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Culon

The Worrisome Situation of the South China Sea ?" China Facing the Stepped-up Military Infiltration by the U.S., Japan and India

?oWithout going to the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, you would not know the magnitude of the threat and challenge to Chinâ?Ts maritime territory and interests? ?" Peoplê?Ts Liberation Army Daily reporter

One cannot see both sides of a coin at the same time. If one can say that one side of the coin is the theory of ?oChina threat? in Southeast Asia gradually fading out, the other side of the coin is the erosion of Chinâ?Ts interests demonstrated in the South China Sea. The 8th Session of ASEAN ?o10 + 3 Summit? held on November 4th 2002 in Phnom Penh seems to have shed some light at the end of the tunnel: China and ASEAN nations signed the ?oASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,? which stipulates that all nations claiming sovereignty over the Spratly Islands shall commit to the status quo and shall not erect any new structure in the disputed regions of Spratly, Paracel (Xisha) and Huangyan Islands.

A year has passed since then and the actual situation is still full of concerns: the relevant countries have kept up their political and diplomatic offensives against China, with regard to Chinâ?Ts claim of sovereignty in the South China Sea. To maintain their existing interests in the South China Sea, they have strengthened military control over occupied islands, islets and other waters, and have stepped up exploration and exploitation activities with the natural resources in the region.

At the same time, world powers such as the U.S., Japan and India have increased their military infiltration in the South China Sea regions, pushing the issue towards a more complicated and internationalized level. The situation allows no room for optimism.

Creating the ?oSovereignty? Initiatives:

On April 9th 2003, Vietnam held a conference in the Spratly Islands in memory of the 28th Anniversary of the ?oLiberation of Spratly,? attended by a Vietnamese Congress delegation led by its Vice Chairman and a Vietnamese Defense Ministry delegation headed by its Deputy Defense Minister. Subsequent inspection tours were conducted at various times to the Vietnam-occupied islands and reefs in the South China Sea. On May 31st, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued a ?osovereignty? declaration on the issue of the Chinese ban on fishing in the South China Sea, claiming that Vietnam had undisputed ?osovereignty? rights over Paracel and Spratly.

The Philippines continues its ?oKalayaan Immigration Project.? In April 2003, the Philippines held activities on Zhongyie Island of the South China Sea commemorating ?othe 25th Anniversary of the Founding of Kalayaan City,? to which the Philippine Navy brought local government officials aboard its warships.

In May 2003, Malaysia held a series of entertainment and competition activities in the name of ?oLabuan International Maritime Challenges? near the waters of Danwan Reef, and had granted permission, for the first time, to 27 fishing boats and 1 cruiser to conduct tourist and leisure businesses around Yuya Shoal.

Lately, the relevant countries have also shown no restraint in expelling Chinese fishing boats and squeezing into the Chinese space in the South China Sea in order to boost their ?osovereignty? initiative campaign. Since the signing of the ASEAN declaration, the Vietnamese military police have seized or detained Chinese fishing boats more than 70 times in the Gulf of Tonkin and Spratly, arresting a total of more than 250 Chinese fishermen, expelling Chinese fishing boats more than 300 times. Between the periods from April to June 2003, the Vietnamese army dispatched more boats to follow, monitor and disrupt the normal operations of the Chinese boats that were conducting scientific exploration activities in the South China Sea. The Filipino Navy also boarded and inspected Chinese fishing boats more than 50 times, arresting and detaining more than 10 Chinese fishermen. The Malaysian Navy expelled more than 50 Chinese fishing boats from Spratly.

The ownership dispute over the South China Sea, especially Spratly, began in the second part of the last century. From the beginning of the 1960s, especially the 1970s, till today, the Chinese-owned, semi-enclosed Spratly Islands and the nearby areas have suffered repeated invasion and occupation by surrounding countries. The nations that claim ?osovereignty? over the entirety or portions of the regions are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, among which Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia have all sent military forces to occupy and garrison the islands. Indonesia is the only country which only claims a portion of the regions. By the end of 1991, apart from 6 reefs that are controlled by Mainland China, and Taiping Island (Itu Aba Island), which is controlled by Taiwan, all 44 other islands, islets and reefs are occupied respectively by Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia. Among the surrounding countries, Vietnam is the only nation that claims ownership over the entire Spratly Islands.

How did the undisputed Chinese territorial rights over Spratly Islands become such a complex ?osovereignty? contest? There are two reasons. One is that the region is located in an important strategic position and rich in natural resources. The second is the existence of loopholes in international laws. The ?oUnited Nations Convention of Law of the Seâ? (UNCLOS) established in 1982 to a certain extent defines the border lines of the world waters fairly. However, when it brought in the new concept of the ?oExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),? it failed to define clearly the boundaries of EEZ and a country?Ts continental shelf, thus allowing multiple boundaries for each EEZ and continental shelf. The result is: because each claimant country defines the border of its EEZ and continental shelf differently, it has inevitably led to conflict and contest. The UNCLOS also stipulated that an island (the island that emerges above water during high tide) can provide the basis for an EEZ that extends to 200 nautical miles around the island, thus lending a legitimate ?oreason? for those involved countries to snatch up islands that do not belong to them.

Management and Control of Military Readiness

In 2003, the surrounding countries?T policy of giving lip-service to military restraint has led to immense problems in the region, which exhibit themselves in the following three dimensions:

The various countries have sent out flights and ships on repeated reconnaissance and patrol missions to strengthen control over uninhabited islands and reefs. Since November 2002, Vietnam and the Philippines have dispatched numerous reconnaissance flights and ships to the Spratly Islands, a remarkable increase in the number of such missions over previous years. The Malaysian Navy has carried out five such patrol missions around the Malaysia-occupied islands and nearby waters, involving more than 100 trips by warships and several hundred flight sorties in the Spratly Islands. In order to tighten control and garrison over Spratly?Ts uninhabited islands and reefs, the Vietnamese Navy have expelled foreign vessels more than 100 times near Spratly?Ts Niu?Te Reef. In 2003, the Philippine Navy repeatedly destroyed or taken down foreign markers erected on Haikou Reef and Wufang Reef. The Malaysian Air Force and Navy on numerous occasions dispatched jets and warships to carry out patrol missions around Spratly?Ts uninhabited islets such as Nankang Shoal, Beikang Shoal and Nantong Reef.

The countries involved have also stepped up maritime exploration and survey operations. During 2003, Vietnam frequently sent survey teams on maritime survey missions to the more than 30 Vietnamese-occupied isles. In May, the Philippine Deputy Foreign Minister announced that the Filipino continental shelf would extend from 200 nautical miles to 350 nautical miles, and that the country would increase its survey activities in the South China Sea regions. In September, two Philippine exploration and survey boats reached Palawan Island and Spratly Islands and conducted extensive hydrographic and maritime survey and prospecting work. In ad***ion, the Vietnamese troops reinforced their military and infrastructural facilities in Vietnamese-claimed islands and repaired the high level outposts on reefs and atolls such as Xiwei Shoal. The Philippine troops also carried out extensive repair, renovation and maintenance work on Zhongye Island Airport including telecommunication facilities. The Malaysian Navy further reinforced the military facilities on their occupied islands as well as uninhabited isles nearby.

Various countries have been actively engaged in improving their combat capabilities in the South China Sea. Vietnam acquired technology from Russia for producing ?oLightening? ?" a large missile warship and plans to equip the ship with ?oSandfly? low-flying, supersonic cruise missiles. Indonesia has, at different times, purchased many SU fighter jets of various models and has plans to form a squadron composed of SU planes. Malaysia has also signed an agreement with Russia to purchase 18 SU-30 fighter jets and intends to increase its purchasing order of advanced combat jets from the U.S. and the U.K. The Philippines has accepted donations of many military jets from the U.S. and Thailand. In order to improve their actual combat operation capabilities in the South China Sea, these countries have also been carrying out targeted military exercises. In 2003, the Vietnamese troops carried out 6 such exercises in the nearby Gulf of Tonkin and Spratly, and 4 out of the 6 exercises were specifically designed for combat in the Spratly Islands. The Philippine and U.S. troops also carried out joint military exercises in 2003, which were also targeted at combat reinforcement in Spratly. At the same time, military exercises have also been conducted near the border of the Philippines and Malaysia in Spratly. The Malaysian Navy and Air Force carried out a routine joint exercise of Navy and the Air Force code named ?oGolden Sword ?" 23/2003?.

Involvement of Big Powers

The U.S. is a super power that is seen to have been involved most extensively in the South China Sea affairs. Analysts believe that the US is the ?obehind-the-scenes? instigator of the South China Sea disputes. The issue of the South China Sea has become a new focal point in the U.S. overall strategic defense policy aimed at guarding against and containing China.

Culon

From the U.S. perspective, if it could establish its hegemon status in this region, it would then be able to go beyond Taiwan Strait to Japan Sea to the north east, thus strengthening the coastal defense of Japan Sea. To the south, the U.S. would be able to cover the South Pacific Region and strengthen the South Pacific Region?Ts alliance with Australia. To the west, it could reach past the Strait of Malacca to enhance the U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region. To the north, it would be able to directly contain Chinâ?Ts expansion efforts toward the south. Therefore, the South China Sea issue has been viewed as the third most important potential hot point in Asia Pacific Region, after the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, and it is considered another important opportunity and challenge for the U.S. to establish its security order in the Asia Pacific Region.

As early as April 1st of three years ago, a U.S. military reconnaissance plane crashed into a Chinese fighter jet while operating in the airspace southeast of Chinâ?Ts Hainan Island. After the event occurred, the US plane entered the Chinese territory, without Chinâ?Ts permission, and landed at Lingshui Airport of Hainan Island. This has become known as ?othe South China Sea Plane Collision Incident? which so shocked the world.

One month later, after reviewing its defense policies, which occurs once every four years, the U.S. decided to shift its strategic emphasis from Europe to East Asia. Three US Naval submarines docked at the base in Guam and the U.S. Air Force stocked conventional cruise missiles in Guam ?" which is the first time in U.S. history that a cruise missile stockpile was set up outside the U.S. mainland territory. On March 23rd 2003, the USS Kitty Hawk battle group was stationed at the Changi naval base in Singapore.

To further tighten control over the South China Sea, the US has not only upgraded the status of its tra***ional allies such as the Philippines, it has also sought to improve military cooperation with Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam. Since the end of 2003, the U.S. and the Philippines have signed many military agreements. Senior military leaders of the U.S. have also exchanged meetings and visits with their counterparts in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, discussing issues of mutual military support, base lease, anti-terrorist coordination, weapon sales and purchases and long-term cooperation prospects. During 2003, the U.S. carried out 12 joint military exercises with ASEAN countries and continued sending large quantities of military supplies to ASEAN countries.

In October 2003, the U.S. aircraft carrier Nimitz was found operating in the South China Sea waters. U.S. Navy ships visited Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam in November, which is evidence that the U.S. might be considering the possibility of leasing this military port of strategic significance.

Japan has not let itself fall behind in this race either. In 2003, the Japanese defense chief visited Singapore. The Chairman of the Chief of Staff for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces led a senior military delegation on a visit to Vietnam and carried out extensive talks and discussions on issues such as mutual military cooperation and anti-terrorist operations. From April 11 to 14, two Japanese warships visited the Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh City. On August 25, a group of Japanese naval vessels visited Manila Harbor in the Philippines. In ad***ion, the Philippines, Japan and Indonesia carried out a ?ojoint exercisê? ?" ?othe 2003 Seaborne Anti-oil-pollution Exercisê? from March 1st to 7th.

India is also seeking closer anti-terrorism cooperation with ASEAN countries and has decided to be part of the South East Asian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Australia has also made efforts to improve military cooperation with ASEAN countries ?" it first sent its Defense Minister and then Commander of the Army to visit Indonesia and Vietnam, and has formally delivered five advanced patrol vessels to Indonesiâ?Ts National Police troops and sold two new search and rescue ships to the Philippine coastal police.

In December 2003, senior leaders from India and Japan held a series of international meetings to open up security dialogues between the two countries. One of the dialogues was on ?oSafeguarding the maritime security of India and Japan,? initiated by some Japanese Consortiums led by the former Japanese deputy secretary of defense. The other dialogue was sponsored by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on ?othe Cooperative Strategy between India and Japan in the New Age.? Analysts here point out that this measure partially aims at jointly containing Chinâ?Ts growth of naval power.

How Can China keep its silence?

Since the 1980s of the last century, when China encountered fierce military clashes with Vietnam in the Spratly Islands, China has been trying to seek resolution to the South China Sea issue through channels of cooperation.

On September 3rd 1992, at the 10th non-aligned nations?T summit held in Jakarta, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said at a press conference: ?oI do not think the South China Sea will become a hot spot and seed of clashes. There exist certain differences between related countries which, when the con***ion is ripe, can be ironed out through peaceful negotiations between those nations. If the con***ion is not ripe, the nations should be able to put aside the disputes and concentrate on development together. There should not be any danger of military conflicts.?

By the mid-1990s of the last century, China introduced a new security concept to the surrounding nations centering on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. The ?oDeclaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Seâ? is seen as a further endorsement of this new security concept, which stressed a spirit of cooperation and understanding in seeking ways to establish mutual trust, strengthen maritime environmental protection, search and rescue efforts and crack down on transnational crimes.

During 2003, China took the initiative and was the first to establish strategic cooperative partnership with ASEAN countries, and the first to join ?oSouth East Asian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.? China also called for the formation of a free trade zone in East Asia.

The Chinese President Hu Jintao was the first one to advocate a diplomatic policy to ?otreat your neighbors with kindness and take your neighbors as your companion,? at the informal meeting of the 11th APEC leaders. He also urged the participants to commit to a ?obig family? spirit in order to achieve prosperity together. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, speaking at the annual meeting of Asia Forum, made the following statement: ?oPeace, security, cooperation and prosperity are the goals in Chinâ?Ts Asia policy. A China that is filled with vigor, prosperity, wealth and strength, devoted to world peace and development, a China that shall never claim supremacy, will make new contributions to the rise and revitalization of Asia.?

In fact, Chinâ?Ts kind gestures have not been acknowledged by the surrounding countries in the South China Sea. Some nations are even led to believe that China is too preoccupied with maintaining its economic growth and stability to worry about the South China Sea issue. Therefore, while China is pursuing a principle to ?okeep our sovereignty rights, put aside disputes and concentrate on joint development,? the other surrounding countries, and even countries from other regions, are competing with each other in their hot pursuits of the South China Sea through every possible means.

The South China Sea Islands

The South China Sea Islands are the collective name of the many Chinese islands, isles, reefs, atolls and shoals scattered around the South China Sea. They are spread over a wide area ?" 1,800 kilometers from north to south, and over 900 kilometers from east to west, including more than 200 islands, reefs, atolls and shoals. The northernmost island is Beiwei Shoal, in the west there is Wan?Tan Shoal, the southernmost island is Zengmu Atoll, with Huangyan Island to the very east. From north to south, the islands can be roughly divided into Dongsha, Paracel (Xisha), Zhongsha and Spratly (Nansha) Islands.

The South China Sea islands have always been Chinese territory. After the founding of the Peoplê?Ts Republic of China, the Chinese government has repeatedly issued serious statements declaring Chinâ?Ts ownership to the South China Sea islands. On August 15th 1951, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai pointed out in the ?oDeclaration on the American and British Peace Treaty with Japan and San Francisco Convention? that ?othe South China Sea islands including Paracel and Spratly Islands are all Chinese territory.? He pointed out that ?oalthough these islands had once been lost to the Japanese imperialists when they launched their war of invasion, they had all been reclaimed and taken back by the then Chinese government after the Japanese surrender.? Since then, the Chinese government has issued a series of statements reinstating Chinâ?Ts legal sovereignty rights over the South China Sea islands including Paracel and Spratly, and that China would not allow any country, under any pretext and through any means to invade these islands. All foreign countries invading and occupying these regions and carrying out any exploration and development activities have been doing so illegally and will not be tolerated.

Administratively, the South China Sea islands have been under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province.


The Invasions and Occupations of the South China Sea by Foreign Countries


Vietnam.

Vietnam?Ts invasion of Spratly Islands started with the South Vietnamese Saigon government. From 1956 to 1971, the Saigon regime frequently sent ships to the waters of Spratly Islands and announced a declaration claiming ownership to the Spratly Islands. On February 14th 1975, the Saigon government issued a White Paper claiming Vietnam?Ts ?osovereignty rights? over Paracel and Spratly Islands. In May 1975, a Vietnamese newspaper published a national map incorporating Chinâ?Ts Spratly Islands into Vietnamese territory and changed the name to ?oTruong Sa Islands?. In 1976, Vietnam included ?oTruong Sa Islands? in the province of Khanh Hoa. In September 1979 and January 1982, the Vietnamese government issued two more similar White Papers on Chinâ?Ts Paracel and Spratly Islands, claiming ownership of the entire region.

The Philippines.

In 1946, the Philippines announced its request for ownership of the Spratly Islands. In 1956, after a Philippine ?oexplorer? visited these islands and carried out exploration activities, he decided to name these islands ?oKalayaan Islands?. On June 11th 1978, the Philippine President signed the Number 1956 Presidential Decree, formally announcing that the ?oKalayaan Islands? belonged to the Philippines. At the present, the Philippines has already built two small air force bases on the Philippines-occupied islands and turned three islands into army bases. The Philippine government also issued ?othe Revised Law on Territorial Water Border Linê? and ?oIslands Principlê?, and unilaterally defined its 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone, including the 410,000 square kilometers of waters east of Chinâ?Ts Spratly Islands.

Malaysia.

In 1978, Malaysia sent a small fleet of ships to parts of the southern islands of the Spratly Islands and erected its ?osovereignty markers.? In 1979, Malaysia decided to mark the above islands as well as a further 270,000 square kilometers of islands and reefs in the Spratly Islands as part of its 200 nautical miles EEZ. From 1983 to 1986, the Malaysian government sent troops and took Danwan Reef, Nanhai Reef and Guangxing Reef (Swallow Reef, Ardasier Bank and Mariveles Reef) by force. In 1991, Malaysia designated a project that would cost $25 million and would expand the land area on those islands. Malaysia is the first country that started tapping into the natural resources of Chinâ?Ts Spratly Islands and is the biggest looter so far ?" the number of Malaysian oil-producing and gas-producing wells in the Spratly Islands exceeds half the total number of all five countries put together.

Brunei.

Brunei claims sovereignty over Louisa Reef (what China calls Nantong Reef), located at the southwestern tip of the island chain of the Spratly Islands. It also claims 3,000 square kilometers of Spratly waters. Brunei became rich through exploitation of oil and gas in the Spratly Islands, boasting 9 oil fields, 5 gas fields, with an annual output of 7 million tons of crude oil and 9 billion square meters of natural gas.

Indonesia.

Since 1966, Indonesia has marked out its ?oexploration agreement zonê? for foreign investors to explore and exploit. This ?oexploration agreement zonê? goes 50,000 square kilometers into Spratly territory. In October 1969, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a continental shelf agreement, which clearly incorporated Chinâ?Ts Spratly territory by 50,000 square kilometers. In March 1980, Indonesia unilaterally announced the establishment of its 200 nautical miles EEZ, showing an unconcealed attempt to further invade and erode into the Spratly waters and oil and gas resources.

[http://army.tom.com January 12th 2004
Source: Outlook East Weekly (liaowangdongfang zhoukan)]
Culon

Ngồi kiên nhẫn đọc hết mấy trang bài các bạn đã post về chủ đề này,tớ muốn đóng góp một vài ý kiến sau.
Nguy cơ TQ sẽ đánh chiếm nốt những đảo mà VN đang chiếm giữ trong quần đảo TS là sớm hay muộn thôi.Tai sao họ sẽ chỉ đánh vào các đảo của VN?Họ muốm cô lập VN với các nước còn lại.Và nếu đánh VN thì họ sẽ quyết tâm đánh chiếm bằng được.Để lấy đó làm bài học răn đe và gây chia rẽ hòng phá thế liên minh bằng chiêu thức bẻ gẫy từng chiếc đũa.Vậy VN chúng ta sẽ làm gì để bảo vệ đảo?
Lực lượng HQTQ sẽ là lực lượng đánh chiếm các đảo.
Không quân sẽ yểm trợ và sẵn sàng nghênh chiến.Tùy theo diễn biến của tình trạng khi đó mà điề động tầm mực can thiệp của KQ.
Họ sẽ dùng chiến thuật đánh Nhanh và dứt điểm để đặt VN và dư luận quốc tế vào thế đã rồi.
Họ sẽ tấn công tất cả các đảo cùng một lúc,thay vì dùng kế Tằm ăn rỗi trong nhiều đợt và nhiều lần.
Lực lượng HQ tham chiếm sẽ có đầy đủ các tầu trong đội hình như một Hạm đội thu nhỏ.
Họ sẽ lên kế hoạch đối phó với KQVN chi tiết hơn là đối đầu với HQVN trong một trận hải chiến.Họ thừa biết HQVN không thể tác chiến xa bờ biển cấp hạm đội với HQ của họ.
Biện pháp đối phó.
Tớ không biết lực lượng thường trực chiến đấu bảo vệ đảo của VN trên các đảo là cỡ Đại đội,Tiểu đoàn hay Trung đoàn???
Và hỏa lực trên đảo ra sao?Cơ số đạn dự trữ có thể cầm cự trong bao lâu?Nhưng tớ biết địa hình và diện tích của các đảo rất bất lợi cho việc phòng ngự.
KQVN va khả năng yểm trợ.
Tớ biết KQVN chúng ta co thể đánh tầu bằng tên lửa không đối hải,nhưng phải bay tiếp cận mục tiêu ở cự ly tương đối gần(15Km-50Km)Còn khả năng tiêu diệt mục tiêu từ 50Km-150Km thì...
Nhưng cho dù thế nào chăng nữa thì cũng phải đối phó với KQTQ bảo vệ hạm đội của họ chứ.
Tên lửa phòng thủ bờ biển chắc không vươn xa đưọc ra đến hạm đội của họ.
Tớ nghĩ chúng ta vẫn có thể đánh chìm toàn bộ hạm đội của TQ bằng những vũ khí mà chúng ta đang có.
Vấn đề là tìm đâu ra được những người anh hùng đó???
Chúng ta nghèo và QĐ của chúng ta lạc hậu,trưóc một kẻ thù tàn bạo và mạnh hơn chúng ta thì lòng dũng cảm bất chấp cái chết là vũ khí sẽ làm kẻ thù khiếp sợ.
Chúng ta không cần phải tranh luận là mua tên lửa của Mỹ,của Pháp hay của Nga mà hãy dùng ngay những chiếc MiG21 hoặc F5E làm những tên lửa diệt hạm có người điều khiển.Mỗi chiếc MiG21và F5 có thể mang cả 1000Kg thuốc nổ cực mạnh đủ để đánh chìm cả một con Sovrenmeny.
Hãy chứng minh cho TQ thấy rằng KQVN nếu cần sẽ là những Thiên Thần Đen đưa hạm đội của họ xuống Yên Nghỉ dưới lòng biển sâu.

F5 đã loại khỏi biên chế từ lâu, Mig 21 thì tầm không xa đến được đảo mà chơi cảm tử thần phong được, cố nâng cấp không chiến hiện đại một tí để phối hợp với phòng không mà bảo vệ lãnh thổ chống lại J10 và J11 của nó được là tốt lắm rồi.
Chống hạm bây giờ vẫn nhờ vào đôi vai bé nhỏ của squadron Su 27/30 và Su22 cũ kỹ. Dùng tên lửa thì tốt hơn kamikaze vì ta không đủ máy bay và phi công chơi trò đấy.
Cũng may là hiện giờ Tàu vẫn chưa đủ thuyền bè để vừa ra oai ở Đài Loan vừa nướng ở Trường Sa.
Tương lai vẫn còn phải tính mệt nghỉ.

hơ hơ bác này nói giống như chuyện viễn tưởng quá.F5E ta bỏ xài lâu rồi.MiG 21 ta cũng không bay biển đâu mất công rớt dọc đường vì...hết dầu,bây giờ chỉ dùng Su22.27.30 thôi.
-Với lại bây giờ không phải Tàu muốn đánh là đánh.lí do thì các bác bên KTQS đã phân tích hết rồikeke nhưng mà khiêu khích thì có ...
-Cuối cùng thì nghe Bác Nói làm em liên tưởng tới phi công Thần Phong của Nhật quá...

Thôi bố làm ơn nghỉ ngơi cho con nhờ,
Nó mà ực được thì nó ực rồi!
VN không thích dùng kamikaze như bố xúi đâu ạ, phi công giờ đắt hơn máy bay nhiều. Bố xúi kiểu ấy thì quê nhà con kiếm đâu phi công mà oánh hả bố?
Ta cần trang bị thêm đủ phương tiện vận lương tải đạn cho anh em trên đảo là vấn đề đầu tiên cần quan tâm.

Tốt nhất là biến lính TQ thành thiên thần trắng bay lên thiên đàng!
Hy vọng là các bác không áp dụng chiến thuật đánh Tàu đến tên ********* cuối cùng!

Tớ nghĩ chúng ta vẫn có thể đánh chìm toàn bộ hạm đội của TQ bằng những vũ khí mà chúng ta đang có.
Vấn đề là tìm đâu ra được những người anh hùng đó???
Chúng ta nghèo và QĐ của chúng ta lạc hậu,trưóc một kẻ thù tàn bạo và mạnh hơn chúng ta thì lòng dũng cảm bất chấp cái chết là vũ khí sẽ làm kẻ thù khiếp sợ.-----> ?????!!!!!!!!
Chúng ta không cần phải tranh luận là mua tên lửa của Mỹ,của Pháp hay của Nga mà hãy dùng ngay những chiếc MiG21 hoặc F5E làm những tên lửa diệt hạm có người điều khiển.Mỗi chiếc MiG21và F5 có thể mang cả 1000Kg thuốc nổ cực mạnh đủ để đánh chìm cả một con Sovrenmeny.
Hãy chứng minh cho TQ thấy rằng KQVN nếu cần sẽ là những Thiên Thần Đen đưa hạm đội của họ xuống Yên Nghỉ dưới lòng biển sâu.
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Anh muốn bầu chú 5 sao vì khả năng viết tiểu thuyết viễn tưởng tuy nhiên lại hợp khẩu vị với nhiều người trên này.
Sao chú không đăng ký làm người anh hùng đầu tiên nhỉ?
Vui quá là vui !!!!!!!!!!!!!!