Mig-29 chống lại F-15

Mig-29 chống lại F-15

"Gần đây nhất 14/9/2001, hai chiếc F-15 của Israel hạ hai chiếc MiG-29 của Syria trong vài giây, cả hai phi công Syria đều là những phi công lão luyện."

Không ngờ bác Quynhle84 đã có thông tin về vụ này.

Dưới đây là thông tin chi tiết về sự cố ngày 14/9/2001. Cứ đà này rất có thể Mig-29 sẽ tiếp tục giữ kỷ lục của mình sang thiên niên kỷ mới.

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On the early morning on one of the last days in April 2002, an UAV of unknown type ?" but belonging to the Israeli Defense Force/Air Force (IDF/AF) ?" crossed the Syrian border after a short flight through the Jordanian airspace. Syrian radars already tracked the aircraft for quite some time, and once it entered the Syrian airspace, the local air defense command of the Syrian Arab Republic Air Force/Air Defense Force (SyAAF/ADF) brought a decision to scramble an interceptor and destroy the intruder. Only minutes later, one MiG-23S of the SyAAF/ADF was vectored towards the UAV: the pilot used the good acceleration of his mount to close rapidly, then managed to properly acquire the target and destroy it using a single air-to-air missile while the UAV was underway near the southern Syrian city of as-Suwayda, and only some 100km north of Amman, Jordan.

Interestingly, while this was going on, the Syrian air defenses were also tracking several Royal Jordanian Air Force helicopters, which were apparently monitoring the Israeli UAV and then did some moves, which indicated that they were interested in its recovery - even from a site beyond the Syrian border! However, due to a swift deployment of one Mi-8 helicopter, the Syrian recovery team was so fast in place the Jordanians never got a chance: the destroyed Israeli UAV was captured and taken away for inspection.

It is reported, that since this loss, the IDF/AF has stopped all of its reconnaissance missions around, over, and beyond the Syrian borders, and so the years-long shadow-boxing between the Israeli Air Force and the SyAAF came to an abrupt end.



Un-Written Rules
Although completely unknown in the public, namely, during the last few years the activity of both the Israeli and the Syrian reconnaissance aircraft along the mutual borders (and around them) was especially intensive. It is understandable that the IDF/AF and the SyAAF are monitoring each other, and the situation along the mutual borders with great care. For many years this was also done, but with each side respecting a sort of an unwritten
consensus being in power, and regulating what which side "could" or "could not" do. During an interview some two years back, Major A. (SyAAF/ADF), an experienced MiG-25PD and MiG-25R pilot, for example, explained that, ?oEvery year, between eight and nine reconnaissance missions are flown by unit along the Israeli borders, and sometimes even behind them?, but, so Maj. A., "such operations are ignored by the Israelis". During another, unrelated, interview, the then Major (meanwhile Col.) H. confirmed this indirectly, stating, "It is a routine for the radars of the Syrian ADF to monitor movements of Israeli reconnaissance planes over northern Israel, Lebanon and Golan?o, and, "the same is the case with Israeli radars when Syrian reconnaissance planes operate along or behind Israeli borders".

"Already since years?o. Col. H. concluded, "Nobody fires at each other, even if there were several cases that aircraft from one of the sides entered the airspace of the other side and were then intercepted.?o

Indeed, since the late 1980s it happened several times that Israeli and Syrian fighters came pretty close to each other, but, both sides would usually turn back without engaging or firing at each other. Apparently, there were three such "lines": one directly along the border, and one on the each side of it. A reserve officer of the SyAAF/ADF, and a SA-6 operator, described the situation as follows: "Usually, we only track the enemy reconnaissance planes on our radars, without firing at them, and that is what they usually do with us. While we were in the camp (forward deployed at Golan), in 1996, we used to observe our and their planes coming very close to each other and then - at a certain imaginary line - both sides would turn back. Sometimes, planes of both sides would cross the line, but there was no reaction from either side. That was directly over the occupied Golan, but behind the Israeli lines."



During the early summer 2001, however, the Israelis suddenly changed their behavior, and started breaking these rules, by dispatching their reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs deeper over Syria. It did not took long and two particularly heavy accidents developed in July of that year. During the first, sometimes in mid-July, two Israeli fighters intruded the Syrian airspace and took a course towards Halab (Aleppo). The SyAAF/ADF scrambled a pair each of MiG-25s and MiG-29s and these intercepted the Israeli fighters over the town of Idlib, only some 35 kilometers from the Turkish border. The Israelis, however, turned away and run towards the Syrian coast of the Me***erranean Sea, where no less but 12 Israeli fighters were being detected by the SyAAF/ADF radar net, waiting for them due east and north-east of Cyprus: the IDF/AF was obviously ready to fight in order to get the two recce-birds out of Syria. Therefore, a decision was taken in accordance with the orders from the top Syrian political leadership, the SyAAF/ADF not to respond in the same manner nor to provoke an air battle, and the MiGs were ordered back to their bases.

On 27 July 2001, two Israeli fighters entered the Syrian air space again, this time at high level, ingressing from Turkish air space, again passing the town of Idlib before taking a course towards al-Ladhiqiyah (Latakia). When over Jisi ash-Shughur, only some 30 kilometers southwest from Idlb, they were acquired by one of the SA-6 sites newly deployed in the area, which forced them to change their course. Meanwhile, also several SyAAF/ADF interceptors were scrambled, and finally both Israelis were forced to turn away, and leave the Syrian air space flying along the Turkish border and then in the international airspace over the Me***erranean Sea.


The Knife Fight
By September 2001, the situation detoriated further, especially so after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, which made both the SyAAF and the IDF/AF extremely nervous. Exactly this provoked the so far heaviest incident in the recent history of Syrian-Israeli aerial clashes.

On 14 September 2001, an IDF/AF Boeing 707, equipped for SIGINT-reconnaissance, was on a mission along the Lebanese and Syrian coast, collecting Syrian defense informations, monitoring foremost telecommunications and radar tags in the Tarabulus (Tripolis) and Hamidiyali areas. The plane was underway at 520 knots and 30.000ft, and escorted by two F-15Cs, at least one of which carried the newest Python Mk.IV air-to-air missiles.

The IDF/AF flew similar missions in the area at least twice a week since quite some times, and ?" as usually ?" the SyAAF scrambled two interceptors to shadow the ?oferret?: the Syrians would always monitor the operations of Israeli reconnaissance aircraft, sending either MiG-23s from Abu ad-Duhor AB, or ?" less often ?" MiG-29s from Tsaykal, forward deployed at al-Ladhiqiyah, would get the honor to fly such missions over the Me***erranean Sea. So far, the Syrians have always taken care to stay at least some 20 kilometers away from Israeli planes, and never showed any interest in attacking the Israelis.

But, on this day, at 0914hrs, the two MiG-29s sent to shadow the Boeing 707 suddenly turned towards the Israeli aircraft and increased their speed. For the pilots of the two Israeli F-15s in escort this was not only surprising, but also an obviously aggressive maneuver. Due to the short range, there was no time to ask questions: the MiGs turned towards the Israeli planes in aggressive manner, and could open fire any moment.

The leader of the F-15-pair ordered the Boeing to instantly distance from the area and engage ECM systems, and then called his ground control for help and reinforcements (as a result of this call, six more F-15s and six F-16s were scrambled, along a single Boeing 707 tanker). Moment later, he warned the Syrian MiG-29 pilots on the international distress frequency to change their course. As the MiGs failed to response, the Eagles moved into attack.

One of the F-15s attacked the lead Syrian MiG-29 from above, closing directly out of the rising sun, and launching a single Python Mk.IV from an off-boresight angle of 40 degrees. The missile guided properly and hit the MiG above the left wing, immediately setting it afire.



The other MiG-29 banked hard right, apparently heading back to Syria, but it was too late, as the second F-15 was already too close: the pilot launched a single AIM-9M Sidewinder from a range of only 500 meters. The missile slammed into the target, crashing it into the sea.

Both Syrian pilots, Maj. Arshad Midhat Mubarak, and Capt. Ahmad al-Khatab, ejected safely and were recovered by Syrian ships. The names of the involved Israeli F-15-pilots remain unknown.


The SyAAF on Alert
After the air battle on 14 September, both the Israelis and the Syrians did their best to downplay the affair. Not only was the clash overshadowed by the 11 September attacks in the USA, but the IDF/AF was rather busy dealing with the Palestinians, while the Syrians were of course dissatisfied with the results of the air battle. The Israelis would not comment at all, while the Syrian officials did their best to deny the affair, the Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister was the only official ready to offer any commentary in response to requiries of our correspondent:
"Yes, the Syrian Air Force had a training accident on that day, and it is true the accident had been very serious, but no aircraft had been lost - to my knowledge."

The Israeli authorities denied anything similar happened. Private sources denied "any unusual activity within the Northern Command" on the given date. A more serious research is currently impossible due to the military censorship.

Nevertheless, all the reports from Syria indicate, that all the mentioned incidents ?" plus the well known attacks of the IDF/AF against SyAAF/ADF positions inside Lebanon - put the SyAAF/ADF (and the whole Syrian military) under a considerable pressure, and each time after another inciden the whole service - together with all special units of the Syrian Army - were kept on the highest possible state of alert (the so-called "State 0" in Syrian military jargon) for the next three days. By late last year, the High Command of the Syrian Air Force decided, that no similar Israeli incursions would be tolerated any more. Already since the 11 September terrorist attacks in the USA, the behavior of both, the SyAAF and the IDF/AF pilots, was described as ?olittle more jumpy than normal? in respect of dealing with unknown aircraft flying near their respective aerospaces.

This was probably the reason for MiG-29s trying to close upon the Israeli Boeing 707 on 14 September. That engagement can definitely be described as a ?overy close range? one: under such circumstances, and dealing with two MiG-29s which could attack the Boeing 707 from a range of more than 20 kilometers, the Israeli F-15-pilots had to act very fast, regardless right or wrong.

Nevertheless, as a consequence ?" and despite being successful in downing both Syrian interceptors ?" after seeing one of their $300 million expensive Boeing coming under such a serious threat, the IDF/AF stopped further reconnaissance flights in the area for quite some time. Especially no penetrations of the Syrian air space were undertaken ?" that is, until the spring 2002. In April 2002, the activities of Israeli reconnaissance assets were increased one more time, and remained so for few weeks - until the Israeli UAV was shot down well within the Syrian airspace, albeit far in the south.


Unclear Backgrounds
The logical question arising as a consequence from reports of this kind is why would the Israelis since the summer of 2001 fly beyond the "lines", break all the rules - even the unwritten ones which were respected by both sides for several years - and operate deep over Syria, putting their planes and pilots at risk, and even being ready to provoke a full air battle for which they considered that 12 interceptors would be needed in order to extract their reconnaissance aircraft out of the Syrian airspace?

Although it is known, that at the given time the Syrian military was involved in several wargames during which certain new weapons systems were introduced, these were conducted far from the places where most of the incidents with Israeli reconnaissance aircraft happened.

Namely, in July 2001 the then new Syrian President, Dr. Basheer Assad, was still struggling to establish his power basis, and had enough problems to keep the military under control, the leadership of which was several times fiercely requesting "more equivalent" reactions from the Syrian side than the "routine" missions flown by Maj. A. and his colleges based at the T.4 Air Base. It would certainly not be in the Israeli interest to provoke a heavier crisis with Syria than already the two well-known air attacks against Syrian positions in Lebanon have done, and at the time the Israeli military was involved in the fighting with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gazah - just like it is now. Therefore, there was no obvious reason for Israeli behaviour in the case of the short air combat - except narvous pilots, while the backgrouns for previous intensive reconnaissance reconnaissance flights over Syria are also unclear, and certainly beyond what was considered as "permitted" by both sides.



Convoys for Baghdad
There was only one possible reason for the intensive Israeli reconnaissance activities - most of which were recorded in the area near the Syrian Me***erranean Sea ports of al-Ladhiqiyah and Tarabulus: the clandestine shipments of arms for Iraq via Syria, which were known to have been arriving in Syrian ports several times during 2001. These would at least be a good reason for some of the reconnaissance missions flown by IDF/AF in the area in that year.

However, the last two such shipments were reported to have arrived in Syria in February 2002, and no other shipments - except those designated for Syria ?" were reported to have arrived ever since. If the Israelis were searching for shipments bound for Iraq, however, the best moment to photograph them would be at the time the large convoys of trucks were moving along the Damascus - Beirut highway in southeastern Syria. However, this would still be almost 100km north of where the April 2002 incident happened, during which a Syrian MiG-23S shot down the Israeli UAV.

Given that the main part of the Syrian military is stationed in the south of the country, however, the reconnaissance missions over the northwestern Syria seem to be less dangerous, even if the photographs taken there could be misleading, as most of the equipment arriving via Syrian ports ?" regardless if bound for Syria or Iraq - has to be brought to Damascus area: on the contrary, the southwestern parts of Syria are considered as the best defended and ones where the Syrians have it most easily to respond. Of course, there is always a possibility, that the Israelis were interested alone about what is going on in the areas deeper within Syria, behind the front on Golan, or simply in what the Syrians were importing for themselves, and not so much about what the Iraqis were getting.

On the other side, especially interesting for the Syrians - and of a considerable concern for them - was the apparent Jordanian involvement in this Israeli operation: the conclusion of the Syrian military leadership, based on the monitoring of Jordanian operations was, that the Jordanians were permitting and supporting Israeli reconnaissance activities, especially the operation of the UAV which was shot down near as-Suwayda.

The situation quietened now, but it must be expected that both sides have ever since re-started their reconnaissance operations: the mutual mistrust between Israel and Syria is such, that they can not permit the movements of the other side to remain unobserved for longer periods of time.

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Le Van Le

Phi cơ tương tự của Mig29 là F16 vả lại cái tụi Syri xài đã là Mig29 lổi thời chưa được hiện đại hoá lại chạm trán với anh chàng F15 hiện đại hoá tùm lum của Ixrael thua te tua là phải .
Dù phi công có lão luyện thì bọn Ixrael đâu phải là dân mới tập lái đâu đã được cầm lái F15 thì phải là dân chuyên nghiệp và lâu năm trong nghề rồi.

With these advanced weapon the WW3 will be fought ,but in the WW4 they will fight with sticks and stones (Albert Einstein)

Thêm vài thông tin về MIG của bạn LevanLe
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_135.shtml
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_111.shtml

Theo tôi thì bất kể kết quả như thế nào cũng vẫn có lời giải thích được cả. Tuy nhiên thực tế thì ...
BTW, cảm ơn bác lekien về cái link. Một website cực hay.
Em nhận được bài trên do một đồng chí gửi email cho, không có được bản đồ chi tiết như trong website.

Le Van Le

2 đánh 1 chả chột cũng què, tụi Israel kéo thêm 6 F-15s và 6 F-16s nữa lên để quây 2 Mig-29 lại có cả AWAC đi kèm nữa thì gì mà không thắng. Có khi 2 Mig-29 chỉ luợn cảnh cáo thôi chứ chưa có ý hạ B-707 mà 2 chú F-15s hộ tống đã ra tay hạ thủ trước ở cự ly ngắn thì Mig-29 phải down thôi, có gì lạ đâu

Trích từ bài của LeVanLe2001 đã đưa:
" On 14 September 2001, an IDF/AF Boeing 707, equipped for SIGINT-reconnaissance, was on a mission along the Lebanese and Syrian coast, collecting Syrian defense informations, monitoring foremost telecommunications and radar tags in the Tarabulus (Tripolis) and Hamidiyali areas. The plane was underway at 520 knots and 30.000ft, and escorted by two F-15Cs, at least one of which carried the newest Python Mk.IV air-to-air missiles. "Trong trận không chiến do ban LeVanLe2001 da dua, các máy bay F-15 của Israeli đã sử dụng 1 loại tên lửa không đối không tiên tiến nhất hiện nay, đó là tên lửa Python 4. Sau đây tôi xin đưa thêm 1 số thông tin về loại tên lửa này để các bạn thấy rõ hơn ưu thế của máy bay Israel trước máy bay Syria.
Tên lửa không đối không tầm ngắn Python 4 của hãng RAFAEL (Pháp) là tên lửa không đối không tầm ngắn tiên tiến nhất thế giới. Python 4 thuộc tên lửa thế hệ thứ 4 điều khiển bằng tia hồng ngoại. Nhờ khả năng điều khiển và đầu dò tìm cảm biến hồng ngoại tuyệt vời, hình dạng khí động học tốt hơn so với các tên lửa thế hệ trước, Python 4 cho phép phi công đạt được chiển thắng tuyệt đối thậm chí cả trong các cuộc cận chiến ác liệt nhất. Tên lửa này có vùng tiêu diệt rộng lớn trong tầm nhìn phía trước của phi công do đó cho phép phi công phá hủy bất kỳ mục tiêu nào trong vùng này bất kể tới quỹ đạo bay hay cách điều khiển bay của mục tiêu. Bán kính rộng lớn vùng tiêu diệt này so với bất kỳ loại tên lửa nào hiện nay tạo cho các phi công một ưu thế 8 : 1 trong các cuộc cận chiến. Thêm vào đó với khả năng tìm kiếm rộng lớn và khả năng động học, Python 4 còn có khả năng chống đối kháng hồng ngoại và hoạt động tốt khi chống lại các mục tiêu chuyển động với tốc độ cao.

Tôi cảm tưởng đây là một vụ đánh lén của F15, vì 2 chiếc Mig29 không hề được chuẩn bị cho không chiến, vẫn chỉ tiến hành các thủ tục cản đường bảo vệ thông thường. Nếu chủ định đánh, chắc chắn con B707 ăn đạn 100%, và không ngu gì mà 2 pilots Mig29 lại bay lại gần đội F15 yểm trợ đến mức đó.

Nhưng dù mấy chú Mig29 có chuẩn bị cho không chiến thì kết quả chắc không khả quan hơn rồi vì đơn giản là F15 nó tương tự như Su27 mà Su27 đánh Mig29 thì mọi người biết kết quả ra sao rồi đó mấy chú Mig29 bị bắn te tua mà Su27 dù không có AWAC vẩn không bị thiệt hại gì.

With these advanced weapon the WW3 will be fought ,but in the WW4 they will fight with sticks and stones (Albert Einstein)

Nhưng vào cự ly dưới 10km mới bắt đầu choảng nhau, nếu Mig29 chủ tâm bụp trước chưa chắc mấy bạn F15 đã lành lặn trở về. Ở đây tôi nói chuyện "có thể bị đánh lén" vì F15 đánh không warn, lại choảng đột ngột bằng IR lock, có mà trời tránh, kể cả Su27 hay F35 vào trường hợp đó cũng teo.
Kiểu như vụ Tầu choảng EP3 ấy, nó không thèm warn mà choảng thì có chạy đằng trời, chứ không cần cọ quẹt mất một cái J8 đâu.

trong điều kiện hiện nay với kĩ thuật tên lửa và radar ngày càng hiện đại thì bên nào phóng tên lửa ra trước là nắm 70% cơ hội thắng rồi. bên nào chậm tay thì nắm 70% cơ hội teo . theo lời bài báo thì Mig-29 hầu như không có chủ tâm đánh thật mà chỉ có hành động khiêu khích. F-15 đã phóng tên lửa trước nên hoàn toàn chiếm ưu thế và giành chiến thắng.