the Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) sold to Australia will be less stealthy than promised are wrong, prime contractor Lockheed Martin says.
The Sydney Morning Herald reported March 15 that the proposed Australian version of the JSF would have ?olow observability? instead of ?overy low observability.?

Lockheed JSF spokesman John Kent said there has been no downgrading of any of the aircraft?Ts stealth for foreign or domestic sales.
?oIt appears that there was just a misunderstanding of terms and definitions,? Kent said.
He said the Australian press reports apparently misinterpreted what ?olow observable? would mean.
The planes will still have the same stealthy ability to avoid radar and other detection equipment as before, he said.
Australia is one of the partner countries expected to buy JSFs in the coming decade.
Another U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released this week says JSF officials have taken four ?okey actions? to speed up such technology transfers:
? Lockheed developed an international industrial plan that identified the type of licenses needed to transfer certain of the technologies;
? JSF program agencies now have dedicated staff for JSF technology licensing;
Lockheed and JSF program agencies have used exemptions in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to avoid delays; and
? Talks about releasing classified information or other technology are taking place early in the program.
Another GAO report released this week said the Pentagon plans to start low-rate initial production of the plane by 2013 without completing some performance tests.

SF Fracas Risks Bad Blood Between Allies David A. Fulghum, Douglas Barrie, and Andy Nativi 03/19/2006 05:11:09 PM
nglo-American feuding over the Joint Strike Fighter threatens to spill over into the wider transatlantic relationship. On the domestic front, there is bad blood between Congress and the Pentagon over the fate of the aircraft''s alternative engine.
Britain is leading the assault on Washington over the contentious issue of technology access on the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), with other program partners, such as Australia, in support.
Dumping the JSF is now an option on the British agenda, if London cannot gain what it calls "operational sovereignty." This was the blunt message made by the British Defense Procurement Minister Paul Drayson, during his visit to the U.S. Capitol last week.
There are already worries that the frustration over the JSF will taint broader defense-industrial relationships between Washington and London. A British industry source says U.S. officials are already irritated by what they view as protectionist overtones within the British government''s Defense Industrial Strategy. There are also concerns about a U.S. backlash against British sales efforts in the U.S., such as on the AgustaWestland EH101 Merlin combat search-and-rescue bid.
"Without the technology transfer to give us the confidence to deliver an aircraft fit to fight on our terms, we will not be able to buy these aircraft," Drayson told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Were London to withdraw from the program, it would mark a nadir in its relationship with Washington, raising fundamental issues over future defense industrial policy and collaboration. The U.S.''s closest ally also feels snubbed by the decision to ax the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 as the alternative engine for the Lockheed Martin fighter. Senior executives from European missile manufacturer MBDA say the company is having to "fight like hell" to gain the ability to put its weapons on the aircraft. They also hint that the U.S. is inflating price quotes for JSF integration.
The JSF engine program is expected to be worth $60-100 billion to sole-source F135 engine-builder Pratt & Whitney if the alternative F136 program is killed, as the Pentagon wants. That''s figured on the basis of an average of 2.5 of the $8-million engines for each of up to 5,000 aircraft to be built over the lifetime of the program. With Rolls-Royce''s 40% share of the F136 alternative engine project, that could mean the loss of $12 billion--at the least--to British industry.
Last week, in special hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, British, Australian and Italian officials expressed unhappiness about lack of consultation in the U.S.''s handling of the JSF program and technology transfer delays. The stakes for the U.S. and its partners are huge. If the program is a success, by 2030, JSF could make up 85% of the world''s tactical fighter fleet. With that would come continued profits from sustainment and maintenance programs lasting 30-40 years.
After JSF, the only large military programs on the horizon are the rapidly merging long-range strike and surveillance efforts expected to produce a family of manned and unmanned aircraft. Therein lies a trap for General Electric (GE) and Rolls-Royce: They can''t continue development of the F-136 if the JSF alternative engine program dies. But F-136 derivatives would be the only competition to Pratt & Whitney. The British government''s stance appears uncompromising. Drayson says he is making clear the risk to U.K. participation because: "I know the British can be accused of understatement."
During the hearing, Drayson was asked by Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) if Britain was willing to contribute more money to fund the alternative program. Drayson says Britain had invested 2 billion pounds ($3.5 billion) into JSF "on the basis of a two-engine approach" and that a minimum buy of 3,000 aircraft would sustain that plan.
While Drayson pitches the alternative engine cancellation as symptomatic of the imperfect industrial relationship between the U.S. and its allies, both Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England and Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne dismissed Drayson''s complaints. Pressed on Britain''s grievance about not being consulted on killing the alternative engine, England was combative.
"That''s correct," he said. "This is an engine being paid for by the U.S. government. If somebody can get something for nothing, they will take it. There''s an industrial benefit for countries and companies. We did not have separate discussions because, frankly, this is an issue of our defense budget. . . not their defense budget. That decision needs to be made in the Dept. of Defense."
Sen. John Warner (R-Va.) expressed astonishment at England''s comment and pointed to Britain''s special status as the only level-one partner in the project.
ENGLAND NOTED THAT THE alternative engine program was a product of congressional action and, as a redundant engine, is not a fundamental requirement for the JSF program. He also pointed out that the $2.4-billion cost of the engine is more than Britain''s initial $2-billion contribution to JSF.
In a more conciliatory tone, England said that outstanding technology transfer issues will be resolved by June. Wynne, speaking at a USAF seminar earlier in the day, brushed aside the impact to British engine-maker Rolls-Royce.
"It will be a profound choice if the British follow through," Wynne says. "I''m not sure they realize that on the engine program there is very little less work that Rolls-Royce will get as a result of using Pratt engines. The work share is roughly the same." GE and Rolls officials were stunned by Wynne''s statement.
Early in the week, the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Mullen also weighed in on the JSF question. He said it was a joint decision with the Air Force, supported by Pentagon analyses showing little value from engine competitions.
"As I look back as far as the B-52, they are [programs with a] single engine [manufacturer]. The history of that is pretty positive. The times we have competed those, the results have not been particularly outstanding." He said the anticipated 15-20% savings from the alternative engine program aren''t expected until 2025.
Australian and Italian representatives at the hearing, while unanimous in echoing Drayson''s complaint about the U.S.''s lack of consultation, were ambivalent about the two-engine program. Both said that savings from a two-engine effort would be appreciated, but their primary desire is to have a JSF on time and on budget to avoid fiscal complications at home.
WARNER PLAYED WHAT could turn out to be a trump card by saying the Pentagon may not have the right to cancel the engine. After looking at the 1996 legislation that authorized the alternative engine program, "I''m not so sure that you don''t have to have an amendment to our law to underpin this decision," he said.
Warner also suggests, with a bit of political muscle flexing, that if the alternative engine program is reinstated, where the money comes from is Congress''s responsibility. "We can go anywhere we want to get the money," he said, which sends the message that keeping the engine program alive doesn''t have to take funds from other parts of JSF.
The JSF Program Director Rear Adm. Steve Enewold testified that by law he''s not allowed to tell partners what''s in the presidential budget, so it was impossible for him to consult with allies beforehand.
When news of the alternative engine''s cut leaked out, aerospace industry officials called it a ploy by the Pentagon to get Congress to add money for the alternative engine program. They said the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings are designed to produce legislative language for funding the second engine, with appropriators to fill in the amount later.
Sens. Warner, Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-N.Y.) all questioned the wisdom of a single-engine program that not only gave a huge program to a single company, but also destroyed the competition for an advanced version of the JSF engine to power the long-range strike and surveillance aircraft family that the Air Force would like to start fielding in 2018.
Some British industrialists have previously raised concerns that the government was not being strident enough with Washington about securing the required access on the aircraft. The U.K. plans to buy up to 150 of the F-35B version of the JSF to meet its Joint Combat Aircraft requirement, likely in two batches. The aircraft is tentatively scheduled to enter service in 2014.
Drayson is looking for far more than oral reassurance that the U.K. will get the access it requires before signing up for the JSF production memorandum of understanding around the end of this year.
"We must therefore be sure to understand the nature and balance of the obligations between our nations consistent with the principles of the agreement on JSF we have signed to date. Operational sovereignty, the ability to integrate, upgrade, operate and sustain the aircraft as we see fit and without recourse to others is of paramount importance to us," says Drayson.
British concerns were only reinforced by the U.S. proposal to ax the alternative engine for the aircraft. The GE/Rolls-Royce F136 can be considered as the preferred engine for the U.K. aircraft because it potentially offers greater thrust growth. Drayson emphasizes the "potential growth capability the F136 offers" and adds, "We expect, as a level-one partner, to be properly consulted on decisions of this magnitude," implying that, on this occasion, the level of consultation was inadequate.