Nga lắp sáu tàu ngầm cho Việt Nam

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-Tàu ngầm:
-Tàu trang bị động cơ hạt nhân:
+2 tàu Type 094 lớp Jin
+ 2 tàu Type 093 lớp Shang
+ 1 tàu Type 092 lớp Xia
+ 3 tàu Type 091 lớp Han
-Tàu trang bị động cơ diesels:
+ 1 tàu Type 039 thuộc lớp Yuan
+ 12 tàu thuộc dự án Project 877 EKM 636/636M lớp Kilo
+ 16 tàu Type 039/G/G1 thuộc lớp Song
+ 18 tàu Type 053 thuộc lớp Ming
Nhìn số lượng tàu ngầm của Khựa mà ngộp

Một bài báo về tàu ngầm Khựa
China''s Submarine Forces
The Risk Report
Volume 5 Number 2 (March-April 1999)
China currently possesses an aging force of Romeo- and Ming-class diesel submarines, as well as five nuclear-powered Han-class (SSN) submarines. China deploys only one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which carries twelve Julang-1 (JL-1) submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Xia is assumed to be patrolling only in its own regional waters, though theoretically, it would be capable of coming to the U.S. coast to launch its missiles, which could then reach into the western United States.
To modernize its forces, China has turned to both foreign suppliers (Russia) and its own development and production for new, more capable submarines. Improvements sought include increased stealth, more capacity to carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles, enhanced survivability for nuclear weapons, and the ability to project naval force globally.
Submarines
One place China has turned for help improving its submarine force is Russia, from which it has ordered a total of four Kilo-class submarines. The Kilo is a medium-range diesel-powered attack submarine, used primarily for anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare. Russia delivered the first Kilo in February 1995, the second in October 1995. Both were the 877EKM model, an export version. Two ad***ional Kilos of a more advanced design were ordered as well. The first arrived in January 1998 and second was sent in late 1998. These Kilo-636 submarines had not previously been exported. They are among the most quiet diesel submarines in the world. Their weapons package includes both wake-homing and wire-guided acoustic homing torpedoes. The Kilo can carry up to 18 torpedoes, which are fired from 6 tubes in its bow. While it does not carry ballistic missiles, the submarine could be upgraded to carry an anti-ship cruise missile system. These Kilo acquisitions, in ad***ion to filling out its force, will help China to improve sonar design and quieting technologies for its own submarines.
China has also been busy constructing several new classes of submarines itself. The first Song-class diesel attack submarine is in sea trials, and two more are under construction. The Song has a quieter propeller and more hydrodynamic hull than the Ming-class submarine it succeeds. In order to enhance their sophistication, these indigenously-produced submarines will incorporate Russian technology. The Song-class submarine is expected to be the first Chinese submarine capable of firing a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile.
In ad***ion, China is designing a Type 093 nuclear-powered guided missile submarine (SSGN), the launch of which is expected in the next century. It will supplement China''s five existing Han-class nuclear submarines. The type 093 will be a multi-purpose nuclear attack submarine with enhanced quieting, weapons, and sensor systems. It will carry torpedoes, possibly anti-submarine warfare missiles, and a submerged-launch anti-ship cruise missile, probably a follow-on to the C-801.

Tiếp theo
China''s most ambitious project is a new nuclear-fueled submarine that will carry ballistic missiles. The first Project 094 SSBN is expected to enter service early in the next century. This submarine, the largest ever constructed in China, will be a significant improvement over the Xia-class submarine, featuring better quieting, sensor systems, and propulsion. It is likely to carry sixteen Julang-2 (JL-2) ballistic missiles, which are the longer-range follow-on to China''s current stock of Julang-1s. China''s new SSBN would be able to target the entire United States; however, Chinese timelines from concept to deployment have historically been very long, so it is uncertain when this capability will actually come on line.
Missiles
The importance of these submarine developments lies in the prospect of China projecting its naval force regionally and deploying nuclear missiles. The former capability will enable China to threaten sea lanes or Taiwan; the latter will enhance China''s strategic standing and the survivability of its nuclear forces.
China currently relies upon the Julang-1 (JL-1/CSS-N-3) as its sole nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile. Twelve are deployed on its Xia-class submarine. The JL-1 is a single-warhead, two-stage missile, which has a range of 1700 km and carries a payload of 600 kg. With a diameter of 1.4 m, a weight of 14.7 tons, and a length of 10.7 m, the JL-1 is the first Chinese missile to use only solid fuel. The yield of its warhead is reported to be in the 200-300 kiloton range. China is estimated to have produced at least 50 JL-1s.
China is in the process of developing a follow-on, the Julang-2 (JL-2/CSS-N-4) submarine launched ballistic missile. The JL-2 is reported to be a three-stage solid fuel missile with a range of over 4,000 nautical miles. It is derived from the DF-23 road-mobile, solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile (which was later named the DF-31). China successfully test fired the rocket engine for the missile at the end of 1983 and flight tested the land variant (DF-31) of the missile in May 1995 for the second time. According to one report, the test flight included multiple reentry vehicles, suggesting the missile will carry multiple warheads. It is estimated the warheads will yield 200-300 kilotons each. With these missiles, China will be able, for first time, to target parts of the United States from submarines operating near the Chinese coast.
In another significant development, the recent report of a select committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (the Cox Committee), indicates that China stole secret design information from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the mid-1980s on the W-88 nuclear warhead that tops the U.S. Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. The information is said to include general, but secret information about the warhead''s weight, size, explosive power, and configuration. Although China has not developed a weapons system using the W-88 information, U.S. analysts believe it tested a warhead with similar characteristics in the mid-1990s. The stolen information could help China develop a smaller, more mobile, potentially MIRVed nuclear missile and reduce the research and design time necessary to do so. In combination with China''s drive to modernize its submarine force, the theft poses a significant threat to U.S. and Asian security.

Sự thách thức từ tàu ngầm TQ
China''s Submarine Challenge
by John J. Tkacik, Jr.
WebMemo #1001
Sea-power trends in the Pacific Ocean are ominous. By 2025, China?Ts navy could rule the waves of the Pacific. By some estimates, Chinese attack submarines will outnumber U.S. submarines in the Pacific by five to one and Chinese nuclear ballistic missile submarines will prowl America?Ts Western littoral, each closely tailed by two U.S. attack submarines that have better things to do. The United States, meanwhile, will likely struggle to build enough submarines to meet this challenge.

A misplaced diplomacy leaves some U.S. Navy commanders reluctant to admit publicly that China?Ts rapidly expanding submarine force in the Pacific is a threat, but if the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the latest Pentagon ?oReport on the Military Power of the People?Ts Republic of China? (MPPRC Report) are any indication, they are undoubtedly thinking it. In a speech sponsored by the Asia Society in Washington earlier this month, for example, Admiral Gary Roughead, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, commented,

I?Tm always asked about the Chinese threat and I say, ?~It?Ts not a threat,?T because you have to have two things to have a threat, and that?Ts capability and intent. There is no question that the PLA navy is modernizing and building its capability and is moving very quickly, but what is the intent?

The Pentagon has already begun to answer this question, but it has yet to do so in a way that shows it takes this threat seriously.

China?Ts Intent
The QDR addresses the question of China?Ts intent:

Chinese military modernization has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios. The pace and scope of China?Ts military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk. China is likely to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles?

According to the MPPRC Report?Ts executive summary, China?Ts specific intent is to ?obuild counters to third-party, including potential U.S., intervention in [Taiwan] Strait crises.? The report continues, ?oDeterring, defeating, or delaying foreign intervention ahead of Taiwan?Ts capitulation is integral to Beijing?Ts strategy.? To this end, China is expanding its ?oforce of ballistic missiles (long-range and short-range), cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems.?

China?Ts Sea-Power Goals
If they are curious about China?Ts intent, Pentagon planners might look to comments by General Wen Zongren, Political Commissar of the Chinese People?Ts Liberation Army?Ts elite Academy of Military Science. The MPPRC Report quotes General Wen as asserting that China must ?obreak? the ?oblockade [by] international forces against China?Ts maritime security? Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China?Ts rise? [T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development.? In fact, it is the explicit goal of the Chinese Communist Party to ?oincrease the comprehensive strength of the nation.?

The Chinese navy?"and its submarine fleet, in particular?"is a key tool in achieving that goal. The September 2004 promotion of Admiral Zhang Dingfa, a career submariner, to Chief of Staff of the People?Ts Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and a full seat on the Central Military Commission was a clear signal of the primacy of submarine warfare in China?Ts strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.

Growing Submarine Force
Admiral Zhang led PLAN?Ts submarine modernization program and oversaw the acquisition of four modern Russian-built KILO subs, including the stealthy Type-636. Orders for eight more are on the books, with the first new boats to be delivered this month. That three Russian shipyards are at work to fill China?Ts orders for new submarines betrays this build-up?Ts urgency.

Admiral Zhang isn?Tt relying solely on the Russians. He has also increased production?"to 2.5 boats per year?"of China?Ts new, formidable Song-class diesel-electric submarine. China is also testing a new diesel-electric that the defense intelligence community has designated the ?oYuan.? The Yuan is heavily inspired by Russian designs, including anechoic tile coatings and a super-quiet seven-blade screw. The ad***ion of ?oair-independent propulsion,? which permits a submarine to operate underwater for up to 30 days on battery power, will make the Song and Yuan submarines virtually inaudible to existing U.S. surveillance networks?"and even to U.S. subs.

Tiếp theo
These new submarines will be more lethal when armed with Russian SKVAL (?oSquall?) torpedoes, which can reach 200 knots. There are reports that the SKVAL is already operational on some Chinese subs. As well, Russia has also transferred the Novator 3M-54E three-stage anti-ship cruise missile to China?Ts submarine fleet for use against aircraft carriers. Each Chinese KILO is armed with four of these missiles.

America?Ts Endangered Submarine Supremacy
In February 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld commented that the size of the Chinese fleet could surpass the United States Navy?Ts within a decade. ?oIt is an issue that the department thinks about and is concerned about and is attentive to.? Indeed, the U.S. Navy will hold a series of major naval exercises in the Pacific this summer that will involve four aircraft carrier battle groups, including a carrier normally based on the U.S. East Coast. This will be the first time the Navy has deployed an Atlantic Fleet carrier to a Pacific exercise since the Vietnam War.

However, there is little indication that the Pentagon is taking the Chinese submarine challenge seriously. If it were, the QDR issued earlier this month would have recommended that the erosion of the U.S. submarine fleet come to an end.

But the QDR envisions a ?oreturn to a steady-state production rate of two attack submarines per year not later than 2012 while achieving an average per-hull procurement cost objective of $2.0 billion.? This means that the U.S. sub fleet will continue to decline for another six years, during which time America?Ts industrial base for constructing subs will further diminish and the per-unit cost of submarines will jump past $2 billion, impelling further cuts in the fleet.

Of the U.S. Pacific Fleet?Ts 35 submarines (including three nuclear attack submarines based in Guam during 2006), about a dozen are underway at sea on operational duties at any one time. Under the QDR?Ts most optimistic estimates, Pacific Command?Ts sub fleet will diminish to about 30 by 2025.

Electric Boat (EB), the nation?Ts preeminent submarine contractor, has announced plans to lay off 900 of its 1,700 designers and marine draftsmen engineers over the next three years. This is a crisis. It will mark the first time in 50 years that the U.S. has not had a new submarine design on the drawing board. EB laid off nearly 200 submarine engineers and machinists in early February?"and EB is the only shipbuilder in the nation that maintains submarine designers. As the build-rate for subs collapsed, EB used maintenance and repair work to pay designers?T salaries and maintain its staff of highly-skilled steelworkers. But without new orders, EB will lay off almost half of its workforce of over 5,000 over the next three years

U.S. Navy combatant commanders already require 150 percent of the attack submarine days currently available, and these requirements will only increase as the submarine force dwindles. If the United States allows production to dwindle further, expertise will be lost and costs will skyrocket for any new classes of submarines contemplated for the post-2012 period.

Meanwhile, China?Ts fleet of modern attack submarines is growing: China already has ten Song/Yuan/Kilo submarines in the Pacific today, over 50 older Ming-class and Romeo boats, five Han class nuclear attack submarines, and one Xia-class ballistic missile submarine. In ad***ion, China has 25 new boats under contract now; 16 are under construction today, including a new class of nuclear attack submarine designated the Type-093 and a new nuclear ballistic missile sub, the Type-094.

The U.S. has three submarines under construction today. Although the Navy?Ts new 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for 48 nuclear attack submarines in the fleet by 2035, the Navy?Ts top submarine commander, Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, has testified before Congress that the Navy needs at least 54 boats to fulfill current critical missions. This number will rise as China?Ts navy expands.

If the Navy does not start launching new subs at the rate of two per year until several years after 2012, the force would dip to a low of 40 in 2028, or 17 percent below the Navy?Ts stated needs. And that rate will not even permit the Navy to reach its sub-minimal target of 48 attack submarines until 2034. All of this assumes that the Navy does not decommission ships faster than expected due to expanded operations in coming years.

Recommendations for the Administration and Congress
The United States must return to building at least two, and preferably two-and-a-half, new attack submarines per year beginning in FY 2009. The U.S. must begin procurement for long lead-time components, such as nuclear reactors, in FY 2007 and 2008. These steps are necessary just to hold U.S. subsurface strength steady.

The Administration should also work with key strategic partners in Asia to bolster their fleets. Japan and India are potential submarine warfare partners. Japan must also be encouraged to upgrade its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surveillance systems.

Congress should hold hearings into reports on the e***orial pages of DefenseNews (February 13, 2006) and Jane?Ts Defence Weekly (February 15, 2006) that the U.S. Navy has sabotaged Taiwan?Ts efforts to procure modern diesel-electric boats from U.S. shipyards by hyper-inflating prices in order to keep U.S. yards from building anything but nuclear boats. A robust Taiwanese fleet would be a welcome relief as the U.S. Navy attempts to counter increasing Chinese sub-surface fleet pressures in Asian littoral waters. The United States and Japan also need an enhanced partnership with Taiwan in airborne and subsurface ASW reconnaissance and surveillance in waters under Taiwanese administration.

John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in China Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Orzel, chiếc tàu ngầm Kilo duy nhất của Ba Lan

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Orzel

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