Nga-Chuyên gia chôm chỉa kỹ thuật quân sự!!!

Cái chú tifosimilan này cứ gân cổ lên cải . Dạ Thưa chú lam ơn chú vô đọc kỹ bài viết trong đường link đó. Nếu chú mù tiếng anh thì chú câm đi. Vì chú càng cố chứng minh thì chỉ có mính chú đang làm trò cười cho thiên hạ thôi. Thôi tôi copy rôi paste no ra đây cho chú luôn.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/s-100.htm
S-100
Work on a new large medium-range bomber began in the late 1950s, in response to the disappointing results obtained with the TU-22 BLINDER, which was intended to replace the TU-16 [which had not met Air Force requirements]. In 1961 the operational and technical requirements for the new airplane were approved, specifying a supersonic missile-carrier with a speed of up to 3,000 km/h [since the overseas XB-70 could fly at a speed of 3,000 km/h] and an operational range of 2000 km. The plane should also be mission capable of hitting enemy aircraft carrier battle groups out in the ocean. The design bureaus A.N. Tupolev, A.S. Yakovlev and P.O.Sukhoi competed for the project, and the results were summed up at the scientific and technical council held in July 1962. The Tupolev design bureau submitted the "aircraft 135" project, whose take-off weight equaled 190 tons. The design failed to match its cruising speed to that of the required one, i.e. 2,500 km/h instead of 3,000 km/h. Yakovlev proposed the Yak-35 aircraft, which resembled the American Hustler, with a take-off weight of 90 tons and a cruise speed of 3,000 km/h. The T-4/S-100 design submitted by KB Sukhoi was selected, with the support of the military and the State Committee Scientific and Technical Council.
The initial design developed in 1964 called for a tailless delta-wing aircraft with four turbojet engines placed in a single "gondola" under the fuselage. The wing had a break in the leading edge, and a small forward stabilizer was included. The plane was to be equipped with three controlled H-45 solid-fuel missiles, located under the fuselage. KB Rybinsk developed the RD-36-41 engines under the direction of P.A. Kolesov. Initially KB Sukhoi was in charge of the project, but ultimately KB Raduga led the design team. During the design process, the arrangement of the aircraft engines was modified and the number of missiles was reduced to two. Construction made extensive use of titanium and steel alloys, and the T-4 used an advanced electrohydraulic, quadruple redundancy fly-by-wire system. It was fitted with a ''droop snoot'' that offered good visibility in the landing configuration, but when the nose of the aircraft was up and locked, the pilots had no forward visibility and all flying was on instruments.
The final design was 44.5m long, had a wing span of 22m, a wing surface of 295.7 square meters and a lift-off weight of 114 tons. The calculated flight-characteristics indicated that the bomber would have a range of 6000 km, a maximum speed of 3200 km/hr at an altitude of 20,000-24,000 meters and an absolute ceiling of 25,000-30,000 meters.
In December 1966, the Sukhoi design bureau presented the Air Force with the mock-up of the T-4 strike/reconnaissance aircraft. In 1967, the Soviet government issued a decree ordering an experimental batch of seven T-4 aircraft to be built, of which one should be used for static research and the rest to be flight-tested. A mock-up airplane was built in 1968, and construction of the first prototype began in 1969 at the Series Production Plant 82 in Tushino (Moscow). The first flight of the prototype T-4 took place on 22 August 1972 and subsequently the plane made 10 flights which were completed in 1974. During these flight trials the plane reached an altitude of 12,100 meters high and a speed of Mach 1.28. It is believed that the ''aircraft 101'' that set a Mach 1.89 record over 2,000 km closed circuit was a T-4.
Soon after testing began, preparation for construction of the first pilot batch of planes was begun. In 1974, work on the T-4 bomber was cancelled, given the beginning of serial production of the more conventionally designed TU-22M bomber.
Although frequently compared to the American XB-70 intercontinental strategic bomber, which it superficially resembled, the T-4 medium bomber was a rather smaller aircraft intended as a medium-range theater system.
Between 1967-1969, KB Sukhoi also developed a design for the rather larger variable-geometry T-4M strategic bomber, derived from the basic T-4 design. On 10 January 1969 the Minister of Aviation Industry issued an order for research and development of a strategic supersonic bomber. A competition was initiated among the aircraft design bureaus of Tupolev, Myasishchev and Sukhoi. In 1969 and 1970 Sukhoi designed the T-4MS bomber that also had variable wings and which was entered into this competition for building a supersonic strategic bomber. The work proceeded slowly, and the T-4MS design effort was ended in favor of work on the Su-27 and other high priority tactical aircraft. In 1975 the contest between Myasishchev''s M-18 design [resembling the B-1 in appearance] and Tupolev''s Tu-160 was decided in favor of Tupolev.

Liệu bác tifomilan có phải là ttkh_2000 không nhỉ .
T-4 hay nổi tiếng hơn với nickname «Со,ка» hay theo phân loại NATO S-100 là dự án thiết kế theo dự án Prọect-135 của không quân Soviet với mục đích để tiêu diệt tầu Sân Bay hoặc cụm tầu Sân bay của Mỹ. Do nặng đến 100 tấn nên mới tên là «Со,ка»- tiếng Nga lóng là "Một trăm). Trọng lượng cất cánh tới 190 tấn nên được xếp vào "thiết bị bay mang tên lửa chiến lược hạng nặng" . Được thiết kế toàn bằng Ti-tan, nhìn như một mũi tên thép khổng lồ sáng trắng (tớ chụp ảnh dưới con này rồi). Tuy nhiên mặc dù thành công nhưng dự án, không đưa ra sản xuất hàng loạt không rõ nguyên nhân vì sao, nhưng chắc chắn "không phải là nguyên nhân kỹ thuật "- trích nguyên lời của cái biển được gắn vào chiếc này trong sân bay. Rất nhiều thành tịu kỹ thuật của con S-100 này được áp dụng cho TU-22 và TU-160 sau này.
Cùng với dự án 135 còn có con IAK-33 là đối thủ cạnh tranh nhưng T-4 thắng do mang được 6 quả tên lửa trong khi đó IAK-33 chỉ 2 quả.
T-4 hay S-100 trang bị 4 động cơ ТР"Ф Р-36-41 ( có modification trang bị tới 6 động cơ) đạt vật tốc tới 3M, bay xa khoảng 7000 km.

Ờ, đúng là T-4 thật. Nhưng ăn cắp thì vẫn là ăn cắp
Bác Tu-144 bị bắt quả tang chôm của Concorde, đau nhé!!!!

Mỗi cái đoạn vàng vàng đấy là đủ biết trình của cậu rồi, dân tộc học mà cậu bảo là so sánh hộp sọ nhân chũng thì hài vãi. Cố tìm tòi thêm đi. Ko nói đến chuyện người ta đúng hay sai, nhưng cậu cố như giỏi cái gì cũng biết rồi chê bai người ta mà mình thì vẫn lòi ra những cái quá hay ho thì đúng là cậu kém thật. Chê người ta thì cũng phải có lý có tình chứ, phán như thánh sống, cậu quá tài. Nhắc lại nhé, dân tộc học hay cao hơn là nhân học là khoa học nghiên cứu con người của xã hội. Còn nhân chũng học là nghiên cứu con người của tự nhiên. Con nhiều nữa, nhưng chỉ nói đến thế thôi, nói nhiều sợ cậu ko hiểu
Gì thì gì, tớ vẫn khoái đồ Nga ngố, vì ngon bổ mà còn rẻ nữa.

Bác này thực hiện đúng chiến thuật "khi đánh nhau thì phải hét thật to" như trong chuyện cười của nhà văn Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ.
Trong kỹ thuật bao giờ cũng có tính kế thừa.
Đây là một thiết kế "ăn cắp" nữa của hãng SukhoiI, Nga được thiết kế trên cơ sở T-4, mới ra năm 2006, được gọi cụm hàng không- vũ trụ mang tên lửa vượt đại châu- một Titanic Nightmare of America

Dưới đây tôi xin post các thông tin ve TU 144. Do bài viết về TU 144 khá dài nên tôi sẽ post làm nhiều bài.
Nguồn Tupolev: The Man and His Aircraft. By Paul Duffy and Andrei Kandalov, published by SAE International (Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc.
400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096-0001, USA)
TU 144

World''s First SST To Fly
The years following the end of the Second World War saw huge developments in civil aviation with aircraft becoming larger and faster, and also flying higher. The Soviet Union had kept pace with, and had sometimes been ahead of, many of these developments, and many research institutes, including TsAGI, had continued to work on the problems which needed to be solved before airliners could go any faster. Already high Mach numbers were being achieved; any higher, and the aircraft would be subject to the aerodynamic buffeting of transonic speeds. The alternative was to go through the sound barrier, to go supersonic. In the early 1960s, research on the metals, alloys and
plastics needed to build an aircraft capable of enduring the high temperatures resulting from sustained supersonic flight began to give results. Meanwhile, in November 1962, France and Britain had signed an agreement for the development and production of
an SST (supersonic transport), the Concorde. Early in 1963, Tupolev set about the task of
designing an SST. He appointed his son Aleksei as chief designer. Up till now, Aleksei had been working on the design of missiles and unmanned aircraft, aiming for the future as seen by military strategists of the 1950s. He received several awards for this work,
and the experience gained on these high-speed projects added to his qualifications for the SST, which, as usual, had his father in overall command.
In the early 1960s, supersonic travel was seen as a means of saving valuable time and of easing the tiredness of jet lag that resulted from long flights. The arguments against SSTs were mostly economical, although that did not stop the Anglo-French project or Tupolev''s one, and ecological, although at the time not very much was known about this aspect, except that the noise of sonic booms could be a problem for people living under the flight path. Tupolev set to work and gathered his team. Despite the huge experience gained by the design bureau on the development of high-speed military aircraft, many
problems remained to be solved. The aircraft''s shape was one of the first. TsAGI, now situated at the Zhukovski test base, had some of the world''s finest wind tunnels, and Tupolev''s designs were formed into models and tested for aerodynamic quality here. This
needed to be at least fifty per cent better than that of military aircraft of the period to assure passengers of a comfortable ride. For the same reason, it was necessary to study the effects of going through the sound barrier on the aircraft''s stability and CG.
New heat-resistant materials needed to be in some cases developed, in others selected to meet the needs for cyclical heating - the aircraft''s expansion when pressurised and heated by air friction followed by its contraction at low levels and speeds and on the ground. A 60m/197-foot fuselage would expand by 300mm/one foot in flight. Not much, perhaps, but its effects on a sealed, pressurised cabin had to be minimal. New lubricants were needed as were new sealants and even construction methods. New cabin environment systems had to be designed to allow passengers to experience normal living con***ions at
20,000m/65,620 feet.
To carry out the work involved, which was regarded by the Soviet government as a matter of national prestige, over 1,000 staff were temporarily assigned to Tupolev from other aviation industry bodies. An early decision was taken to test the aerodynamic qualities of the wing design. This was done by modifying a MiG-21, by fitting a new -144-shaped wing to it. This was done by MiG at its design bureau workshop on
Leningradskoe Shosse.
For the prototype, which was being constructed at the Opyt factory, many of the parts had to be chemically etched on to the material from which they were to be made, and then manually finished. The fuel tanks had to be sealed manually from the inside.
The visual similarity of Tupolev''s aircraft and the Anglo-French Concorde has often led to charges of copying. These began in June 1965, when a model of the Tu-144 was shown at the Paris Air Salon
(to be continued)

Tiep bai truoc:
TU 144
Although when compared in detail the differences are major, the aircraft certainly look alike. Tupolev''s designers advise that the general shape of the aircraft was determined mostly by the laws of aerodynamics, combined with the needs (or market) for the aircraft
and by materials available. They also point to the similarities of the DC-9 and the BAC1-11; the DC-8 and the Boeing 707; and the DC-10 and Lockheed TriStar. Computer-aided design was in the early stages of development in those days; today, the air-raft might well be even more alike.
The prototype Tu-144 was completed in the summer of 1968. The Soviet government was anxious to see it fly before the Concorde, and at the 1965 Paris Air Salon, it had been announced that it would fly in 1968. As usual with Tupolev aircraft, it was disassembled for transfer to the test base at Zhukovski. Tupolev''s works were (and still are) close to the centre of Moscow, with no available airfield nearby. Ilyushin, on the other hand, is based at Moscow''s original city centre airport, Khodinka, and thus they don''t need to take their aircraft apart before the first flight. It was reassembled at Zhukovski by October, and ground tests and engine runs were completed as a matter of priority. On 31 December 1968, hours before the deadline, Eduard Yelian pulled back the control column and SSSR- 68001 lifted off Zhukovski''s 5km/3.1-mile-long main runway with a MiG-21 escort, on the world''s first SST flight. He had waited for sixteen days for reasonable
weather con***ions to make the flight.
Four aircraft were manufactured just for tests; two went to TsAGI for static tests. One went to Sib Nil in Novosibirsk for heat tests, and the fourth was fatiguetested at Zhukovski. The new airliner was powered by four newly developed NK-144 engines designed by the Kuznetsov engine design bureau which were fitted with afterburners used mainly on take-off. The airframe and wings were made from duraluminium,
although the leading edge of the wings, where supersonic flight generated high temperatures, was manufactured of stainless steel and titanium.
The prototype Tu-144 was shown at the 1971 Paris Air Salon, already showing a number of design changes resulting from the experience gained during the flight test programme. It was an opportunity to compare the two SSTs, for further down the flight line
was the French prototype Concorde. The -144 was larger and the wing roots began with a marked increase in sweep to help improve slow flying characteristics. On both aircraft, the engines were mounted in the underwing pods, but with very different arrangements.
Later -144s would feature a small pair of wings just behind the ****pit, which pivoted outwards from the fuselage to assist low-speed performance, and was retracted at higher speeds.
With Aeroflot, enthusiastic at first, expressing the possibility of ordering large numbers of the Tu-144s, production was set up at Voronezh factory N64. Meanwhile, the flight test programme was proceeding. On 5 June 1969, the Tu-144 went through the sound
barrier for the first time, flying at an altitude of 1 l,000m/36,091 feet. A year later, on 26 May 1970, it exceeded Mach 2, flying at 2,150kph/l,336mph at an altitude of 16,300m/53,480 feet. It had been unveiled to the public for the first time a few days earlier, on 21 May, when it was demonstrated at Sheremetyevo airport, and inspected by officials from the Ministry of Civil Aviation.
It was soon apparent that fuel consumption was much higher than calculated; while in Soviet economic terms this may not have been of great importance, it had a marked effect on the aircraft''s range. Instead of the promised 6,500km/4,039 miles, it could only fly
about 3,500km/2,175 miles, and could not reach many of the eastern and south-eastern cities of the Soviet Union without stopping for fuel and thus losing the time it was intended to save. To make matters worse, the second production aircraft crashed while giving a display at the 1973 Paris Air Show with 300,000 onlookers and the world''s media present. No accident report was issued; this was not done in Soviet times,
but there seems to have been no blame attributable to the aircraft. A major cause seems to have been the need to avoid an unidentified French Mirage filming the airshow. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union''s determination to be first was widely interpreted as hurrying along the test programme, and drew much unfavourable comment.
By that time, five production aircraft had been completed, and five more were in the course of production.
(to be continued)

Tiếp bài trước:
TU 144
In 1973, Aleksei Tupolev, now appointed general designer of the OKB following his father''s death, handed over the SST programme to Valentin Blizniuk, who would remain in charge until the programme ended in 1990.
The shortened range of the -144 had led the Soviet government to order the Kolesov Engine Design Bureau to develop a new, more efficient engine capable of delivering the same 20,000kg/44,0921b of thrust with afterburners on. The fifth production aircraft, SSSR-77105, was modified to take the new engine, designated the RD-36-51A, and flew as the Tu-144D with these engines for the first time in November 1974.
After the accident at Paris, Aeroflot''s enthusiasm for the -144 diminished, although training of crews began in late 1974; with Tupolev test pilots as instructors, no Aeroflot pilot would ever command a Tu-144. Training flights were flown with the early Tu- 144s over the Domodedovo (Moscow''s new domestic airport)- Baku-Tashkent route. Later, from December 1975, cargo and mail were carried on regular services between Moscow and the Kazakhstan capital, Alma Ata. In February 1977, but with restricted payloads,
cargo services began linking Moscow and Khabarovsk. On both these services, supersonic speeds were achieved over the sparsely populated regions below. Always, the pilot in command was from Tupolev. At last, on 1 November 1977, the Tu-144 received its NLGS certificate of airworthiness, and on the same day passenger services began. But not Aeroflot services. Instead, the Ministry of Aviation Production operated the flights, providing pilots, engineers and technical support, although Aeroflot sold the tickets
and retained the money. Aeroflot pilots served as copilots, but command was always with a Tupolev test pilot. The services were only on the Domodedovo-Alma Ata route. A total of fifty return flights were made; the ticket cost was eighty-two roubles (approximately $91) each way for an economy-class seat. The -144 held 122 economy- and eleven first-class passengers. Some 3,194 passengers were carried. Only two aircraft, SSSR-77108 and -77109, served. The service ended on 31 May 1978, a few days after the first production Tu-144D, flying on test from Zhukovski, experienced an in-flight fire, and
was destroyed while making an emergency landing at Yegonevsk. The aircraft, SSSR-77111, had only recently been completed. The cause of the fire has never been revealed.
But the reason that the Tu-144 did not succeed had little to do with the aircraft or its teething problems. It was that political support for the SST had started to fade after the Paris accident. Aeroflot used the second accident as an excuse to stop services on an aircraft it had never actually operated. After the loss of SSSR-77111, four of the five aircraft still on the production line were completed. They were based at Zhukovski and flew occasionally as aerial laboratories with two continuing in service on ozone layer research until late 1990.
(to be continued)

Tiếp bài trước:
TU 144
Altogether, the sixteen flying Tu-144s built made 2,556 flights, and totalled 4,110 flying hours. The hightime aircraft SSSR-77144 (sequentially, this should have been -77104) flew just 432 hours. In the mid-1990s, ten Tu-144s remain, and four of these are in museums: SSSR-77106 was flown to Monino on 29 February 1980 by Giorgi Voronchenko; SSSR-77107 was flown to Kazan on 29 March 1985 by Vladimir Matveev; SSSR-77108 was flown to Kuibyshev on 27 August 1987 by Boris Vasiliev; and SSSR-77110 was flown to Ulyanovsk on 1 June 1984 by Sergei Agapov. SSSR-77109 remains at Voronezh, at the factory where it was produced, and SSSR-77105
remains on the dump at Zhukovski. The four Tu-114Ds (excluding the fifth that crashed) SSSR-77112 to -77115 remain at Zhukovski. In November 1993, an agreement was signed by Tupolev to make airworthy a Tu-144 (SSSR-77114 was chosen) to be used as a research vehicle for a future US supersonic transport. The other partners in the venture were Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, Rockwell Collins and NASA, with interests from England, France, Germany and Japan also involved. By then, the original engines, the RD-36-51As, were no longer available, so Aleksander Pukhov, the chief designer of
the restoration project, chose to fit the NK-321 engine of the Tu-160 instead.
As the Tu-144 had not flown for some years, it was necessary to check and overhaul thoroughly all the aircraft''s systems - hydraulics, electrical and mechanical. For the research programme, it was also necessary to fit a complex sensor system needed to gain the aerodynamic and engineering data required. A Damien computer was installed in the aircraft to record flight parameters. At the time of writing, the rebuilt Tu-144 is expected to make its second first flight in 1996. The agreement called for a thirty-fiveflight
programme to be undertaken from Zhukovski in order to gain an FAA experimental certificate of airworthiness, and then for the aircraft to be flown to the United States. A second aircraft is involved in the programme as a spares source to keep the primary
aircraft airworthy. Aeroflot pilots and engineers still regret the passing of the Tu-144; they regard it as a ''lost generation''. Tupolev pilots and engineers worked with Aeroflot
staff at all times as the operational flying was regarded as developmental. Usually each aircraft would fly only once or twice per week. They recalled that you could not touch the aircraft for at least twenty minutes after a flight because of the high skin temperature (up to 120°C/230°F) of the metal.
(The End)

Năm 64 con XB-70 đã bắt đầu bay thử, trong khi đó đến tận năm 72, Nga mới bắt đầu bay thử con T-4 và con này chưa bao giờ bay thử được đến vận tốc 2M và sau vài lần bay thử thì dự án đã bị ngưng chắc chắn không phải là do vẫn đề kinh tế vì lúc này người Nga xô sẵn sàng trả bất cứ giá nào để có được một máy bay ném bom tốt như vậy mà vẫn đề là con này gặp quá nhiều vẫn đề kỹ thuật khi bay siêu âm mà người Nga không thể giải quyết nổi, mà ở đây người Nga thiết kế con T-4 này là dựa chính vào công Nghệ sản xuất máy bay concorde tuy nhiên những gì lấy trộm được từ dự an concorde chưa đủ để người Nga có thể hoàn thành con T-4 này . Khi XB-70 đã test lên vận tốc 3M thì người Nga mới đối phó bằng con MIg25 con ma giấy, máy bay sản xuất ra để doạ máy chú mẽo và giúp cho cơ quan tuyên truyền của Nga xô chấn an các đồng minh của mình, khi bắt được con MIg25, người Mẽo đã thấy được sự tụt hậu và khủng hoảng kinh khủng trong nên công nghệ xô viết .
Thế nên trong bất cứ thời kỳ nào tương đương người Nga không bao giờ có những máy bay có thể sánh ngang người mẽo cả vì người Nga còn ngồi chờ đi ăn căp thì làm sao mà vượt trước được.