Hải quân Nhật

Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force Takes Delivery of First EH101
AgustaWestland, a Finmeccanica company, is pleased to announce the delivery by Kawasaki of the first of 14 EH101 helicopters to the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF). The handover ceremony took place 3rd March at Kawasaki Aerospacê?Ts Gifu plant. The helicopter is the first of 14 aircraft selected by the Japanese Defence Agency to meet its transportation, Airborne Mine Counter Measures (AMCM) and Antarctic support requirements. AgustaWestland and Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) signed a licence and purchase agreement in 2003 to produce and support the Japanese EH101s. KHI has now established manufacturing, test flight and support facilities at its Gifu works in Japan. Fourteen utility rear-ramped variants of the EH101 have been selected to replace the JMSDF?Ts fleet of Sikorsky MH-53Es and S-61s. Assembly of the second aircraft is already underway in Japan and the remaining 12 aircraft kits will be prepared by AgustaWestland in the UK for final assembly by Kawasaki in Japan.
Speaking at the ceremony Giuseppe Orsi, AgustaWestland?Ts CEO, said ?oIntroducing into operation a sophisticated new product such as the MCH 101 is a challenging task: however we are convinced that the AgustaWestland, Kawasaki and Marubeni teams will further develop the excellent working relationship with the JMSDF to achieve the expected goals and to make this program a great success. This on schedule delivery is the first example of the good results that this team has achieved and will continue to deliver. We are looking forward to long lasting cooperation with Kawasaki and the Japanese defense industry, with the aim to jointly develop and deliver to the Japanese Defense Agency other high technology equipments that will contribute to the Japanese defense capability and to the success of the Japanese defense industry.?
The JMSDF by introducing this helicopter into its inventory is joining a large family of EH101 users that includes the British and Italian navies, the Portuguese, Danish, Canadian and British Air Forces, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police and soon the US Marine Corps. Today?Ts delivery and the recently signed contract for 12 AW139 helicopter with Mitsui Bussan Aerospace highlights AgustaWestland?Ts strengthened position in the Japanese market where now more than 30 out of 53 helicopters ordered so far are in service with civil and government operators.


Được tande sửa chữa / chuyển vào 15:12 ngày 11/03/2006

Một bài viết về hải quân Nhật đang hoạt động tại Ấn Độ Dương và Trung Đông
Japan?Ts New Blue Water Navy: A Four-year Indian Ocean mission recasts the Constitution and the US-Japan alliance
By the Asahi Shinbun
Translation by Eriko Osaki and Michael Penn
[This is the second of a two part series on the strategic and constitutional implications of Japan?Ts expansive naval role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. See Richard Tanter?Ts "Japan?Ts Indian Ocean Naval Deployment: Blue water militarization in a ?onormal country?.]
Part One: Postponing the Legal Issues and Sailing Rapidly
Facts about the Dispatch
According to its commanders, the unit which is now operating in the Indian Ocean is the thirteenth. So far, forty-seven ships, including convoy ships, supply ships, minesweepers, and others -- with 9,260 sailors -- have been dispatched. The ships sail from five bases in rotation, but two supply ships have been dispatched five times each.
"Prepare the warning shot!"
The command of the watch echoed on the bridge of the convoy ship Kurama, which was sailing in the Gulf of Oman near Iran, after 8 pm. Sailors in helmets and bulletproof vests hastily began to load pistol belts into machine guns on the deck, and the atmosphere of the ship became electric.
Radar had picked up a small craft of unidentified nationality approaching aft from the left at over 20 knots. The shadow of the ship was moving rapidly without answering signals of international radio. Everybody on the bridge suspected that it was a suicide terrorist vessel.
"If the ship approaches at this pace, we?Tll have to shoot," thought a commander of the first group, Honda Hirotaka (58). Next to him, Hirano Terutsugu (44), a ship commander, gasped, thinking, "This is going to be the first fire."
It was about an hour after they spotted the ship. The shadow approached to about 500 meters, then sailed abreast of the convoy, and finally turned on its navigation lights. It turned out to be an Iranian police craft and danger was avoided. It was January 3rd, 2002, not long after they arrived in the Arabian Sea. The start was just like a "semi-combat zone."
Commander Honda was sounded out on the dispatch after 9.11, shortly after Prime Minister Koizumi issued a seven article directive. Preparation started hastily.
"In any case, head your ships for the Indian Ocean. I''ll handle the situation before we reach there." Just after he was told this by the commander of the convoy and left Japan with about 700 sailors, Kabul fell. The capital of Afghanistan had been controlled by the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban.
When they crossed the Straits of Malacca, the basic plan of the anti-terrorism law was finally decided in the cabinet, prescribing where and how to operate. However, details were uncertain, such as how to make contact with the U.S. military and where to buy fuel.
When they entered the Indian Ocean in the middle of November 2001, a U.S. military frigate requested refueling from them for the first time. However, the Defense Agency ordered them to "Wait." Their explanation was that "the fuel they were carrying was not for the multinational force," but for themselves, having been purchased from their defense expenses. The first refueling was thus unsuccessful.
The first duty of a commander in the field was to find a support base where they could get fuel. The Kurama visited nine locations in seven countries, including some along the Persian Gulf. Above the waters, hundreds of aircraft were flying out of three aircraft carriers with the intention of mopping up Al-Qaida remnants.

The DDH144 Kurama
The long period of navigation in the Indian Ocean can be said to be "an uncertain battle" for the MSDF, which usually just repeats short-term training on Japan?Ts periphery. At first, the sailors were not told when they would return home.
In December 2001, a ship named Sawagiri reinforced the convoy transporting humanitarian supplies to Karachi, Pakistan. Many sailors assumed that they would be back before the end of the year, and some of them carried only several thousand yen, assuming that "we will not call at any port." Their wallets were soon empty, and they asked their families to mail money from Japan.
As sailing drags on, human relations inside the narrow ships tend to get tense. When a baby was born in a family of a sailor, there was an announcement that "both mother and baby are in good con***ion," and on Coming of Age Day, everybody congratulated young members. These things were done so as to "prevent divisions" among the crew.
Eventually the dispatch stretched over 152 days, into the next year. Petty Officer Usui Koichi (50) said, "It was more delightful to bring everyone back home safely than to actually accomplish our duty."
It has been a full four years since the relief activities of the MSDF on the Indian Ocean began. Approximately nine thousand crew members and forty-seven ships have been dispatched in total. This series is going to describe their activities though the eyes of the dispatched crew members.
Part Two: Sticking to the Aegis Ships for Safety
The Aegis Ships
A U.S.-made combat ship provides air defense for the fleet. The ship is equipped with high-performance radar and computers, which enable it to locate and attack a target automatically, and to attack more than ten targets simultaneously with missiles with a range of more than 100 km. The MSDF now possesses four of these Aegis ships.
The northern Arabian Sea at dawn was blurred with a cloud of sand.
It was the early morning of March 20, 2003. Not many days had passed since the aerial bombing of Baghdad was launched. Takashima Hiroshi (53) of the fourth unit, a unit commander of the first ship, made an announcement to the unit members of three ships on the microphone of the Aegis ship Kirishima: "Our mission is clearly different from the attack of the American and British armies. Each of you is to calmly protect your allotted space."
Recognizing that a number of navies were sailing toward the Persian Gulf, he felt it necessary to sweep away the crews?T worries about their involvement in the Iraq attack.
In December 2002, more than a year since they started operations in the Indian Ocean, the government decided to dispatch the Aegis destroyers. However, there was a gap between the perceptions of frontline U.S. forces and the Japanese government, the latter regarding the dispatch as "evidence of the Japan-U.S. alliance."
Unit commander Takashima said, "The refueling activities were appreciated, but there weren''t any special remarks on the dispatch of the Aegis ships."
The MSDF stressed security during ocean refueling. The two ships connected by a refueling pipe had to remain parallel to each other for long hours. Since the ships were vulnerable to attack during refueling, it was desirable to be guarded by the Aegis ships, whose radar could pick up targets a great distance away and whose computers had excellent data processing ability.
Shibata Masahiro (51), unit commander of the second ship, who led the Aegis destroyer Kongo, said that he felt "safe." Every time a target on radar moves, a conventional convoy ship has to be maneuvered by an operator checking its direction and speed. On the Aegis ships, all of these operations are automated." On a conventional convoy ship, no matter how skillful the sailors are, they still have some worries."
In fact, a case was reported to the Defense Agency in which the guards on board observed a plane from one of the coastal nations, which was in a blind spot for the radar, flying over a conventional ship.
The dispatch of the Aegis ships was justified in the name of improvement of the sailors'' onboard quality of life, although it was initially delayed because the Aegis vessels'' ability to share information with the American Navy was not fully supported within the Japanese government.
"The air temperature was 42 degrees (C.), but 80 degrees on deck." Sugimoto Masahiko (53), a unit commander of the third ship of the second unit, who had worked on a conventional ship during the summer, dropped an egg on the deck and took a picture, saying, "Just reporting numbers won''t help people understand the heat."
Twenty or thirty minutes later, a sunny-side up egg was ready. This picture was probably used by the Defense Agency to gain the understanding of Komeito leaders, who had been hesitant about the dispatch of the Aegis ships.
Regarding the dispatch of the Aegis destroyers, Admiral Koda Yoji (55) reflected, "It would have been valuable if the Aegis ships had been dispatched right after 9.11." His thought was based on his experience as a defense manager and the commander of a convoy ship.

DD Aegis Chokai, the last Aegis-equipped ship to be dispatched
At first, the U.S. military intended to deploy many Aegis ships on both the east and south coasts of Iraq, in ad***ion to NATO AWACS aircraft (Airborne Warning and Control System), in order to prevent terrorism by aircraft.
If Japan''s Aegis ships had been dispatched to the Indian Ocean at that time, when the area was only lightly guarded, the dispatch might indeed have become "a symbol of the Japan-U.S. alliance."
Why did they continue to deploy the Aegis ships? Admiral Koda answered, "Since the dispatch of the mine-sweeping unit to the Persian Gulf, our operations have become fairly well understood by the nation. However, we cannot say it is fully recognized. This time, there can be no failure at a time when the number of overseas operations is increasing."
The Aegis ships carried out six missions to the Indian Ocean. There has been no dispatch of an Aegis ship since the Chokai was sent in November, 2005.

Part Three: Anti-terrorism: Shivering with Fear At Times; Exercises Daily
The Arms of the Convoy
A convoy ship is equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, explosive shells, and machine guns for air defense; anti-submarine torpedoes for defense against submarines; and anti-ship missiles. Under the anti-terrorism law, there are no limitations on the kinds of arms they may use.
The Arabian Sea looks dark green from the sky, and the tranquil water continues on to the horizon.
Aviation commander Murai Ryoichi (43) of the tenth unit, who returned home this January, was in charge of watching the water during refueling activities in a sea-borne helicopter. The Aegis ship Kirishima was at the front, followed by the refueling ship and a foreign ship parallel with each other. Another ship followed. The helicopter flew ten kilometers ahead at an altitude of about 150 meters.

Japanese SH-60J Seahawk landing
on the deck of the USS Kittyhawk
The detection range of the Aegis radar is over 200 kilometers, but small fishing boats and some others are hard to detect. He said, "Sometimes small targets emerge suddenly in the ocean and we were consistently moving."
There were cases in which four sailors watched carefully and gave warnings on international radio when another ship moved into their path, and they even checked inside a suspicious ship using the guidelines and information of the U.S. military.
Other navies accompanied the refueling ships, but Captain Murai said, "I guess no other units guarded more carefully than Japan."
On the water, exercises against suicide terrorism are repeated daily. "A craft of unidentified nationality is approaching at 60 degrees to the right of the ship, from 30 miles away." A high-pitched warning vibrates in the ship. Sailors take their positions and a warship shell is sighted on the aircraft. There is a warning by radio, the shooting of signal bombs, warning fire...
In the Arabian Sea, where Operation Enduring Freedom is continuing, they have tried to learn from the attack on an American destroyer by terrorists on a small boat in Yemen in 2000. There are threats from both small planes that may plunge into a ship from a low altitude, and from small boats.
"Japanese are permitted to shoot only after thorough measures, even though a real attack could be completed in a matter of several seconds," Fukuda Tatsuya (38), torpedo bombardier leader in charge of handling weapons, pointed out. If the object is an aircraft, shooting is not allowed until it approaches below approximately five kilometers, where it could be seen with the naked eye. That''s because they seek to avoid erroneous attacks by confirming carefully whether the opponent really plans to attack, according to the measures based on the antiterrorism law.
How dangerous is the operation in the Indian Ocean? Information which the U.S. provided other nations included one warning that specifically said that ships are targeted by terrorists.
Nishimura Takashi (42), a staff officer aboard a third unit ship, had a strange experience in the Straits of Hormuz in 2003. At midnight on a night with no moonlight, an object approaching at high speed from right forward was detected on the radar screen. He ordered the watch to spot it, but the light on the screen suddenly broke up into two. After passing by both sides of the convoy, they came together again. They couldn''t identify what it was. "They might have looked like one ship since they were close to each other. What would have happened if they had been terrorist ships?"
Sugimoto Masahiko (53) third ship Captain of the second unit encountered a drifting boat with about fifty people on board in 2002. He couldn''t just abandon them after finding them. He tried to make contact with them by sending a small boat. When the crew approached them, men who had been lying down suddenly got up.
"Damn! They may try to rob us of a boat."
Captain Sugimoto told the Japanese boat crew to distance themselves from the drifting boat. If they were armed... In the end, they left it to the Canadian military which has the authority to board another vessel.
A number of units had liver-chilling experiences. However, no cases were reported in which units of the multinational forces were attacked by terrorists. "It has been three and a half years since launching the mission, and we''re now getting used to the field."
In June 2005 the unit under the anti-terrorism law was reduced from three ships to two.
Part Four: Japan Has Become a Bond for the Multinational Force
Frequency of refueling from Japan to foreign countries: To the US, 296 times; to the UK, 23 times; to France, 55 times; to Germany, 12 times; to Spain, 10 times; to Greece, 10 times; to the Netherlands, 7 times; to New Zealand, 15 times; and to Pakistan, 57 times. The total was 552 refuelings as of October 8, 2005.
It was a very hot day, over 40 degrees. When the supply fleet started refueling, forty crew members were busy on deck. They were sweating all over, and the work generally takes from one to five hours.
In March 2003, the Iraq War was about to begin. Supply ship Tokiwa from Yokosuka base repeated this tough work and refueled seven other ships a day. They worked from 7 am to 8 pm for a month without holiday. The chief of the crew said, "It was tough work. I was worried about the con***ion of the crew." One hour''s refueling enables a frigate to sail for four days. A mostly-American fleet started concentrating in the Arabian Sea for the coming Iraq War.

Supply ship Tokiwa refueling the USS Seattle during
Operation Enduring Freedom
The MSDF played an important role in supplying fuel to the multinational forces that confronted the terrorists'' organization in the Indian Ocean. Because ships en route to the Persian Gulf always pass there, fuel was supplied to all that were designated as working against the actions of terrorists. The amount of refueling that month shot up to twenty thousand kiloliters, which is twice the level of the previous month. A Japanese crew leader, Sawamura Koki (49), who was dispatched to the Indian Ocean three times, said, "It was the busiest period." They received telegrams from the US, which informed them of the detailed actions of fifty ships from other countries such as France and Germany.
In summer 2003, Moriyama Susumu (35), a commander of the ship Haruna, that was dispatched from Maizuru, Kyoto, looked at the dispositions on the map with deep emotion. He said, "I felt that I was a member of the multinational force." Japan has refueled fleets from eleven countries. It has refueled Pakistan since last July in ad***ion to Western countries. Crews communicate with each other on the sea. A commander of the 61st ship of the tenth unit, Fukuda Takuo (55), got a message that said "We want to eat sushi," before they supplied fuel to a Germany ship. So he told the cook to make "makizushi" for them. He said, "Because the work is monotonous, everyone looks forward to receiving supplies."
The Japanese also performed taiko and kendo. In response, bottles of wine were sent from France, cookies from America, a box of apples from Pakistan, and so on. These were sent by the rope that tied the ships together. When an MSDF ship paid a goodwill visit on a long voyage around European waters this July, it received 630 free kiloliters of fuel in French ports in return for the Japanese refueling in the Indian Ocean.
A US admiral, who commanded the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, expressed thanks to Japan in March 2003 at a press conference in Yokosuka, because the MSDF had refueled it indirectly through the U.S. supply fleet in the Arabian Sea in February 2003. The Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law provides that the activities in the Indian Ocean are to contribute to international society by eliminating international terrorism. The Iraq War was outside of this law. A highly-placed government official explained, "The aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk was also engaged in the operation against terrorists." But the truth is not yet clear.
The amount of refueling to the multinational forces in the past four years was about 410 thousand kiloliters, ninety percent of it to US ships. The activities in the Indian Ocean mainly involved support to the U.S., but refueling for Pakistan also became frequent.
Koda Yoji (55), who has seen the whole process, said, "For 4 years Japan has kept on refueling without rest. Not only the US, but also other countries highly appreciate Japanese activities. Giving free fuel became a bond among multinational forces. It is something that only Japan can do."
Part Five: The World''s Gaze Makes Japan Tense
The Changing Quantity of Refueling
Japan still refuels about ten ships a month, but the quantity of refueling has decreased sharply. The maximum was forty thousand kiloliters in March 2002, and the minimum was one thousand in August 2005. Nowadays the use of compact ships has increased, while large supply ships were common at first.
"How long will it take to complete the mission?"
"We can''t finish soon. I think it will take about ten years."
When Shibata Masahiro (51), commander of the second unit, who was dispatched to the Indian Ocean in 2003, met commanders from Canada and Germany at sea, he talked about their activities with them. Because of the difficulty in tying down terrorist movements on the sea lanes, Shibata agreed with their view that the mission would be a long-term one.
Twelve countries, including Japan, joined the operations against terrorists at sea. The Japan Defense Agency said that it has inspected 11,000 suspicious ships, seized drugs, and arrested many crews since September 2001. However, it is not clear how this work actually contains terrorists. The MSDF has provided 410 thousand kiloliters of fuel, which is about the same amount that 400 Japanese ships consume in a year.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at a Naval Review
However, the quantity of refueling declined rapidly after the peak in 2002. Even some inside the MSDF say that Japan should shift to other activities now. Most of the commanders, however, feel that continuing to participate is important.
Because the Japanese fleet includes battleships that not only have artillery, but also missiles and torpedoes, their very presence shows foreign countries the "national will."
Commander of the sixth unit, Kawano Katsuyoshi (50) thinks, "The presence of Japanese ships in the Indian Ocean means not only the Self-Defense Forces, but also Japan has taken a big step forward in international society."
In 1991, the MSDF left Japanese seas for the first time to engage in disposing of sea mines off Kuwait. Commander Kawano says, "The difference from the activities in 1991 is that now Japan works in cooperation with ten other countries." He also said, â?oJapan doesn''t go there to fire missiles. Working together with other countries in the same place is what is important."
Admiral Kojo Koichi (59), who has been engaged in the mission from the beginning, told each commander, "This mission doesnâ?Tt mean just the support for US-UK military action. What you have done is for Japan. I want you to keep telling the crew this." His words show his recognition of the fact that the sea lane that the fleet uses between Japan and the Indian Ocean is the same one that oil tankers use to link Japan with the Middle East.
The activities of the MSDF are limited to waters around Japan, except for military training in the US or for long-distance voyages. Long-term navigation stretching over half a year is an unfamiliar experience for Japan. Commander Tanaka Tsuneo (53) told a press conference, "I was inspired with confidence because I worked on such an intense mission" after finishing a 162 day voyage this September. Kawano said, "Japanese ability is highly estimated by other countries'' navies. The navy must go wherever it is ordered. The Japanese navy is likely to improve its weak points."
The New National Defense Program Outline that was laid down at the end of last year states that the mission of the SDF is to join international operations to improve the international security environment as well as Japanese security.
On October 26th, the Japanese government decided to extend the term of the dispatch one more year based on the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. How will the MSDF change in the future? The mission to the Indian Ocean will be a key.
This five-part series, coordinated by Tanida Kuniichi, appeared in the Asahi Shinbun between October 29 and November 5, 2005. This slightly abbreviated English translation is by Eriko Osaki and Michael Penn of the Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations http://www.shingetsuinstitute.com. Richard Tanter provided helpful suggestions for the improvement of an earlier version of the English translation.
ISSN: 1557-4660

Một bài viết nữa về hải quân Nhật, lực lượng hải quân mạnh thứ hai trên thế giới
Japan?Ts Indian Ocean Naval Deployment: Blue water militarization in a ?onormal country?
By Richard Tanter
[ By most standards, Japan is now the world?Ts number two naval power. This article, and the accompanying Asahi Shimbun series on Japan?Ts four year Maritime Self Defense Force deployment to the Indian Ocean, reveals how far Japan?Ts military reach now extends within the framework of US-Japan alliance. See the five-part Asahi Shinbun report, ?oJapan?Ts New Blue Water Navy: A Four-Year Indian Ocean Mission Recasts the Constitution and the US-Japan Alliance? ]

Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force destroyers and refuelling supply ships have been continually on-station in the Indian Ocean since November 2001. The MSDF ships were dispatched under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001), which has since been extended a number of times beyond its original two year period of application. [1]
Deployments began with the dispatch of the supply ship Hamana (8,150 tons) and its destroyer escorts Kurama (DDH - Shirane-class, 4,400 tons) and Kirisame (DD ?" Murakame-class, 5,200 tons). The stated purpose of the contingent was to provide a Japanese re-fuelling capacity to the multinational forces operating in the Indian Ocean against Afghanistan following the U.S. attack prompted by the 9/11 bombing attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In December the following year, after considerable controversy inside the ruling party and cabinet, Aegis-air defense system-equipped Kongo-class destroyers were included amongst the escort vessels, ostensibly to meet the air defense needs of the supply ships. As of the beginning of 2006, the supply ship Tokiwa had been on station for a month, escorted by the same Kirisame.

The JDS Tokiwa supply ship refueling the destroyer Sawagiri
Between 2001 and mid-2005, according to the Asahi, forty seven MSDF ships have participated in thirteen rotations on station. By October 2005 MSDF supply ships had supplied 552 ships in the multinational force, dispensing fuel worth 155 hundred million yen.[2]
Rules of engagement
But the Japanese mission is not limited *****pplying fuel. The Asahi articles make clear that one part of the MSDF contingents duties has been interception of vessels regarded as suspicious. The Asahi cites JDA statements about 11,000 inspections, and ?omany crews? arrested.[3] The Asahi comments wryly, ?ohowever, it is not clear how this work actually contains terrorists.? In fact, a great deal is unclear about the Japanese activities in ?oOperation Enduring Freedom - Maritime Interdiction Operations (OEF-MIO)?. The precise guidelines the MSDF is using are not known, though the Asahi refers to use of US guidelines concerning suspicious ships. The Asahi cites an example where the boarding of a ship was left to a Canadian navy ship, apparently authorised to do so where the MDSF was not. [4] Yet the precise Rules of Engagement and legal framework under which the MSDF is operating in these interdiction operations is not known, nor is the fate of those ?omany crews? arrested.
The question of the precise legal arrangements governing these interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean now overlaps with the issue of the legality of multinational operations to interdict alleged weapons of mass destruction under the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, to which Japan is a party. The MSDF is an eager partner in this developing capacity, and Japan hosted one of the first PSI multilateral naval and coast guard exercises off the coast of Sagami Bay (?oTeam Samurai 04?) in October 2004.[5] For the blue water interdiction ambitions of the MSDF, four years of practical experience in the Indian Ocean is invaluable.

Changes in the Indian Ocean deployment
As the Ground Self Defense Force commitment to Iraq winds down, there is no sign that this MSDF Indian Ocean deployment will be abandoned. However, during the past four years, the pattern of activity and the character of the deployment has gone through important changes. As the Asahi notes below, the height of refuelling activities corresponded with the attack on Afghanistan itself, but the attack on Iraq led to another spike in supply work.
In 2005, the number of escort vessels was reduced from two to one, and most importantly in the November 2005 deployment, the supply ship was no longer accompanied by an Aegis-class destroyer. There were most likely two reasons for this, neither suggesting a scaling back of Japan?Ts naval role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
Firstly, in 2004 the Koizumi government committed Japan to rapid deployment of a theatre missile defence system in conjunction with the United States, the most potent part of which will be the sea-based system centred on Japan?Ts four Aegis-class destroyers. All four Aegis-class ships - the Kirishima, Kongo, Myoko and Chokai - spent time on the Indian Ocean station, but all four are undergoing advanced Aegis training with the US Navy, in preparation for their new duties. [6]

The DD173 Kongo is equipped with the advanced Aegis combat system
Secondly, the primary reason for dispatching the Kongo-class Aegis ships in the first place was not, as was stated by the government at the time, air defense for the supply vessels. The smaller but still highly competent Shirane- and Murakame-class destroyers were more than capable of handling any conceivable local area ocean air defense. The real reasons are not completely clear, but undoubtedly have to do with the prodigious area-wide surveillance and tracking capacities of the Aegis air defense system operated by the Kongo-class ships . These would have enabled the MSDF ships to cooperate with both US and UK navy and air units operating not only in the Indian Ocean, but possibly over Afghanistan itself. The possibility has also been raised that they were used to provide air defense warning for the approaches to the giant US-base on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago ?" a crucial and ongoing staging ground for both the war on Afghanistan and the war on Iraq.
More generally, the Indian Ocean deployment has been of enormous value to the MSDF itself, by providing a very large portion of the MSDF?Ts ships and personnel with war zone experience. The MSDF thus gained practical experience of multilateral operations in theater, with all the trials of inter-operability, communications difficulties, differing rules of engagement, and differences in organisational culture.
?oInter-operability? ?" the capacity to work together with military forces of other nations, is clearly a technical requirement for any effective multinational force ?" whether under UN auspices or any other. The importance and difficulty of achieving this goal is clear from this Canadian navy discussion:
?oThese obstacles are commonly grounded in such factors as disagreements or misunderstandings over mission goals, priorities and rules of engagement (ROEs); the reliance of different coalition contributors on different types of equipment, or on similar equipment with different specifications; the commitment of the various national forces involved to incompatible tactical,
organizational, leadership or other professional doctrines; the involvement in coalition campaigns of units that have been exposed to unrealistic and/or insufficient training and preparatory exercises; and a variety of other factors,
ranging from different organizational cultures to outright policy disagreements at the highest levels of national decision-making. Left unattended, such sources of behavioural divergence can create havoc in the field, particularly when many of the national contingents involved are not large enough to be logistically, and in other respects, self-sufficient.? [7]
Almost immediately in 2001, the MSDF rapidly discovered how little prepared it was for large-scale operations far from home ?" and hence welcomed the opportunity for expansion of its capacities as a true ?oblue-water navy?. While most attention has gone to the role of accompanying destroyers, the impact of the distant deployment experience is evident in the rapid development of larger supply vessels than were available in 2001, such as the newly launched 13,500 ton Mashu, deployed in November 2004, almost twice the size of its predecessors.
In ad***ion to the MSDF deployments documented below, and the GSDF deployment of more than 600 troops on reconstruction duties in Samawa in the southern Iraqi province of Al Muthanna, there has also been a series of Air Self Defense Force deployments that have led to a constant ASDF presence, amounting to more than 264 transport flights as of February 22, 2005. [8]
The Indian Ocean deployment and Heisei militarization
However, the Indian Ocean operations have received much less criticism. The Indian Ocean deployments are well away from the public eye, and little is known in detail about them. In contrast to the deeply politicised debate over the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq, there was little public discussion and less criticism of the MSDF dispatch and its continued involvement in the region now in its fifth year. Neither scholars nor journalists have been effective in efforts to penetrate the veils surrounding the operations.[9]
But it is not just distance and absence of concrete information that explains the relative acceptance of this deployment. Much more than the Iraq deployment, the MSDF deployment can be presented as part of Japan?Ts contribution to international cooperation against transnational terror, thus gaining the crucial legitimacy in Japan of association with legitimate United Nations-linked activities. The legislation under which the MSDF continues to operate in the Indian Ocean is the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and is continually presented to the Japanese public in such terms.[10]

The JDS Bungo participating in an exercise with the US fast attack
submarine USS La Jolla
The real military capacities of the SDF as a whole have been steadily and effectively expanded over the past decade and a half, in a process I have described as Heisei militarization.[11] Especially in the past five years, through changes in law, foreign policy and security high level doctrine, operational guidelines for cooperation with US forces, SDF rules of engagement, force structure, and military planning, Japan has removed many of the pre-existing restraints on the use of its already materially extremely powerful military forces.
Some of these shifts were underway in the 1990s, especially in the implementation of the 1997 Japan-US Mutual Security Treaty Guidelines, but much more followed in a rush of legislative, organisational, and doctrinal changes precipitated by the 9.11 attacks. US concern to reposition Japan within US global strategy coincided with the desire of the dominant elites in the LDP, Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency to push away both the domestic and foreign restrictions on Japan becoming a ?onormal state? status. This process of Heisei militarization, driven by both US pressure and domestic elite preferences culminated in the two momentous decisions of 2003-4 to deploy a theater missile defense system, whatever the consequences may be for relations with China, and to deploy ground troops in Iraq.

* Richard Tanter is Acting Director of Nautilus Institute at RMIT, and coordinates the Austral Peace and Security Project http://nautilus.org/~rmit/index.html and the Global Collaborative. He is co-e***or (with Gerry Van Klinken and Desmond Ball) of Masters of Terror: Indonesia?Ts Military in East Timor in 1999 (second e***ion), (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). Email: rtanter@nautilus.org

[1] See Gavan McCormack, ?oJapan?Ts Afghan adventure?, Japan in the World, November 5, 2001. http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/Afghanexpe***ion01.html
[2] The supply statistics are set out in Kaijou Bokuryou Kanbu, Hokyuu yusou kyouryoku shien katsudou nado no jisseki ni tsuite, H17 (2005) .12.6 http://www.jda.go.jp/JMSDF/about/haken/hakenkyouryoku/sienkatudou/index.html. The Indian Ocean rotations are set out in detail in Kantei no shutsunyuu minato kiroku, H17(2005).12.6. http://www.jda.go.jp/JMSDF/about/haken/hakenkyouryoku/kantei/index.html, and in ?oJieitai Indoyou Haken?, Wikipedia ?" Japanese e***ion, (accessed, 24.2.2006). <http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki?
[3] See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ?oAchievement of Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation (OEF-MIO)?, October 2005, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/effort0510.html#2
[4] A Canadian Naval Task Group similar in composition and size to the MSDF contingent was deployed in the Arabian Sea in November 2001, and is still on station under the code name of Operation Apollo. See ?oCanada''s Military Contribution To The International Campaign Against Terrorism? http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/mspa_operations/operations_e.asp?x=1&id=5, and ?oCanada''s Naval Task Group Arrives In Arabian Sea?, CJTFSWA 01-01 - November 23, 2001, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=294. There is a detailed and useful account of the Canadian Marine Interdiction Operations in United States Central Command, Canada, http://www.austin2600.org/mirrors/leaflets/www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/canada.htm
[5] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise "Team Samurai 04" (Overview and Evaluation), October 28, 2004. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/arms/psi/overview0410.html
[6] See ?oCommands we train?, Center for Surface Combat Systems detachment, Yokosuka, US Navy, http://www.yoko.atrc.navy.mil/commands.htm
[7] Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs, ?oThe Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability: The Issues?, Policy Matters/Enjeux Publics, June 2002, Vol. 3, No. 7. http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol3no7.pdf
[8] For data on ASDF Middle East operations to February 2006 see ASDF, Iraku fukkou shien haken yusou koukuutai ni yoru yusou katsudou jisseki?, http://www.jda.go.jp/jasdf/iraq/jisseki.htm.
For ASDF contingent rotations see ASDF, Iraku fukkou shien haken yusou koukuutai, http://www.jda.go.jp/jasdf/iraq/iraq_contents.htm
[9] This is evident when writing on the MSDF deployments is compared with the work of activist-researchers such as Peace Depot?Ts Umebayashi Hiromichi, whose creative use of the US Freedom of Information Law has made it possible to document important new understandings of the US Aegis-class missile defense patrols in the Sea of Japan. See his ?oOkushirijima seihou 190 km sakusen kuiki?, Kaku Heiki/Jiken Monitaa (239),August 1, 2005, online at http://www.peacedepot.org/nmtr/bcknmbr/nmtr239.pdf
[10] For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release announcing the October 2005 extension of this law was headed: Japan decides to continue to dispatch MSDF vessels to the Indian Ocean in order *****pport international efforts to fight against terrorism (Extension of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law).http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/measure0510.html
[11] Richard Tanter, ?oJapanese Militarization and the Bush Doctrine?, Japan Focus, (221) http://www.japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=221, and at length in Richard Tanter, ?With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization, and the Bush Doctrine?, in Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, e***ed by Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov, (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).
[12] See GlobalSecurity.com, Japan Maritime Self Defence Force
Nihon Kaijyo Jieitai, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jmsdf.htm
[13] For a brief but insightful examination of an emerging case for a reassessment of this claim with respect to China, see You Ji, ?oA New Era for Chinese Naval Expansion?, China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 5 (March 02, 2006) http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&issue_id=3637&article_id=2370827: ?oThe PLAN is firmly committed to move in the direction of achieving partial superiority in a specific war situation relatively close to home waters. This will force the navy to add more advanced warships and sophisticated IW measures in the years to come. Consequently, this persistent modernization will gradually produce capabilities for long-range power projection beyond the initial combat design. The civilian leadership seems to have committed itself to providing enough national resources to this naval leap forward. Liu Huaqing?Ts blue-water dream may be brought to reality sooner than we expect.?
[14] The 200-strong ASDF contingent operating three C-130 Hercules transports is currently based in Kuwait, and flies regularly into southern Iraq. Recent reports suggest it will operate more widely in Iraq itself, and from Qatar. See
?oSDF to pull out from Iraq in April-May?, Nikkei Net Interactive, February 27, 2006
ISSN: 1557-4660

Vãi thật !!!

Nhật cùng với Mỹ phát triển hệ thống tên lửa phòng thủ từ xa
Ballistic Missile Defense and the US-Japan Alliance
By Martin Sieffupi
[Ever since the Nixon-Mao accommodation in 1972, Chinese strategic analysts have generally viewed the US-Japan security pact as a way to restrain Japanese remilitarization. Some have called it the "cork" in the "bottle," or a "leash" on a possible new Japanese military threat in a region whose tensions, pivoting on China-Japan conflict, are growing even as its economic bonds expand. Now, however, Koizumi''s decision to deploy missile defenses in collaboration with US surveillance and command-and-control ?" in conjunction Japanese dispatch of Self-Defense Forces *****pport the US in the Iraq War, the permanent stationing of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the repositioning of US forces centered on the transfer of I Corps to Japan, and the explicit inclusion of Taiwan within the scope of the alliance --- have convinced the Chinese that Japan has become an active participating in a US design to contain China. Japan?Ts substantial commitment to the development of a cooperative Ballistic Missile Defense program coordinated the US thus has important regional and global ramifications. Japan Focus]
WASHINGTON -- Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro is due to step down in a few months after five confident, controversial years at the helm of the world''s second-ranking industrial power, but he will leave a ballistic missile defense juggernaut behind him.
Hardly a week now goes past without some isolated, usually little-remarked upon item that heralds another enormous stride in fulfilling his guiding vision of a gigantic, long-lasting new high-tech partnership with the United States to develop a world class BMD shield for his nation.
On Thursday, U.S. Army secretary Francis J. Harvey discussed progress in BMD cooperation with Japanese officials in Tokyo.
Earlier this month, a senior Boeing executive told a group of Washington reporters who specialize in covering BMD issues that the Japanese government is extremely interested in studying the Missile Defense Agency''s controversial Airborne Laser, or ABL anti-ballistic missile system, for which Boeing is the prime contractor. Should such a system become operational in the next few years, it could be of the greatest value in protecting Japan''s huge, densely populated cities from nuclear missiles fired from nearby North Korea.
Boeing''s Airborne Laser
"The Japanese are very interested in ABL," Greg Hyslop, director of the ABL program at Boeing. He said Boeing had already launched a study "to explore where Japanese defense industry might participate."
"They have very strong capabilities and they are very interested in doing it," Mitchell B. Kugler, Boeing''s director of its Strategic Initiative Missile Defense Systems, told reporters in the March briefing. "Our friends and allies in some ways are more at need (of upgraded ballistic missile defense systems) than we are now."
Indeed, Japan is now America''s most significant international partner in developing BMD systems, Air Force Lt. Gen. Henry "Trey" Obering III, director of the Missile Defense Agency, told the House Armed Services subcommittee hearing on March 9.
Obering was speaking the day after the first successful flight test of an interceptor missile using a nose cone developed by Japan occurred on March 8 off the coast of Hawaii. He told the subcommittee that the United States has been working with Japan on missile defense research since 1999.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy Peter Flory, who testified with Obering, said with its commitment to spend around $1 billion, Japan has become the United States'' largest international partner in missile defense. "The United States and Japan have agreed to work together to develop a more capable sea-based interceptor" that would improve the defense of both nations, he said.
The comments of the Boeing executives, Obering and Flory come after an epochal year when Koizumi pushed through the institutionalization of Japan''s high-tech BMD cooperation with the United States in a series of hugely ambitious projects, including the purchase of more than $1 billion worth of U.S.-built Standard Missile 3s developed for the sea-based Aegis anti-ballistic missile system to defend against threats from unpredictable North Korea.
Indeed, as the last year of Koizumi''s mandated maximum five-year run as Japan''s prime minister peters out, he appears to be trying to step up the pace of institutionalizing U.S.-Japanese technical and industrial cooperation on the BMD programs that may endure for years or even decades to come.
Last year, Koizumi closed a deal with Lockheed Martin for Japan to either buy off the shelf or produce itself 124 Patriot PAC-3 missiles by 2010.
Patriot PAC-3 Missile
The deal will not come cheaply for Japan and is a welcome boost for the prime U.S. contractor Lockheed Martin. The costs of developing the massive industrial and technological infrastructure needed to make the PAC-3s in Japan will be vastly greater than if the Defense Agency bought them off the shelf from the United States. However, Koizumi, ever the visionary, wants use the deal to establish the foundation for an independent Japanese ABM production capability. The program would also be a huge boost to Japan''s own missile production technologies.
Koizumi also knows that Japan''s once ambitious space and missile programs have long languished with engineering problems and clearly needed a shot in the arm. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is expected to produce the PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles domestically for deployment starting fiscal 2008 in association with Lockheed Martin.
Now, the interest Japanese officials are expressing in the Airborne Laser offers the prospect of another major area of cooperation between the two countries and major corporations in both.
The ABL has had a rocky road recently and speculations that now appear unfounded about its possible cancellation have circulated the U.S. media. The ABL program currently looks secure at least until it passes the crucial tests Gen. Obering has decreed for it in 2008. But having Japanese financial and engineering resources available to develop it would be an enormous shot in the arm for it.
And from the Japanese side, cooperation offers access into a rich new frontier area of technological breakthroughs that Japanese science and technology by itself has been lagging in until now.
The flourishing U.S.-Japanese special relationship in BMD has become one of the most important and overlooked developments in global strategy. The prospect of expanding it into ABL research suggests that there may be a lot more to come.
Martin Sieffupi is a Senior News Analyst for United Press International. This article appeared at UPI on March 24, 2006. Posted at Japan Focus on March 31, 2006.
ISSN: 1557-4660

Nhật muốn tăng cường quan hệ hải quân với Ấn Độ
Japan wants naval ties with India
3 April 2006: Japan is ready to give transit facilities in the Pacific Ocean to Indian naval warships, in return for similar facilities to its coast guard service in the Indian Ocean, which India is baulking at.
Impressed with Indian sea power evident during joint patrolling and exercises with foreign navies, and the robustness of its escort service to special ships in the Indian Ocean, Japan wants its own forces trained here to preempt attacks from North Korea and Islamic extremists perceiving it a US ally in the war against terror.
Japan feels its cities, ports and ships in the deep sea are vulnerable *****ch attacks, but while India is comfortable with training its forces, it is not ready to provide facilities to foreign navies in the Indian Ocean.
Được tande sửa chữa / chuyển vào 15:13 ngày 08/04/2006

Nếu so sánh lực lượng HQ của Nhựt Bủn với anh củ sâm tư bản thì như thế nào nhỉ ? Có vẻ như Hàn Quốc chú trọng bộ binh nhiều hơn là hải quân vì sát nách là anh Bắc Hàn. Mặc khác Hàn và Nhật đều là đồng minh của Mẽo nên đồ chơi chắc cũng sẽ giống nhau. Qua sự kiện đảo Dokko(goi tên theo kiểu Hàn) hay Takeshima (theo cách gọi của Nhật) thì liệu sẽ có đụng độ trong tương lai ko ?

Đề nghị các bác đưa ảnh lên thì chỉnh be bé đi tí cho anh em nhờ. Tài liệu nào bằng tiếng Anh cũng khỏi cần đưa lên, ở đây toàn dân ăn rau muống kinh niên, nếu muốn đọc tiếng Anh tự tìm trên google cả đống, việc quái gì phải vào diễn đàn tiếng Việt mà tìm.
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