Hồ sơ điệp viên tỷ đô của CIA: Mỹ đã ăn cắp công nghệ của Liên Xô ra sao

Dành tặng các bạn độc giả hồ sơ về việc ăn cắp công nghệ vũ khí hàng không không quân Liên xô những năm cuối thập niên 1970-1980, giúp Mỹ hoàn thành nhiều dự án, rút ngắn hàng thập kỉ so với LX về tụt hậu công nghệ quân sự

Gián điệp Mỹ tại Liên Xô bán bí mật 100 tỷ đôla
Tại sao gián điệp của CIA Adolf Tolkachev cầu xin KGB không xử bắn y.

Xin được giới thiệu bài viết với tiêu đề và phụ đề trên của Vitali Kariukov nhân các vụ Nga và Mỹ bắt giữ người của nhau thời gian gần đây. Bài đăng trên “Svobodnaia Pressa” ngày 13/1/2019. Chúng tôi có bổ sung thêm ảnh của Adolf Tolkachev.

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Ảnh: Denis Vyshinski / ТАSS
Trên “nền” các vụ scandal gián điệp đang làm nóng dư luận mới đây, khi FSB (Cơ quan an ninh) Nga bắt giữ cựu lính thủy đánh bộ Mỹ Paul Whelan, còn phía Mỹ thì bắt giữ công dân LB Nga Dmitri Makarenko, báo “Svobodnaia Pressa” muốn nhắc lại một câu chuyện (gián điệp) đã xảy ra cách đây 40 năm. Con số tổn thất khi đó được tính bằng hàng tỷ đôla. Không nhẽ bây giờ các gián điệp trở nên kém cỏi hơn và có giá trị ít hơn?

Năm 1978. Sau khi trả tiền ở quầy thanh toán tại một cây xăng và quay trở lại xe, người lái xe của Đại sứ quán Mỹ tại Matxcova phát hiện một phong bì thư lạ được nhét dưới tấm thảm lót sàn xe. Anh này ngay lập tức chuyển bức thư đó cho cấp trên của mình. Đấy là một bức thư có nội dung đề nghị hợp tác: một người nào đó đề nghị cung cấp “dịch vụ” – tức làm gián điệp cho người Mỹ.

Có vẻ như CIA đã quá gặp may! Nhưng vào thời điểm đó tổ điệp báo CIA tại Matxcova vừa mới nhận một chỉ thị ghi rất rõ: không được phản hồi các đề xuất “tự nguyện hợp tác”- (vi) các sỹ quan tình báo Mỹ sợ dính bẫy khiêu khích của các cán bộ phản gián Xô Viết.


Bức thư đó (và sau này có tới tổng cộng 5 bức thư tương tự), như về sau đã biết, là của cán bộ Viện nghiên cứu khoa học “Fazatron” Adof Tolkachev. Chính y là “nhân vật chủ động (đề xuất xuất hợp tác)”,- có nghĩa là tự mình muốn hợp tác với tình báo nước ngoài, trong trường hợp này- là tình báo Mỹ.

Do đặc thù công việc nên Tolkachev có điều kiện tiếp cận những thiết kế bí mật trong lĩnh vực công nghiệp vô tuyến Xô Viết. Đó là những thông tin về thiết bị vô tuyến trang bị cho Không quân chiến đấu và Lực lượng phòng không Liên Xô, các phương tiện kỹ thuật tên lửa và rất nhiều, rất nhiều các bí mật quan trọng khác.

Tại sao Tolkachev lại hành động như vậy? Đã đến tuổi ngũ tuần nhưng anh ta vẫn chưa làm được một điều gì đáng kể trên con đường công danh, sự nghiệp của mình . Xấu trai, không cao lớn, bị bệnh huyết áp cao.

Cha mẹ vợ của Tolkachev trong những năm Đại thanh trừng ( những năm cuối thập kỷ 30 tại Liên Xô-ND) bị đàn áp, và nhà khoa học không thành đạt này không có thiện cảm gì đặc biệt với chính quyền Xô Viết.

Chính vì thế nên đã không vào đảng, và thành thử, cũng không được thăng tiến và chỉ dừng lại ở vị trí một cán bộ bình thường của Viện nghiên cứu “Fazatron”. Anh ta bí mật đọc Solzenitsyn và Sakharov (Solzhenitsyn- nhà văn, Giải Nobel văn học năm 1970, Sakharov- nhà vật lý, viện sỹ Viện Hàn lâm khoa học Liên Xô, một trong những cha đẻ của bom nhiệt hạch Xô Viết- cả hai ông này đều là những nhân vật bất đồng chính kiến với chính quyền Xô Viết-ND).

Nhưng điều quan trọng nhất- Tolkachev mơ được sang sống ở Phương Tây, thêm nữa, được mang cả vợ Natalia và con trai đi cùng,- vợ Tolkachev cũng có cùng suy nghĩ trên với chồng.

Tuy vậy, không thể nói là cá nhân anh ta bị chính quyền Xô Viết bạc đãi điều gì đó: gia đình Tolkachev sống trong một ngôi nhà vào loại sang trọng xây từ thời Stalin (còn gọi là “Stalinka”- các tòa nhà nhiều căn hộ được xây dựng từ cuối những năm 30 đến những năm đầu 50 theo phong cách bán cổ điển, thường chỉ 5 tầng- để phân biệt với các tòa nhà lắp ghép xây dưới thời Khrushev- ND) tại Quảng trường “Khởi nghĩa”, còn tổng thu nhập hàng tháng của gia đình Tolkachev (3 người) là 700 rúp (trong khi lương trung bình của một kỹ sư thời gian đó chỉ là 110 rúp/tháng).

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Adolf Tolkachev . Ảnh: “Luận chứng và sự kiện”, ngày 28/10/2018.
Nhưng dù sao thì cuối cùng, vào năm 1979, các sỹ quan tổ điệp báo CIA tại Matxcova cũng đã quyết định phản hồi những đề nghị khẩn thiết của nhà khoa học này và đã tổ chức một cuộc gặp anh ta.

Ngày trong buổi làm quen đầu tiên, Tolkachev đã trao cho các “bạn Mỹ” một khối lượng khổng lồ những thông tin quý giá và bí mật đến mức ngay sau khi nghiên cứu nội dung các thông tin trên, phía Mỹ cảm thấy choáng ngợp và ngay lập tức dành một sự quan tâm đặc biệt đến “đối tác” Matxcova mới này. Và đặt mật danh cho Tolkachev là “Sfer”.


Những thông tin mà tên gián điệp này cung cấp cho Mỹ rất có giá trị, như bây giờ người ta thường nói- có “có dung lượng chất xám” rất lớn, và đáng giá cực kỳ nhiều tiền.

CIA đã mở cho Tolkachev một tài khoản ở một trong các ngân hàng Phương Tây và CIA đã chuyển vào tài khoản này 2 triệu đôla trong suốt thời gian y hợp tác với người Mỹ. Còn một khoản tiền nữa họ (CIA) đã chuyển cho tên phản bội khi gặp riêng y- bằng tiền rúp (vào khoảng 800.000 rúp- một số tiền khổng lồ thời đó).

Tổng cộng Tolkachev đã gặp với các “cán bộ phụ trách” người Mỹ của y khoảng 20 lần. Và trong khoảng thời gian đó, ngoài tiền, theo yêu cầu của kẻ phản bội, CIA còn chuyển cho điệp viên của mình các loại thuốc chữa bệnh (Phương Tây sản xuất), các băng cassette nhạc rock and roll (rock 'n' roll) và v.v.

Gia đình Tolkachev dùng khoản “tiền thưởng”này mua xe hơi “Ziguli” và dacha (nhà nghỉ ngoại ô)- và y đã cất giấu số tiền bẩn của mình tại nhà nghỉ này. Có vẻ như, thế thì cũng chỉ là một tay gián điệp tầm thường. Lấy đâu ra con số 100 tỷ đôla bị “đánh cắp”? Nhưng, cụ thể là thế này, thứ nhất, - đấy là tùy thuộc vào cách nhìn từ hướng nào....

Vấn đề là ở chỗ trong “sự nghiệp” hoạt động gián điệp của mình, những thông tin cực mật mà Tolkachev đã chuyển cho CIA đã vô hiệu hóa mọi nỗ lực của Tổ hợp công nghiệp quốc phòng Liên Xô trong lĩnh vực không quân và tên lửa- tức những loại vũ khí hiệu quả nhất thời bấy giờ.

Cộng thêm nữa, không nên quên những tổn thất (trong) tác chiến mà những nước trên thế giới mua (hoặc được trang bị- lúc này chủ yếu là các nước A rập-ND) các hệ thống vũ khí phòng không và máy bay chiến đấu của Liên Xô phải gánh chịu.

Vì như đã biết, trên mỗi phương tiện này (máy bay, vũ khí phòng không) đều có lắp thiết bị của hệ thống nhận biết “địch-ta”,- mọi tham số của những hệ thống này đã bị Tolkachev hào phóng cung cấp hết cho người Mỹ.


Ngoài ra, để có thể thay thế các thiết bị này, cần phải tháo rỡ, thiết kế lại và lắp thiết bị mới cho tất cả các máy bay Liên Xô ngay trên đất Liên Xô và ở nước ngoài. Cũng phải tốn kém hàng tỷ đôla nữa. Còn người Mỹ, ngoài việc có được trong tay những thiết kế bí mật mới nhất (những ý tưởng sáng tạo, các giải pháp khoa học giải quyết những vấn đề phức tạp nhất và v.v), họ lại còn có thể tiết kiệm được nhiều tỷ đôla lẽ ra phải chi những thiết kế kỹ thuật quân sự của mình.

Nó cũng tương tự như việc cả nền kinh tế Xô Viết làm việc cả ngày lẫn đêm để phục vụ tổ hợp công nghiệp quốc phòng Mỹ vậy. Có nghĩa là với chỉ hơn 3 triệu đôla, Tolkachev đã bán các bí mật quân sự ước tính trị giá 100 tỷ đôla. Do khối lượng thông tin khổng lồ mà tên phản bội Tolkachev cung cấp, người Mỹ đã đặt cho y biệt danh “Máy bơm” (thông tin).

Cũng dễ hiểu, một sự rò rỉ thông tin như vậy trước sau cũng bị phát hiện. Vào năm 1984, Edward Lee Howard (E.L.Howard- 1951-2002, sau chạy sang Liên Xô -ND) đến Áo.

Trước đó, viên sỹ quan tình báo CIA gạo cội này được giao nhiệm vụ đến Matxcova để liên lạc với Tolkachev. Nhưng ngay trước chuyến đi, “cấp trên” quyết định dùng máy phát hiện nói dối để kiểm tra anh này. Và Howard, vốn đang sử dụng ma túy nên đã không qua được kỳ kiểm tra trên và bị sa thải.

Do ấm ức với cấp trên nên vị cựu sỹ quan tình báo này bay đến Viên (thủ đô Áo), xuất hiện tại Đại sứ quán Xô Viết và đã “bán” “Sfer- Tolkachev” cho phía Xô Viết với cái giá cực bèo- chỉ 150.000 đôla. Các sỹ quan phản gián KGB lập tức “bắt tay vào việc”.

Và sau đó không lâu, thông tin về Tolkachev phản bội đã được khẳng định qua một nguồn khác độc lập với Howard- nguồn này cũng đã tiết lộ cho phía Xô Viết biết tên tuổi của “con chuột chũi” đang làm việc cho CIA.

Người cung cấp tin đó chính là Trưởng phòng Xô Viết Cục phản gián đối ngoại của CIA là Aldrich Ames (Aldrich Ames sinh năm 1941- hiện đang thụ án tù chung thân tại Mỹ vì tội làm gián điệp cho Liên Xô và sau là Nga-ND. Vòng vây bắt đầu được xiết chặt....

Nói cho đúng, bắt đầu từ năm 1984, khi các sỹ quan phản gián KGB bắt đầu quan tâm đếnTolkachev, họ đã sử dụng y để tuồn nhiều tin giả đưa người Mỹ vào bẫy. Còn sau khi Ames đã cung cấp thêm tin về Tolkachev, KGB đã bắt y.


Tên gián điệp này bị choáng nặng và ngay lập tức khai tuốt tuồn tuột và cầu xin không xử bắn y, (tại một cuộc gặp sỹ quan CIA từ trước khi bị KGB phát hiện làm gián điệp, viên sỹ quan tình báo Mỹ này khi nghe đề nghị của “Sfer” về việc cấp cho viên chứa thuốc độc phòng trường hợp bị đổ vỡ và bị bắt đã nói với y rằng nếu có chuyện gì xảy ra, đích thân tổng thống Mỹ sẽ can thiệp để cứu y). Sau này quả là có như vậy thật, nhưng với một chữ... “nhưng”.

Tháng 10 năm 1986, tại cuộc gặp giữa Mikhail Gorbachev (Tổng bí thư ĐCS Liên Xô) và Ronald Reagan (Tổng thống Mỹ) tại Reykjavík (thủ đô Iceland), Tổng thống Mỹ Reagan đã đề nghị Liên Xô đổi “Sfer” lấy một ai đó. Người đứng đầu Nhà Trắng lúc đó không biết là kẻ phản bội đã bị hành hình vào tháng 9 (một tháng trước đó) và Tổng BT M. Gorbachev đã trả lời: “Muộn rồi, y đã bị xử bắn”.

Tuy vậy, thông tin Tolkachev đã bị xử bắn cũng không hề ảnh hưởng đến tiến trình cuộc găp giữa hai nguyên thủ. Còn việc vô hiệu hóa được Sfer cũng có thể coi là một đòn giáng mạnh vào CIA của cơ quan phản gián Xô Viết trong những năm 80. Và giờ đây, cuộc chiến giữa các hiệp sỹ áo choàng và dao găm (các cơ quan tình báo) vẫn tiếp diễn.

http://baodatviet.vn/the-gioi/ho-so/gian-diep-my-tai-lien-xo-ban-bi-mat-100-ty-dola-3372940/?paged=2

Nguồn gốc của CIA thừa nhận vai trò to lớn của tên phản bội Adolf Tolkachev

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...s/csi-studies/studies/vol47no3/article02.html

Điệp viên bạc tỷ: Kẻ hủy hoại nền hàng không quân sự Xô Viết

Bài học về kẻ phản bội Tolkachev sẽ mãi mãi là một bài học đau đớn dành cho nước Nga sau này.



Để tránh trở nên lỗi thời do bị lộ bí mật, Nga đã phải gấp rút thực hiện 10.000 nâng cấp lớn nhỏ cho máy bay Su-27 để cho ra đời phiên bản nâng cấp Su-27SM hiện đại hơn.

Theo Tom Cooper - chuyên gia phân tích sức mạnh không quân tại Trung Đông, vào tháng 3/1986, các tiêm kích hạm F-14 thuộc Hải quân Mỹ nhanh chóng chiếm ưu thế bầu trời vịnh Sirte, phía bắc thành phố Sirte – quê hương của nhà lãnh đạo Libya Muammar Gaddafi.

Các hoạt động gây nhiễu mạnh mẽ đã vô hiệu hóa toàn bộ khả năng phòng thủ không gian của Libya, ngăn chặn họ giành lại quyền làm chủ bầu trời vịnh Sirte.

Con "ngáo ộp" quay lại bầu trời

Hành động mạnh mẽ của Mỹ đã buộc Tripoli phải từ bỏ những tuyên bố chủ quyền của mình trên vùng biển Địa Trung Hải. Bị thiệt hại nặng nề bởi các đòn tấn công chính xác cũng như các hoạt động tác chiến điện tử, lực lượng Phòng không – Không quân Libya buộc phải để mặc các máy bay đối phương làm chủ bầu trời của chính mình.

Thực chất chiến dịch này chỉ là một đòn đánh thử nhằm kiểm tra sức mạnh của lực lượng phòng thủ bầu trời Libya và là mở đầu cho chiến dịch tập kích đường không quy mô lớn được thực hiện vào tháng 4 cùng năm. Lần đầu tiên sau 10 năm, kể từ thời điểm kết thúc chiến tranh Việt Nam, quân đội Mỹ lại mở một chiến dịch tập kích đường không quy mô lớn ở nước ngoài.

Nhiều người cho rằng, thành công của Mỹ tại Libya là kết quả của hoạt động huấn luyện thường xuyên cộng với chiến thuật tác chiến linh hoạt và phù hợp. Nhưng họ cũng quên mất rằng, còn một nhân tố quan trọng khác trên mặt trận không tiếng súng, có tác động tích cực lên chiến dịch này, đó là hoạt động tình báo.

Điệp viên bạc tỷ



Giữa thập niên 1980, lực lượng tình báo Mỹ bắt đầu cấy được những cơ sở tin cậy của mình vào ngành công nghiệp quốc phòng Xô Viết. Đối với ngành công nghiệp hàng không quân sự nói riêng, xuất hiện một cái tên đặc biệt mà sau này người ta vẫn còn phải tốn nhiều giấy mực, đó là Adolf Georgievich Tolkachev, một nhà khoa học ngành điện tử hàng không.

Tolkachev chính là nhân vật chính của cuốn tiểu thuyết thực tế "Điệp viên bạc tỷ" của nhà văn David Hoffman. Sinh năm 1927 tại tỉnh Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan và là một nhà khoa học tài năng nhưng ông lại sa đà vào con đường chính trị.

Tolkachev sớm có những suy nghĩ tiêu cực và lệch lạc về chính quyền, cộng thêm việc mẹ vợ bị hành quyết, cha vợ bị bắt đi lao động khổ sai trong thời kỳ lãnh tụ Stalin thực hiện các chính sách cải cách cứng rắn những năm cuối thập niên 1930. Tất cả những điều này đã khiến ông nuôi dưỡng trong mình một ý định "phục thù".

Sự nghiệp tình báo của ông chính thức bắt đầu vào năm 1979, khi ông móc nối được với một cơ sở của CIA tại Moskva, đó là nhà ngoại giao John I. Guilsher.

Những "nạn nhân" đầu tiên

Lại nói về chiến thắng của Hải quân Mỹ trên vịnh Sirte. Ngày 24/3/1986, sau khi làm chủ bầu trời vùng vịnh, các máy bay Hải quân dễ dàng quét sạch các tổ hợp tên lửa S-200 đóng quanh bờ biển và đánh chìm thêm một vài tàu tên lửa của Hải quân Libya.

Một tháng sau, 66 máy bay F-14, F-111 và A-6 của Mỹ mở chiến dịch tập kích đường không "Hẻm núi Dorado" vào hai thành phố Tripoli và Benghazi. Mặc dù phòng không Libya chống trả quyết liệt, chỉ có 1 máy bay của Hải quân Mỹ bị bắn rơi. Lực lượng tấn công rút lui sau 11 phút.

Tiếp tục, tháng 1/1989, 2 chiếc F-14A Tomcat của Hải quân Mỹ lại đột kích vào vùng trời Libya, bắn rơi 2 máy bay MiG-23MF của Không quân Libya rồi rút lui ngay sau đó.

Các chiến thắng kiểu "áp đảo" của Mỹ vẫn tiếp tục trên bầu trời Trung Đông trong thập niên 1990. Năm 1991, Không lực Mỹ tràn ngập bầu trời Iraq vỏn vẹn trong 3 ngày, lực lượng Không quân Iraq, vốn được trang bị và huấn luyện tốt, được thử lửa qua cuộc chiến với Iran, nay bị đánh cho tan tác, thậm chí nhiều phi công còn phải bay sang Iran trốn chạy.


Hình ảnh chiếc MiG-23MF của Không quân Libya bị bắn hạ ngày 4/1/1989 bởi tiêm kích hạm F-14A Mỹ. Nguồn: U.S. Navy

Đó là Không quân, còn Phòng không Iraq cũng chẳng khá khẩm hơn bao nhiêu. Sau hơn 20 năm phát triển, từng nếm mùi khói lửa qua các cuộc chiến tranh giữa người Ả Rập – Israel và chiến tranh với Iran, nay Phòng không Iraq cũng phải "tắt điện" trước Không lực liên quân và gần như không gây ra bất cứ cản trở lớn nào cho lực lượng tấn công.

Đây chỉ là 4 ví dụ trong hàng tá các ví dụ khác về những chuỗi chiến thắng kiểu "áp đảo" của Không quân Mỹ đối với lực lượng đối phương trong 30 năm qua. Thời kỳ mà các máy bay Mỹ phải vận lộn, xoay xở vô cùng khó khăn với Không quân và Phòng không đối phương nhằm chiếm quyền làm chủ bầu trời như ở Việt Nam đã đi vào dĩ vãng.

Một câu hỏi lớn được đặt ra, từ một cường quốc bại trận trong chiến tranh Việt Nam, sau 10 năm, quân đội Mỹ, cụ thể là Không lực đã lấy lại sức mạnh của mình như thế nào?

Người có công đầu tiên không thể không nhắc đến đó chính là Tolkachev.

Nhiều học giả cho rằng, thất bại của các lực lượng quân sự vùng Trung Đông là do thiếu huấn luyện, chỉ huy kém, trang bị nghèo nàn và kinh nghiệm không có. Hay cho rằng ở Iraq năm 1991, lực lượng phòng không của quốc gia Ả Rập này đã xuống cấp nghiêm trọng, cộng thêm với các quyết sách chính trị của giới lãnh đạo gây ra tổn thương cho chính bản thân họ.

Chúng ta hãy thử đặt sang một bên các vấn đề về khí tài và phương tiện chiến đấu, về huấn luyện, chiến thuật, chiến lược hay các quyết định chính trị ồn ào, nhìn vào các sự kiện lịch sử trên một lần nữa, để nhận ra một điểm chung giữa chúng. Đó là lực lượng Mỹ có những hiểu biết đầy đủ về trang bị của Libya, Iraq và cả Nam Tư sau này.

Ví dụ, phi công điều khiển những chiếc A-7E Corsair II tấn công các tổ hợp tên lửa phòng không S-200 của Libya quanh vịnh Sirte ngày 24/3/1986 biết rất rõ các tính năng kỹ chiến thuật của phương tiện mà đối phương sử dụng. Họ biết radar 5N62 hoạt động ở băng tần nào, dễ bị nhiễu ở rãnh sóng nào cũng như vùng mù của radar nằm trong khoảng bao nhiêu.

Tương tự, các phi công điều khiển hai máy bay F-14A Tomcat bắn rơi hai chiếc MiG-23MF năm 1989 biết rằng các máy bay chiến đấu cánh cụp – cánh xòe MiG-23 thuộc biến thể "Flogger-B" thiếu cơ động ở những vị trí nào và biết nó thiếu khả năng tấn công ở góc tấn lớn.

Phi công vận hành F-15/F-16 của Không lực Mỹ cũng thuộc như lòng bàn tay toàn bộ tính năng của từng loại vũ khí, từng loại biến thể mà kẻ thù của họ sử dụng trên bầu trời Iraq năm 1991 và 2002 sau này.


Dự án MiG-29 là một trong những dự án chịu nhiều thiệt hại nhất từ Tolkachev. Sau này Nga đã bù đắp lại bằng cách phát triển biến thể MiG-29SMT (trong ảnh). Nguồn: Tom Cooper Collection

Hoạt động tình báo chính là chìa khóa của những thành công kể trên.

Sổ tay chiến thuật mà các phi công được dạy tại Trường Vũ khí Không quân, thuộc Không đoàn 57 Không quân Mỹ đã đề cập rất rõ về tính năng chiến thuật của những loại vũ khí hiện đại nhất đang có trong trang bị của quân đội Liên Xô, bao gồm cả chiến đấu cơ MiG-29, Su-27, tổ hợp tên lửa S-300P, tổ hợp Buk và nhiều loại phương tiện khác.



Kẻ tàn phá ngành hàng không Xô Viết

Tất cả những tài liệu mà Tolkachev cung cấp cho Mỹ đều rất có giá trị, cả về mặt công nghệ quân sự lẫn chính trị.

Từ năm 1979, khi làm việc ở cương vị kỹ sư thiết kế tại Viện nghiên cứu kỹ thuật Radar Liên Xô (hay Cục thiết kế Phazotron), Tolkachev đã có thể tiếp cận được với những tài liệu đặc biệt nhạy cảm, được Liên Xô xếp vào hàng "Совершенно Секретно" (tuyệt mật), chủ yếu về các phương tiện điện tử hàng không, radar và các tên lửa chiến thuật sắp trang bị cho các máy bay Xô Viết.

Tháng 12/1979, Cục phòng vệ Mỹ bắt đầu xây dựng bộ hồ sơ về các khí tài điện tử dựa trên những thông tin nhận được từ Tolkachev.

Các tài liệu này được CIA đánh giá rất cao: "Chúng ta chưa bao giờ lại có thể có những hiểu biết đầy đủ và chi tiết như thế này [về các vũ khí của Liên Xô] cho đến khi chúng được triển khai".


Adolf Georgievich Tolkachev. Nguồn: David Hoffman

Tháng 4/1980, tình báo CIA lại chuyển về trung tâm một tài liệu nữa của Tolkachev đề cập chi tiết về một loại khí tài chống nhiễu dự tính sẽ được trang bị cho radar của các máy bay chiến đấu thế hệ mới.

Vài tháng sau, Tolkachev lại được ghi nhận khi cung cấp các tài liệu về một loại máy bay chiến đấu độc đáo mới của Xô Viết và một số biến thể tên lửa hàng không sắp được trang bị.

Các tình báo viên thuộc Cục Phòng vệ Mỹ tháng 9/1980 đã ca ngợi: "…, đóng góp của Tolkachev đã giúp phá bỏ những giới hạn bao lâu nay kìm hãm sự phát triển của các hệ thống quốc phòng… .Tài liệu mà Tolkachev gửi về đã giúp nước Mỹ tiết kiệm nhiều sinh mạng, phương tiện, rút ngắn thời gian và tiền của trong các hoạt động nghiên cứu, phát triển công nghệ mới".

Nhìn về hướng bên kia, những tổn thất mà Tolkachev gây ra cho ngành công nghiệp hàng không quân sự Xô Viết là không thể đong đếm nổi.

Thông tin về các chiến đấu cơ tiên tiến như MiG-29, MiG-31, Su-27 và các vũ khí trang bị kèm theo đều lộ. Các thông tin được gửi đi một phần như dự án Su-27, hoặc bị lộ hoàn toàn như MiG-29. Phía Mỹ đã tranh thủ được thời gian, nhanh chóng phát triển các phương tiện mới đủ khả năng đối kháng lại vũ khí của Liên Xô.



Từ cuối năm 1984, Tolkachev dần bị lộ tẩy bởi các "ván bài tình báo" được KGB sắp đặt. Nhiều tài liệu của ông gửi về Mỹ bị phát hiện, thậm chí bị "trộn" bằng tài liệu giả, hoặc tài liệu bị sửa chữa nhằm gây thiệt hại cho phía Mỹ.

Ngày 20/9/1985, Tolkachev bị bắt và bị tuyên án tử hình về tội danh làm "gián điệp cho nước ngoài". Bản án được thi hành năm 1986.

Năm 1991, Liên bang Xô Viết sụp đổ. Trong suốt một thời gian dài của thập kỷ 90, do tình hình kinh tế khó khăn, ngành công nghiệp hàng không quân sự của nước Nga phải ngậm ngùi chịu cảnh thiếu kinh phí, không có bất cứ dự án phát triển máy bay lớn hay thậm chí nâng cấp nào được thực hiện.



Chính vì nguyên nhân này mà các tài liệu Tolkachev cung cấp cho phía Mỹ vẫn còn giá trị ngay cả khi ông ta đã chết từ lâu.

Một kỹ sư Sukhoi từng phát biểu: "Trong 20 năm, chúng tôi đã phải thực hiện 10.000 nâng cấp lớn nhỏ khác nhau để cải tiến phiên bản Su-27 thành Su-27SM nhằm sửa chữa những thiệt hại mà Tolkachev gây ra".

Những gì Adolf Tolkachev tiết lộ cho CIA có lẽ vẫn không được phổ biến rộng rãi trong nhiều năm tới, tuy nhiên, chắc chắn rằng khối lượng của những tài liệu bị lộ này là rất lớn – theo cả nghĩa đen lẫn nghĩa bóng.

Hành động phản bội của ông dẫn đến việc thải loại sớm nhiều phương tiện chiến tranh hiện đại và làm nhiều loại tên lửa hàng không "lỗi thời" ngay từ khi đi vào biên chế. Bài học về kẻ phản bội Tolkachev sẽ mãi mãi là một bài học đau đớn dành cho nước Nga sau này.

https://warisboring.com/the-man-who-ruined-the-soviet-warplane-industry/

Adolf Tolkachev 1 trong những cha đẻ máy bay tàng hình Mỹ

A Look Back … The Execution of a “Great Spy”: Adolf Tolkachev
In 1976, Adolf Tolkachev, a Soviet aviation specialist working on stealth technology for aircraft, began leaving notes in, or on, the cars of U.S. diplomats near the American Embassy in Moscow. He was interested in meeting with CIA officials.

For almost a decade—after finally making that contact—he proved to be a tremendous reporting asset. He provided plans, specifications and test results on existing and planned Soviet aircraft and missiles. The information provided by Tolkachev saved the U.S. government billions of dollars in defense expen***ures, a coup that prompted some intelligence historians to call him “the greatest spy since Penkovsky.”



Tolkachev’s espionage ended with his arrest by the KGB on June 9, 1985. On Sept. 25, 1986, a TASS (Russia’s official news agency) news article announced that Tolkachev had been tried, convicted and executed the day before. Although initial suspicion for his arrest fell on former CIA employee and defector Edward Lee Howard, who had been slated to handle Tolkachev while stationed in Moscow, subsequent information revealed that Tolkachev was also betrayed by Aldrich Ames.

For more on Tolkachev, visit “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky” from Studies in Intelligence.


Historical Document
Posted: Sep 25, 2008 11:17 AM
Last Updated: Jun 09, 2015 01:10 PM

https://www.cia.gov/news-informatio...8-featured-story-archive/adolf-tolkachev.html

Đó cũng là lý do tại sao LX có lý thuyết tàng hình, nhưng ko bám theo nó trước mà lại là Mỹ, bởi LX thừa biết bí mật đã bị lộ và cho phép thằng Mỹ sử dụng làm chuột bạch trước, để ngày nay Nga tiến bộ công nghệ, với trang bị tàng hình tốt hơn trên Su-57

Cách CIA điều hành một ‘gián điệp tỷ đô’ ở Moskva



Điệp viên đã biến mất.

Ông là điệp viên có giá trị và thành công nhất trong lòng Liên Xô mà Hoa Kỳ đã điều hành trong hai thập niên. Các tài liệu và bản vẽ của ông đã mở khóa những bí mật về nghiên cứu vũ khí và radar của Liên Xô cho tới nhiều năm trong tương lai. Ông đã lén đưa các bảng mạch và bản thiết kế ra khỏi phòng thí nghiệm quân sự của mình. Hoạt động gián điệp của ông giúp đưa Hoa Kỳ lên vị trí thống trị các vùng trời trong chiến đấu trên không và xác nhận các lỗ hổng của hệ thống phòng không Liên Xô – nó cho thấy rằng tên lửa hành trình và máy bay ném bom chiến lược của Mỹ có thể bay mà không bị radar phát hiện.

Vào cuối thu và đầu đông năm 1982, CIA đã mất liên lạc với ông ta. Năm cuộc hẹn gặp đều bị bỏ lỡ. Hoạt động giám sát của KGB được tiến hành trên khắp đường phố. Ngay cả các nhân viên CIA “có vỏ bọc rất kín” tại căn cứ Moskva mà KGB không hề biết cũng không thể vượt qua được.

Vào tối ngày 07/12, ngày hẹn gặp tiếp theo được lên lịch, tương lai của hoạt động ngầm được đặt trong tay của Bill Plunkert. Sau một thời gian làm phi công Hải quân, Plunkert đã gia nhập CIA và được đào tạo làm nhân viên tình báo. Ông đang ở độ tuổi 35, cao khoảng 187 cm (6 ft 2 in) và đã đến trạm Moskva vào mùa hè. Nhiệm vụ của ông là lẩn tránh KGB và kết nối các liên lạc, gặp gỡ.

Buổi tối hôm đó, vào khoảng giờ ăn tối, Plunkert và vợ của ông, cùng với Trưởng trạm CIA và vợ ông ta, bước ra khỏi Đại sứ quán Mỹ đến bãi đậu xe, dưới sự theo dõi liên tục của lực lượng dân quân mặc quân phục – lực lượng này báo cáo cho KGB. Họ bước lên một chiếc xe hơi và người trưởng trạm lái xe đi. Plunkert ngồi bên cạnh ông ta ở ghế trước. Hai bà vợ của họ ngồi phía sau, tay cầm một chiếc bánh sinh nhật lớn.

Gián điệp là nghệ thuật của sự đánh lừa. Tối nay, Plunkert là nhà ảo thuật. Ẩn dưới bộ quần áo bên ngoài của mình, ông mặc một lớp thứ hai vốn thường thấy ở một ông già người Nga. Chiếc bánh sinh nhật là giả, với phần phía trên trông giống như một chiếc bánh nhưng che giấu một thiết bị bên dưới, được gọi là hộp hình nộm (jack-in-the-box), do các chuyên gia kỹ thuật của CIA tạo ra. CIA biết rằng các đội giám sát của KGB gần như luôn luôn bám đuôi theo sau chiếc xe hơi và hiếm khi vượt lên chạy bên cạnh. Chiếc xe chở sĩ quan CIA có thể biến khỏi tầm nhìn trong phút chốc khi rẽ vào một hoặc hai khúc cua. Trong khoảnh khắc ngắn ngủi đó, sĩ quan CIA có thể nhảy ra khỏi xe và biến mất. Đồng thời, chiếc hộp hình nộm sẽ được bật ra, hình nộm có vẻ ngoài trông giống như đầu và thân của người sỹ quan vừa mới nhảy ra khỏi xe.

Thiết bị này chưa từng được sử dụng trước đó tại Moskva, nhưng CIA ngày càng tuyệt vọng sau nhiều tuần trôi qua. Plunkert cởi bỏ bộ quần áo Mỹ bên ngoài của mình. Đeo vào chiếc mặt nạ phủ khắp mặt và cặp kính mắt, ông bây giờ đã cải trang thành một ông già người Nga. KGB đang bám đuôi theo sau một khoảng. Lúc đó là 7:00 tối, màn đêm đã buông xuống được một lúc.

Chiếc xe rẽ vào một góc đường. Plunkert mở cửa xe trước và nhảy ra ngoài. Cùng lúc đó, một trong những người vợ đặt chiếc bánh sinh nhật lấp vào chỗ trống trên chiếc ghế trước cạnh tài xế. Bằng một cú đập mạnh dứt khoát, mặt trên cùng của chiếc bánh hé mở và một cái đầu cùng thân mình bung ra thay vào vị trí trống. Chiếc xe tăng tốc lướt đi.

Bên ngoài, Plunkert bước bốn bước trên vỉa hè. Khi ông bước sang bước thứ năm thì chiếc xe bám đuôi của KGB vòng qua góc đường đó. Ánh đèn pha bắt gặp một ông già người Nga trên vỉa hè. Nhưng KGB không để ý đến ông ấy và phóng đi đuổi theo chiếc xe hơi.

Hộp hình nộm đã phát huy tác dụng.

Điệp viên muốn trả thù

Trong những năm đầu Chiến tranh Lạnh giữa Hoa Kỳ và Liên Xô, Cơ quan Tình báo Trung ương Mỹ đã che dấu một bí mật khó chịu về chính tổ chức này. CIA đã không bao giờ thực sự có được các điệp viên hoạt động trên các đường phố Moskva. Việc tuyển dụng điệp viên ở đó là quá nguy hiểm cho bất kỳ công dân hay quan chức Liên Xô nào mà họ muốn tranh thủ. Chính quá trình tuyển dụng – từ giây phút đầu tiên một điệp viên khả dĩ được xác định và tiếp cận – cũng đầy ắp nguy cơ bị KGB khám phá, và nếu bị bắt đang hoạt động gián điệp, điệp viên chắc chắn sẽ phải đối mặt với cái chết. Một vài điệp viên tự nguyện hoặc được CIA tuyển dụng bên ngoài Liên Xô tiếp tục báo cáo một cách an toàn một khi họ trở về nước. Nhưng đa phần CIA đã không tuyển được các điệp viên tham gia hoạt động gián điệp ngay tại chỗ.

Sau đó một chiến dịch gián điệp đã hình thành và tình thế đã có sự đổi chiều. Người điệp viên chính là Adolf Tolkachev, một kỹ sư và chuyên gia về sóng vô tuyến, hoạt động sâu bên trong bộ máy quân đội Liên Xô. Trong vòng 6 năm, Tolkachev đã gặp các sĩ quan CIA 21 lần trên các đường phố của Moskva, một thành phố được KGB giám sát kỹ lưỡng.

Câu chuyện về Tolkachev được nêu chi tiết trong 944 trang điện tín mật trước đây của CIA về chiến dịch gián điệp này. Chúng đã được giải mật mà không cần điều kiện cho cuốn sách sắp xuất bản mang tựa đề “Điệp viên tỷ đô” (The Billion Dollar Spy). CIA đã không xét duyệt cuốn sách này trước khi xuất bản. Các tài liệu và các cuộc phỏng vấn với những người tham gia giúp mang lại một bức tranh chi tiết đáng chú ý về cách thức hoạt động gián điệp được tiến hành ở Moskva trong những năm căng thẳng nhất của cuộc Chiến tranh Lạnh.

Tolkachev đã bị thôi thúc bởi mong muốn trả thù lịch sử. Mẹ của vợ ông bị hành quyết và người cha thì bị gửi đến các trại lao động trong giai đoạn Đại khủng bố những năm 1930 dưới thời Joseph Stalin. Ông cũng mô tả mình là bị vỡ mộng về chủ nghĩa cộng sản và “là một người bất đồng chính kiến ngay trong sâu thẳm tâm hồn”. Ông muốn tấn công lại hệ thống Xô-viết và đã làm như vậy bằng cách cung cấp bí mật quân sự cho Hoa Kỳ. Các nhân viên CIA điều hành Tolkachev thường quan sát thấy rằng dường như ông quyết tâm gây ra thiệt hại tối đa có thể cho Liên Xô, bất chấp những rủi ro. Hình phạt dành cho tội phản quốc là tử hình. Tolkachev không muốn chết dưới tay KGB. Ông yêu cầu và nhận được một viên thuốc tự tử từ CIA để sử dụng nếu ông bị bắt.

Không quân ước tính tại một thời điểm trong toàn bộ chiến dịch là hoạt động gián điệp của Tolkachev đã tiết kiệm cho Hoa Kỳ 2 tỷ USD trong nghiên cứu và phát triển vũ khí. Tolkachev lén đưa hầu hết các tài liệu bí mật ra khỏi văn phòng của ông vào giờ ăn trưa. Các tài liệu đó được giấu trong áo khoác của ông và được chụp hình bằng cách sử dụng một máy ảnh Pentax 35mm thường được kẹp chặt vào một chiếc ghế trong căn hộ của ông. Đổi lại, Tolkachev đòi tiền từ CIA, chủ yếu như là một dấu hiệu của sự tôn trọng. Không có nhiều thứ để mua ở Moskva – một nơi thiếu thốn nhiều thứ. Ông cũng yêu cầu các album nhạc phương Tây – The Beatles, Led Zeppelin, Uriah Heep… – cho con trai đang ở độ tuổi thiếu niên của mình.

Tolkachev đã trở thành một trong những điệp viên có hiệu quả cao nhất của CIA thời Chiến tranh Lạnh. Tuy nhiên, điều ít được biết đến về toàn bộ chiến dịch – điều chứng tỏ sự trưởng thành của CIA – là khi nó hoàn thành điều mà bấy lâu nay vẫn nghĩ là không thể đạt được: tiếp xúc cá nhân với một điệp viên ngay trước mũi KGB mà không bị phát hiện.

Lẩn tránh KGB

Trạm hoạt động Moskva là một căn phòng an toàn bằng kích thước của một toa chở hàng nằm bên trong Đại sứ quán Mỹ. Các nhân viên điều hành điệp viên tụ tập ở chiếc bàn làm việc nhỏ, xem xét kỹ lưỡng các bản đồ trên tường với những chiếc đinh ghim màu đỏ nằm rải rác để đánh dấu những điểm nóng nguy hiểm có KGB và tỉ mỉ lên phương án cho từng bước đi.

David Rolph, trong chuyến đi nhiệm kỳ cho CIA lần đầu tiên của mình, đã giữ vai trò là sĩ quan điều hành Tolkachev vào năm 1980. Cuối buổi chiều ngày 14 tháng 10, ông bước ra khỏi trạm và đi về nhà. Một giờ sau, ông quay trở lại đến cửa Đại sứ quán cùng với vợ, ăn mặc như sắp đi đến một bữa tiệc tối. Một dân quân Xô-viết đang đứng gác nhìn thấy họ đi vào tòa nhà sứ quán.


David Rolph, nhân viên CIA thứ hai phụ trách Tolkachev. Nguồn: trích từ cuốn sách.

Rolph và vợ ông đi qua những hành lang hẹp đến một trong các căn hộ và đẩy một cánh cửa vốn đã hé mở. Căn hộ đó thuộc về Phó phụ trách kỹ thuật tại trạm Moskva, một người đa năng chuyên giúp các sỹ quan điều hành về trang thiết bị và các vật ngụy trang che dấu, từ máy quét sóng vô tuyến tinh vi đến các khúc gỗ giả.

Người Phó phụ trách kỹ thuật ra hiệu cho Rolph một cách im lặng. Hai người đàn ông xấp xỉ cùng một chiều cao và vóc dáng. Trong im lặng, Rolph bắt đầu tự chuyển đổi mình (được gọi là thay đổi nhân dạng) để trông giống như vị chủ nhà. Người Phó phụ trách kỹ thuật có mái tóc dài bù xù. Rolph liền đeo lên một bộ tóc giả, cũng dài và bù xù. Người Phó phụ trách kỹ thuật có một bộ râu quai nón rậm. Rolph cũng đeo lên một bộ râu rậm. Người Phó phụ trách kỹ thuật giúp Rolph điều chỉnh và bảo đảm an toàn việc ngụy trang, sau đó trang bị cho Rolph một máy quét sóng vô tuyến, ăng-ten và tai nghe để theo dõi các hoạt động truyền phát sóng của KGB trên đường phố.

Từ ngưỡng cửa, Rolph nghe thấy một giọng nói. Đó là Trưởng phụ trách kỹ thuật, người vừa đến và đã cố tình nói to, giả định rằng họ đang bị KGB nghe lén. “Này, chúng ta có định đi xem các cửa hàng máy móc mới không?” người Trưởng phụ trách hỏi. Người Phó trả lời lớn tiếng, “Tuyệt! Đi thôi”.

Nhưng người Phó phụ trách thực sự không hề rời căn hộ. Người đàn ông đã rời khỏi căn hộ trông giống như người Phó phụ trách chính là Rolph. Người Phó phụ trách thực kéo một chiếc ghế ra và ngồi xuống chờ đợi khoảng thời gian lâu. Vợ của Rolph, mặc bộ đầm ăn tối, cũng ngồi xuống và sẽ vẫn ở đó trong sáu giờ tới. Họ không thể thốt ra một từ, vì KGB có thể đang lắng nghe.

Điểm quan trọng của việc chuyển đổi nhân dạng là sẽ đi qua phạm vi đại sứ quán mà không bị phát hiện. KGB thường không để ý đến các chi tiết công nghệ khi nhân viên sứ quán Mỹ lái xe ra để tìm kiếm thức ăn, hoa hoặc phụ tùng xe hơi cho chiếc xe Volkswagen cũ màu be và xanh. Đêm nay, chiếc Volkswagen đó rời đi lúc hoàng hôn. Người Trưởng phụ trách công nghệ cầm lái, Rolph ngồi ở ghế cạnh tài xế. Những chiếc cửa xe thì dơ bẩn. Các dân quân Nga chỉ nhún vai.

Khi đã lăn bánh trên đường phố, chiếc xe chạy theo một tiến trình chậm, không theo quy luật. Bằng cách rời đại sứ quán dưới vỏ bọc ngụy trang, mục tiêu của Rolph là lẩn tránh KGB, nhưng vài giờ sau đó, ông dần dần bộc lộ một cách tiếp cận mới, cố gắng để cắt đuôi KGB. Cuối cùng thì nhiệm vụ của ông là trở thành “bóng đen”, nhằm thoát khỏi toàn bộ sự giám sát. Nhưng để đạt được điều đó đòi hỏi một thử thách cân não mệt mỏi và khá lâu, thậm chí trước khi ông có được cơ hội đầu tiên của mình để gặp trực tiếp Tolkachev.

Trong một hành trình nhằm phát hiện mình có bị giám sát hay không, sỹ quan điều hành phải nhanh nhẹn như một vũ công múa ba-lê, biết gây bối rối như một nhà ảo thuật và rất tập trung như một người kiểm soát không lưu. Chiếc xe Volkswagen dừng lại ở một cửa hàng hoa, điểm dừng ngụy trang thông thường đầu tiên của họ. Việc tạm dừng là để xem liệu các đội tuần tra đi bộ hay những chiếc xe theo dõi của KGB có bất cẩn và lao đến vấp phải họ hay không. Rolph vẫn ngồi phía sau cánh cửa xe bẩn thỉu của chiếc Volkswagen và không nhìn thấy gì.

Sau một tiếng rưỡi lái xe, Rolph bắt đầu đếm ngược trong đầu. Nguyên tắc quan trọng là sẽ tiến tới giai đoạn tiếp theo chỉ khi ông chắc chắn 95 phần trăm là ông thực sự không bị theo dõi. Lý do rất đơn giản: Ông có lợi thế hơn khi ở trên xe. Khi đi bộ một mình, ông sẽ dễ bị lộ hơn nhiều. Rolph cân nhắc những điều ông đã nhìn thấy trên đường phố đang tối dần. Ông khá chắc chắn. Ông nhìn sang người Trưởng phụ trách công nghệ, người này đã ra dấu cho ông với ngón tay cái hướng lên trên. Trong khi chiếc xe vẫn đang di chuyển, Rolph nhanh chóng cởi bỏ lớp ngụy trang và đặt nó vào một cái túi nhỏ trên sàn. Ông tóm lấy chiếc túi mua sắm đã được chuẩn bị cho Tolkachev và mặc vào một chiếc áo khoác len. Chiếc xe dừng lại một chốc lát. Rolph nhảy ra ngoài và bước đi thoăn thoắt.

Ngay sau đó, trên một đại lộ rộng lớn khác, ông đi thẳng đến một đám đông đang chờ đợi một trong những chuyến xe điện – loại xe thường chạy quanh các tuyến giao thông chính của Moskva. Ông nhìn lướt qua các hành khách xe điện, chú ý cẩn thận đến những người bước lên xe cùng với ông. Sau đó, ông đột ngột bước về phía cửa và nhảy xuống ở trạm dừng kế tiếp, theo dõi xem có người nào theo sau ông không. Không một ai.

Ông bắt đầu giai đoạn cuối cùng bằng cách đi bộ. Rolph là người có sức khỏe tốt và đầu óc sáng suốt, nhưng hành trình nhằm phát hiện có bị theo dõi không làm ông mệt mỏi. Thời tiết cuối thu khá lạnh, ẩm ướt và nặng nề. Miệng ông trở nên khô khốc, nhưng chẳng có nơi nào ông có thể dừng lại một cách an toàn. Máy quét sóng vô tuyến vẫn yên lặng ngoại trừ những tiếng nhiễu sóng và âm thanh bình thường.

Tại một nhà hát nhỏ, Rolph đẩy cánh cửa mở ra. Đây là điểm dừng chân ngụy trang thứ hai của ông. Ông kiểm tra các thông báo và lịch trình niêm yết trên tường. Mục tiêu của ông là buộc người của KGB làm điều gì đó khác thường, đi vượt qua, nhờ đó ông có thể phát hiện ra họ trước khi họ có thể gọi tăng viện. Rolph rời nhà hát với những chiếc vé cho một buổi biểu diễn mà ông không có ý định tham dự.

Rolph đi bộ đến một cửa hàng đồ cổ, khác với thói quen thông thường của ông. Vẫn không có gì. Sau đó, ông bước vào một tòa nhà chung cư gần đó và bắt đầu leo lên cầu thang. Đây chắc chắn là nhằm kích hoạt một cuộc phục kích của KGB; họ không thể cho phép ông biến mất khỏi tầm nhìn trong một tòa nhà chung cư nhiều tầng. Thực tế, Rolph không định đi vào đâu trong tòa nhà và không biết ai sống ở đó. Ông chỉ cố gắng khiêu khích KGB. Đến đầu cầu thang, ông ngồi xuống và chờ đợi. Không có ai chạy đến.

Rolph quay lại. KGB đã không xuất hiện trong 3 tiếng rưỡi. Tuy nhiên, để đảm bảo chắc chắn, ông bước vào một công viên nhỏ có các băng ghế. Rolph nhìn đồng hồ. Ông còn cách điểm hẹn 12 phút.

Đã đến lúc đi. Ông chắc chắn 100 phần trăm. Ông đứng dậy rời khỏi băng ghế.

Đột nhiên, ông choáng váng bởi một tiếng động trong tai nghe của mình, rồi nó lặp lại một lần nữa và lần thứ ba. Chúng khá inh ỏi, rõ ràng là từ các đội theo dõi của KGB. Ông đứng lạnh cứng người và căng thẳng. Âm thanh trên đôi khi có thể được sử dụng như một tín hiệu, từ một nhân viên KGB này đến nhân viên KGB khác. Nhưng tiếng ồn đó cũng có thể là một người trực tổng đài vụng về nhấn nhầm nút của mình.

Rolph thường lặp đi lặp lại những lời “khi bạn là bóng đen, bạn là bóng đen”. Trong tâm trí của ông, điều đó có nghĩa rằng khi bạn là “bóng đen”, bạn có thể làm bất cứ điều gì, bởi vì không có ai đang theo dõi bạn.

Không có gì cả. Không có dấu hiệu của bất cứ ai trong công viên. Rolph thả lỏng vai và hít một hơi thật sâu.

Khi bạn là bóng đen, bạn là bóng đen.

Cuộc gặp với người điệp viên đã diễn ra hoàn hảo. Tolkachev chuyển giao 25 cuộn phim có chứa các bản sao tài liệu tuyệt mật. Rolph quay trở lại chiếc xe Volkswagen, mặc bộ râu và tóc giả vào và họ lái xe quay trở lại đại sứ quán. Các lính canh không cần liếc nhìn lại họ lần thứ hai. Cánh cửa sứ quán mở ra. Một lát sau, các dân quân Liên Xô trong lán gác ghi nhận rằng David Rolph và vợ ông rời bữa tiệc tối tại sứ quán để về nhà.

Bài viết được chuyển thể từ cuốn sách của David E. Hoffman có tên gọi “” (Điệp viên tỉ đô: The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal một câu chuyện có thật về sự phản bội và hoạt động gián điệp thời Chiến tranh Lạnh), do Doubleday xuất bản vào ngày 7 tháng 7. Một số bức điện tín được giải mật của CIA từ quá trình hoạt động của Tolkachev hiện được đăng tải tại trang davidehoffman.com.

Nguồn: David E. Hoffman, “How the CIA ran a ‘billion dollar spy’ in Moscow”, The Washington Post, 04/7/2015.

'Điệp viên tỷ đô' của CIA tại Nga sa lưới như thế nào?

Suốt vài tháng sau đó, những cuộc thảo luận căng thẳng đã diễn ra bên trong nội bộ CIA về cách tốt nhất để bảo vệ Tolkachev bởi CIA vẫn muốn duy trì các hoạt động của điệp viên giá trị này.

CIA đã thống nhất rằng các cuộc gặp trong tương lai sẽ bị hạn chế tối thiểu, có thể chỉ 2 lần/năm, đồng thời khuyên Tolkachev nên đặc biệt thận trọng trong các hoạt động thu thập tình báo của mình.

Tháng 4/1984, một lần nữa Tolkachev ra hiệu sẵn sàng gặp CIA. Tại cuộc gặp, Tolkachev đưa cho nhân viên CIA những cuộn phim, 39 trang ghi chú viết tay, 26 trang trong số đó chứa đựng những thông tin chi tiết. Tolkachev cũng bàn giao một số sơ đồ về hệ thống radar của Liên Xô.


Tài liệu của CIA về Tolkachev.
Tại cuộc gặp này, tinh thần của Tolkachev có vẻ tốt. Tolkachev cho biết tất cả mọi hoạt động đã trở lại bình thường trong văn phòng của anh ta, không có các hành động điều tra bất thường của nhân viên an ninh như năm trước. Trong bản ghi chú gửi cho CIA, Tolkachev xin lỗi vì đã hành động thái quá khi hủy hết các thiết bị gián điệp, đồng thời có thể tiến hành hơn 2 cuộc gặp trong 1 năm đồng thời yêu cầu được cung cấp một số máy ảnh mini mới. Tolkachev cũng thông báo anh ta bị viêm dạ dày mãn tính và tình trạng sức khỏe ngày càng trở nên xấu đi. Nhưng viên sĩ quan CIA tiếp xúc với Tolkachev đánh giá rằng các hoạt động trong mạng lưới tình báo này đã "trở lại bình thường".

Đến tháng 1/1985, Tolkachev có thêm hai cuộc gặp với sĩ quan của CIA tại Moscow và tiếp tục cung cấp cho cơ quan tình báo Mỹ nhiều thông tin quan trọng. Đến đầu tháng 3/1985, CIA yêu cầu Tolkachev chụp ảnh các tài liệu về máy bay tiêm kích tiền tuyến của Liên Xô và hẹn gặp vào giữa tháng, nhưng không nhận được hồi âm từ Tolkachev. Vì lý do bảo mật, CIA đã quyết định không đưa ra tín hiệu cho một cuộc gặp đột xuất, mà phải chờ đến cuộc gặp theo lịch tiếp theo, dự kiến vào tháng 6/1985.



Ngày 5/6/1985, Tolkachev ra hiệu sẵn sàng cho cuộc gặp. Tuy nhiên, nhân viên CIA đã phải hủy bỏ khi phát hiện đang bị theo dõi gắt gao trước cuộc hẹn. Vào ngày 13/6 - mốc thời gian hẹn dự phòng, Tolkachev vẫn ra tín hiệu sẵn sàng, trong khi nhân viên CIA được cử đi gặp xác định rằng mình không bị KGB theo dõi. Khi tiếp cận điểm hẹn, nhân viên CIA này không thấy có điều gì bất thường, nhưng vào thời gian hẹn chính xác, anh này bất ngờ khi thấy hơn một chục nhân viên KGB xuất hiện sau các bụi cây gần đó. Điệp viên CIA nhanh chóng bị tống vào một chiếc xe ô tô và đưa thẳng đến nhà tù Lubyanka nhưng trước đó, anh này nhanh chóng quan sát thấy Tolkachev không có mặt tại điểm hẹn và sau đó cũng không thấy xuất hiện tại nhà tù trên.

Tại Lubyanka, nhân viên CIA trên đã bị buộc tội làm gián điệp cùng một số tang vật thu được khi anh này mang theo, dự kiến sẽ đưa cho Tolkachev. Sau khi không khai thác được gì, KGB cuối cùng đã thông báo cho Đại sứ quán Mỹ về trường hợp bắt giữ này. Đến trưa này hôm sau thì nhân viên CIA được phóng thích.
Việc bắt giữ nhân viên CIA được công bố rộng rãi tại Moscow ngay sau đó, nhưng không có một báo cáo nào về Tolkachev. Theo quy định, nhân viên CIA bị bắt giữ cùng gia đình anh ta sẽ bị trục xuất vài tuần sau đó. Nhưng mãi đến tháng 9/1985 mới có thông báo rằng Tolkachev đã "bị bắt vào tháng 6" do đồng lõa trong hoạt động gián điệp này.


Theo một báo cáo công khai, Edward Lee Howard, một cựu sĩ quan CIA bất mãn, bị nghi ngờ là đã thỏa hiệp với KGB về vụ Tolkachev. Howard đã biết về hoạt động của Tolkachev vào đầu năm 1983 như một phần công tác chuẩn bị thực hiện nhiệm vụ ở Moscow vào mùa hè năm đó. Hồ sơ “sạch” của Howard khiến cho anh ta trở thành một ứng cử viên tốt để xử lý các hoạt động của Tolkachev tại Moscow.

Tuy nhiên, Howard đã gặp vấn đề trong quá trình kiểm tra an ninh định kỳ vào đầu năm 1983, trước khi khởi hành theo kế hoạch tới Moscow. Anh ta được báo cáo là đã có một số hành vi không phù hợp và thiếu trung thực. Dựa vào đó, CIA đã quyết định chấm dứt công việc của Howard, vốn được triển khai từ tháng 4/1983.

Bị sa thải, Howard bắt đầu uống rất nhiều rượu và đã gọi điện thoại đến Moscow vào mùa hè năm 1983 hơn một lần yêu cầu nói chuyện với trưởng trạm CIA tại đó. Rõ ràng đó là các cuộc gọi quấy rối.

Theo các bài viết được đăng tải trên báo chí Mỹ, nhân viên an ninh đào ngũ của Liên Xô Vitaliy Yurchenko tiết lộ với các quan chức Mỹ rằng một cựu quan chức CIA (được xác định là Howard) đã liên lạc với KGB tại Áo vào tháng 9/1984 và cung cấp thông đến hoạt động của CIA. Theo nguồn tin này, Howard đã đến châu Âu một lần nữa vào tháng 4/1985 và gặp gỡ với các nhân viên KGB ở Vienna, nơi anh ta cung cấp thêm các thông tin về những hoạt động bí mật của CIA tại Moscow.

Ngày 25/9/1986, hãng thông tấn TASS tuyên bố: Tolkachev bị xử án vì tội phản quốc, bị bác đơn xin tha tội và đã bị xử tử hình ngày 24/9/1986. TASS không cho biết Tolkachev bị xử tử thế nào, chỉ nêu Tolkachev “hành động vì ích kỷ và có thái độ thù địch với nhà nước Liên Xô”.

Tóm lại, Adolf Tolkachev là một điệp viên thành công và có giá trị nhất của Mỹ ở Liên Xô trong hai thập kỷ thời kỳ Chiến tranh Lạnh. Những tài liệu và bản vẽ mà anh ta cung cấp đã vén bức màn bí mật về những năm tháng nghiên cứu và phát triển các loại vũ khí và radar của Liên Xô. Không quân Mỹ ước tính rằng tin tức mà Tolkachev cung cấp cho CIA đã giúp Mỹ tiết kiệm hàng chục tỷ USD trong nghiên cứu và phát triển vũ khí. Mặc dù Tolkachev là một trong những điệp viên hiệu quả nhất của CIA trong thời kỳ Chiến tranh Lạnh, nhưng rất ít người biết về hoạt động gián điệp này.

https://www.sofmag.com/the-execution-of-a-great-spy-adolf-tolkachev/

Mỹ dùng tin tình báo về máy bay Nga từ 30 năm trước
Quân đội Mỹ hiện vẫn sử dụng thông tin tình báo về các máy bay Nga do điệp viên đứng đầu một phòng nghiên cứu radar quân sự từ thời Liên Xô cung cấp.


Một chiến đấu cơ Su-27 của Nga được sản xuất từ những năm 80. Ảnh: Myzone59

Theo Business Insider, nhiều chiến đấu cơ hiện đại của Nga được chế tạo và phát triển trên cơ sở các thành tựu công nghệ quân sự từ thập niên 80 của thế kỷ trước. Do đó những thông tin do điệp viên Adolf Tolkatchev cung cấp trong giai đoạn này vẫn còn hữu dụng với quân đội Mỹ.

David Hoffman, tác giả cuốn sách về Tolkachev có tựa đề "Điệp viên tỷ đô", cho biết những thông tin do điệp viên phản bội này cung cấp liên quan đến hầu hết các chiến đấu cơ của Nga được sản xuất trong giai đoạn những năm 1980 và đầu những năm 1990.

"Mặc dù vụ việc xảy ra cách đây 30 năm nhưng dường như những thông tin do Adolf Tolkachev cung cấp vẫn rất quan trọng đối với các chuyên gia công nghệ quân sự Mỹ", David Hoffman cho hay.

Thông tin do điệp viên Tolkachev cung cấp có thể giúp cho các chiến đấu cơ của Mỹ giành lợi thế trước các máy bay Nga trong trường hợp xảy ra đụng độ trên vùng trời Syria.

Adolf Tolkachev đứng đầu đơn vị thiết kế radar Phazotron của Liên Xô trong thời kỳ Chiến tranh Lạnh. Năm 1977, Adolf Tolkachev đã phản bội tổ quốc, bí mật hợp tác với CIA, và trở thành một trong những điệp viên quan trọng nhất trong lịch sử Mỹ.

Trong 8 năm hoạt động gián điệp giữa lòng thủ đô Moscow, Adolf Tolkachev đã trở thành một nguồn tin quan trọng giúp Mỹ nắm được nhiều bí mật về công nghệ quân sự của Liên Xô, đồng thời tiết kiệm được hàng tỷ đô la để nghiên cứu phát triển vũ khí.


Adolf Tolkatchev, điệp viên tỷ đô của Mỹ. Ảnh: Stimulatedboredom

https://www.businessinsider.com/us-and-russia-planes-in-syria-2015-10

The Execution of a “Great Spy”: Adolf Tolkachev


Former Soviet Pilot Viktor Belenko’s Military Identity Document
Soviet Lt. Viktor I. Belenko carried two personal items – this military identity document and a knee-pad notebook with flight data – on his dramatic flight to freedom in a MiG‑25 Foxbat fighter from the USSR to Japan in 1976.
Born in 1947, Belenko was a fighter pilot with the Soviet Air Defense Forces based at Chuguyevka near the eastern perimeter of the Soviet

An Exceptional Espionage Operation: The Capture and Execution of Colonel Penkovsky, 1963

On the afternoon of October 22, 1962, a nondescript man was suddenly seized off the streets of Moscow by the KGB. He had been under surveillance on suspicion of treason. Thus ended Oleg Penkovsky’s career of spying for the United States and Great Britain. Penkovsky is considered one of the most valuable assets in Agency history.

In 1976, Adolf Tolkachev, a Soviet aviation specialist working on stealth technology for aircraft, began leaving notes in, or on, the cars of U.S. diplomats near the American Embassy in Moscow. He was interested in meeting with CIA officials.

For almost a decade—after finally making that contact—he proved to be a tremendous reporting asset. He provided plans, specifications and test results on existing and planned Soviet aircraft and missiles. The information provided by Tolkachev saved the U.S. government billions of dollars in defense expen***ures, a coup that prompted some intelligence historians to call him “the greatest spy since Penkovsky.” Here is his story.


The Execution of a “Great Spy”: Adolf Tolkachev
Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky

An Exceptional Espionage Operation

Barry G. Royden

E***or’s Note: This unclassified article draws extensively on Directorate of Operations files, which, of necessity, remain classified. Because Tolkachev’s story serves as an important case study of Cold War intelligence operations, it is being made available to scholars and to the public in as much detail as possible, despite minimal source citations.

Barry Royden researched and wrote this article while teaching as a CIA Officer-in-Residence at the Joint Military Intelligence College. He recently retired after four decades in the CIA, last serving as Associate Deputy Director of Operations for Counterintelligence. He is currently teaching Counterintelligence at a Directorate of Operations training facility.

On 20 September 1985, international wire service reports carried a statement distributed by the official Soviet news agency TASS that one A. G. Tolkachev, whom it described as a staff member at one of Moscow’s research institutes, had been arrested the previous June trying to pass secret materials of a defensive nature to the United States. Subsequent news stories said Tolkachev was an electronics expert at a military aviation institute in Moscow who was compromised by former CIA officer Edward Lee Howard.

In October 1985, The Washington Post ran a story that described Tolkachev as “one of CIA’s most valuable human assets in the Soviet Union.” According to FBI affidavits related to the Howard espionage case that were made public, Tolkachev had provided information on Soviet avionics, cruise missiles, and other technologies. The Soviets subsequently publicly confirmed that they had executed Tolkachev in 1986 for “high treason.”

Despite the fact that more than 15 years have passed, little ad***ional information has surfaced about Adolf Tolkachev and his work for the CIA. The following is the story of a brave and dedicated man who for over seven years provided the CIA with a huge volume of extremely sensitive and valuable intelligence on Soviet military research and development (R&D) activities. It is also the story of a well-conceived and executed CIA intelligence operation run in Moscow under the nose of the KGB.

The Beginning
In January 1977, on a typically depressing winter evening in Moscow, the local CIA chief left his office and drove to a nearby gas station used by diplomats. While waiting for gas, he was surprised when a middle-aged Russian approached him and asked him in English if he was an American. When the CIA chief answered affirmatively, the Russian placed a folded piece of paper on the car seat and departed. The CIA chief later noted that his was the only American-plated car at the gas station, and it appeared obvious that the man was waiting for an American to appear. The man was calm and clearly had thought out his approach.

The note, written in Russian, was short and to the point. The writer said that he wanted to “discuss matters” on a “strictly confidential” basis with an “appropriate American official.” He then suggested a discreet meeting at a given time and place in the car of an American official or at a Metro station entrance. The writer also suggested a signal—a parked car at a certain place and time, facing either one direction or the other—to indicate which meeting arrangement was preferred. The note contained sketches of the exact locations of the two optional sites and where the car should be parked to trigger a meeting.

It would be a long and tortuous process before secure contact would be established between the CIA and this “intelligence volunteer.” The KGB had established a pattern in the Soviet Union of running “dangles” (ostensible intelligence volunteers actually controlled by the KGB), which made it risky to respond to any potential volunteer. Dangles were aimed at flushing out Agency personnel so that they could be expelled from the country and to obtain important information on the CIA’s methods of operation.

On the other hand, many of the CIA’s best agents through the years have been intelligence volunteers. One of the Agency’s most famous Soviet agents, Col. Oleg Penkovsky of the Soviet military intelligence service (GRU), volunteered to the CIA in Moscow in 1960. He also experienced great difficulty in establishing contact with Western intelligence. Penkovsky passed letters to two American students, a British businessman, and a Canadian businessman over a period of several months before he succeeded in using British businessman Greville Wynne to open a channel to US and British intelligence. [1]

The CIA ran Penkovsky jointly with the British for a little over a year, and he provided immensely valuable information on Soviet political and military plans and intentions. He also passed data on Soviet missile deployment methods and operations that proved critical to the United States during the Cuban missile crisis. All substantive meetings with Penkovsky, however, were held in the West, taking advantage of his travel abroad with Soviet delegations.

The point in time when Tolkachev chose to try to establish contact with the CIA in Moscow was a particularly sensitive one. CIA personnel in Moscow had several operational activities scheduled to take place over the next several months that they and CIA headquarters were loath to complicate by the possibility of getting caught in a KGB dangle operation. In ad***ion, Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State-designate in the administration of newly elected President Jimmy Carter, was scheduled to visit the USSR soon to lay the basis for bilateral relations, and it was clear that the new US administration did not want anything untoward to roil the waters between the two countries. As a result, given the absence of any identifying data on this prospective volunteer, the lack of any indication of his access to sensitive information, and the difficult counterintelligence (CI) environment, CIA headquarters decided against replying to the note.

More Approaches
On 3 February 1977, the volunteer again approached the local CIA chief, this time as he got into his car. (Although the chief’s car was parked near the US Embassy, it was blocked from the view of the Soviet militiamen guarding the Embassy by high snow banks, a fact that Tolkachev later said he had taken into account.) He again spoke briefly, dropped a short note into the car, and departed. The note reiterated the writer’s desire to establish contact with an American official. Based on the previous CIA headquarters decision, no action was taken to respond to the note.

Two weeks later, the CIA chief was approached after work by the same individual, who dropped another note into the car. This note said that the writer understood the concern about a possible provocation. He claimed that he was an engineer who worked in a “closed enterprise” and was not knowledgeable about “secret matters,” so he might not be going about this the right way. He said that he had not included specific information about himself because he worried about how his letters would be handled. He repeated his request that he be contacted, and he provided new instructions for establishing contact.

By now, the CIA chief was impressed with the man’s tenacity and asked headquarters for permission to respond positively by parking his car in a spot that had been indicated in the note, so that the writer could pass him a letter with more details about who he was and what information he wanted to share. Headquarters, however, continued to demur, citing overriding CI concerns, and forbade any positive response.

In May, the volunteer approached the CIA chief for the fourth time, banging on his car to get his attention. The chief ignored him.

More than six months passed before the volunteer appeared again. In December 1977, he spotted an individual who had gotten out of an American-plated car and was shopping in a local market. The volunteer gave a letter to this individual and pleaded that the letter be hand delivered to a responsible US official. The letter was passed unopened to the US Embassy’s assistant security officer, who in turn gave it to the local CIA chief.

In the letter, the volunteer again provided instructions and accompanying drawings for an initial contact with an American official. He went further this time, however, and included two typewritten pages of intelligence regarding the electronic systems for a Soviet aircraft, which convinced the newly arrived local CIA chief, Gardner “Gus” Hathaway, that a serious effort should be made to respond. He said that he wanted to do “what Belenko did.” [2] Again, he provided some contact scenarios. Hathaway sent a message to Washington, urging that he be allowed to follow up and contact the volunteer. This time, CIA headquarters tentatively concurred, pending an evaluation of the intelligence sample.

In early January 1978, however, headquarters again disapproved contact. It cited the fact that an American official had been declared persona non grata by the Soviet government just one week previously, as well as the fact that the CIA had had to send home two case officers the previous year, when cases they had been handling were compromised. Headquarters concluded that they could not afford to lose another officer in Moscow, should the latest contact prove to be a Soviet provocation attempt. Meanwhile, the evaluation of the information provided by the volunteer showed it to be highly interesting but not likely to do “grave damage” to the USSR—a criterion that apparently had to be met in headquarters’ view before it would approve taking the risk to meet the volunteer.

By fortuitous chance, in February 1978, the Pentagon sent a memo to the CIA citing the US military’s high interest in any intelligence that could be provided on Soviet aircraft electronics and weapons control systems. As it turned out, this was precisely the type of information, albeit in limited quantity, that the volunteer had passed in December 1977.

Persistence Pays Off
On 16 February 1978, the volunteer approached Hathaway and his wife at their car on the street after work and passed another note containing ad***ional intelligence information. He wrote that he seemed to be caught in a vicious circle: “I’m afraid for security reasons to put down on paper much about myself, and, without this information, for security reasons you are afraid to contact me, fearing a provocation.” He then suggested a secure way to pass key identifying data on himself. In his note, he provided all but two of the digits in his phone number. He instructed the recipient of the note that at a certain time at a certain bus stop he would be standing in line holding two pieces of plywood, each with a single number on it. These would be the last two digits in his phone number. At the indicated time, Hathaway’s wife drove past the bus stop in question, recognized the volunteer holding the two pieces of plywood, and recorded the numbers.

Hathaway immediately sent a cable to CIA headquarters pushing for a positive response to the volunteer. This time, headquarters concurred. On 26 February, after careful planning, John Guilsher, a case officer fluent in Russian, conducted a lengthy surveillance-detection run to determine that he was free of any Soviet surveillance and then called the volunteer’s home phone from a public phone booth. The volunteer’s wife answered the call, however, forcing Guilsher to break off the conversation. Guilsher repeated this exercise on 28 February, with the same lack of success.

On 1 March 1978, Tolkachev again approached Hathaway and his wife on the street after work. This time, he passed 11 pages of handwritten materials, the bulk of which was detailed intelligence on Soviet R&D efforts in the military aircraft field. In this note, Tolkachev finally identified himself fully, providing his name, address, exact employment, and a great deal of personal background information. He noted that he had spent “hours and hours roaming the streets in search of [US] diplomatic cars,” and, having found one, had returned “tens of times” without passing anything, because of unfavorable con***ions. He said that he was now almost desperate for a positive response to his efforts, and, if he did not get one this time, he would give up.

Tolkachev had clearly gone above and beyond what could be expected of anyone trying to volunteer to help the United States. The CIA, on the other hand, for a variety of good reasons had had to be cautious about accepting contact with him. Fortunately, after much soul-searching, it had been decided to meet him. Once that decision was made, a spectacular intelligence success story began.

Making Contact
At about 10 p.m. on 5 March 1978, Guilsher, after determining that he was free of surveillance, called Tolkachev at home from a public phone at the Bolshoi Theater and spoke to him for the first time. Guilsher identified himself as “Nikolay,” as Tolkachev had suggested in his 1 March note, and confirmed that the proper people had received all the materials Tolkachev had provided. The purpose of the call was to assure Tolkachev that his security was intact and that US intelligence was interested in learning more about him and his work. He was told that he would be called again with further instructions regarding future contacts.

It was not until August, however, that the details finally were worked out on how the case was to be pursued. Despite Hathaway’s desire that personal contact be established with Tolkachev in the USSR, CIA headquarters opted—as “safest”—to have the necessary materials and directions passed to Tolkachev via a deaddrop (an impersonal exchange of information) so that he could prepare a series of letters with ad***ional information about his access and his work. These letters were to be prepared in “secret writing” (SW), instructions for which were contained in the deaddrop, and were to be sent to various accommodation addresses (apparently innocuous addresses actually controlled by the CIA). At Hathaway’s insistence, to enhance Tolkachev’s protection, he also would be passed a “one-time pad” (OTP). The one-time pad (a series of numbers randomly keyed to letters that can be put into clear text only by someone having an identical OTP) would be used to encipher his secret writing messages.

On 24 August, Guilsher contacted Tolkachev by phone and directed him to a deaddrop site located next to a phone booth near Tolkachev’s apartment. The materials for Tolkachev, hidden in a dirty construction worker’s mitten, consisted of an operational message, a series of intelligence requirements, an SW carbon paper with instructions for its use, three pre-written “cover” letters (apparently innocent letters, on the reverse side of which the SW was to be concealed), and an OTP with accompanying instructions. The CIA later determined that Tolkachev had retrieved the materials.

In September, all three cover letters from Tolkachev were received, and their SW contents successfully broken out. All three letters showed signs of having been opened, presumably by the Soviet authorities, but the SW had gone undetected.

The SW messages contained useful intelligence on such subjects as a new Soviet airborne radar reconnaissance and guidance system, the results of performance tests of new Soviet aircraft radar systems, and the status of work on the weapons-aiming systems for various Soviet aircraft under development. Tolkachev also indicated that he had 91 pages of handwritten notes that he wanted to pass. The intelligence contained in these letters finally tipped the balance, convincing senior CIA managers that Tolkachev should be considered a valid volunteer. As a result, Hathaway was given the go-ahead to arrange a personal meeting with him in order to construct an in-country communications system between him and the CIA.

On New Year’s Day 1979, the CIA took advantage of Soviet holiday laxness to arrange its first personal meeting with Tolkachev. After ensuring that he was free from surveillance, Guilsher used a public phone to call Tolkachev at his apartment, triggering contact at a predetermined meeting site. He reminded Tolkachev to bring the 91 pages of notes with him. A 40-minute meeting was held while walking the streets of Moscow in bitterly cold weather.

Tolkachev was well prepared. He delivered the voluminous notes, which contained a detailed description of the highly sensitive work in which he was involved, as well as exact formulas, diagrams, drawings of oscilloscope presentations, precise weapon and electronic systems specifications, charts, and quotes from official documents. He had carefully drawn various diagrams and charts on oversize graph paper. Guilsher passed Tolkachev ad***ional intelligence requirements and operational questions, as well as a payment of “good faith” money. He was impressed with Tolkachev’s calm manner. He also noted that Tolkachev was probably one of the few sober Russians in Moscow on this major national holiday.

Impressive Production
The information that Tolkachev provided in his first meeting was quickly disseminated to a limited number of senior civilian and military customers. It had an immediate impact, as reflected in a March 1979 memorandum sent to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by a high-ranking military recipient of the Tolkachev information. This memo stated that all the information provided by the “special source” had correlated fully with existing holdings from photo and communications intelligence collection. Regarding the new data reported, the memo concluded that the Soviets would judge it quite damaging to their interests for Washington to be in possession of this information.

The memo continued by stipulating that the primary value of the source’s reporting was that it provided detailed data on new Soviet weapon systems that would not be available from technical collection sources for many years, if ever. The complete documentation on these systems, which the agent provided even before the systems were fully operational, was described as “of incalculable value.”

In May 1979, the CIA hosted a three-day seminar for a small group of senior customers of Tolkachev’s product. Representatives included senior analysts from both civilian and military intelligence agencies. This group’s consensus was that Tolkachev’s information was impressive. Military representatives attending the seminar stated that the data he provided had saved them “up to five years of R&D time.”

Tolkachev was on his way to becoming one of the most valuable and productive agents in the history of the CIA.

Assessment and Background
Before the first personal meeting with Tolkachev, one of his handwritten notes had been passed to the CIA’s Office of Technical Service (OTS) handwriting experts for analysis. The analysis, done in May 1978, was positive, accurate, and even prophetic. The report made the following observations:

The writer is intelligent, purposeful, and generally self-confident. He is self-disciplined, but not overly rigid. He has well above-average intelligence and has good organizing ability. He is observant and conscientious and pays meticulous attention to details. He is quite self-assured and may plow ahead at times in a way which is not discreet or subtle. All in all, he is a reasonably well-adjusted individual and appears intellectually and psychologically equipped to become a useful, versatile asset.

After his early reluctance to identify himself to the US officials he was trying to contact, Tolkachev over time provided a great deal of information about himself. He wrote that he was born in 1927 in Aktyubinsk (in what is now Kazakhstan), but moved to Moscow two years later and had lived there ever since. He did not provide any information about his parents. The only sibling mentioned was a brother, Yuri, who was born in 1938 and described as a train mechanic.

Tolkachev identified his wife as Natalia Ivanova née Kuzmina. She was born in 1935 and worked as an electronics engineer at the same institute where he worked—he described her as an “antenna specialist.” He wrote that his wife’s mother “had been executed in 1938,” but he said nothing about the reasons for her execution. He noted that his wife’s father had spent many years in a labor camp, typically the fate of “enemies of the Soviet state.” Freed in 1955, he had returned to Moscow, but died shortly thereafter. Tolkachev commented a number of times to at least one of his case officers that the brutal treatment that his wife’s parents had suffered was a key factor in his motivation to work against the Soviet regime. He never shed any light on why the authorities had taken these actions against his wife’s parents, but once suggested that his wife and her parents were Jewish. Given the Stalinists’ anti-Semitism, this factor may have played a role in their persecution.

Tolkachev apparently was devoted to his family and took their interests into account in everything that he did. He wrote that he helped his wife with the housework and liked to go shopping with her. He said that she would not question where he got “reasonable sums” of money. He explained: “I got married at 30 and have lived with my wife already 22 years. I am 52 and my wife is 44. Apparently, I belong to those who love only once. I consider that I have the normal attachment to the family that exists in mankind.” The couple had one child, a son named Oleg, born in 1966. In 1979, Oleg was described as going to “art school;” by 1982, he was studying at an architectural institute. Tolkachev made it clear from the beginning that he had not told, and would not tell, his wife or son about his work for US intelligence.

In detailing his technical credentials, Tolkachev wrote that he had completed “optical-mechanical radar training” in 1948 and graduated from the Kharkov Polytechnical Institute in 1954. Since then, he had worked at NIIR (Scientific Research Institute of Radio Building). He described himself as a “leading systems designer” at this institute and said that he worked in a large open office with 24 other people. (In writing this, he seemed to recognize that there would be interest in knowing how much privacy he had in his office, in terms of his ability to steal secrets.)

Tolkachev led a relatively comfortable life. He said that he earned 250 rubles per month, plus a 40 percent “secrecy bonus,” which would give him a normal salary of some 350 rubles (about $110 at the official exchange rate at that time). His wife’s salary would have doubled this amount. He later added that he occasionally received monetary awards for inventions in his field. An average Soviet salary at that time was estimated at 120 rubles per month.

Tolkachev and his family lived on the 9th floor of an apartment building only some 400 meters from the US Embassy. He noted that this location had allowed him to walk unobtrusively near the Embassy when he was seeking to establish contact. The apartment consisted of two rooms, plus a kitchen, bath, and toilet. Although modest by US standards, it was quite luxurious by Moscow standards. These cramped quarters, however, were to limit his ability to carry out his clandestine role for the CIA.

Various health problems bothered Tolkachev during his collaboration with the CIA. At one time or another, he indicated that he had high blood pressure, peritonitis, and gastritis. He also had trouble breathing at night due to a broken nose that he had suffered as a youth playing hockey. Nonetheless, he described an active life. His hobbies were jogging, skiing, reading, listening to Voice of America and West German news broadcasts, and watching TV. He also said that he and his family enjoyed camping out in the summer.

Motivation
Tolkachev was not a member of the Communist Party. He said that he had lost his early interest in politics because it had become “enmeshed in such an impassable hypocritical demagogy.” His theater going had declined, he wrote, because all the plays had become too ideological.

When asked during his first personal meeting about his motivation for approaching US intelligence, Tolkachev said that he was “a dissident at heart,” who could best “contribute to the cause” by taking advantage of his access to unique information of value to the West. In April 1979, he explained his motivation in a written note, of which the following is an excerpt:

. . . I can only say that a significant role in this was played by Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, even though I do not know them and have only read Solzhenitsyn’s works which were published in Noviy Mir. Some inner worm started to torment me; something has to be done. I started to write short leaflets that I planned to mail out. But, later, having thought it out properly, I understood that this was a useless undertaking. To establish contact with dissident circles which have contact with foreign journalists seemed senseless to me due to the nature of my work. (I have a top secret clearance.) Based on the slightest suspicion, I would be totally isolated or liquidated. Thus was born my plan of action to which I have resorted.

. . . I have chosen a course which does not permit one to move backward, and I have no intention of veering from this course. My actions in the future depend on [my] health, and changes in the nature of [my] work. Concerning remuneration, I would not begin to establish contact for any sum of money with, for example, the Chinese Embassy. But how about America? Maybe it has bewitched me, and I am madly in love with it? I have not seen your country with my own eyes, and to love it unseen, I do not have enough fantasy or romanticism. However, based on some facts, I got the impression that I would prefer to live in America. It is for this very reason that I decided to offer you my collaboration. But I am not an altruist alone. Remuneration for me is not just money. It is, even to a greater extent, the evaluation of the significance and the importance of my work.

Tolkachev further explained that he had decided “five or six years ago” to cooperate, but that he waited until “my son grew up.” He wrote, “I understand that in case of a flap my family would face a severe ordeal.” At first he thought about trying to establish contact at a US exhibit, but decided this would not be secure. He then started taking long walks around the Embassy area. Having spotted cars with diplomatic license plates, he looked for an opportunity to approach an American getting in or out of his car. He observed that some of these cars had Russian drivers and realized that he would have to be careful which car he chose. (Tolkachev clearly had no idea that he had stumbled on the local CIA chief as the target for his initial approaches.) He noted that he had decided that the driver of the car he chose to approach had to be an American and not a Russian chauffeur due to “his bright and beggarly clothing—trousers which had never seen an iron—no Russian chauffeur of a diplomatic vehicle would ever dress like that.”

The Operation Takes Off
The first meeting with Tolkachev in January 1979 was a watershed event. The information that he passed convinced all, but the most diehard skeptics, that the CIA was in contact with a volunteer with immense potential. The Agency now moved into high gear to put the operation on a sound footing.

The CIA was breaking new ground in several ways. Tolkachev provided access to information of a sort never before seen in its Soviet operations, in terms of both its huge value to US military planners and its highly technical nature. In ad***ion, Tolkachev was to be handled extensively via face-to-face meetings in Moscow rather than by deaddrops, which were normally used for Russian assets handled in country.

The January meeting started a pattern of successful encounters with Tolkachev held every two or three months over the next 18 months of the operation. The first meetings were dedicated not only to receiving Tolkachev’s immensely valuable intelligence, but also to working out the critically important operational details that would ensure that he could be handled securely and productively over the long term. This meant constructing a viable agent communication system, coming to agreement with the agent over a compensation package and a way to deliver it, and working out the means by which he could best take advantage of his access to obtain Soviet secrets for delivery to the CIA in a secure manner. Tolkachev continued to deliver large quantities of highly valuable intelligence while the details of the arrangement were being worked out.



Agent Communications
Considerable planning was needed to establish a contact routine for the Tolkachev operation. In this case, the CIA did not have the luxury of being able to provide the agent with any external training in the use of deaddrops before the initiation of his agent role. Since painstaking efforts had already led to a personal meeting with Tolkachev, the door was opened to the possibility of using face-to-face encounters on an ongoing basis.

In February 1979, after several exchanges of messages with CIA headquarters regarding the type of communications to be used in this case, a deaddrop was put down for Tolkachev containing a small spy camera, a light meter, camera instructions, and an operational note, all concealed in another “dirty mitten.” The spy camera was matchbox-sized and had been fabricated by OTS so that Tolkachev could photograph documents clandestinely at his office.

The note passed to Tolkachev in the same deaddrop contained a communications plan that provided for a variety of methods of contact. For example, Tolkachev could be called at home once a month, on the date that corresponded to the number of the month, that is, 1 January, 2 February, 3 March, and so forth. Tolkachev would cover the phone between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. on those dates to await a “wrong-number” call. Depending upon the name asked for by the caller, Tolkachev would be directed to one of three prearranged deaddrop sites: “Olga,” “Anna,” or “Nina.” The caller also had the option of asking for “Valeriy,” which would trigger a personal meeting at a prearranged site one hour from the time of the call.

Once a month, on the date that corresponded to the number of the month plus 15 days—18 March, 19 April, 20 May, etc.—Tolkachev was directed to appear at one of several prearranged sites, at a specified time according to the month, and to wait for five minutes—a password and recognition signal were incorporated into the plan in case someone other than the regular case officer should make the meeting.

Once every three months, on the last weekend of the month, Tolkachev would have the opportunity to pass materials via deaddrop. Tolkachev would look to see whether a “ready to receive” signal had been made; if so, he was to put down a package in a prearranged site. A recovery signal would be put up the next day so that he could check to ensure that his package had been received. He was also given instructions on how to package and conceal any drop of materials for passage to the CIA. He also could trigger a deaddrop delivery by making a marked signal on any Monday; a case officer in turn would signal readiness to receive his package, using a parked-car signal the following Wednesday, and that night Tolkachev could put down his deaddrop package. A recovery signal would then be put up the following day to signal the successful recovery of his drop.

Tolkachev, however, resisted using deaddrops. In an April 1979 written message, he said that he did not understand why the CIA wanted to use deaddrops to communicate. He said that personal meetings would be no more risky than using deaddrop passes, because in both cases a CIA officer had to be free of surveillance to carry out the communications plan. Given this fact, Tolkachev said that it seemed to him that personal meetings were to be preferred, because they would be much more productive. He also noted that “psychologically” he preferred to exchange materials via personal meeting, because he worried that a drop could accidentally fall into the wrong hands and that in such a case the documents he provided could be traced back to him.

Hathaway agreed with Tolkachev’s reasoning, as ultimately did CIA headquarters. As a result, beginning in April 1979, personal meetings with Tolkachev were used almost exclusively. Several were held with him in the second half of 1979, and more than 20 took place over the next five years. These personal encounters allowed Tolkachev to hand over to his CIA case officer hundreds of rolls of exposed film and hundreds of pages of written notes containing an enormous amount of valuable intelligence.

Surveillance Detection Runs
To ensure that the case officer was free from KGB surveillance before carrying out any element of the communications plan, the officer would conduct a surveillance detection run. This involved case officers moving about the city in an apparently innocent fashion, while unobtrusively checking to determine whether they were under surveillance. Although the 17th Department of the KGB, responsible for counterintelligence inside the USSR, had a large manpower pool, it could not maintain surveillance on all foreigners all the time, so it was important to try to convince surveillance teams, when they were covering a given case officer, that the officer was not involved in any operational activities when they were moving about the city.

As part of this process, every case officer went to great lengths to establish a routine that took him to various parts of the city on a regular basis, to do shopping, run errands, take part in recreational activities, go sightseeing, take the children out, walk the dog, and so forth. These routines were carefully constructed to try to bore the KGB surveillance teams, to the point where they would be moved to other, presumably more productive, targets. If and when the officers did find themselves free of surveillance while on these personal travels around the city, they would take advantage of this situation to look for prospective new deaddrop sites, to service such sites, or to carry out other operational activities.

This method of action meant that a series of alternative contacts had to be built into every agent communication system, because a case officer could never know ahead of time whether he would be free of surveillance on any given day. Because of the heavy surveillance normally used against CIA case officers, another part of any agent communications system required that several case officers be read in on the case, so that any one of them who was able to determine that he was surveillance-free on a given day would be capable of communicating with the agent.

Another technique that was used to defeat KGB surveillance was to disguise the identity of the case officer being sent out to meet with Tolkachev. This technique was first used in this operation in June 1980. John Guilsher drove to the US Embassy building at about 7:20 p.m., ostensibly having been invited to dinner at the apartment of an Embassy officer who lived there. Once inside, he disguised himself so that when he later left the compound in another vehicle, he would not be recognized by KGB surveillants waiting outside. Checking to ensure that he was free of surveillance, Guilsher, while still in the vehicle, changed out of his western clothes and made himself look as much as possible like a typical, working-class Russian by putting on a Russian hat and working-class clothes, taking a heavy dose of garlic, and splashing some vodka on himself. Guilsher then left his vehicle and proceeded on foot and by local public transportation to a public phone booth, where he called the agent out for a meeting at a prearranged site.

After the meeting, Guilsher returned to his vehicle, put on normal Western clothes, and drove back to the Embassy. There he resumed his own identity and then left the compound and returned to his apartment. Tolkachev’s case officers successfully used this technique, with some variations, for a number of meetings with the agent over the course of this operation.

[Agent Compensation
As is the case with most agents, remuneration was a subject of great importance to Tolkachev and an operationally difficult matter to resolve. As the details were worked out over time, it became evident that he was primarily interested in obtaining a salary as a demonstration that the CIA highly valued his work, rather than as a means to enrich himself.

The dialogue regarding compensation began with the second personal meeting in April 1979. During a 15-minute walking contact, Tolkachev turned over five rolls of film that he had taken with his miniature camera and more than 50 pages of handwritten notes containing intelligence of both a substantive and operational nature. In the notes, he proposed to pass information over a 12-year period, divided into seven stages; he wanted to be paid a set amount at the end of each stage. He said that he considered that stage one had been completed with the passage of the extensive materials that he had delivered in January, added to what he had been able to pass before that time via his SW messages and written notes. He went on to say that he did not feel that he had been adequately compensated for his first year and a half “of lonely efforts to break down the wall of distrust” and for the significant information that he had provided to date. He provided a range of figures in the tens of thousands of rubles, which he said he believed would be fair compensation for the information that he had provided so far.

Tolkachev stated that he could either just pass information as he had outlined in his seven-stage plan, and ask for a sum of money “in six figures” equal to “what Belenko got,” or he could go beyond this and keep passing new information as it developed and he got access to it. [3] Tolkachev wrote that, if he were cooperating just for the money, he probably would follow the first course, but, because he had tasked himself with passing the maximum amount of information to the United States, he did not intend to stop halfway, and “only the second course of action is viable.”

In October 1979, Tolkachev returned to the subject of his reimbursement. Subsequent to the April letter outlining his salary demands, he had been told that the DCI had approved the passage to him of an amount of rubles equivalent to almost $100,000 for the information that he had provided to date. In response to this, Tolkachev now wrote that, when he said he wanted compensation in the “six figures,” he meant “six zeroes!” He went on to say that he had heard on the Voice of America that “American specialists” estimated that the Soviets would have to spend $3 billion to reequip the MiG-25 as a result of the Belenko defection. If that were the case, he reasoned, “several million dollars is not too fantastic a price” for the information that he had provided to the CIA on the new technology with which the Soviets would reequip this aircraft.

In Tolkachev’s first meeting with Guilsher in January 1979, the latter had told him that his superiors were worried that, if the agent were given a substantial amount of money, he would start throwing it around. Returning to this topic, Tolkachev wrote in his April note that “the subject of reckless handling of sums of money can never arise.” He stated that he already had the means to buy a car and an expensive dacha. Although he said that he never wanted a car, he planned to buy one when his son turned 15 or 16—depending on “how his relations develop with his growing son.” He also said that neither he nor his wife had any inclination to be saddled with a dacha, although they were considering eventually buying a small house and some land.

Perhaps realizing that his salary demands might seem exorbitant, Tolkachev went on in his April note to emphasize that his “basic goal in working with [the CIA] consists of passing the maximum amount of information in the shortest time.” He wrote that he knew that “the end may come at any moment, but it does not frighten me and I will work to the end.”

In the next meeting in December 1979, Tolkachev said that he realized that his salary demands were unrealistic. He said he had made them because he wanted to ensure that he got appropriate recognition for his work. On accepting the over 100,000 rubles that he was passed at this meeting, Tolkachev commented that this was much better than the few thousand rubles that he had previously been paid. He went on to say that he did not really need the money and that he would just store it; he added that he did not want any money at the next meeting. He said he just wanted the money as proof that the CIA really valued his work.

By May 1980, Tolkachev’s salary had finally been agreed on. He was told that he was to be paid an annual salary “equivalent to the salary of the US President” for his work in 1979 and an even higher salary for each year thereafter that he was in place and productive. The bulk of these funds would be held in escrow, to be available to him at some future date when he determined that he wanted to be exfiltrated to the United States with his family. Meanwhile, these funds would earn 8.75 percent interest, and he would be able to draw on them at his discretion.

Tolkachev suggested in one of his notes that he wanted to consider donating some of his salary to the Russian dissident movement. He said that previously he had not raised this possibility because he had not yet worked out the matter of his CIA compensation and that, “I would not like to divide up the hide of an unkilled bear.” Now that agreement had been reached to pay him certain funds, however, he said that he wanted to consider how some of these funds might be made available to the families of dissidents who had been repressed by the Soviet authorities. The hard part would be to find a way to do this securely, and he asked for the CIA’s ideas. As it turned out, no such arrangement was ever made, presumably because no way could be found to do this without possibly compromising Tolkachev.

Dealing With a Camera Problem
Another vitally important issue that took some time to work out concerned how Tolkachev could best collect the large quantities of highly technical data to which he had access. The miniature camera passed to him in February 1979 had a number of limitations. Although it allowed for
70 to 80 exposures per roll, it required more light than was normally available for the photography done by Tolkachev at his office. More important, its small size made it almost impossible to hold steady, frequently resulting in blurred photos. Tolkachev also complained that it clicked too loudly, and that he had to stack several books in order to get the camera at the right 13-inch height to take photos.

Tolkachev suggested that he be given a regular 35-mm camera. He said that the best method for photographing sensitive institute documents would be for him to take them home over the lunch hour, while his wife would still be at the office and his son would be at school. As a result of this suggestion, in June 1979, he was passed a Pentax ME 35-mm camera and clamp to hold the camera steady by attaching it to the back of a chair.

The results immediately justified the change in cameras. In the April and June 1979 meetings, Tolkachev had passed over a dozen rolls of film taken with the miniature camera, but almost all were unreadable. In meetings held in October and December 1979, after the receipt of the Pentax, he provided more than 150 rolls of film shot at home, all of excellent quality. Accompanying notes included new intelligence and explanations of the documents he had photographed.

CIA headquarters continued, meanwhile, to work on giving Tolkachev the capability to photograph documents at his office, should that prove necessary. In October 1979, the agent was passed two updated spy cameras fabricated by OTS; in December, he received four more. The cameras, disguised in a suitable concealment device, had a capacity of some 100 shots per roll of film. Given the intricacy of changing the film, Tolkachev was to return the entire camera each time that he completed a roll.

New Security Practices at Work
The forethought in issuing Tolkachev the new spy cameras proved worthwhile. Tolkachev’s institute initiated new security procedures in December 1979. In the past, institute staffers could check out an unlimited number of sensitive documents from the institute library, as long as they were returned before the close of business that same day. Now, such documents could only be checked out by leaving one’s building pass at the library. Tolkachev was no longer able to take the documents to his apartment to photograph, because he could not leave the building without showing his pass.

For several months, Tolkachev was reduced to photographing documents at his institute using the new spy cameras. He informed the CIA that the only secure manner of doing so was to photograph documents in the men’s toilet. Despite the danger and the difficulty, he exposed all the frames of four of his six miniature cameras during this period, which he passed to his CIA case officer in a personal meeting in February 1980.

Nonetheless, Tolkachev preferred to do his photography at home with his 35-mm Pentax. He continued to be dissatisfied with the CIA’s miniature
cameras, saying that the low light con***ions were difficult to overcome and that he had a hard time trying to hold the camera still while shooting. In ad***ion, the cameras periodically malfunctioned.

To deal with the new security restrictions, Tolkachev suggested that the CIA fabricate a copy of his building pass. He could then leave the fake building pass at the library when checking out documents, while using his real pass to exit and reenter the building over the lunch hour. He suggested that he could “lose” his pass so that he could turn it over to his case officer to be copied. Instead, for his protection, he was asked to take color photos and provide a physical description of the pass, which OTS could use to try to make a duplicate.

Meanwhile, by good fortune the new security restrictions were canceled in February 1980. The change in procedures had worked a hardship on the women who worked at the institute, who constituted a majority of the staff. The women complained that they needed to leave the institute during the lunch hour to do their shopping, but they could not return any sensitive documents that they might have checked out from the library and retrieve their building passes, because the library was closed for lunch. This enabled Tolkachev to resume photographing documents at home. The benefits to the operation were immediately visible: In June 1980, Tolkachev passed almost 200 rolls of film, the largest amount he was ever able to turn over in one meeting.

Rave Reviews
Meanwhile, customer satisfaction with Tolkachev’s reporting remained extremely high. A December 1979 Defense Department memorandum to the DCI said that, as a result of Tolkachev’s information, the Air Force had completely reversed its direction on a multimillion dollar electronics package for one of its latest fighter aircraft. Furthermore, in March 1980, a preliminary internal CIA evaluation highly praised Tolkachev’s information on the latest generation of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems, stating: “We never before obtained such detail and understanding of such systems until years after they were actually deployed.” The evaluation also noted that the information jibed with data produced by “national technical means,” but that it added important details that other collection systems could not provide.

Also in March 1980, consideration was given to having cleared Defense Department personnel work on the translation of backlogged materials provided by Tolkachev, due to the inability of CIA translators to keep up with this task. It was estimated that it would take eight clerks and three Russian-language translators, working full time for seven to eight weeks, to process these materials! (In the end, however, no action was taken on such an initiative.)

An April 1980 internal CIA memorandum called Tolkachev’s information on jam-proofing tests for Soviet fighter aircraft radar systems “unique”—such data, sought for many years, was not obtainable by national technical means. In June 1980, Tolkachev was cre***ed with providing unique information on a new Soviet aircraft design, extensive information on modifications to another Soviet fighter aircraft, and documents on several new models of airborne missile systems. The next month, another internal memorandum stated that, even if Tolkachev’s spying were discovered, the value of the information that he had provided would not diminish for at least eight to 10 years—it would take the Soviets that long to design, test, and deploy new technology to replace that which the agent had compromised to the CIA.

The kudos continued. In September 1980, a memorandum from the Defense Department stated: “The impact of [Tolkachev’s] reporting is limitless in terms of enhancing US military systems’ effectiveness, and in the potential to save lives and equipment.” It also called the information instrumental in shaping the course of billions of dollars of US R&D activities, and described the value of Tolkachev’s information to these programs as immense.

From January 1979 until June 1980, Tolkachev had provided an extremely high volume of incredibly valuable intelligence to the US military. This information could have meant the difference between victory and defeat, should a military confrontation with the USSR have occurred.



Plans for Contingencies
In the early stages of the operation, the CIA had to consider how and when ultimately to end it. This included potential exfiltration arrangements, given the tremendous value of Tolkachev’s information and the high risks that he was running. Headquarters had quickly concurred in offering exfiltration to Tolkachev and his family, but it wanted to delay any actual departure from the USSR for several years, if possible, to take maximum advantage of his access.

Tolkachev had also been thinking about the eventual end of his relationship with the CIA, but in somewhat different terms. In the note that he passed in April 1979, he had requested that he be issued a poison pill, writing, “I would not like to carry on a conversation with organs of the KGB.” He reiterated this request in his October 1979 note and made it a steady theme in his messages to the CIA from that point onward. The CIA officers handling this case at first resisted these requests, but gradually concluded that Tolkachev would not be put off. The matter was then referred to the DCI, who refused to authorize the issuance of a poison pill.

After being told of this decision, Tolkachev wrote a letter to the DCI pleading his case; he gave the letter to his case officer during his June 1980 meeting. In it, he detailed the risks he was running and insisted that he be given the means to commit suicide, if necessary, because of his “precarious security situation.” Because of the large number of intelligence requirements he had been given, he said that he could not answer many of them without obtaining documents to which he did not normally have access. To satisfy these requirements, he had to check out quantities of sensitive documents from the institute library. Each time he did so, he had to sign out the documents which had originated with his institute but which were outside of the purview of his own work. Worse, he had to obtain prior written permission from any other Soviet research institutes or agencies whose documents he wanted to obtain.

Tolkachev emphasized that, if the KGB ever for any reason suspected that information was being leaked on the research activities on which he was working, a review of the document sign-out permission cards would quickly finger him as the leading suspect. He said that the next thing the KGB would do would be to search his apartment, and “things that I can hide from my family I can never hide from the KGB.” Given this situation, he said that it should be easier to understand his efforts to obtain the “means of defense” as soon as possible. By having a means to commit suicide, Tolkachev said that he would be able to keep secret “the volume of his activity and the methods by which he was able to carry out this activity.” Incredibly, Tolkachev was not only thinking about his personal situation, but he was pointing out the importance of preventing the Soviets from finding out exactly what he had passed to the Americans, which would greatly complicate their efforts to carry out a damage assessment, when and if he were compromised.

In this June 1980 note, Tolkachev also responded to the CIA’s suggestion that a dialogue begin on the subject of his eventual exfiltration to the United States with his wife and son. He specifically requested that these exfiltration preparations be made as soon as possible, and he asked to be notified of what he had to do *****pport this planning.

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Turnover
The handing over of an agent from his first case officer to a successor is always a signal event in any agent operation. Although John Guilsher had not actually “recruited” Tolkachev, he had been the agent’s first handler and he had moved the operation from its initial, halting steps into a smooth relationship. He had made Tolkachev feel confident that he could be depended on to protect his security, and the two had become comfortable with each other in the dangerous endeavor in which they were involved. It was time, however, for Guilsher to leave Moscow, and the CIA had some concern that Tolkachev might react negatively to the introduction of a new case officer. Nonetheless, on 14 October 1980, Tolkachev met for the first time with his new case officer and showed no hesitation in accepting him. An important milestone had been passed.

Tolkachev told his new case officer at their first meeting that he had purchased a new car, a Russian Zhiguli; and he insisted that the meeting be held in the car, which was parked nearby. He suggested that, in the future, other meetings could be held in the car.

The CIA ultimately agreed that personal meetings in Tolkachev’s parked car were a sensible complement to walking meetings. Although the car’s license plates were traceable to the agent, there was no reason for the KGB to pay particular attention to these plates, should they see the car parked with two people sitting in it. The CIA case officers meeting with Tolkachev always dressed like working class Russians. In cold weather, it would appear more natural for two people to be seated in a warm car than to be out walking. Gradually, meetings in Tolkachev’s parked car were incorporated into the meeting plan and used throughout the duration of the operation.

Alternate Communications
In September 1980, CIA headquarters suggested that planning begin for the possible use of Short-Range Agent Communications (SRAC) with Tolkachev, as an emergency backup communications system. It could be used if Tolkachev wanted an emergency meeting, or if there were a need for a brief exchange of data without the risk of a personal meeting.

Headquarters proposed the use of the latest and best SRAC system available at the time. It consisted of two identical units, one for the case officer’s use and one for the agent’s use. These units were about the size of two cigarette packs laid end to end. Each unit came with detachable antennas, Russian or English keyboard plates, battery packs and batteries, chargers, and instructions.

Before any planned transmission, both the agent and the case officer entered their messages by keying them into their respective unit one letter at a time. The messages were automatically enciphered as they were keyed into the units. The units had a capacity of several thousand characters. With no major physical obstructions between them, the units had a range in the hundreds of meters. They were programmed to exchange messages in a burst transmission that lasted only seconds. The messages could then be read by scrolling the deciphered text across the unit’s small screen.

The use of this communications method was highly structured. In this operation, it would be up to the agent to initiate any SRAC exchange. To start the process, Tolkachev would be directed to mark a predetermined signal site (a chalk mark on a utility pole) in accordance with a periodic (normally monthly) timetable. A case officer would monitor this site, which would be on a street regularly used by the officer.

If the agent marked the signal, this would initiate a sequence of events leading up to a SRAC exchange. Both the agent and a case officer would go to prearranged electronic letter drop (ELD) sites at a predetermined time. These sites would be close enough to allow a SRAC exchange while being far enough apart so that there could be no apparent visual connection between the case officer and the agent. Primary alternate sites and times for ELD exchanges were built into the communications system. There were also prearranged signals for the agent to convey that he did or did not receive the message transmitted to him. In the Tolkachev operation, these signals were to be parked car signals (PCS)—that is, the agent would park his car a certain way at a certain place at a given time to indicate that he did or did not successfully receive the SRAC transmission. In return, the CIA would use a PCS to convey the same information to the agent.

The idea of using SRAC was broached with Tolkachev in a note passed to him in the October 1980 meeting. He responded positively in December 1980, and, in March 1981, a SRAC unit and the accompanying paraphernalia and communications plan were passed to him.

Some technical bugs had to be worked out before this system could be used successfully. As it developed, it was decided not to meet Tolkachev for an extended period after his March 1981 meeting to decrease the frequency of contact with him, and thus reduce the chance that the KGB might stumble onto his activities. Consequently, the agent was not met again until November 1981, at which time he returned his SRAC unit, saying that he could not get it to work. The unit was repaired and returned to him later.

In March 1982, the agent signaled for a SRAC exchange, and a successful exchange of SRAC messages was carried out on 13 March. Tolkachev had asked for the exchange because he wanted an unscheduled personal meeting just three days after a regular meeting. The purpose of this unscheduled meeting was to allow him to provide a critique of the first cut of the fake building pass that OTS had made. Anxious to obtain this pass so that he could safely check out sensitive documents, Tolkachev resorted to using the SRAC system.

SRAC was not the only alternate communications method introduced into this operation. In November 1981, Tolkachev was passed a commercially purchased shortwave radio and two one-time pads, with accompanying instructions, as part of an “Interim-One-Way Link” (IOWL) base-to-agent alternate communication system. He was also passed a demodulator unit, which was to be connected to the short wave radio when a message was to be received.

Tolkachev was directed to tune into a certain short wave frequency at specific times and days with his demodulator unit connected to his radio to capture the message being sent. Each broadcast lasted 10 minutes, which included the transmission of any live message as well as dummy messages. The agent could later break out the message by scrolling it out on the screen of the demodulator unit. The first three digits of the message would indicate whether a live message was included for him, in which case he would scroll out the message, contained in five-digit groups, and decode the message using his one-time pad. Using this system, Tolkachev could receive over 400 five-digit groups in any one message.

Tolkachev tried to use this IOWL system, but he later informed his case officer that he was unable to securely monitor these broadcasts at the times indicated (evening hours) because he had no privacy in his apartment. He also said that he could not adhere to a different evening broadcast schedule by waiting until his wife and son went to bed, because he always went to bed before they did.

As a result, the broadcasts were changed to the morning hours of certain workdays, during which Tolkachev would come home from work using a suitable pretext. This system also ran afoul of bad luck and Soviet security. Tolkachev’s institute initiated new security procedures that made it virtually impossible for him to leave the office during work hours without written permission. In December 1982, Tolkachev returned his IOWL equipment, broadcast schedule, instructions, and one-time pad to his case officer. The CIA was never able to use this system to set up an unscheduled meeting with him.

Excellent tradecraft and good luck conspired to allow the CIA to continue its pattern of undetected personal encounters with Tolkachev. Over 10 such meetings were held between October 1980 and November 1983. There were some instances where heavy KGB surveillance on CIA officers forced a given meeting to be aborted, but for the most part they were held as scheduled.

The periodically heavy KGB surveillance on various case officers, often without any apparent logic, did, however, force the CIA to become more creative in its personal-meeting tradecraft. A new countersurveillance technique that was used for this operation involved what was called a “Jack-in-the-Box” (JIB). A JIB (a popup device made to look like the upper half of a person) allowed a case officer to make a meeting with an agent even while under vehicular surveillance.

Typically, a JIB would be smuggled into a car disguised as a large package or the like. Subsequently Tolkachev’s case officer and other station personnel would set out in the car many hours before a planned meeting with the agent. Following a preplanned route, the driver at some point would make a series of turns designed to provide a brief period when the trailing surveillance car would lose sight of the car containing the case officer and other CIA personnel. After one of these turns, Tolkachev’s case officer would jump from the slowly moving vehicle, at which time the driver would activate the JIB. The JIB would give the appearance to any trailing surveillance team of being the missing case officer. The car would then continue its route, eventually arriving at a given destination, usually the home of one of the other CIA personnel in the car. The JIB, again concealed in a large package, would then be removed from the car. At that point, the case officer would almost certainly be missed by the KBG surveillants, because he would not get out of the car, but they would have no hope of locating him until he returned to a known site.

Meanwhile, the case officer, having exited the car wearing a Russian-style coat and hat, would proceed by foot and public transportation to the meeting site, after assuring himself that he indeed was free of surveillance. After conducting the meeting, he would use public transportation to return to the Embassy or to his home. This method of avoiding surveillance was used successfully several times for meetings with Tolkachev.

It was preferable not to overuse this technique because the KGB would be well aware that the case officer had eluded surveillance and that almost certainly some operational act had been carried out. Typically in such situations, some KGB retaliation could be expected—such as air let out of the case officers’ tires, cars blocked on the street, or other harassment—and surveillance of suspected CIA personnel in general would be increased temporarily. Nonetheless, at times the use of this technique was the only way that a case officer could get free to meet with Tolkachev.

The communications plan with Tolkachev had to be adjusted in other ways as well. In November 1983, Tolkachev asked that he not be called at home to set up unscheduled meetings, because the phone was now located in his son’s room and it was his son who always answered the phone. Although the CIA could defeat KGB surveillance, defeating the habits of a typical teenager was more than either it or the agent could manage!

Favors for Oleg
Tolkachev’s desire to satisfy some of the needs of his son was high on the agent’s list of reasons for maintaining his relationship with US intelligence. Oleg liked Western rock-and-roll music. In the note that Tolkachev passed to the case officer at his October 1980 meeting, he asked to be provided with some popular records for passage to his son. He also requested Western stereo equipment. Finally, he asked for advice on how he could dependably receive Western radio broadcasts, which were frequently jammed by Soviet authorities.

In response, the CIA provided seven cassettes of taped rock-and-roll music during a March 1981 meeting, despite concerns that having such cassettes could pose a security threat. Tolkachev said that the CIA should not worry, because such music was available in the Russian black market, but he himself did not want to be bothered trying to track it down there. He then requested stereo headphones for his son, some albums, and the words of the songs in these albums in English. He also asked that he be given the words to the songs on the seven cassettes that had been previously taped for his son.

This effort to do favors for Oleg continued. In March 1982, Tolkachev “reluctantly” asked more personal favors. He requested a Walkman for his son, as well as a set of pencils of various degrees of hardness for Oleg to use for mechanical drawing. He also asked for some non-Soviet razor blades, writing that “shaving with Soviet razor blades is an unpleasant operation.” He apologized for asking for such trivial things, noting that, “unfortunately our personal life consists also of all types of small things which sometimes exert an influence on the general mood of life.” CIA personnel in Eastern Europe were ultimately tasked with purchasing a local razor and a year’s supply of razor blades for passage to Tolkachev.

In February 1983, Tolkachev asked for various drafting materials for his son, including specialized drafting pens, inks, erasers, and pen tips. In April 1983, he asked for some Western books on architecture for Oleg, as well as other Western books, which apparently were for both him and his son. The books included Hitler’s Mein Kampf, a copy of the Bible (in Russian), the DIA publication Soviet Military Power, the memoirs of Golda Meir, and a Solzhenitsyn book. He also asked for biographies of famous world figures and a selection of popular Western fiction. Although all indications are that his son was never made witting of Tolkachev’s CIA role, he clearly was a beneficiary.

More Money Matters
Tolkachev’s remuneration continued to be a subject of negotiation. In December 1980, he asked that the 8.75 percent interest that his escrow salary was accumulating be paid to him in rubles at the end of each calendar year. Despite the obvious security concerns, this request was granted. In November 1981, Tolkachev was passed an amount of rubles equivalent to over $40,000, which was the amount of interest to which he would be entitled as of 31 December of that year. Even this, however, did not satisfy him.

In February 1982, Tolkachev wrote the CIA that the conversion of his interest from dollars to rubles should be done at the black-market rate (which in his mind was the real rate of exchange) rather than the official rate. By his calculations, he should have received more than four times the amount of rubles that he had been given.

CIA officials managing this case agreed that Tolkachev’s information was well worth the sums he was seeking, and it was decided to meet his request starting the following year. There was, however, great concern about the large amounts of funds that he would be receiving. Any unusual spending by Tolkachev or his family could easily be noticed by the Soviet authorities and lead to a security investigation. Because of the fears that such large amounts of rubles could cause security problems, consideration was given to the possibility of compensating him in part with expensive jewelry or gold coins.

In later written exchanges, Tolkachev agreed that he might be partially compensated with “very fine gold Russian-made jewelry” from the late 19th or early 20th century. He noted that such jewelry could be reasonably explained as having been left to him by his mother. CIA headquarters subsequently conducted a search of antique shops and other possible sources in London, Rome, Paris, Helsinki, Munich, New York, and Washington, to locate and purchase such pieces. This proved to be quite difficult, but eventually some items were found and passed to Tolkachev.

In December 1982, Tolkachev again raised the subject of his remuneration, but with a different twist. He said that he would like to create a “relatively large reserve of money in case of unforeseen events.” He noted that, if a “full breakdown” occurred in his activity, no amount of money would help. If, however, a “partial breakdown” occurred—such as a co-worker catching him hiding materials or taking classified materials home—he might be able to bribe his way out. CIA headquarters never liked this idea, and ultimately it was discarded.

Exfiltration Planning
The CIA was also focused on the need to construct a viable plan for removing Tolkachev and his family from the USSR in the event of a perceived threat of arrest. This subject had first been raised with Tolkachev in December 1979. He responded in February 1980 that he had never considered leaving the USSR, but that, if the CIA could get him and his family out of the country, he would like to pursue planning for such an eventuality. At this point, however, he informed the CIA that his wife and son were totally unwitting of his intelligence work, and thus the whole question of their possible exfiltration would take some deliberation.

After the June 1980 meeting, planning for the possible exfiltration of Tolkachev and his family proceeded sporadically. CIA personnel in the Soviet Union were tasked to devise workable exfiltration scenarios, including the casing of signal sites and agent pickup sites, while CIA headquarters took on the task of manufacturing containers in which the agent and his family could be smuggled out of the USSR.

Tolkachev appeared highly interested in this subject, once it had been broached. One of Tolkachev’s former case officers recalls that Tolkachev would periodically brainstorm on the subject, suggesting wildly improbable scenarios, such as having the CIA fly a specially made light aircraft into a rural area of the Soviet Union, where Tolkachev and his family could be picked up. When discussing that particular possibility, he noted that the only problem might be that such an aircraft designed to evade Soviet aircraft detection systems might have trouble accommodating his wife, due to her weight!

The subject of exfiltration came up again in January 1983, following the initiation of new security regulations at Tolkachev’s institute, which suggested at least the possibility that the Soviets might have become aware of the leakage of sensitive information from that institute. It was agreed that a Leningrad option would be preferable if Tolkachev and his family were able to get out of Moscow. This would involve a vehicular pick up in Leningrad and subsequent smuggling across the border into Finland in a specially constructed hiding cavity in the vehicle. The secondary option would be a vehicle pickup on the outskirts of Moscow, the smuggling of Tolkachev and family into a secure holding area, and their subsequent removal from the country by controlled aircraft or overland by specially modified vehicle.

There was some discussion of actually issuing an exfiltration plan with suitable alternatives to Tolkachev at his next meeting, in March 1983, but it was decided to discuss the subject with him in depth at that time to ensure that the CIA’s tentative plans made sense to him and to seek more information from him to aid in the planning for this eventuality. This was done in a written note, which was passed to Tolkachev at the March meeting. In this note, it was proposed to meet again with Tolkachev in April to get feedback from him and to allow for in-depth discussions of an exfiltration plan.

Tolkachev was met in April 1983 as planned. He refused, however, to accept an envelope that had been prepared for him outlining an exfiltration plan with various alternatives. He said that because of his “current family situation,” he did not want to consider exfiltration at that time.

In a written note, Tolkachev explained further his unwillingness to accept an exfiltration plan. He wrote that he and his wife had some acquaintances who had left the Soviet Union for Israel, and eventually ended up in the United States. The woman in this family had subsequently written to Tolkachev’s wife about how much she missed her homeland. Tolkachev said that his wife had commented that she could never leave Moscow, let alone the Soviet Union, because she would suffer “too much nostalgia.” Similarly, Tolkachev wrote that his son had commented (presumably in response to an elicitation effort by his father) that, “It would not be too bad to travel to the West for two or three years,” but he could never leave the Soviet Union for good because all his friends were there.

Tolkachev said that, given this situation, “I cannot think about exfiltration since I would never leave my family.” Nonetheless, he provided written answers to the questions that had been posed, so that exfiltration planning could continue, against the day that his family situation somehow changed.

Protecting Production
By mid-1980, the operation had settled into a regular routine, with Tolkachev taking documents home during his luncheon break for photographing. The main limiting factor at this time was the weather. In winter, Tolkachev was able to smuggle large quantities of documents out of the institute under his heavy clothing. In summer, lighter clothing restricted how much he could sneak out.

Meanwhile, CIA headquarters continued to work on a fake building pass for Tolkachev that he could use to check out documents, should tighter security restrictions be reimposed. In October 1980, headquarters reported that OTS hoped to have a final version of the fake pass in November.

That same month, Tolkachev passed to the CIA a document sign-out permission card from his institute’s document library. He asked that the Agency’s technical experts also try to duplicate this card. He wanted to use it to replace the real one surreptitiously, because the card contained a full listing of the large volume of sensitive documents that Tolkachev had signed out, most of which he had obtained to photograph for the CIA. The agent had long worried that, if and when any leak occurred in the United States that indicated that sensitive information from his institute had been compromised, the KGB’s first recourse would be to check the document sign-out cards, and, in so doing, they would quickly finger Tolkachev as a likely culprit. If, however, he could substitute a “clean” sign-out card, there would be nothing on the record to point to him as a possible suspect.

OTS was given the task of reproducing this sign-out card as well as his building pass. Both were completed by early 1981 and passed to Tolkachev. He substituted the fake sign-out card for his real card in March 1981, greatly relieving the pressure he felt, at least for the immediate future. He had returned his fake building pass, however, because the color of the outside cover was not quite right. Fortunately at the time, the institute was still under somewhat relaxed security procedures, and Tolkachev was able to sign out documents without leaving his building pass.

In November 1981, however, he reported that his institute had reinitiated the procedure by which the building pass had to be left at the document library when signing out documents. By then, OTS had completed the fake building pass and it was included in the materials passed to the agent during a meeting held that month. The following month, however, Tolkachev called for an unscheduled meeting to return the fake pass again—the color was still not right. He noted that he would not need his original pass while on extended vacation in January and February and could lend it for use in fabricating the fake pass. He stressed his concern that his production would fall off if this problem were not solved. The case officer resisted the temptation to take his pass at the meeting, reasoning that there was no guarantee that a case officer could make a subsequent meeting with the agent within a given time frame to return the pass, which made giving up his pass too risky. Tolkachev was told that a fall off in production would be preferable to his doing something that could dramatically increase the chance of his being compromised.

Despite the increased security restrictions at his institute and the difficulties in fabricating an exact replica of his building pass, Tolkachev continued to produce documentary intelligence, albeit at a reduced rate. In December 1981, he passed several rolls of 35-mm film; in February 1982, he provided more than a dozen rolls. Asked how he had managed to continue to do this photography, given the security restrictions in place, Tolkachev said he was able to resort to various ruses, too complicated to explain in their entirety.

Subsequently, Tolkachev provided another story that he had concocted to bypass these security regulations. He noted that sometimes, after leaving his building pass and checking out a document, he would return to get his pass so that he could go home for lunch, explaining that he could not return the documents he had checked out because “his boss was currently reviewing them.” He would then take the documents home and photograph them. When the case officer commented that this was “dangerous,” Tolkachev laughed and said, “Everything is dangerous.”

Tolkachev called for an unscheduled meeting in March 1982 to provide ad***ional feedback on the fake building pass that OTS had produced. This time, he gave the case officer a piece that he had torn off his pass so that OTS could work with the exact colors.

A number of meetings had been held between November 1981 and May 1982, primarily instigated by Tolkachev in an effort to solve his building pass problem. It was decided in May that, for security reasons, these personal contacts should be halted for several months. Later, heavy, but apparently routine, KGB surveillance of CIA case officers in the latter half of 1982 forced several planned meetings to be aborted. It was only through the CIA’s first use of its JIB technique that they were able to reestablish personal contact with Tolkachev in December 1982.

At this December meeting, the agent said that for the first time he had successfully used the OTS-fabricated building pass to smuggle sensitive documents out to photograph at his home. Nonetheless, Tolkachev was depressed because his production was down, as a result of a new, two-tiered building pass system set up at the institute. Now, he and all but a few of the most senior officers had to turn in their building pass anytime they left the building. To reenter, they needed to go to the main desk and give their pass number to the guard to reclaim their pass. Even worse, because the new passes were different from their predecessors, the fake OTS pass was now useless.

In ad***ion, Tolkachev and all other staffers at the institute now needed to get signed permission slips from their bosses to leave the institute during working hours, except for going home for lunch. This meant that it was virtually impossible for Tolkachev to go to his apartment on the indicated mornings to listen to his shortwave radio for possible IOWL messages. He requested a camera that he could use to photograph documents at his office, despite his past difficulties in doing so.

CIA headquarters speculated that the Soviets might have learned that sensitive information on the projects being worked on in this institute had leaked to the United States. It recommended that Tolkachev be directed to stand down for six months (later modified to “several months”). Headquarters also opposed issuing Tolkachev a special camera for use in his office as being too risky, but said that the agent should be informed that he would be kept on full salary during any stand down in his operational activities.

At meetings held in February and March 1983, the CIA case officer continued his discussions with Tolkachev regarding how to keep the operation productive in the face of the heightened security restrictions. At the March meeting, Tolkachev provided a strip from his new building pass and a photograph of it so that OTS could try to duplicate it. He said that he had smuggled his 35-mm camera into his office on three consecutive days until he could photograph it clandestinely at his desk!

Tolkachev continued to do some document photography in spite of the security restrictions. He turned over more than a dozen rolls of 35-mm film at the March meeting with his case officer and another dozen-plus rolls at an April meeting.

To deal with these restrictions while at the same time heeding the agent’s desire to remain productive, CIA headquarters decided in May to issue him at the next opportunity the latest miniature camera in its inventory, which was the third generation of such cameras. Meanwhile, for security reasons Tolkachev would be directed to stand down completely from taking any documents home to photograph.

The Beginning of the End
The summer and early autumn months of 1983 were harbingers that the best days of the Tolkachev operation were over. From then on, various problems reduced the agent’s productivity until his arrest at some still-undetermined date in the first half of 1985.

Between September and November 1983, five attempts to hold a meeting with Tolkachev failed. On three occasions, the agent signaled a readiness to meet, but did not appear at the meeting site at the appointed time. On two other occasions, the agent signaled a readiness to meet, but no appropriate CIA case officer was able to shake surveillance and show up at the meeting site. Tolkachev later said that he had been unable to make the three meetings he missed due to minor but unavoidable problems, but he had gone to the meeting site for the two meetings that the case officer had had to abort.

Finally, in mid-November, Tolkachev and his case officer met. The agent appeared relaxed and happy to be back in touch. He provided 16 pages of handwritten notes but no film, noting that for security reasons he had been unable to photograph any documents. The case officer gave Tolkachev a note discussing security matters, some new requirements, two new concealed mini cameras with accompanying instructions, a light meter, some ad***ional questions regarding the efforts to duplicate his document sign-out card, a proposed meeting schedule for the future, some pieces of gold jewelry of the type he had specified, and some books of fiction and architecture that he had requested. All the physical signs from this meeting were positive, except for the agent’s inability to photograph any documents.

Security Threat
When Tolkachev’s written notes from this meeting were processed, however, the CIA officers involved in the case were stunned to read that a serious security threat to the agent had occurred the previous spring—one that had frightened him to the point where he had been convinced that he would be arrested at any moment.

In his note, Tolkachev said that a major security investigation had been conducted in his office in April 1983, apparently regarding possible leaks of classified information about a particular Soviet fighter aircraft target-recognition system. Tolkachev said that security personnel in his institute had requested on a priority basis a list of all personnel having access to information on this subject. Because Tolkachev had passed information on this system to the CIA the previous month, he was convinced that any leak would almost certainly be traced back to him.

Tolkachev wrote that, after having been informed of this investigation, he had asked for the next day off. He had driven to a dacha, taking all of his espionage paraphernalia—including his SRAC unit, Pentax camera, and deaddrop and signal site instructions—as well as the books and money that had been passed to him. [4] At the dacha, he had burned everything that would burn. He had thrown the remaining charred metal parts out of the car on the drive back into Moscow.

At that point, Tolkachev said that he had started carrying everywhere with him a poison pill that he had obtained. He reasoned that the most likely
scenario for his arrest would be a call to his boss’s office, at which point he would be seized. As a result, for the next several days, any time he was called to this office, he first placed the poison pill under his tongue, so that if seized he could immediately bite it. Given these circumstances, wrote Tolkachev, he would have to stand down on any document photography for the time being. He said, however, that he would continue to provide written information about sensitive documents.

Tolkachev had prepared his written account of these April events in the expectation of a meeting with the CIA in September. With each missed meeting, he added a few pages, each time showing increased confidence that he had weathered the storm and would be able to continue his work for the CIA. Meanwhile, as noted above, Tolkachev had acted quite calmly at his 16 November meeting, giving no sign at that time that he had suffered this tremendous scare. A subsequent CIA message from Moscow to headquarters commented that Tolkachev’s continued sang froid, despite the events of April, demonstrated that “this is indeed a driven man who is determined to continue to produce, by whatever means he deems necessary, right up to the end, even if that end is his death.”

CIA headquarters in turn noted in a message sent to Moscow that the information provided by Tolkachev in March on the Soviet fighter aircraft target recognition system had not been disseminated outside of the CIA until June, and thus no leak of this information could have occurred. This ignored, of course, the possibility that a leak from the Agency itself could have taken place—something that was unthinkable in CIA eyes, until the treason of CIA officer Aldrich Ames. [5]

Over the next several months, intense discussions took place inside the CIA regarding how best to protect Tolkachev, while still trying to keep the operation going. It was agreed that meetings in the future should be held to a minimum, probably only twice yearly, with a possible reissuance of a SRAC capability. In ad***ion, a revised communications system was planned. There was also a great deal of discussion about the problem of trying to get the funds to Tolkachev that were owed him (the yearly interest on his escrow account), in light of the physical difficulties of passing large sums of money to him and the possible security threat posed by his having such sums in his possession. Finally, it was agreed that a complete exfiltration plan should be prepared and passed to the agent at the next meeting.

Headquarters directed that Tolkachev be advised to exercise extreme caution in his intelligence-gathering activities. He was not to take any more documents home to photograph. The CIA decided that he should be told to limit his activities for the most part to writing down at home notes on sensitive documents that he had read in the office that day. It was decided to continue the practice of passing miniature CIA cameras to the agent, but to tell him to use them only if he felt completely secure in doing so.

In April 1984, Tolkachev again signaled his readiness to meet. At the meeting, the agent gave the case officer the miniature cameras he had been given, having shot full rolls of film with both, and some 39 pages of handwritten notes, 26 of which contained detailed intelligence. He also handed over some schematics on Soviet radar systems. All but a handful of the 96 frames that he had taken with his spy cameras were of excellent quality.

Tolkachev, in turn, was passed two new spy cameras, a revised communications plan, a note, some medicines and books that he had requested, and over 100,000 rubles. He again refused to accept the exfiltration plan, insisting that he would not be able to use it.

At this meeting, Tolkachev’s morale seemed to be high. He said that everything appeared calm at his office, with no further developments relating to the sudden security investigation of the previous year. In his note to the CIA, he wrote that he was sorry to have overreacted and destroyed his spy gear. He also said that he thought that he could be met safely more than twice a year, and he asked for several new mini-cameras and for the re-issuance of his Pentax 35-mm camera. The only negative note appeared to be his health—he wrote that he had been diagnosed as having “chronic gastritis,” and that his peritonitis had worsened. He asked for medicines for both problems. Tolkachev’s case officer wrote that, as far as Tolkachev was concerned, it appeared that the operation was “back to normal.”

Weighing Risks and Gains
Between April and October 1984, the internal CIA debate continued regarding the appropriate balance between productivity and security for this case. The agent’s security was deemed to be the primary consideration. As a result, Tolkachev was not to be reissued a Pentax camera, because it would be too dangerous for him to try to carry documents home to be photographed in the future. The agent could be met more than twice a year, but only if he insisted that it was safe.

Another meeting with Tolkachev took place in October 1984. He returned the two miniature cameras—all 90 frames came out clearly—and turned over another 22 pages of written notes. The agent in turn was passed three new miniature cameras, a note, various medicines, architects’ drawing ink for his son, and some intelligence requirements. Tolkachev said that everything was normal at work and that his health had improved. He again insisted that he be given a Pentax; when told that it was too dangerous, he replied that he had requirements to meet and that he was anxious to get on with his work.

Despite Tolkachev’s insistence, CIA headquarters reaffirmed that it was too dangerous for him to be given another 35-mm camera. CIA personnel in Moscow agreed, but they worried that he just might go out and buy a camera himself. It was agreed that he should be passed more than two miniature cameras at future meetings to try to keep him happy and to discourage any effort to obtain another 35-mm camera.

There was also a continued discussion of what should be done to pay Tolkachev the funds he would be owed as of 31 December. Based on his escrow account holding of over a million dollars, which represented salary that had been accumulated as of December 1983, Tolkachev would be owed several hundred thousand rubles, just in interest alone. His ruble interest payment was based on the amount of his accumulated salary at the end of the previous year.

Business as Usual
In January 1985, another seemingly routine meeting was held with Tolkachev. He returned his three used miniature cameras and passed 16 pages of handwritten notes containing both intelligence and operational information. The case officer gave him five new miniature cameras, intelligence requirements, new communications signal sites, some 100,000 rubles, and three Russian-language books that he had asked for. Per Tolkachev’s request, the case officer also returned some technical notes that the agent had passed to the CIA earlier.

Tolkachev again said that all was calm at his office, and he immediately asked whether his Pentax had been included in his package. When he was told why this had not been done, he said that he disagreed, but would abide by the decision. Although he said that his overall health was better, his teeth were still bothering him. He suggested that the next meeting be held in June, and that plans be made for an average of three meetings per year.

At this meeting, Tolkachev had a long list of personal requests; including medicines, transcripts of official statements made by Soviet leaders as reported in the Western press; books, albums, and soft-tipped pens for his son; and English-language materials (written and cassette) for his son and one of his son’s female friends. Tolkachev recognized that it would take a lot of work to satisfy all these requests, and he proposed that someone be hired full-time, to be paid out of his escrow funds, just to take care of these requests.

Tolkachev also explained how he was currently doing his document photography. He said that he usually took the documents to the toilet of an office building in the institute complex that was adjacent to his office building. He did this because the light was better there (a bigger window), and it was used less often. He said that he usually arranged to make a cover stop at someone’s office in the other building to explain his presence there. Normally, the whole process took no more than 20 to 25 minutes.

When the film that Tolkachev had returned in January was developed, it was unreadable, almost certainly due to the lack of light—he had written in his note that he had done the photography on a cloudy day, and he worried that he had not had sufficient light. This was particularly unfortunate because he had noted that the photographed papers had included “very important documents concerning frontline fighters for the 1990s.” Tolkachev did, however, provide some useful information on this subject in his notes.

Nothing happened at the January meeting that indicated that the operation at that point had been compromised. Tolkachev’s demeanor was consistent with that of previous meetings, and the written information was consistent with what he had previously provided in terms of subject matter, quality, and quantity. In ad***ion, the case officer had not seen any change in KGB surveillance habits or patterns. Although it is still not known exactly when Tolkachev was compromised, it almost certainly was at some point after this meeting.

Missed Meetings
As a result of the failed photography from the January meeting, it was decided to signal for an unscheduled meeting with Tolkachev in March to ask him to try to rephotograph the documents on the frontline fighter. In ad***ion, OTS had recently tested a new film that could function in low-light con***ions, which could be used in the miniature cameras; this film was to be given to him at this next meeting.

In early March, Tolkachev’s case officer put up a visual signal that he wanted a meeting. Tolkachev, however, failed to signal that he could make a meeting. In mid-March, he appeared to signal his readiness to meet—this was the second option for a possible meeting in March—by opening one of the transom windows in his apartment between 12:15 p.m. and 12:30 p.m.

In retrospect, it may be noteworthy that he opened a transom window that he normally did not use and which was less visible from the street. Tolkachev may have been trying to indicate that he was in trouble, although there is no other evidence *****pport this hypothesis. In any event, he did not appear for the meeting. The third alternate meeting was set for late March, but he failed to signal a readiness to meet, so no meeting was attempted. For security reasons, it was decided not to try again to signal for an unscheduled meeting but to wait for the next scheduled meeting, which was set for June.

Disaster
On 5 June, which was the first option for a meeting in that month, Tolkachev signaled his readiness to meet. During the indicated time frame, he opened the middle transom window in his apartment, which was the window he normally used. However, the case officer who planned to make the meeting was forced to abort when he encountered heavy surveillance before the meeting, and it was not possible to send an alternate case officer on this occasion.

On 13 June, the second alternate meeting date, Tolkachev’s readiness-to-meet signal was again seen. The case officer had not detected any surveillance in proceeding to the meeting site. As he approached the site, the only unusual thing he noted was a woman talking loudly on a radio taxi phone in the area. At the exact time set for the meeting, however, the case officer was suddenly jumped by more than a dozen KGB security personnel dressed in military camouflage uniforms who had been hiding in some nearby bushes. Several well-dressed men, apparently senior security personnel, quickly appeared to direct the seizure. The case officer was bundled into a van and taken off to Lubyanka Prison. Tolkachev was not seen at the meeting site nor later at the prison.

The treatment of the case officer during his arrest followed standard KGB procedures for such situations. He was physically restrained and thoroughly searched but not physically abused. At Lubyanka, he was accused of being a spy. In front of him, and while being videotaped, the package that he had planned to pass to Tolkachev was opened piece by piece, with some running commentary from the KGB questioners. Getting no reaction, the KGB ultimately notified the US Embassy of his arrest. Detained at 9:40 p.m., the case officer was finally released at 12:20 a.m.

The case officer had been carrying five miniature concealed cameras; four pages of handwritten materials that were being returned to Tolkachev at his request; two architectural books; 20 French and 20 German drawing pens for Tolkachev’s son; a large quantity of periodontal medicine; a book concealment device that contained 250 pages of Western newspaper and magazine articles requested by Tolkachev; and an envelope with thousands of rubles.

An accompanying note thanked the agent for the “very important written information” that he had provided at the last meeting, but stated that it had not been possible to recover the documents that he had photographed. It discussed a new low-light film that it was hoped would be ready for passage to him soon, and described his photography from the previous summer as excellent. The message raised the possibility of providing him with a new document sign-out card so that he could use it to replace the original “as we did in 1980.” It cited the CIA’s reluctance to provide English-language materials for his son and his female friend because of concern about how he would explain these to his unwitting son. And, finally, the note stated that the enclosed payment of thousands of rubles was “partial payment of the interest due to you in 1985.”

The arrest of the CIA case officer was highly publicized in Moscow, but no mention was made of Tolkachev by name or position. As expected, the case officer and his family were forced to leave the country the week following the arrest. It was not until September that Tolkachev was publicly named as having been “arrested in June” for complicity in this intelligence operation.

Behind the Compromise
According to overt reporting, Edward Lee Howard, a disgruntled former CIA officer, is strongly suspected of having compromised Tolkachev to the KGB. Howard had been made aware of the Tolkachev operation in early 1983 as part of his preparation for a planned assignment to Moscow that summer. Although this would have been his first overseas tour as a CIA officer, his “clean” background—he had served overseas with both the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development prior to joining the CIA—made him a good candidate to handle the Tolkachev operation in Moscow.

Howard, however, had problems during a routine security reinvestigation in early 1983, prior to his planned departure for Moscow. He reportedly made some admissions of inappropriate behavior, and still failed to satisfy security investigators that he was being fully honest with them. Based on these problems, it was decided to terminate his employment, which was done in April 1983.

Taking dismissal badly, Howard reportedly started drinking heavily—he apparently had been a periodic binge drinker for some time, a fact that CIA managers were unaware of. He placed phone calls to Moscow in the summer of 1983 on more than one occasion, asking to speak with the CIA chief. These evidently were harassment calls, and the chief correctly saw them as possible indicators that Howard might ultimately betray CIA secrets in retaliation for his dismissal.

According to articles in the US press, erstwhile Soviet defector Vitaliy Yurchenko told American officials that a former CIA official (quickly determined to be Howard) contacted the KGB in Austria in September 1984 and provided information regarding CIA operations. [6] According to these accounts, Howard traveled to Europe again in April 1985 and met with the KGB in Vienna, where he provided ad***ional information on clandestine operations. [7]

There is little doubt that Howard betrayed Tolkachev, but it is not clear whether this was done during his September 1984 or April 1985 meeting with the Soviets. The KGB is known to investigate carefully and systematically any allegations of treason so that they can build an airtight case before they make an arrest. Thus, it is possible that Howard betrayed Tolkachev at his first meeting with the Soviets, resulting in the initiation of a time-consuming KGB investigation. Howard also may not have recalled the exact name and position of the agent, which could have made it initially difficult for the KGB to zero in on Tolkachev. On the other hand, Howard could have held back on providing the most important information that he had at his disposal, which would include his knowledge of the Tolkachev case. He might have wanted to probe the Soviets at his first meeting to confirm their willingness to pay him what he thought he was worth.

As it turned out, Tolkachev’s days would have been numbered, even if Howard had not betrayed him. According to overt accounts, Aldrich Ames also passed Tolkachev’s name to the KGB when he volunteered to work for them in 1985. Ames claims that he did not provide a full “dump” regarding all the sensitive CIA cases of which he was aware until June; however, he could have provided this information to them in April 1985, when he first passed classified information to the Soviets.

High Marks from the KGB
An article in the Soviet newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya in February 1990 discussing the Tolkachev case was clearly the work of KGB officials. It contained a number of comments that can only be taken as grudging praise for the CIA:

CIA provided Tolkachev with a cleverly compiled meeting schedule. CIA instructors made provisions for even the tiniest of details . . . . the miniature camera came with detailed instructions and a light meter . . . . Let us give CIA experts the cre*** due them—they worked really hard to find poorly illuminated and deserted places in Moscow for meetings with Tolkachev . . . . Anyone unfamiliar with CIA’s tricks would never imagine that, if a light were to burn behind a certain window in the US Embassy, this could be a coded message for a spy . . . . Langley provided touching care for its agent—if he needed medicine, everything was provided . . . . In every instruction efficiently setting out his assignment, they checked up on his health and went to great pains to stress how much they valued him and how concerned they were for his well-being.

A Final Accounting
A senior CIA analyst who had been a member of the small, highly compartmented Department of Defense task force formed in 1979 to review Tolkachev’s product and make recommendations on the best ways to exploit it, and who had continued to work on these materials after he came to the CIA in 1981, commented in retrospect on the value of Tolkachev’s production. The analyst noted that Tolkachev’s information was so voluminous and so valuable that, even though the agent was arrested in 1985, the task force continued to exploit his information until approximately 1990.

Fortunately, no indication has surfaced that either Tolkachev’s wife or his son was ever imprisoned or suffered any long-term effects from his treason. Tolkachev clearly took into account the need to shield them fully from his CIA activities, so that they would survive any compromise. At least one report indicates that Oleg Tolkachev is now a prominent Russian architect. To the degree that his son and his wife survived his arrest, Adolf Tolkachev would have been content that he had accomplished his goal of seriously damaging the Soviet system while protecting his family and allowing them to lead normal lives.
https://www.sofmag.com/the-execution-of-a-great-spy-adolf-tolkachev/

DANIEL MORGAN GRADUATE SCHOOL
of
NATIONAL SECURITY
presents
Adolf Tolkachev: The Billion Dollar Spy
1
David E. Hoffman
Author and Contributing E***or,
The Washington Post
At 6 p.m. on a cold, dark Moscow evening on January 12, 1977, Robert Fulton, the CIA station chief in
the Soviet capital, was filling up his car. The gas station was a small pavilion on Ulitsa Krasina. As
Fulton was about to climb back into his car, a man approached him, and spoke in English. “Are you
American?” the man asked. “I would like to talk to you.” Fulton said it would be difficult to talk then and
there, and so the man left a small packet on his front seat and quickly slipped away into the night.
This approach was the start of a phenomenally successful espionage operation. The man was Adolf
Tolkachev, a specialist in airborne radar who worked deep inside the Soviet military establishment.
At first, the CIA ignored his approaches, fearing a KGB trap. In my book “The Billion Dollar Spy,” I
describe the debate between the Moscow Station and headquarters over whether Tolkachev was genuine,
or a dangle. At the time, Stansfield Turner, the CIA director, was unsettled by unexplained events in
Moscow, including the discovery of U.S. agents and a mysterious fire in the embassy. Turner ordered a
complete stand-down of espionage operations until the problems could be fixed. After a period of
hesitation, Turner finally approved a resumption of espionage operations in Moscow in 1978. The CIA
concluded Tolkachev was for real, and sent him instructions for how to communicate using dead drops
and secret writing.
However, Tolkachev preferred not to use impersonal methods. He wanted to look his case officer in the
eye. What would become six years of personal contacts with Tolkachev started on a frigid New Year’s
Day, 1979. In his first meeting with CIA officer John Guilsher, Tolkachev passed materials to the United
States literally under the nose of the KGB. Most of the 21 meetings with the CIA through early 1985 were
held within three miles of the front entrance of the KGB headquarters.
What drove Tolkachev to become such a highly-productive agent for the United States? The answer
reaches back to the years before World War II.
When German bombers attacked Moscow on July 21, 1941, Tolkachev was just 14 years old. The city
was largely constructed out of wood, and the German planes dropped 104 tons of high explosive and
forty-six thousand incendiary bombs, killing 130 persons, the first in a wave of aerial bombings that
This article is adapted from his latest book, The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage
and Betrayal, (Doubleday, 2015) and remarks delivered at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School as part of the 2016
National Security Lecture Series on December 15, 2015.
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would go on until the following April. The Soviet capital was defended by over six hundred large
searchlights and eight hundred anti-aircraft guns but only primitive radars.
Radar was a new technology, and the success of the German bombing campaign showed how the Soviet
Union desperately needed improved radar. The goal became the focus of Tolkachev’s education and
career. He went to a vocational school, the equivalent of a high school, where he studied electronics,
finishing in 1948, and then to the Kharkov Polytechnic Institute in the Ukraine, completing his studies in
1954 in the radio-technical department, chiefly about radar. Upon returning to Moscow, he was assigned
to a military research facility, the Scientific Research Institute for Radio Engineering, known by its
Russian acronym, NIIR. It was later given an ad***ional name, Phazotron Scientific Design Association,
or simply Phazotron. It had been the first manufacturing facility for radar in the Soviet Union, and in the
1950s, the facility expanded into research and development of military radars, which grew in
sophistication from simple sighting devices to complex aviation and weapons guidance systems. It was
the only place Tolkachev had ever worked.
In 1957, he married Natalia Ivanovna Kuzmina, who worked in the antenna department at the institute.
Natasha was 22 years old, he was 30. Natasha had suffered greatly. In Stalin’s Moscow in the late 1930s,
her mother had worked in the Soviet ministry overseeing the timber industry, and was a Communist Party
member. On Sept. 17, 1937, the secret police showed up at the apartment. Natasha’s mother was arrested
and taken away. Her mother was accused of being a subversive and was shot. Her father, e***or of a party
newspaper for workers in light industry, was frightened. Refusing to testify against his wife, he fled to a
friend’s apartment, was arrested a week later, and was sent to the gulag. At that time, Natasha was only
two years old. Her parents just disappeared one night and she grew up in an orphanage. After the war, her
father came back from the camps, and told her the full story of the horrors. He died not long after.
Natasha held strong feelings. She managed to stay out of trouble, but those who worked with her knew of
her bitterness. She read the banned writer Boris Pasternak and the poet Osip Mandelstam. When
Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s novel “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” was published in 1962 in
Novy Mir, a literary journal, she was the first in the family to devour it. Later, when possession of
Solzhenitsyn’s unpublished works was considered more dangerous, she was unafraid to pass around
copies in samizdat. She was, in the words of a supervisor, “unable to be insincere.”
Her long ordeal and her deep antipathy to the Soviet party-state became Tolkachev’s, too. They were
angry about what happened to her parents, but by 1957, the year they wed, life seemed to be improving.
Young people felt a certain optimism in the 1950s—these were the years after the war, after Stalin’s
death, the time of great promise, known as The Thaw. They hoped for an end to the sacrifices of the past,
and there was a hint of more openness.
In 1965, Tolkachev and his wife had a son, Oleg, their only child.
But by the late 1960s, Tolkachev grew disenchanted with the system around him. He knew the story of
the cruel repression of Natasha’s parents. On top of that, hopes for the thaw came to crashing end—
especially with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, crushing the Prague Spring. At one point
during the events, workers in Natasha’s office were asked to raise hands to vote support for the Soviet
invasion. Natasha was gutsy. She was the only one in her office to dare raise her hand, “no.”
Tolkachev didn’t act on his disenchantment right away. His young son was growing up and Tolkachev
didn’t want to do anything that could hurt his family. He didn’t want his son to lose his parents, like
Natasha had.
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But in the mid-1970s, he was deeply influenced by two men who spoke out against the Soviet system:
Andrei Sakharov, who was a scientist and, like Tolkachev, held a top-secret security clearance, and
Solzhenitsyn. In January 1974, Solzhenitsyn was arrested and deported from the Soviet Union. In 1975,
Sakharov received the Nobel Peace Prize but was prohibited from leaving the country to receive it.
These events left a deep and lasting impression on Tolkachev. When he later recounted his
disenchantment to explain his actions to the CIA, he identified 1974 and 1975 as a turning point. After
years of waiting, he decided to act. “I can only say that a significant role in this was played by
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, even though I don’t know them and have only read Solzhenitsyn’s works that
appeared in Novy Mir,” he wrote in a letter to the CIA.
Gradually, in meetings and letters, the CIA learned more about Tolkachev’s motivations. Tolkachev stood
apart from other agents; he did not belong to the Communist Party or serve in the military or the security
agencies. He was a loner, but with a steely determination.
“Some inner worm started to torment me,” he said. “Something had to be done.”
Tolkachev’s expression of dissent began modestly, by writing short protest leaflets. He told the CIA he
briefly considered sending the leaflets in the mail. “But later,” he added, “having thought it out properly, I
understood that this was a useless undertaking. To establish contact with the dissident circles that have
contact with the foreign journalists seemed senseless to me due to the nature of my work.” He had a top
secret clearance. “Because of the slightest suspicion, I will be totally isolated or liquidated for safety.”
Tolkachev decided that he would have to find other ways to damage the system. In September 1976, he
heard the news that a Soviet pilot had defected to Japan in a MiG‑25. When the Soviet authorities ordered
Phazotron to redesign the radar for the MiG‑25, Tolkachev had a dawning realization: his greatest weapon
against the Soviet Union was not some dissident pamphlets, but right in his desk drawer, the top secret
blueprints and reports that were the most closely held secrets of Soviet military research. He could
seriously injure the system by betrayal—turning these vital plans over to the “main adversary,” the United
States.
Tolkachev told the CIA he had never even considered selling secrets, say, to China. “And how about
America, maybe it has bewitched me and I am madly in love with it?” he wrote. “I have never seen your
country with my own eyes, and to love it unseen, I do not have enough fantasy nor romanticism.
However, based on some facts, I got the impression, that I would prefer to live in America. It is for this
very reason that I decided to offer you my collaboration.”
Guilsher, his first CIA case officer, asked Tolkachev at their initial meeting about his motives. In reply,
Tolkachev declared, “I am a dissident at heart.” He didn’t explain right there, but over time, Tolkachev
came to trust Guilsher, and in letters and meetings, the CIA learned Tolkachev didn’t spy because he
loved America. Rather, Tolkachev spied out of anger and resentment, at the past and the present. He felt
the Soviet system was not fulfilling even the most basic job of providing for society. He told the CIA in a
letter that he felt Soviet politics, literature and philosophy had been “enmeshed for a long time in such an
impassable, hypocritical demagoguery” and “ideological empty talk” that he ignored it all.
Tolkachev was deputy director of a laboratory in an important Soviet defense industry facility. By Soviet
standards, he had a good salary and a comfortable apartment in an elite high-rise. But he was driven by
antipathy toward the system. Tolkachev told the CIA over and over again, he was bound and determined
to do as much damage as possible in the shortest possible time to the Soviet Union. He originally
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4
proposed to spy for 12 years in seven stages, but much of what he intended to acquire was accomplished
in the six years he was an agent.
After he had been caught and executed, his wife Natasha said he did it “for freedom in our country,” a
remarkable motive for a man who had never lived or even visited a free country.
Throughout the six years of the operation, the CIA paid Tolkachev handsomely, usually in stacks of
rubles. Dollars were also deposited for Tolkachev in an escrow account, which amounted to almost $2
million at the end of the operation. Tolkachev asked for money as a sign of respect for the risks he was
taking, but in shortage-plagued Moscow, there was little he could buy with the cash. He also asked for
Western rock music for his son, as well as quality drafting equipment—ink, pens, erasers—for his son’s
architectural studies. Tolkachev also requested books from the West, and medicine for his wife. He also
demanded a suicide pill from the CIA, and received it. Tolkachev appreciated all the gifts and money, but
they were not his central motivation.
The nature of the positive intelligence received from Tolkachev—complex diagrams, specifications,
blueprints, and circuit boards from airborne radars and the disclosure of Soviet military research and
development plans stretching a decade into the future—was extraordinary. I interviewed two U.S.
intelligence and military experts who examined Tolkachev’s documents over several years, and they said
they never found a single page contaminated with disinformation, after much cross-checking. CIA
operational cables declassified to me show that only two years into an operation that eventually lasted for
six years, the U.S. Air Force estimated that Tolkachev had saved the United States $2 billion in research
and development costs. Tolkachev offered a vital look at Soviet R&D plans a decade into the future,
allowing U.S. planners to develop countermeasures for existing and planned radars and weapons systems.
In essence, Tolkachev revealed the adversary’s intentions and capabilities, the core of the CIA’s mission
in intelligence collection. For the leadership of the United States, it was vitally important to know Soviet
priorities in military research and development, as well as capabilities—what they could do and could not
do. For decades, there were holes and misjudgments in U.S. intelligence on Soviet intentions and
capabilities. But when it came to air defenses, Soviet tactical fighters, interceptors, radars, avionics, and
guidance systems that would confront Americans in any hot war, Tolkachev’s material was invaluable.
One of his most important contributions was to clarify for the United States that the Soviet Union was
years behind in developing the technology for look-down, shoot-down radar, allowing warplanes to see
targets at low altitude moving against the background of the earth. Tolkachev provided the United States
with renewed confidence in U.S. weapons systems that cost billions of dollars and took years to develop,
such as the terrain-hugging, strategic cruise missile, which was flight-tested and deployed in the years of
Tolkachev’s espionage.
Tolkachev also passed to the United States a library of top secret documents about the design and
capability of radars deployed on Soviet fighters and interceptors, including the MiG‑23 fighter, the
MiG‑25 high-altitude interceptor, the MiG-31 interceptor, and the MiG‑29 and Su‑27 multi-role fighters.
In particular, Tolkachev compromised several versions of the SAPFIR and ZASLON radars. Tolkachev
also carted away Soviet secrets on surface-to-air missiles and the sensitive Soviet project called
SHTORA, or “window blind,” which was designed to conceal surface-to-air missiles from the radars of
target aircraft.
In another intelligence windfall, Tolkachev was the first to alert the United States that the Soviet Union
was starting to develop an advanced airborne warning and control system, or AWACS, a flying radar
station. Once Tolkachev pointed it out, U.S. spy satellites confirmed it, a good illustration of how
different kinds of intelligence collection can work together. The Tolkachev documents also revealed to
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5
the United States that the MiG-31 fighter carried an air-to-air data link that would allow it to function as a
mini-AWACS on its own, sharing radar information with other fighters. Previous attempts to break such a
data link and “read” it had proven almost impossible for the United States. But now, with Tolkachev’s
documents identifying what each bit of information meant, the link could be cracked open, an incredible
breakthrough. The United States could intercept Soviet AWACS signals, to detect—and deceive—the
pilots who depended on them
https://dmgs.org/wp-content/uploads/HOFFMAN_publish.pdf

Mỹ mất công đánh cắp tiêm kích Liên Xô: Kinh ngạc trước những phát hiện bất ngờ

Tình báo Mỹ săn lùng các máy bay tiêm kích của Liên Xô cả ở bên ngoài Triều Tiên. Từng có thời gian lực lượng an ninh Nam Tư đã giúp đỡ họ rất nhiều.

Tình báo Mỹ săn lùng bằng được tiêm kích Liên Xô

Theo Konstantin Chuprin,chuyên gia Nga, khí tài hàng không của Liên Xô luôn được giới lãnh đạo quân sự Mỹ quan tâm trong cuộc Chiến tranh Triều Tiên.

Hai chiếc máy bay cường kích IL-10 và một chiếc tiêm kích Yak-9P bị rơi vào tay kẻ địch đã được đưa tới Mỹ, nơi những cỗ máy này được gắn phù hiệu Không quân Mỹ và sử dụng vào mục đích thử nghiệm bay.

Lầu Năm Góc, tất nhiên, quan tâm nhiều hơn cả tới các máy bay phản lực MiG-15 mà chủ yếu được những phi công Liên Xô sử dụng trong cuộc chiến tranh Triều Tiên. Một cuộc săn lùng thực sự đã được triển khai, nhưng không phải ở đó.

Theo chuyên gia hàng không và là nhà báo người Anh nổi danh tại phương Tây, ông Roy Brabrook chia sẻ:

"MiG-15 có khả năng tăng tốc tốt hơn "Sabre" F-86 (tiêm kích chiến thuật chủ lực của Mỹ vào thời điểm đó), và vượt trội hơn F-86 về vận tốc ở những độ cao trên 8.500m. Khi chiếc Sabre bản nâng cấp đạt trần bay tối đa của mình, thì MiG-15 vẫn còn dư địa khoảng 1.200m".


Tiêm kích MiG-15 do Liên Xô chế tạo.


Cuối cùng, các lực lượng vũ trang Mỹ và đồng minh có mặt tại Triều Tiên đã gặp may. Một chiếc MiG-15 bị bắn hạ đã rơi xuống bãi cạn, và những thuỷ thủ Anh đã trục vớt được nó. Nó được các chuyên gia phối hợp với Mỹ nghiên cứu một cách kỹ lưỡng.

Kinh ngạc trước những phát hiện bất ngờ

Theo lời ông Brabrook, họ rất kinh ngạc khi bất ngờ phát hiện ra rằng thiết kế MiG-15 không có gì bất thường về công nghệ: "Những vật liệu siêu nhẹ và nhiên liệu đặc biệt… không hề được sử dụng".

Bí mật nằm ở chính ý tưởng khí động học của cỗ máy do Liên Xô sản xuất, sự đơn giản và dự tính trong ý tưởng thiết kế và khẩu pháo của tiêm kích F-86 Sabre không thể so sánh với sức mạnh của pháo trên MiG-15.





Tình báo Mỹ săn lùng các máy bay của Liên Xô cả ở bên ngoài Triều Tiên. Từng có thời gian lực lượng an ninh Nam Tư đã giúp đỡ họ rất nhiều.

Lý do hết sức đơn giản – ngay sau chiến tranh, mối quan hệ giữa Moscow và Belgrad biến thành thù địch và chỉ bình thường hoá trở lại vào năm 1960 sau khi Lãnh tụ Stalin qua đời, nhưng vẫn còn những bất đồng.

Vì vào thập niên 50 Mỹ từng là nhà cung cấp vũ khí nước ngoài chủ yếu cho Quân đội Nam Tư, Nhà lãnh đạo Tito đã chấp thuận một số yêu cầu của Mỹ liên quan tới vũ khí Liên Xô.

Vào năm 1953, một chiếc tiêm kích Yak-23 trong tình trạng tháo rời đã bị đánh cắp từ một toa xe lửa.

Các máy bay loại này dành cho Tirana (Thủ đô Albania) đã được bàn giao từ lực lượng Không quân Ba Lan, kế hoạch tiếp nhận chúng bởi người Albania dự kiến được tổ chức tại Belgrad.

Chính quyền Nam Tư sau này giải thích với các láng giềng trong Khối xã hội chủ nghĩa rằng chỉ có Ông Trời mới biết được.

Nhưng chiếc máy bay đánh cắp đã được bàn giao cho Mỹ, nơi nó được sử dụng vào mục đích thử nghiệm bay. Điều này thậm chí còn được Lầu Năm Góc dựng thành phim tài liệu và có thể truy cập trên mạng.

Các chuyên gia Mỹ đánh giá cao các tính năng cất-hạ cánh và khả năng cơ động của cỗ máy không được sử dụng nhiều ở Liên Xô cũng như chỉ ra những tính năng về tốc độ chưa tương xứng và vũ khí không đủ mạnh. Sau này nó được trả lại cho Nam Tư.

Tuy nhiên, có một giả thiết khác (nghe có vẻ đúng sự thật hơn) khi chiếc Yak-23 này bị một phi công dùng để đào tẩu từ Rumania sang Nam Tư, quốc gia cũng được cung cấp các máy bay tiêm kích trên.

Yak-23 là cỗ máy cánh thẳng, thiết kế kiểu tàu lướt, thế hệ chuyển đổi từ động cơ piston sang động cơ phản lực – vào thời điểm điểm đó đã lỗi thời.

Mối quan tâm lớn vẫn tập trung vào MiG-15, mà một trong số đó, nếu tin vào những tin đồn "của lịch sử" thì các cơ quan an ninh Nam Tư và Mỹ cũng cùng thời gian đó đã lấy được một cách bất hợp pháp và đưa nó về Mỹ qua lãnh thổ Nam Tư.
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