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John O'Brien on Ajax
The former Ajax and National Team midfielder on his time with the legendary Dutch side
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John O'Brien special to dcunited.com Friday,
May 20, 2011 - 10:33am

John O'Brien with Ajax in 2002​

'CHASING THE SOCCER DREAM'
As I board a plane from LA to DC I’m reminded of the many flights to and fro I’ve made chasing the soccer dream. If I’m wearing head to toe Nike, I’m headed to a U.S. National Team game. If it is Adidas, then Ajax is going somewhere. Long hair, jeans, and a t-shirt means I am a journalist, I guess. Along with each clothing style comes a mindset. A brand if you will. Nike/National Team soccer is belief, freedom, and an unrestrained will as underdog trying to

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... conquer the rest. Adidas/Ajax is practice, functionality, and the craft with roots in the Old World, soccer performed to a T. The world of soccer has changed since I left the US to join Ajax in Holland 17 years ago. Most notably, American soccer and its academies have developed. Now we also have abilities to develop players competitive at the professional levels. However, in the player development field, Ajax is still top dog. I know for certain I would not have been the player I became without Ajax. Clubs and coaches around the world emulate Ajax’s system. Similar practices, methods and external structures will work to help player development. To add to the external structures here are some personal internal experiences in the youth system, which undoubtedly also help describe the path.
THE AJAX DIFFERENCE

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The first time I noticed the difference Ajax-specific training made was in my first reunion with my American constituents at the U.S. Youth National Team level only six months in. At a training camp in Florida I noticed I could control the ball while being tightly marked. I was able to use my body to hold off a defender while moving the ball and surveying the field for opportunity. Fast-forward a year to a U-18 National Team camp. Josh Wolff and Ben Olsen were the in-form players of that team. We had an opportunity to compare ourselves with a professional European side. I say "compare" deliberately because in every American players' mind is the desire to measure one’s self against the best - and those, we were told, play elsewhere. During the game, I felt I was from elsewhere. As an Ajacied (Ajax player) I was no longer an outsider to world soccer. I did not need to rate myself against a standard held on another continent. The standard itself had become internalized. I knew what made a good player and where players fell by the wayside. How I could perform the craft would decide if I ended up on a second division squad in Belgium or as a soccer star in a metropolitan Italian city. As with most goals along a spectrum, we usually end up somewhere in between.

AJAX SCOUTING REPORT

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Ajax taught me the basics of what it means to be a professional player; the responsibilities, how to deal with pressure and adversity, and most importantly how to literally play the game. So here are a couple Ajax specific elements to look out for this Sunday. First, unless D.C. United has morphed into Spain, the Dutch side is not going to sit back on their haunches. They usually play a man-on-man marking style, except for holding one player next to, or in front of, the opposing team’s center forward. Offensively, you can expect the classic 4-3-3 with the primary intention to get behind the defense on the flanks. This is done either by well-timed deep runs or by isolating the technical winger one-on-one with heaps of space to exploit. When Ajax’s defenders have the ball and are being pressed they look to play it to the feet or chest of the center forward while the midfielders all re-position themselves to be an outlet. Rafael van der Vaart, the former Ajax star, has earned his bread and butter at Tottenham this season positioning himself well for knock downs from the 6’7” Peter Crouch. The second defender plays the long ball and a midfielder is off and running to a new position for the knock down. A midfielder facing the goal and receiving the ball at his feet means danger for the opposing side. Lets hope D.C. United brings its offensive style to the game and we can all witness a great friendly between the classic U.S and Dutch teams. John O'Brien is currently pursuing a degree in psychology at Antioch University.


Min of Meer (More or Less)
A poem about Ajax’s former stadium De Meer, by John O'Brien Damp earth rises from the ground palpable with presence.

A tram bell, a whistle, the thud of ball to foot and foot to ball.
I carry my oversized red gear bag to the small changing locker.
There is a system to all this movement.
Unrelenting noises and bodies coerce things to the goal.
Hup, hup, snel, snel, schiet!
Men watch, grunt and grumble.
The goal is a refined point; the point is well defined
What are we doing today? Ajax
How do we do it? Ajax
Who are we? Ajax
Echoes in the empty hallways underneath the spectator’s feet.

The top 50 managers of all time
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Choosing the 50 best footballers of all time? That is easy. You simply take your pick of Diego Maradona or Pele and work your way down the list. But the 50 greatest post-war managers from around the world? That has been a fearsomely difficult challenge. No doubt some of the selections that follow will be regarded as highly provocative.

Expert advice has been taken from foreign colleagues, as well as elders and betters, to try to ensure that it is neither too British-based or too modern. Some names that were unfamiliar to this correspondent proved very deserving of inclusion. Come on down Hennes Weisweiler!
But attempts to establish strict criteria proved almost as difficult as choosing between Clough, Ferguson and Zagallo. After all, you are not just comparing different eras but pitting club managers against some who have only worked in the international sphere.

Do you push for the great one-club men, like Busby or Paisley, or those who proved that they could succeed all around Europe, like Capello and Trapattoni? Do you give extra marks for the game's great stylists and how much should this list reflect the game's tactical innovators?


In the end, choosing the winner was about the only easy bit and subjective valuations came to the fore. If this exercise proved anything, it is that Britain used to produce some of the world's greatest managers. These days, we are forced to buy them in.



50. Hennes Weisweiler. Thank him for the fact that Borussia Monchengladbach are a name we all love to roll around the tongue. Weisweiler not only turned the club into a serious force but inspired a whole wave of German coaches including Berti Vogts and Gunther Netzer.



49. Jesse Carver. One league title with Juventus in 1950 might seem scant reason to include the Liverpudlian but Carver, whose peripatetic career saw him manage both Holland and Millwall, was a trailblazer. The distinguished football writer Brian Glanville cre***s Carver with being the man to show English football that training with the ball might be more productive than mindless running. We should have paid more attention to him.



48. Albert Batteux. There should be one French club manager in the top 50 and those in the know propose Batteux ahead of Guy Roux. Why? For winning nine league titles with Stade de Reims and St Etienne between 1953 and 1970. And he was twice a European Cup finalist with Reims.



47. Carlos Bianchi. Five-times South American coach of the year and Boca Juniors' most successful manager. Which makes it all the stranger that his talent never travelled well to Europe where there were unsuccessful stints in France, Spain and Italy.



46. Sven-Goran Eriksson. His place in the list would not be disputed in Sweden, Portugal or Italy given that he was a club champion in all three countries. But it is hard to see him climbing the charts now that he's at Manchester City.
45. Don Revie. Some England fans would not include him at all for walking out on the national side but there has to be recognition of the builder of the Leeds United team which dominated the early Seventies through good football and a dash of thuggery.



44. Carlo Ancelotti. Sir Alex Ferguson's Manchester United trampled over Ancelotti's Juventus en route ******mpions League success in 1999 but it is the Italian who now has two European Cup medals from his time at AC Milan. But for the miracle of Istanbul, it would have been three.



43. Carlos Alberto Parreira. Probably lucky to be included given that he coached the least-loved of Brazilian world champions in 1994 and then screwed up their 2006 campaign. But it is hard to ignore a man who coached at five different World Cups with four different countries.



42. Otto Rehhagel. Greece's functional football at Euro 2004 shouldn't blind us to the fact that it was an extraordinary success by the 100-1 outsiders. Interestingly, his time at Werder Bremen is remembered for the flashy football. That's called adaptability.



41. George Raynor. Ever heard the one about the English manager who took Sweden to the 1958 World Cup final? Raynor also led Sweden to victory over England at Wembley. Imagine how sweet that must have felt for a man so overlooked in his own country that he was sacked by Doncaster Rovers.



40. Udo Lattek. Included for the hard-luck story as much as the trophies. The German was sacked by Bayern Munich only a year after winning the European Cup and a third successive Bundesliga. He was reappointed in 1983 and again won three German championships and reached the European Cup final. His reward? Have a guess.



39. Bill Nicholson. He won his first game as Spurs manager 10-4 against Everton but not many guessed that it would signal the greatest period in the club's history. A first English double of the 20th century followed and then the Cup Winners Cup, the first European trophy won by an English club. As Martin Jol knows all too well, the Spurs board are rather impatient for a return to the glory years.



38. Sepp Herberger. He took over the German national team when there was a swastika on the tracksuit, but Herberger is widely respected for rebuilding his country's football after the war by coaching the 1954 world champions in the so-called Miracle of Bern against the favoured Hungarians. "If you don't shoot, you won't score," was one of his many pithy phrases still in circulation.



37. Karl Rappan. The game's innovators need to be recognised and, as manager of Switzerland, he dreamed up the the sweeper system. It was originally known as the verrou because he withdrew one player, Verrouieleur, and it was then adapted by the Italians into catenaccio. So now you know.



36. Louis Van Gaal. Not even Clough had Van Gaal's belief in himself and his own methods. They brought him great success at Ajax, where young players followed his orders, but he managed to upset the whole of Catalonia while at Barcelona. How they will have laughed when he failed to reach the 2002 World Cup finals with Holland.



35. Sir Bobby Robson. A grand old man of the game who is as passionate now as during his 13 years at Ipswich. A couple of penalties away from leading England to the 1990 World Cup final, and not even the Germans would have begrudged him.



34. Helmut Schoen. Under his leadership, Germany were World Cup runners-up in 1966, finished third in 1970, European champions in 1972, World Cup winners in 1974 and European runners-up in 1976. Which is more than the England team has achieved in its entire history.



33. Rafael Benitez. The goatee beard does him no favours but, after impressing at Valencia, the Spaniard need only clinch a Premiership title with Liverpool to go shooting up the list. A bit more flair would be welcome to go with the trophies.



32. Valery Lobanovski. A towering figure in Soviet football for the dominance of his Dynamo Kiev team in the 1970s and 80s. An uncompromising leader, he also led the Soviet Union to the final of Euro 88.



31. Ottmar Hitzfeld. A genial man who has jousted many times with Sir Alex Ferguson. The German lost some of those battles, most notably at the Nou Camp in 1999, but, unlike the Scot, he does have two European Cup medals from his time with Borussia Dortmund and Bayern Munich.



30. Carlos Bilardo. Went by the nickname of El Narigon (old big nose) and he has always suffered in comparison to the other Argentine World Cup winning coach Cesar Menotti. Bilardo was blessed to have Diego Maradona in 1986 but his players vouch that he was a fine motivator who left nothing to chance in his preparations.



29. Guus Hiddink. Not great with his tax returns but, since establishing PSV Eindhoven as European champions back in 1988, his itinerant career has shown him to be one of the best coaches of his generation. Appears to enjoy the underdog role as shown with his work for Australia and South Korea.



28 Giovanni Trapattoni. He won seven Serie A championships, a Bundesliga title with Bayern Munich and more but has never quite made the top tier of Italian coaches. Known for some combustible moments including a dressing room punch up with Paolo Di Canio while manager of Juventus.
27. Aime Jacquet. Talk about having the last laugh. L'Equipe, the bible of French sport, attacked Jacquet incessantly before the 1998 World Cup finals and even called for him to stand down. His response was to guide Les Bleus to a famous victory in Paris.



26. Nereo Rocco. Twice a European Cup winner with AC Milan in the Sixties, he is perhaps best known for bringing the catenaccio system into Italian football. For which, I guess, we should not really be thanking him.



25. Tele Santana. Failure to win the 1982 World Cup with Brazil might, in some circumstances, have seen Santana vilified. But what a failure! Their joyous football is still remembered more fondly than Brazil's 1994 World Cup victory.



24. Sir Alf Ramsey. Destined to be England's only World Cup winning manager for some time to come, Ramsey brilliantly made the most of his resources in 1966 and had the courage to trust his own instincts and omit Jimmy Greaves. Embittered in his later years but no wonder given the shameful treatement at the hands of the FA.



23. Enzo Bearzot. Brazil should have won the 1982 World Cup but instead it was Bearzot's Italy. And they did so by casting off some of the defensive shackles that characterised football in his home country.



22. Cesar Luis Menotti. 'El Flaco', the skinny one, revelled in his reputation as a liberal free-thinker but what really made his name was winning the World Cup for Argentina on home soil in 1978. What followed was an anticlimax, particularly at Barcelona.



21. Fabio Capello. The sergeant-majorish Italian was sacked by Real Madrid in the summer for not winning the title with sufficient panache but style was never his priority. That was winning. His AC Milan side once went unbeaten for 58 Serie A matches which trumps Arsenal's Invincibles.



20. Franz Beckenbauer. Brief spells at Bayern Munich and Olympique Marseille are not much of a club career to go on but two World Cup finals with Germany - losing to Argentina in 1986 and gaining revenge in 1990 - would suggest that the Kaiser knew a thing or two about coaching.



19. Vicente Del Bosque. For years, he seemed destined for lowly coaching roles at Real Madrid but ended up taking charge for the most successful spell in the club's modern history. Quiet, unassuming, almost Paisley-like, he made a team out of the galacticos. Madrid showed their gratitude for two European Cups by sacking him.



18. Luiz Felipe Scolari. The Brazil side he inherited in 2001 was struggling to qualify for the World Cup finals. They ended up as winners. 'Big Phil' punches his weight as a club and international manager. No wonder Brian Barwick wanted him.



17. Marcello Lippi. "Such a good-looking bastard he makes most of us look like Bela Lugosi," Sir Alex Ferguson once said of the Italian. And it is his charisma as much as coaching intellect that has underpinned his triumphs with Juventus and, most memorably, in the 2006 World Cup finals with Italy.
16. Jose Mourinho. A truly exceptional tactician and motivator and, boy, he knows it. There will be complaints that this big trophy hunter with FC Porto and Chelsea is ranked too low. To climb the charts, all he has to do is to prove that he loves the beautiful game half as much as he enjoys advancing his own career.


15. Johan Cruyff. The longest-serving and most successful of Barcelona managers fitted double heart bypass surgery in between winning four league titles and the Catalan club's first European Cup in 1992. A shame he gave up management but still a huge influence in Barcelona club politics.



14. Mario Zagallo. Brought in shortly before the 1970 World Cup finals, Zagallo's job was to find enough room in the team for Pelé, Gérson, Tostão, Jairzinho and Rivelino. It is probably not as easy as it sounds, but he fine-tuned what is widely regarded as one of the world's greatest teams. Just a shame he did not use his experience to see that Ronaldo was in no state to play in the 1998 World Cup final.



13. Helenio Herrera. With an ego the size of the San Siro, the French-Argentine cast a big shadow over European football in the 1960s. A great motivator and disciplinarian who imposed rigid catenaccio on his teams, he enjoyed his greatest success at Inter Milan where he twice won the European Cup. He might have been higher up the list but for the subsequent allegations of corruption against that regime.



12. Jock Stein. "Jock, you're immortal," Shankly told his great friend in the dressing room after the 1967 European Cup triumph which marked a first for a British team. What's more, he did it with a bunch of Glaswegians. Would he have succeeded outside Scotland? Probably, but it is hard to tell from his 45 days at Leeds.


11. Arrigo Sacchi. A one-time shoe salesman who built one of the greatest club sides at AC Milan and did so with innovative tactics. With Baresi closing the back door and Van Basten knocking in the goals, Sacchi used the athleticism of Rijkaard and Gullit in a powerful pressing system.


10. Arsene Wenger. Ranked above managers who have won more and with very good reason. A champion of style and sporting beauty and, most remarkably, a football man you can take at his word. There is not a single club that has not coveted him in the last ten years.


9. Miguel Munoz. He inherited the great Real Madrid side and probably did not have to do much from the sidelines as Puskas, Di Stefano and the rest stuffed Eintracht Frankfurt 7-3 to win the European Cup in his first season. But he also went on to win nine titles and build the European club champions of 1966.



8. Bela Guttman. Jose Mourinho calls himself a special one but this brilliant and brash Hungarian is cre***ed with establishing the cult of the manager. One of the pioneers of the attacking 4-2-4 formation, he enjoyed his greatest success at Benfica where, having recruited Eusebio, he secured successive European Cup victories in the early Sixties. "The third season is fatal," he said, although he rarely stayed long enough to find out.



7. Brian Clough. No doubt he would put himself top of the pile and his feats were truly extraordinary. He turned Derby County into league champions and Nottingham Forest into the best team in Europe. What a shame he was never given the opportunity to prove his talents with England but then he might have rubbed everyone up the wrong way like he did at Leeds.



6. Bob Paisley. Still the only coach to have three European Cup medals - although, unfairly, no knighthood - the unassuming son of a County Durham miner would have been too modest to trot out his great signings like Dalglish, Hansen, Souness and Rush. "Mind you, I wasn't only here for the good years," he once said. "One year, we came second."


5. Bill Shankly. The builder of another of football's great institutions, Shankly would surely have shared in Liverpool's later success in Europe had he not retired far too prematurely. It is hard to believe that Bob Paisley and Joe Fagan would have gone on to those later triumphs without his colossal influence.


4. Sir Alex Ferguson. After knocking over the Old Firm in Scotland, he has built a modern-day monster out of Manchester United and has done so with teams of flair and adventure. A giant of football and yet his CV will always have an unmissable hole without that second European Cup. Clinch that and perhaps we can elevate him into the top three.



3. Ernst Happel. A man of few words but many trophies, the Austrian was league champion in four different countries (Holland, Belgium, Germany and Austria). He also led Holland to the 1978 World Cup final. But what most impresses is that unfashionable Feyenoord and Hamburg have won the European Cup once each; Happel was the common denominator. Even Clough might be impressed at that CV.


2. Sir Matt Busby. If club-building scores high, then it is hard to look past the man who took over the reins at Manchester United in 1946 when Old Trafford was literally a bomb site. He then faced the most difficult of all rebuilding jobs when he lost a brilliant team, and almost his own life, in the great tragedy of Munich. Fergie has won more trophies but was there ever a more deserved triumph than United's 1968 European Cup victory?


1. Rinus Michels. The Dutchman, who died in 2005, was named coach of the century by FIFA in 1999. For once, that organisation knew what it was doing. The originator of Total Football, Michels won the European Cup with Ajax, the Spanish league with Barcelona and Euro 88 with Holland. He should also have won the 1974 World Cup. What's more, you would have paid Wembley prices to watch his teams.

Defensive performances in the 2010/11 Eredivisie
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After analyzing the offensive performances in last season’s Eredivisie in terms of shots, shots on target and goals per shot, now it’s time to do the reverse process and look at the defensive side. Just like in the previous post, data was extracted from the NOS website which presents these parameters in the match reports. The NOS uses data provided by Infostrada Sports, a company that specializes in sports data.

Shots per match
Just like in the previous analysis we’ll start by looking at the amount of shots allowed per match. After all, this is assumed to be one of the key determinants in determining the defensive team performances, and with that, the amount of goals conceded. A future post might dive into exploring the strengths of the relationship between goal conceded and parameters like shots allowed, shot on target percentage and goals per shot on target, but we’ll save that for a later time.

Shots allowed per match​

Unsurprisingly, the three teams with the least amount of shots allowed per match are the three top performing teams in the league: PSV (8.9 shots allowed per match), Twente (9.4) and Ajax (9.8). More surprising perhaps is De Graafschap’s sixth place and their 12.1 shots allowed per match, which is about two-third of a shot below the league average. Despite that, only five teams conceded more goals than their 56, which makes it worthwhile to look at the quality of the shots allowed and the shot stopping qualities of the goalkeepers.

Shots on target


The first parameter indicating the quality of the shots allowed would be the fraction of shots that are on target. Take a look at the diagram below and note Twente’s remarkable performance in this department. Only 49.8% of the shots they allowed was on target, whereas the league average was 56.8%. In an average match, given the fact that Twente tends to allow 9.4 shots per match, this would reduce the absolute number of shots on target by 0.65.

On target fraction of shots allowed​

At the other end of the spectrum, again, De Graafschap sticks out with almost 61% shots allowed on target, which provides an explanation for their high amount of goals conceded despite their low absolute number of shots allowed.

Goals per shot on target
The third parameter in the chain of conceding would be the amount of goals conceded per shot on target. This reflects a combination of both the quality of the defense and the goalkeeper. These efforts are indistinguishable with the current data, as these rough data do not provide any information on the quality of the shots fired in, other than whether they were on target or not. More elaborate databases, including parameters like shot direction, velocity, shot distance, number of defenders between ball and goal and the position of the goal keeper would allow a form of discrimination between the defenders’ effort and the shot stopping qualities of the goal keeper. Unfortunately, for now, these are not available for the Eredivisie.
Back to the data that we do have then. The single best performing team in terms of goals per shot on target is definitely Ajax. Goal keeper Maarten Stekelenburg (and Vermeer and Verhoeven during some stage of the season) and the Ajax defense allowed only 0.159 goals per shot on target, which was significantly lower than the league average of 0.218, but also significantly lower compared to their rivals PSV (0.195) and Twente (0.214).
Another excellent performance is Groningen’s return of just 0.194 goals per shot on target, which seems an important element to their successful campaign, leading to the club’s best first half of the season ever.

Goals allowed per shot on target


Negative outliers are Willem II (0.306) and VVV (0.269), the two teams finishing 18th and 17th in the final ranking.​

Goals per shot
A summary of the data provided in the ‘shots on target’ and ‘goals per shot on target’ diagrams would of course be the aggregated version: ‘goals per shot allowed’. Although this does not provide any ad***ional information to the above, the aggregation of both parameters would still be worthwhile.

Goals per shot allowed​

Although Twente’s excellent performance in terms of ‘shots on target fraction’ compensates for their average performance regarding the amount of ‘goals allowed per shot on target’, it still doesn’t make up for it. Note that the spread in terms of ‘shots on target fraction’ is much lower than the spread in terms of ‘goals allowed per shot on target’.
Overall, Ajax’ 0.090 goals per shot allowed gave then a competitive advantage over Twente’s 0.107 and PSV’s 0.112. Another thing to note is that Heracles, Feyenoord and De Graafschap all performed above average in terms of the absolute number of shots allowed, but below average in terms of the amount of goals conceded per shot.
The performances in terms of absolute number of shots allowed and amount of goals conceded per shot can be combined into one final figure, displaying both parameters at once. The X-axis represents the amount of goals conceded per shot while the Y-axis represents the number of shots allowed per match. An ideal location would therefore be the bottom left corner of the graph.
The yellow lines indicate the averages for both parameters, making it easy to discriminate whether a team allows too many shots (upper left), allows opponents to score too many goals per shot (lower right), or both (upper right).

Defensive performances in the Eredivisie​

In conclusion
A detailed recording of goals, shots and shots on target does provide quite some depth in analyzing the defensive performances of the different teams. And these graphs (at least to me) seem a useful direction to digest this information quickly.

Offensive performances in the 2010/11 Eredivisie
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Now that the Eredivisie is over, it is time to sit back and take a look at some of the performances delivered by the different teams throughout the season. Ajax came out victorious in the end in the unique event of a true Eredivisie final against Twente. Excelsior and Vitesse battled to the very end to see the tiniest of margins decide who stays up and who faces the dreaded promotion/relegation play-offs.
In the end it all came down to the very essence of football: scoring more goals than you allow your opponent to do. This articles kicks off a planned series review articles regarding the past Eredivisie season with a simple, though interesting look the offensive side of the game. It evaluates goals scored, shots taken and shot accuracy to come up with some interesting stats.

The data
But before can dive right in it pays off to look at the source of these data. The data dare collected from the NOS website, which offers the parameters mentioned above that are provided by a company called Infostrada Sports. The three main input parameters for this review seem quite well defined, as goals, shots on goal and shots wide are generally clearly distinguished. I’ve assumed that blocked shots are grouped under shots off target.

Shots per match
Every goal grew from a shot on goal (let me include headers etc. among shots here), so let’s first look at the teams’ amount of shots per match. The average amount of shots was 12.91, which is slightly lower than the 14.7 presented in a recent article on the excellent Soccer by the Numbers blog, including data from the first half of the Premier League season.

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Over the past Eredivisie season, PSV and Ajax were positive outliers with 17.7 and 17.5 shots per match repsectively. Compared to those two, Twente’s 15.8 seems on the low side. Best-of-the-rest positions are for Feyenoord, Heracles and AZ at around 13.6 shots per match. At the other end of the spectrum, Willem II created only 9.8 shots per match, which was only marginally less than the 9.9 shots per match created by NAC, who in spite of this figure manage to spend most of the season in a safe mid-table position.

On target percentage
But winning matches may not all be about the number of the shots per game, but also about the quality of the shots created. Let’s therefore look at two other graphs. The first one depicts the fraction of shots that were on target and the second one plots both the amount of goals scored per shot and the amount of goals scored per shot on target.

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On average 57% of shots were on target, with top and bottom teams quite randomly spread among the field. Of note is Twente’s low percentage of 54.5% of their shots being on target. NAC, who’d also scored low on absolute number of shots created, were bottom of the table with only 52.7% shots on target. Overall spread seemed much lower in this department compared to the absolute number of shots created, but the difference of 6% more shots on target between for example Heracles and Groningen is definitely of relevance.

Goals per shot
The second graph shows the average amount of goals scored per shot (yellow) and per shot on target (blue). It turns out that ADO outperformed the other teams in the amount of goals per shot (0.17) and per shot on target (0.29). Groningen and Roda and Heracles, ADO’s rivals in the Europa League play-offs, also had good seasons in terms of the amount of goals scored per shot and per shot on target. NAC made up for their low amount of shots and shots on target, particularly with their impressive 0.25 goals per shot on target.

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In conclusion

These graphs split out the Eredivisie teams according to several aspects of their offensive game. Ideally, of course, each team would rank among the top teams in the amount of shots, the fraction of shots on target and the amount of shots on target that are converted to a goal. But it turns out that none of the teams consistently scores high in all categories.
Breaking the process of scoring goals down into these different aspects of scoring seems like a valuable tool in identifying a team’s general strategy. Take the examples of NAC and ADO, two teams that seem to aim at creating fewer, though qualitatively superior shots. In contrast, for example, AZ ranks sixth in terms of creating shots, but only fifth from bottom in terms of goals scored per shot, which indicates a more opportunistic offensive approach.

PSV 2-2 Ajax: PSV press, Ajax fight back
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PSV twice took the lead by exploiting a clear weakness in the Ajax defence, but the away side managed to claim a point. Fred Rutton made two changes from PSV’s previous league game. Wilfred Bouma and Zakaria Labyad dropped out, with Timothy Derijck and Tim Matavz coming in.
Frank de Boer was without Miralem Sulejmani and chose to bring Vurnon Anita into the side as the holding player. This match was open and entertaining, largely because there were two attack-minded midfields who wanted to play the ball rather than win it back.

PSV start strongly

For the first few minutes there was a huge difference in the two sides’ attitude without the ball – PSV pressed Ajax strongly from the first whistle, winning the ball quickly and putting them in command of the game. Ajax, however, were happy to sit back in their own half, showing a surprisingly passive approach when out of position.
The first goal resulted directly from the pressing – Ajax were high up the pitch when Gregory van der Wiel was dispossssed, and some neat passes down the PSV left eventually resulted in Tim Matavz finishing well. The battle in that part of the pitch – Ajax’s right-back zone – turned out to be the key battleground of the game.

Midfield battle

PSV’s pressing didn’t last long, however, and the game settled down into a fairly tame, free-flowing midfield battle based around movement rather than tackling. PSV’s two attack-minded central midfielders, Ola Toivonen and Georgino Wijnaldum, showed a decreasing amount of interest in defending as the game progressed, and it was a surprise that Theo Janssen didn’t influence the game more when breaking forward from central midfield.
There was some confusion in the way Ajax played to the right of the pitch. Cristian Eriksen played as a narrow right-winger, tucked into the midfield, whilst Siem de Jong started to the right of the triangle and burst forward. In ad***ion, van der Wiel tried to motor forward on the overlap, and presumably there was the intention of making a triangle on that flank to overload PSV – but it never quite worked, and the main outcome was the leave the flank ripe for PSV counters, through Erik Pieters and Dries Mertens.

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Ajax step it up

The injury to PSV goalkeeper Przemysław Tytoń, which stopped the game for 15 minutes at the end of the first half, was a key factor in the game. PSV’s momentum was broken up, and after that stoppage Ajax regrouped and started to press much more. They played the game in PSV’s half and eventually found an equaliser through Kolbeinn Sigþórsson – for all their attempts at intricate play, it was Sigþórsson doing a battering ram act that eventually got them the goal.
PSV then recovered after half time and started pressing more, and it’s tempting to conclude that the concession of a goal, and the return to a deadlock in the game, suited their natural game more – in particular, their midfield. They were much more positive and worked good situations down their left. This was the period when van der Wiel was exposed – he made a crazy tackle on Mertens to concede the penalty for the second goal, then got caught too high up the pitch for a chance Mertens wasted when one-on-one.

Late on

Van der Wiel partly atoned for his poor defensive performance with a good run down the right for the equaliser. By this stage, Frank de Boer had introduced the physical threat of Dmitri Bulykin for Sigþórsson, and this prompted more direct balls into the box – Bulykin tucked home Sigþórsson’s ball.
The final stages were exciting but not frantic – both teams tired, and though the midfields basically gave up defending, there was a feeling that both managers were content with a point.

Conclusion

There is an interesting pattern to many Eredivisie games in terms of tactics – they’re rarely won by a change of formation, but the game goes through many separate phases – often revolving around whether the sides are pressing. This was the case here – especially in the first half, when both teams were on top when they pressed.
Ultimately, this was a battle between two teams who aren’t built to play against each other – they’re built to convincingly beat more lowly sides. Both wanted to dominate possession, to play the ball gently through midfield and to construct clever attacks, when a bit of organisation wouldn’t have gone amiss. Still, it was a good game, and the nature of the final scoreline – PSV making the running, Ajax just about catching up – summed up the game well.

Real Madrid 3 – 0 Ajax: Tactical trouble at Ajax from a wider perspective
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In the much anticipated replay of last year’s Champions League group stage game ,where Ajax took a true battering and ended up losing 2 – 0 at Madrid, Ajax lost 3 – 0 this time at the Estadio Bernabeu. In terms of ‘face value’ Ajax provided more counter play – in fact their amount of 19 shots registered was higher than any Champions League opponent achieved at the Bernabeu since Bayern in the 2006/07 Champions League quarter final – but the final score line and the dominance expressed by Real’s front four left little to the imagination. Ajax failed the benchmark test that was supposed to show the progress made under manager Frank de Boer in the past year.

The wider perspective
Rather than picking on tactical situations of this particular match, or highlighting individual players’ performances, this might be a nice moment to reflect on the tactical shortcomings of Ajax’ optimistic wide forwards 4-3-3 system, which has failed to produce a European football goal for 433 minutes now. In fact, Ajax has failed to win a single match against opposition of equal quality so far this season. The Dutch Super Cup was lost to ten men Twente (1-2), while both the Eredivisie clashes at PSV (2-2) and at home against Twente (1-1) were drawn.
Two players coming in for quite some criticism for their performances during these matches are right full back Gregory van der Wiel and holding midfielder Theo Janssen. While it sometimes seems hard to suppress the knee-jerk reaction to blame the individual players at stake, at the same time such a reaction seems irrational and unfair. Dutch international Gregory van der Wiel definitely has the potential to play an important role for this Ajax team and Theo Janssen rightfully stood out as the Eredivisie player of the year last season, dominating both crucial Eredivisie matches and European fixtures for his club Twente.
So why is it that these two players seem to carry the burden of what’s going wrong at Ajax at this moment?

The ‘Ajax philosophy’

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The starting line-ups​

Ajax have shown difficulty beating opponents of equal or superior stature. At the same time, matches against inferior opposition are won relatively easily, as expressed by the recent club record of scoring twice or more in fifteen consecutive Eredivisie matches. And to be fair, the Eredivisie contains quite a lot of those inferior teams compared to the standards set by Ajax, both in terms of youth player development and the standards of player acquisition.
Manager Frank de Boer consistently has Ajax play in a wide wingers 4-3-3 formation, and the offensive nature of that formation is accompanied by a high pressing, possession based playing style. This way of playing football is deemed essential to expressing ‘the Ajax culture’ and is applied rigidly, with little room for modulation, apart from varying the individual players involved.
This way of using the 4-3-3 formation contrasts with most of the teams of equal or superior opposition that Ajax fails to produce results against, and it does so in exactly the full backs and holding midfielder areas of the pitch, where Van der Wiel and Janssen fail to deliver at present. While most other teams make quite clear choices to maintain the balance between offense and defense, De Boer has committed himself to an over-attacking formation that gets picked apart by decent opposition.
Other teams, as evidenced by the recently published UEFA Champions League technical report, maintain their balance either by covering their defensive line with conservative use of their full backs while playing a single holding midfielder, or by covering their offensive full backs by deploying two conservative holding midfielders. De Boer has made it abundantly clear that it is part of his ‘playing philosophy’ to use offensive full backs, while fielding only one holding midfielder, and that rigidness is causing trouble.

The Real Madrid goals
All three of Real Madrid’s goals provided excellent cues to the problem at stake. At the first goal, Ajax’ midfield was completely overrun by a brilliantly executed high speed one touch passing move. Both of Ajax’ full backs were overrun by Real’s front four as high as on the midline of the pitch. The second goal saw central playmaker Kaká in acres of space at the edge of the box after Theo Janssen had moved over to the right full back area to cover for Van der Wiel, leaving Kaká a playground of space in a crucial area. A second holding midfielder would have easily closed down that space. Finally, the third goal was preceded by an impressively well executed 60 yard Xabi Alonso pass that picked out advanced full back Arbeloa, indeed, free in Ajax’ right back area with Van der Wiel pressing too high up the pitch and Janssen still on his way back from covering duties at left back.

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Tactical naivety
It is not the individual effort by Theo Janssen or Gregory van der Wiel that lies at the heart of the problem. One single holding midfielder simply can’t cover for full backs expressing offensive desires. Any side capable of quick ball circulation and witty movement along their offensive players will pick such a side apart.
Against inferior opposition this problem might be less exposed, although Ajax are still looking for their first clean sheet of the Eredivisie season, but the tactical naivety of demanding both offensive input from the full backs and playing a single holding midfielder will be punished when playing decent opposition, where the ‘I’ll just score one more than you do’ approach won’t work.
Meanwhile, Frank de Boer has moved himself into a difficult situation by proclaiming the status of ‘untouchable’ to the present playing style, stressing that this is the true Ajax philosophy. For now it is clear that he isn’t winning any important matches with it.

Ajax 2 – 0 PSV: Impressive pressing performance leaves PSV no chance
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This clash between two Eredivisie title contenders may go down as one of the best games Ajax played under their current manager, Frank de Boer. The home side pressed PSV all over the pitch and the successive dominance in possession allowed them to continue an intense pressing level throughout the full ninety minutes. PSV proved unable to work their way around the pressure, and after going a goal down, new manager Philip Cocu could not turn this game around.
This match report has been composed with the use of match data that were provided by Infostrada Sports.

Ajax’ 4-3-3 that wasn’t really a 4-3-3

The line-ups for this match, with the size of the dot corresponding to the number of completed passes. Note
Aissatti's presence in this game reflected very well.
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No less than six players out of the presumed best XI missed out today. Long-term injuries have kept the entire front three of Sigthorsson, Boerrigter and Sulejmani sidelined, while midfielder Theo Janssen (suspended) and injured defenders Gregory van der Wiel and Nicolai Boilesen also missed out. Frank de Boer today picked Daley Blind at left-back, ahead of the recently disappointing young defender Koppers.
In midfield, De Boer made the interesting choice to go with both Eyong Enoh and Vurnon Anita, something he was reluctant to do at first, but a solution that worked out extremely well. Siem de Jong featured in the striker role, be it with a lot of positional freedom, allowing Christian Eriksen to overlap. Eriksen played a more central and more offensive role today due to the coverage provided by the double pivot of central defensive midfielders behind him.

PSV’s 4-3-3
With a fully fit selection available, PSV should have been expected the have the better of Ajax in this department. Philip Cocu, who took over after the departure of Fred Rutten, elected Georginio Wijnaldum over Jeremain Lens at the right wing, although, after losing a series of duels to Blind, he was at times swapped with central midfielder Zakarya Labyad.
At right-back, Stanislav Mannolev seems to have fallen out of favor, mainly due to his defensive liabilities and his eye-catching lack of control that limits his offensive output. Atiba Hutchinson got the start, with excellent performances against Heerenveen’s Assaidi recently.

The first half
There is one word to describe the events of this match: pressure. Ajax played the way Frank de Boer would have liked them to play for longer, pressing their opponents all over the pitch, making it barely possible for PSV to string more than a few passes together.
Such an intense pressing strategy is employed more often, but regularly fails to win enough possession for the home team to be able to keep up with the amount of energy it costs. It often fades around the fifteenth minute, with the away side slowly gaining an advantage when playing around the pressing team. Not so today though, as Ajax gained roughly 66% of possession early on and proved able to press PSV during the remaining part of the match. The math is quite simple here, conserve the ball a lot and you’ll be able to limit the amount of time the intense pressure is required.

The problem for Ajax
Winning possession is one thing, turning it into goal scoring chances is quite another. In the first half, Ajax’ chances were limited to long range shots and an odd of target header from a corner. Ajax mainly spent their possession in midfield, where they enjoyed a rather simple acquired numerical advantage. Striker Siem de Jong drifted deep, even below the level of the midfielders, adding up the extra man. As mentioned before, playing both Enoh and Anita provided Eriksen with double the amount of defensive midfield cover that he’s used to, liberating more of his offensive threat.
All in all, the first half showed a dominant Ajax side, a PSV side that looked robbed of any opportunity to circulate possession and a limited number of goal scoring chances. An impressive stat to show Ajax’ pressing was PSV’s number of first half goal scoring chances: zero. Striker Matavz and left winger Mertens completed one and two passes respectively in the first half, an expression of how early Ajax’ pressing generally intercepted possession, or reversely, how unable PSV proved to deal with it.
One more stat? Okay, Vermeer completed all but one of his 18 first half passes, while Tyton failed to complete a single passing attempt out of eleven.

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This graph presents the number of completed passes per team as the match goes from 0 to 90 minutes. This allows insight into which team dominated which phases of the match. Ajax outpassed PSV in nearly all 5 minute sections of this match, with their most dominant spell during the 55th-65th minute, when they scored their goals.
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The second half

With PSV limiting themselves to stopping Ajax’ threat and Ajax winning their dominance with a false nine striker role, providing goal scoring threats from within the box seemed a concern for the home side. It took a brilliant short corner routine (or a fluke cross?) by Ismael Aissatti to open the score, again from outside the box. He curled one over the arms of Tyton, just into the far top corner of the goal.
Ajax now defended a lead, so possession became a goal in itself, rather than a way to obtain goals. Immediately after the 56th minute goal, Ajax went on to dominate possession for the next ten minutes, as is shown in the passing chart. By that time they had doubled their lead through a Siem de Jong penalty, won by, again, Aissatti.
Cocu’s only change that had any chance of turning things around came in between both Ajax’ goals, as he removed his slightly injured captain Toivonen, who disappointed throughout. The PSV captain generally needs his side to be present on the opponent’s half to make an impact and his performance in terms of creation is generally limited.
Cocu introduced pacy winger Lens, but his presence obviously did not solve PSV problem of being unable to pass through Ajax’ numerical advantage in midfield. With their offensive three of Matavz, Mertens and Lens completing only 17 passes in the final third of the game, PSV was never able to construct any offensive threat. Ajax generally intercepted the ball early in PSV’s game, with Vertonghen particularly on song today. The Ajax captain made 14 of his 27 (!) interceptions while defending the lead, with the pair of Enoh and Anita throwing in another 15.

In the end

Pressing is a key element of how Frank de Boer wants his Ajax side to play. And today turned out very well. Pressing may very well backfire on a team, for example when not holding on to the ball enough themselves, making the spells of pressing needed longer and more frequent. Today’s pressing was in part a success due to the lack of PSV pressing. This allowed Ajax a rather easy time on the ball, as was evident from the 695 passes with a near 80% completion rate.
Siem de Jong’s false nine role proved crucial in gaining the upper hand in midfield, but again, Ajax had trouble turning their possession into quality goal scoring chances. Overall number of 11 Ajax shots, 7 of which on target, versus 3 PSV shots, 2 of which on target, don’t tell the whole story. Most of Ajax’ attempts stood a relative small chance of going in and it took a moment of individual brilliance (let’s give Aissatti the benefit of doubt, should it exist) to open the score.
PSV should take a critical look at their plans going into this game. While they did defend compact, like they normally do, they failed to press Ajax and thereby allowed Ajax longer spells of possession than strictly needed. And even though no imminent goal scoring danger was created, Ajax was allowed to conserve energy that was unleashed as soon as PSV had regained possession. Homework for Cocu.

Frank de Boer's reinvention and the importance of being Vurnon Anita
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"I have no explanation," Frank de Boer's answer, to why Ajax perform better after the winter break, three seasons in a row now. Their current run of eight consecutive wins is the best sequence by any side in this crazy Eredivisie season strung at the right time. However the year didn't get off to the best start; defeats to Feyenoord and FC Utrecht, meant Ajax were staring right down the barrel, eight points off the leaders, and their chances of retaining the championship looking slim.

As the Eredivisie enters the final stretch, Ajax wrestled back the favourite tag originally bestowed upon them, leading with six games remaining albeit four points ahead of sixth place. At the back of De Boer's mind is the knowledge last year they won their final six fixtures to snatch the title. Whereas their rivals have either stagnated or stuttered the Amsterdammers have an essence of calm, vibrancy and renewal.

In their last eight games, they've picked up the maximum 24 points, compared to Feyenoord and Heerenveen (17); FC Twente (16); AZ (15) and PSV (12). Only Heerenveen (26) have accumulated more points to Ajax's 25 since the league resumed in late January. How they've done it is the result of going back to the future. De Boer was at a crossroads, an injury crisis threatened to destabilise Ajax's season. But with key personnel returning the former left-back had an ace up his sleeve. Not many would paint the Hoorn native as a tactical buff in the guise of a Marcelo Bielsa. In the last few weeks that attitude has slowly changed.

A coach that knows what he wants. De Boer has often spoken, at times in great length, the importance of Ajax returning to their roots, dismissed as a romantic and idealist. He has – without exaggerating – turned back the clock, getting the Amsterdam club to play a brand of football many never thought possible. Since his arrival he's kick-started a renaissance, the past few weeks, a continual phase, seen further progression.

"It seems we finally understand," he said after the Heracles game. "Before the winter break we were rather predictable, a lot of matches we kept possession, but weren't a threat." Ajax, this must be stressed, are on the right path but still have a long way to go if they’re to be held in the same breath as the class of 1995.

It's no coincidence this revival has coincided with reverting Ajax's most valuable commo***y to his natural position. It's often said the best things come in small packages, at 5 foot 6 Vurnon Anita is not the most physically imposing, but in recent weeks his presence cannot be underestimated. Anita started the defeat to Utrecht at left-back, where he's played for much of the season, due to the injuries of Nicolai Boilesen and back-up Dico Koppers.

The latter returned in the following game away to NAC Breda, Anita remained in defence, this time filling in at right-back. However, against NEC, he got his wish and returned to a defensive-midfield role with Ricardo van Rhijn slotting in at right-back. Ajax's fortunes changed and they’ve not looked back.

The 22-year-old midfielder of Antillean descent, a graduate of the Ajax academy, is adept in multiple positions. He's gradually become a fixture in the side over the last four seasons but never cementing a spot. "He's no Messi or Maradona but still a very valuable player," according to his former Oranje U17 coach Ruud Kaiser. "Left back or right back, it doesn't bother me, because I'm playing and can continue to develop," Anita added. "The coach knows that I prefer to play as a defensive midfielder, circumstances mean I have to fill in at full-back, but I will always give my best."

At the back-end of last season De Boer started him where he prefers to much acclaim. This time around he’s armed with ad***ional instructions. A settled defence has allowed Anita to thrive, often dropping between Toby Alderweireld and Jan Vertonghen, effectively becoming a third centre-back, or as Henk Spaan writes "point guard."

As a result Ajax with the ball takes up a 2-3-2-3, stretching play. When out of possession adopting a 3-3-1-3 or sticking to their orthodox 4-3-3 shape, making the pitch as small as possible, pressing and closing down space. Ball retention is also a defensive weapon, as the old adage goes if the opposition don't have it, they can't hurt you, the result a significant improvement, keeping four straight clean sheets, before they only managed five in their previous 24 league games.

The keystone is Anita. "Nice statistics," grinning after being told Ajax have never dropped any points whenever he's played in midfield. "But we do it together, the team is now more balanced, we still miss some players but their replacements have done a good job." His movement like a conductor prompts the rotation of systems. When dropping to become a third-centre back, slightly in front of Alderweireld and Vertonghen, it's a cue for the full-backs – in recent weeks Van Rhijn and Koppers or Daley Blind – to push forward, either side of him, turning into auxiliary wingers. If they move further ahead, sandwiching the two other midfielders, the shape morphs into a 2-1-4-3.

A playing style similar to Clarence Seedorf, Anita shuttles across the pitch following the ball, once in possession his impeccable metronomic passing coupled with grandiose football intelligence makes him perfect for the role, the 'number six' or controlling playmaker, according to De Boer. He can dictate the tempo: whether Ajax needs to slow things down or raise it. This also depends how high up the pitch they are. More than anything the entire midfield, which was disjointed at the start of the season, is more balanced, proactive and fluid.

His goal against Heracles, another domineering display by Ajax winning 6-0 – goals from six different players – typified a newfound confidence: first exchanging passes with Eriksen then a one-two with Siem de Jong before coolly lifting the ball over the oncoming goalkeeper. The returning Kolbeinn Sigþórsson also got on the score sheet. "This is the Ajax I want to see," De Boer purred.



Often going unnoticed, a sign of a good job, Anita is now in the nation's conscious – teammate Eriksen believes he's good enough for a place in Oranje. Anita, recognising the completion he faces, is not undaunted "I'm now in the spotlight, playing in different role than at the start of the season, if I work hard maybe in the future. I'm still young."

Whether this new approach is the culmination of months planning, De Boer has reinvented Ajax, like Johan Cruyff in 1986, bringing their football up to date. Ajax can't play like they did 17 years ago, the complexion has changed, so a need to adapt but sticking to their principles some of which gradually abandoned over the last decade, until now resurrected by De Boer. The ease in which his players have started to play in his vision might be a result of the starting eleven containing between eight and ten academy graduates. His steadfastness to his ideals has won him many admirers.

Dragging Ajax to a point ahead of AZ, after Gertjan Verbeek's side held an eight point advantage, winning their last eight games scoring 27 goals and conceding just three – playing a brand of football evocative of his mentors, on top of that dealing with an injury plagued squad, has shown his man-management as well as tactical acumen in good light. The slight tactical tweaking by De Boer, instigated by his players on the pitch seamlessly, has allowed them to control games, scoring with sweeping moves, adhering to the club mantra: "Simple football is the most beautiful."

Against Den Haag for example, they attempted 909 passes, a figure grossly enhanced by the opposition going down to ten men midway through the first half. "We helped each other by making more triangles," Anita commented. The average since he moved into midfield, and the adoption of this new style, is 747 passes with 615 completed. Ball possession is 65%. Exceeding 51%, the magic number as far as Louis van Gaal was concerned.

Some might say tiki-taka, or tikkie-takkie voetbal, has arrived in Amsterdam, with slight justification, De Boer has been known to sought advice from Pep Guardiola. Analysing the training methods of Barcelona, in person as well as DVDs sent by his former teammate, to see what he can use within his own squad. It's easy to label them 'Barcelona-lite' or 'poor-mans Barça', but this isn't De Boer's aim, even if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery and a compliment of sorts, what is – returning his club to the only way of playing he knows.

What tends to be forgotten in the discourse is how both Guardiola and De Boer are only following the blueprint Cruyff mapped out in the 1990s. Barcelona is more or less a modern reference for De Boer. Much of his identity, it must be noted, been greatly shaped by Van Gaal as well as Cruyff. It then comes as no surprise many see him as a strong candidate to fill the void Guardiola will leave when he decides to step down. But, becoming the 'Sir Alex Ferguson of Ajax' is one dream. "Would I like to remain with Ajax for the next 10 years? That would be great," De Boer told Voetbal International last October. "Even if Barcelona were to approach me tomorrow, I would not go. I'm not finished here."

He doesn't have a seasoned squad at his disposal, nevertheless he's a manager in the perfect environment – a former Ajax youth team coach working with familiar faces – what he's done is further evidence, clear and concise instructions coupled with the right training – following the Michels model – attaining this level isn't beyond them. In the last month or so, his players look fitter, covering more ground, as well circulating the ball at a more rapid rate, there's a comfortable equilibrium in transition between attack and defence.

There was even a brief moment, against NEC, as De Boer's side were adjusting, the shape of the side took on (the fabled) 1-3-3-3 formation with Vertonghen (libero) and a defensive three of Van Rhijn, Alderweireld and Anita in front. An accident but this brought back nostalgic memories. "We must continue to look at ourselves. There is so much room for improvement," De Boer contemplated.

Jari Litmanen, in attendance during the NEC game, noted a "difference in quality" from the side he saw lose to Manchester United. It helped with the game being less pressurised De Boer noting "against lesser sides mistakes aren't easily punished." However he's all too aware this season there's been a few exceptions to this rule.

This new approach has allowed club captain Vertonghen to play his natrual game, building from the back; starting, continuing and on the odd occasion finishing the attack. To some Ajax's best attacker, the quintessential ball-playing centre-half, in the mould reminiscent of predecessors Velibor Vasović, Ruud Krol and Ronald Koeman. His goal against Den Haag was a perfect illustration: intercepted the ball in his own half, played a one-two with Ismaïl Aissati, before he knew it, in the opposition penalty box, dragged the ball onto his right foot and curled past the keeper. The strike took him to seven league goals, the most by an Ajax defender since Frank de Boer in 1994/95.

He's even showed the wherewithal to play as a 'number four' (deep-lying creator) against RKC Waalwijk when De Boer switched to three defenders in the second half. A role model is closer to home in the shape of his coach. "I've learned a lot from him. Analysing situations during a game and building attacks. He stands for the old Ajax style, daring football."

Christian Eriksen, for much of the season restricted, is playing with more vigour as a classical 'number eight' (incisive playmaker), playing in between the lines, occasionally supporting Siem de Jong, the false No9, as a deep-lying forward.

Against PSV, where Anita was at his irresistible best, De Boer couldn't hold back his pleasure after the 2-0 win. "For 94 minutes we had them by the throat," he enthused in his post-match interview. "Vurnon was excellent again. We know that he's at his best in midfield." Once more, the number tells a story. A few months ago De Boer was bemoaning his side lackadaisical ending to games, not being able to continue constant pressure on the opposition for the duration. He finally got his wish.

Before the PSV game he compiled and showed a motivational video featuring Michael Jordan, wild animals feasting and their title victory last season. These were examples of 'success' and it resonated into his players. "It's not something I usually do," he explained to De Telegraaf. "The only time was before the championship game with FC Twente."

"The video worked," thumbs up from Ismaïl Aissati who opened the scoring. Vertonghen added he saw the fear in the PSV player's eyes. "They were terrified," the Belgian defender began. "I found us to be very strong. The difference wasn't so much in quality but intent. We always play to our own strengths and never felt in trouble."

If they keep up this new scintillating and relentless style, with half-a-dozen games left, including trips to Heerenveen and Twente, De Boer could very well follow his managerial "role model" Van Gaal in winning back-to-back championships. A thought never envisaged when he walked into the job. Then again not many expected him to get Ajax playing like they currently are which could end up as his biggest triumph.

Double Pivot with RVP[r23)] up top!
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With less than a week until the kick-off of the next major international tournament, it is time to consider some tactical issues going into Euro 2012. And 11tegen11 is not the only one to do so. During the build-up to next week’s kick-off, for the Dutch on Saturday against Denmark, tactical issues are being discussed all around.

It is safe to say that around these major tournaments no Dutchman seems short of a powerfully formulated opinion on how the national team should play and it is striking to note how many of those take a different view compared to what the manager prefers. Thereby taking the easiest spot.
Should Holland not be crowned Champions of Europe in a few weeks time, things will be considered to have gone wrong. Fans having taken that easy spot of disagreeing with the manager will console themselves with their moral victory of having had a different view on how the team should have played and do seldomly concern themselves with the fact that the performance under their tactical preferences might have been the same, or even worse. Fitting with this excellent depiction by @Zone_14 on the Beyond the Pitch website, summarizing the Dutch football fans’ mentality as having a massive inferiority complex, wrapped in an ever great superiority complex.

That being said, this preview will now focus on the two most debated topics regarding the Dutch national team: which version of the 4-2-3-1 formation to play and which striker to use. Minor issues by now are the left wing area, where Ibrahim Afellay earned his starting spot over Dirk Kuyt, who played more matches than any other player under Van Marwijk, with a series of bright and energetic performances, showing that the Barcelona winger has returned to fitness in time, after injuring his cruciate ligaments early this season. Furthermore, the only position that has not been clearly settled yet is at left-back, where both Stijn Schaars and Jetro Willems compete for the starting spot. Young Willems barely has 1500 minutes of Eredivisie experience for PSV under his belt, but offers offensive qualities that seem more limited with Schaars playing. The Sporting Portugal player, however, offers more experience and this may give him the edge here.

The starting XI for Euro 2012
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The formation

Obviously, Holland will operate in a 4-2-3-1 formation. They’ve done so for all of the past years and to no shortage of success. As has been extensively described earlier, Van Marwijk generally uses two different variants of that formation. The first one, used against comparable or superior level opposition, fields two genuine holding midfielders and will accordingly be termed The ‘ Double Pivot’ version. This was also the preferred version throughout the nearly successful 2010 World Cup campaign.
The second variant field one holding midfield and pairs him with a deep-lying playmaker, as Van Marwijk has preferred against defensive sides of inferior quality. This version will be termed the ‘ Deep-Lying Playmaker’ version and was used for most of the Euro 2012 qualifying matches.
It is safe to say that Holland will use the Double Pivot formation during Euro 2012. However, this still remains an area where the majority of the fans disagree with Van Marwijk. There is a loud voice demanding the creativity of Van der Vaart to be installed, rather than the defensive soli***y of Nigel de Jong. A frequently heard phrase which is used here is that this “ brings more football to the team”, as if defending is not part of playing football…

Comparing the Double Pivot and the Deep-Lying Playmaker

When we arbitrarily consider all matches that Holland has played since the start of the 2010 World Cup, we find 29 matches, of which two can be excluded from further analysis. Against Ukraine they fielded a B-side in what most resembled a 4-3-3 formation, against Bayern Munich they did not play another country. Of the World Cup final we will consider the result after 90 minutes.
The Double Pivot was used in 20 matches and produced 2.39 points per game, while the Deep-Lying Playmaker was used in the remaining 7 matches to produce a magnificent 2.71 points per game.
However, this analysis would not be complete without considering the fact that the DP was used against significantly higher rated opponents compared to the DLP. The average FIFA ranking of the DP opponents is around the level of the Czech Republic, while the average DLP opponents ranked around the level of Hungary.

The striker

This is another example of the manager’s favorite versus the fans’ favorite. With the top scorers of both the English Premier League and the Bundesliga to choose from, some have termed this a luxury problem. Klaas-Jan Huntelaar has won over lots of support among the fans with his magnificent goal scoring record in the Euro 2012 qualifying campaign, while Robin van Persie’s goal draught at the World Cup helped Huntelaar’s case further.
Before we’ll go into the numbers here, considers the following. Would you prefer Holland to win the tournament, or the striker to score goals? Right, and that is exactly what is wrong with looking at the outcome side of things (goals, assists) on an individual basis in a team sport. There seems to be growing trend among comparable sports, like basketball and ice hockey, to look a team outcomes with particular individual players playing. For a number of reason, however, this methodology is difficult to translate directly to football.

The same set of matches that we used above shows us that KJH scored 14 goals in the 13 matches that he started as a striker, while RVP scored only 5 in 14 games starting as a striker. Ironically, RVP also scored five goals playing as a left winger while KJH started up top. Again, KJH played inferior opposition with the average FIFA ranking corresponding with , while RVP’s opponents averaged the strength of Switzerland or Ireland.
Things are more relevant at team level, however, and with 2.57 points per game with RVP starting as a striker he certainly has the edge over KJH’s 2.15 points per game.

Thêm một bài nữa ....tưởng chừng hi vọng haha

Revitalised Oranje, renewed hope.
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The Netherlands nearly ended their twelfth European Championship qualification campaign with a perfect 100% record. With Euro 2012 next on the agenda a revitalised L'Oranje side go into the tournament with confidence. A group of players, mainstay of the squad for nearly a decade, will attempt to end a 24-year wait for silverware. However straight straight off the bat they will be tested as they've been drawn in the so called 'group of death' against historical rivals Germany, Portugal and Denmark.

The draw

"It's the toughest group, everyone agrees on that. I have met all the coaches and none of them looked happy," was the immediate reaction of Coach Bert van Marwijk. "It's a huge challenge, this group. We just have to win it; I mean if you want to play a role of importance, you need to win the first match. Everything should be focused on that from now on."

All three teams are no strangers to meeting L’Oranje none more so than Germany, whose recent friendly win, 3-0 in Hamburg, being their biggest over the Dutch in more than 50 years gives them a sort of psychological edge. However the result in part is misleading due to the absence of key Dutch players which manager Joachim Löw stressed. It will be the 39th meeting of the two rivals, and the fifth at the European Championships, so far 2-1 in Oranje's favour.

As for Portugal it will be the 11th encounter, with Oranje sole victory against the Iberian side coming in the second ever contest back in 1991. And in the year of the 100th anniversary of Denmark’s first game against the Dutch, the sides can look forward to the 31st duel. Despite the predicament a confident Van Marwijk remains bullish and the year they have had every reason to be.

What a difference a year makes

"The best team in world football," Gavril Balint, coach of Moldova, enthusiastically described the team he was about to lock horns with. A contrast to last August, when Bert van Marwijk’s side engulfed in a solemn atmosphere, travelled to Donetsk. It was their first game since losing in the World Cup final a month prior and the heartbreak was still fresh. A year on, things couldn't be more different.

"I didn’t want to play the game, and we asked the Ukrainian FA to postpone it, but they weren’t willing to do that," Van Marwijk recalled. "My own motivation was lacking, and I didn’t hide that fact. I think you should always be honest with your players, rather than pretending or disguising your feelings." Instead of staying in the doldrums, the easy way out, Van Marwijk noted for his man-management set about removing any remnants of self-pity: "I told them the same thing again and again during the World Cup: we have a mission."

In truth the journey to Poland and Ukraine has been straightforward, the hard-fought 2-1 victory at home against Finland early on being the exception. The defeat to Sweden away, on the final matchday where not much was riding on it aside from the unbeaten record, was Van Marwijk's first competitive loss inside ninety minutes. His record now stands as: 25 matches played, 23 wins, one draw and the solitary defeat. His overall record still reads well. The game against Sweden in Solna was his 43rd (32 wins, 11 draws and 2 defeats in 90 minutes) in charge the goal return is 97 with just 30 conceded.

His win total of 32 is only four behind Bob Glendenning's all-time record by a Dutch national team manager. Victory in Rotterdam against Moldova was the tenth consecutive victory on home soil equalling the previous record set between 1970 and 1973. And who can forget the 11-0 rout of San Marino, the biggest ever win in Oranje's 106 year history.

There's a common cliché in football (and all sports) that goes you're 'only as good as your last game'. If your significance and self-worth are determined by your last performance on the pitch, then you have a problem. Even the greatest of sports teams – and individuals – cannot achieve to the same standard all the time. The defeat to Sweden will be treated as a bad day in the office, though it's still a defeat and lessons will be drawn from it as well as being used as a wakeup call, putting things into perspective it shouldn’t overshadow the last twelve months of progression.

A change of system

One of the subplot's of the campaign has been the alteration of his system. In the months after last summer's World Cup, borne out of necessity rather than design, he slowly distanced himself from the reactive model that served him well in the first two years of his tenure. Instead he's allowed a more fluid proactive style, short-distance precession passing, to take shape.

Not only has the football improved, from an aesthetic point of view, but as a by-product they've tightly controlled games as possession and pressing becomes paramount. Against Balint's side for example they had 80% of it in the first half. This is not to say Holland haven't been an attack-minded outfit in his first two years, they have, the major difference being the choice of build-up style. The current is more closely related with circulation football a method engrained in Dutch DNA.

The crazy 5-3 win over Hungary – as well as shipping in three against Sweden – in which lackadaisical defending threatened to undermine the new approach, only reinforced Van Marwijk's belief concentration not talent will be the difference between the Dutch triumphing and failing. Before the extraordinary collapse against Sweden, conceding two in as many minutes after leading 2-1, the Dutch had a pretty solid defensive record in the group, only conceding five in total. The total ended with eight Maarten Stekelenburg only letting in just the two.

Since his appointment in August 2008 Van Marwijk has been his own man, refusing to listen to discerning voices, not wavering from the task at hand. He's taken L'Oranje from also-rans into realistic challengers one that has earned respect from their peers. Including Germany boss Joachim Löw who was quick to point out the threat of a new look Dutch side next summer.

Reflection, renewal and the Barça effect

The lost final in Johannesburg still preys on his mind. When Ruud Krol proclaimed Spain to be the metaphorical heirs of 'total football' and Johan Cruijff not hiding his displeasure of the Dutch losing their identity. It hurt, however this allowed a moment of reflection, firstly to seek solace in the achievements that got them to the final – one let's not forget they could have won – and most importantly learning from the defeat. Van Marwijk: "What's motivating us now is a desire to draw lessons from the final that we lost, and to make the most of that experience."

From disappointment to renewal, the shackles – pragmatism – removed allowing his players greater freedom to express themselves. The joie de vivre that encapsulated their predecessors returned. It might come across as outlandish in saying L’Oranje are a completely different beast from the side that came close to glory in South Africa but the undeniable truth is they are. An inspiration came in the shape of FC Barcelona. One of the positives of their rise over the last three years is how much their brand of football is owed to the Dutch school. Xavi Hernández: "Our model was imposed by [Johan] Cruijff; it's an Ajax model." This has evidently tapped into the psyche.

At club level Frank de Boer is reinventing his Ajax side by instilling the lost philosophy of mentors Louis van Gaal and Johan Cruijff, both especially the former impacting greatly on the modern Barcelona. Whilst Co Adriaanse, already a disciple of the attacking game, on arrival at FC Twente declared: "The ideal situation for me is to create a team that approaches the way Barcelona plays and the squad I found in Enschede is perfect to chase my goals."

In a recent interview Frank de Boer, when asked if there's any Dutch influence in Pep Guardiola's Barça, he spoke about their 'pressure play', how greatly he's impressed by it – with their turnaround: from losing possession to retaining it in mere seconds – and commented the likelihood his former teammate drew inspiration (and greatly enhanced it) from former manager Louis van Gaal, who was also noted to use the method. It comes as no surprise, when Ronald de Boer then revealed, Guardiola is a self-confessed lover of Dutch football. "He always talked about total football, forward pressing, about what Johan [Cruijff] taught him and about Dutch players. Pep has that urge to attack and to dominate, a bit like the Dutch play."

The change of system and approach resulted in the much lauded 4-0 win over Hungary in Budapest. On the pitch the rejuvenated style was plain for all to see. The Dutch defence, midfield and attacking lines played much closer to each other, increased mobility, flui***y and synergy in midfield allowed their passing game to flourish. Rafael van der Vaart – the man of the match – commented how akin the football was to Barça's. A thought echoed by teammate Ibrahim Afellay, currently playing with the Catalan giants. Most commentators agreed, as well as being careful not to get carried away, labelling some of the play worthy of 'tiki-taka'.

Strength in numbers

It's even more remarkable, in the ten qualifiers played, there's been five different midfield combinations deployed in part due to injuries throughout the campaign (in brackets for and against): Van Bommel, Nigel de Jong, Sneijder (7-1); Van Bommel, Van der Vaart, Sneijder (5-1); Nigel de Jong, Van der Vaart, Sneijder (9-3); Van Bommel, Strootman, Sneijder (13-0) and Van Bommel, Strootman, Van der Vaart (3-3). The penultimate trio helped in part by the 11-0 demolition of San Marino. The one prior, consisting of ex-Ajax teammates, combined for the team goal of the campaign in Budapest.

The first triumvirate which used throughout the World Cup and in the first two qualifiers (San Marino, away and Finland, home), basic shape: two defensive midfielders and a number 10, has since been been dropped in favour of a deep-lying creator alongside a defensive midfielder with a trequartista in front. This has brought great verve, creativity and control to a Dutch midfield that has shaped into formidable unit with the tools to best if not equal the finest in Europe.

Last summer the front three were: Dirk Kuyt, Robin van Persie and Arjen Robben. Due to the persistent injury of the Bayern Munich winger, Van Marwijk like he has done with the midfield has had to adjust, with five different combinations played. And like in the centre of the pitch with minimal disruption. The different attacks (in brackets for and against): Kuyt, Huntelaar, Elia (5-0); Van der Vaart, Huntelaar, Afellay (2-1); Kuyt, Huntelaar, Afellay (4-1); Kuyt, Van Persie, Afellay (9-3); Kuyt, Huntelaar, Van Persie (16-3). The latter being utilised the most in four games.

Holland ended the qualification phase with 37 goals Klaas-Jan Huntelaar responsible for twelve. The former Ajax man is riding a crest of wave with the national team, often not guaranteed a starting role, no one can deny when the opportunity has presented itself he's taken it with both hands. 14 goals in his last 12 internationals since the World Cup has earned him the right to wear the number '9' shirt. He's also 11 goals away from breaking the national record, currently owned by Patrick Kluivert (40 goals in 79 games), Huntelaar has 30 from 48 appearances.

The formation of choice is 4-2-3-1, a number nine supported by two inverted wingers and a trequartista, an interesting feature is the playmaking capacity of the wide men: both often drifting in when doing so their position taken up by the full-backs. The consistent high level performance despite an ever changing midfield and attack has – to an extent – shows strength in depth. In the words of Van Marwijk a "luxury problem" to have once everyone is fit and available for selection.

A generation looking for fulfillment

Wesley Sneijder, another standout performer in Budapest, afterwards was put in the same esteem company as Xavi and Andrés Iniesta by former manager Marco van Basten. The Internazionale playmaker has created 28 goalscoring opportunities for his teammates during the campaign and has been a player reborn.

Playing with freedom as a trequartista he's often dropped deep to dictate the play – with his short and long passing – rotating with the regista. This was notable against Hungary as his and Van der Vaart’s constant switching and movement (on and off the ball) hurt the opposition just as well as their rapid circulation of the ball.

Age hasn’t been a talking point, though it's the elephant in the room, Sneijder will be 27 when Euro 2012 kicks-off. It will be his fifth international tournament with L'Oranje. Three more than Johan Cruyff and two more than Marco van Basten. In the last two years he’s turned touted early promise into reality. The fulcrum of the side, one of the premier players in world football, much will rest on him but the burden lessens with the calibre of players around him, much of the squad is roughly the same age with equal wealth of experience.

Arjen Robben will be 28; Robin van Persie and Klaas-Jan Huntelaar the same age; Rafael van der Vaart, approaching 100 caps, 29 the same as Maarten Stekelenburg. Mark van Bommel the captain 35, Joris Mathijsen 32, Dirk Kuyt 31. Nigel de Jong and Johnny Heitinga 27 whereas Ibrahim Afellay, if he recovers in time, 26.

Every one of the names – with more than 700 caps combined – has featured prominently under Van Marwijk, it would be foolish *****ggest it will be their last tournament, but it's realistic to assume a high percentage will not be at the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, meaning next summer could be the last of this generation as a collective. Van Marwijk, who is expected to sign an extension to his contract taking him to at least 2014, knows and in the last 18 months made sure the future’s safeguarded.

Already 23 players have won their first cap under him including: Michel Vorm, Tim Krul, Gregory van der Wiel, Jeffrey Bruma, Erik Pieters, Kevin Strootman, Georginio Wijnaldum, Eljero Elia, Jeremain Lens and Luuk de Jong all under-25 (bar Vorm) and featured in the last squad. Van der Wiel and Pieters are the first choice full-back whereas Strootman, who has greatly impressed in his short time with the set-up, will compete with Van der Vaart and Nigel de Jong in playing alongside Van Bommel. Luuk de Jong rise and eye-catching performances at FC Twente has made him the third choice striker.

Lessons from history

Since triumphing in 1988 the fortunes of L'Oranje can be best described as mixed. A disappointing 1990 World Cup, where an alleged mutiny took place, was followed by reaching the semi-finals of Euro 1992 crashing out on penalties. A better performance in USA 94 saw them dumped out by eventual winners Brazil in the quarter-finals the same exit in Euro 96.

The last great generation reached the semi-finals in 1998 but again fell to penalties two years later in Rotterdam it was Groundhog Day. Under Louis van Gaal they failed to reach the 2002 World Cup, first missed tournament since 1986, Dick Advocaat returned for Euro 2004 and again the Dutch made the semis but couldn't progress any further.

Marco van Basten brought an air of freshness but his insistence his squad was not ready to win the 2006 World Cup proved correct as Portugal who eliminated them in 2004 were the victors in the Battle of Nuremberg. In fairness things got a little better in 2008 as a new swagger had many take notice but Guus Hiddink’s equally exciting Russia put pay to the Van Basten revolution.

Greater challenges await this current crop, in the eyes of Rafael van der Vaart the best since France 1998, once the festivities begin. Not many expected the Dutch to go far last summer and the same it seems next year but one thing's for certain a renewed approach coupled with players at the peak of their powers gives L'Oranje every chance of equalling the feat of Rinus Michels class of 1988.

One could argue lady luck hasn't always worn orange. The same was true against Spain last July, who could meet Van Marwijk’s men in the final in Kiev – if they get there. After a freak set out circumstances saw them on top of the world, albeit for a month, Van Marwijk has thrown down the gauntlet to his players and the nation as a whole, to make the next four years a golden period in Dutch football history.

Denmark 1-0 Holland: Krohn-Dehli goal provides the first surprise of the tournament
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June 9, 2012

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The starting line-ups​

Holland had the majority of possession and chances, but Denmark snatched the three points.
Morten Olsen chose the XI that was widely expected to start the game, in a rough 4-2-3-1 formation.
Bert van Marwijk’s starting selection was also as predicted, with Ron Vlaar in the side to replace the injured Joris Mathijsen. Jetro Willems became the youngest player in European Championship history at left-back.
This wasn’t quite the usual “park the bus and counter-attack” you expect from an underdog winning 1-0 – Denmark were simply outplayed for long periods in the first half, rode their luck, but then defended excellently in the final 20 minutes.

Midfield
The most interesting part of this game was the way Denmark played in midfield. While most 4-2-3-1 sides would shift to a 4-4-1-1 in the defensive phase of play, Olsen was much more open and didn’t tell his wide players to get back quickly into a second bank of four. This is a side that essentially defends with a back four and two holding players, with Christian Eriksen told to pick up a holder, and the wide players tracking the opposition full-backs. This meant Holland had a lot of space either side of the two Danish holders.
Niki Zimling and William Kvist work as a duo, but had very separate roles. Kvist sat deep in front of the defence (and actually dropped into the back a few times) and occupied the zone Wesley Sneijder naturally plays in, but Zimling became something of a free player, and with no-one to track in his zone, pushed higher up the pitch and pressurised Mark van Bommel and Nigel de Jong on the ball. This made Denmark extremely open, basically with only a back four and a holder ahead, rather than two solid banks of four.

Sneijder
Sneijder’s movement was fascinating, and while he’s endured a difficult season at club level, this was a superb performance. His appreciation of space and the way Denmark were trying to shut him out of the game was fantastic – naturally he positioned himself between the lines, but when Kvist dropped deep and goalside of him, he motored forward and became a second striker, out of Kvist’s reach. He also made runs past the defence – most notably when he pushed past Simon Kjaer on the defender’s blind side, but couldn’t get enough power on a header after a long cross from deep.
Other times, Sneijder took advantage of the fact Dennis Rommedahl stayed high up the pitch, and moved over to the left to pick up short passes from the defence or midfield, and then played a couple of superb through-balls – one in particular for substitute Jan-Klass Huntelaar with the outside of his foot was sublime, and should have been rewarded with a better finish.

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However, Robin van Persie had a terrible game in front of goal. His first touch deserted him, and he also had problems keeping his footing. His best work came when he moved over to the right of the pitch and combined with Arjen Robben; the Bayern winger was extremely predictable with his movement on the ball when van Persie remained in central positions, but when the striker moved over and played one-twos, Robben could sprint into the space created by van Persie drawing Vlaar up the pitch.

Denmark play out and push full-backs up
A notable feature of Denmark’s game was their insistence on playing out from the back, with Stephan Andersen always playing short sideways balls to Kjaer and Daniel Agger, with Kvist becoming the third centre-back, the full-backs moving higher up the pitch, and Denmark becoming something like a 3-3-1-3 at goal kicks. This often worked well, and drew Holland up the pitch to press, leaving space in behind – but Andersen looked a little nervous with the ball at his feet, and played a terrible pass straight to Robben that resulted in Holland hitting the post.
If this sounds like Holland were dominating, they were. This wasn’t a disciplined, organised, solid defensive display from Denmark in the first half. Nor was it a particularly counter-attacking performance – they were clearly trying to play passing football, they were just inferior to Holland and fortunate that the Dutch squandered some extremely presentable chances.
What Denmark did well, however, was to push the full-backs on, particularly Simon Poulsen down the left. He’d actually been the best player on the pitch when these sides met two years ago at the World Cup (until he was involved in a comical own goal) and his brave positioning helped push Robben back. Pressure down that side resulted in the first goal, scored by Krohn-Dehli.
Krohn-Dehli also did well without the ball. Whereas Rommedahl stayed high up the pitch and did little defensive work, Krohn-Dehli increasingly got back when needed and helped Poulsen double up against Robben.

Second half
After half-time, Denmark became more reserved. They played deeper, the full-backs became more defensive-minded, and the passing was about cooling the tempo of the game rather than looking to penetrate/
But Sneijder was still the game’s star man and recorded some amazing statistics – most passes (62, next highest 55), most passes played in the final third (37, next highest 21) and most tellingly, most chances created (10, next highest 5). Denmark defended well in the penalty box, but simply couldn’t shut him down. The top two pass combinations in the game were Ibrahim Afellay to Sneijder, and Sneijder to Afellay – showing how much Sneijder was playing towards the left flank.

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Subs
Van Marwijk waited a long time to make changes. On 71 minutes came his double change. Rafael van der Vaart was on for De Jong to give more attacking thrust to the midfield. Klaas-Jan Huntelaar replaced the quiet Ibrahim Afellay, so Sneijder went leftish and van Persie dropped deeper.
This was the natural change – and had Huntelaar remained on the bench, we would have been questioning van Marwijk’s sanity – but it made Holland much less potent going forward. The combinations that had previously worked well (albeit without the reward of a goal) were no longer evident, and now individuals started trying to do everything on their own. Robben kept running down blind alleys, van der Vaart had a hopeful shot from a crazy position, and van Persie vanished from the game. The only bright moment after the Dutch substitutions came from that brilliant Sneijder pass through to Huntelaar.

Denmark kill the game
However, it was in the final 15-20 minutes that Denmark were at their most impressive defensively. Having seen van der Vaart introduced to become a creative midfielder moving forward from deep, Olsen responded immediately by withdrawing Eriksen and bringing on Lasse Schone, more comfortable at tracking van der Vaart towards his own goal. Denmark started to defend with eight players, with Krohn-Dehli protecting Poulsen on the left. The exceptions were Nicklas Bendtner, who remained upfront, and Rommedahl who didn’t track back well – so the energetic Tobias Mikkelsen came on to do that job, much to Rommedahl’s disgust.
When Denmark got the ball they slowed the tempo very nicely, and despite van Marwijk shouting at his side to move higher up the pitch, Holland aren’t accustomed to pressing and were very passive without the ball. Bendtner did some good work, dropping deep and holding up the ball.
Denmark were relatively comfortable in the final ten minutes, and the aerial domination of Agger and Kjaer was impressive, but it wasn’t like that for the whole game – Denmark adjusted well and protected what they had. They didn’t park the bus from the start.

Conclusion
Denmark didn’t play superbly, and Holland didn’t play badly. This result came down to finishing – Holland created some excellent opportunities, mainly through Sneijder, which were wasted. Denmark’s defence kept a clean sheet, but had van Persie brought his Arsenal form to this match, the Danes would have been criticised for being extremely open without the ball.
That said, Denmark adjusted well to the situation. They cooled the tempo, held onto the ball, defended in greater numbers and frustrated Holland. The group of death now looks even deadlier

Holland 1 -2 Germany: The broken team…
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A match that Holland needed to win in order to keep chances of qualifying to the knock-out stages of Euro 2012 in their own hands, ended in a bitter defeat. Germany had the better of the game, except maybe in the closing stages when Van Marwijk made some changes and Holland bravely, but desperately, chased an equalizer. In the end, Germany thoroughly deserved the victory, based on their tactical superiority and several key German players outperforming their Dutch counterparts.

The starting line-ups

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A lot of speculation went on in the build-up to this game and most of it concerned whether Klaas-Jan Huntelaar should start ahead of Robin van Persie and whether Van der Vaart should be accommodated as deep-lying playmaker in favour of either Van Bommel or De Jong.

However, Van Marwijk opted for the same starting eleven that played against Denmark, with the exception of Joris Mathijsen who returned from injury at centre-back, at the expense of Ron Vlaar.

Germany manager Joachim Löw fielded the expected starting eleven.

The first half

The game started out at a slow pace with both teams happy to take some time to settle in. In most matches, either one or both of the teams look to take advantage of open play turnovers to launch quick breaks, but this match was different early on. Both teams set out rather patiently, mainly aiming not to lose possession in dangerous areas, and knowing that not conceding might be the main objective early on.
But after this quiet opening phase, some interesting aspects could be seen. Holland had created a few chances when Van Persie used his excellent of the ball skills to get in behind the German defensive line, but he failed to convert his early opportunities. Germany soon adapted by dropping their defensive line a bit deeper, thereby opening up more space in midfield, which soon worked to their advantage.

Özil’s movement

Germany smartly used Mesut Özil’s lateral movement to unsettle the Dutch defense and take advantage of the large spaces in midfield with both teams’ defensive lines wary of conceding too much space in behind them.
As can be seen from the diagram below, Özil received passes both at the right and left offensive midfield area, indicating his smart lateral movement. Particularly on their right wing, Germany created numerous offensive moves, with Thomas Müller clearly dominating the struggling left-back Jetro Willems.
With Özil moving laterally, a choice had to be made in the Dutch defensive midfield zone. Nigel de Jong mostly covered Özil in his lateral runs, but this left Van Bommel on his own to cover the ground in front of the Dutch defense, where he was overloaded by Khedira and Schweinsteiger.

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Broken team

The same diagram shows that Wesley Sneijder operated in his beloved left wing area, but his activity in this match was concentrated here even more than it was before. This is not to state Sneijder had a weak game, not at all, but the defensive part of his job as a central offensive midfielder was an area that Germany smartly exploited.
With Sneijder mainly staying high up the pitch and the Dutch defensive line wary of not conceding space in behind them, the ‘broken team’ problem appeared. The distances between the offensive four and the defensive six were way too large for Van Bommel to be covered, even more so with De Jong being dragged aside by Özil.

Broken wings

An area where Holland normally dominates their opponents are the wings. And both of them failed to perform here. Ibrahim Afellay had an anonymous game and failed to contribute. On the other wing, much of the cre*** should go to Philipp Lahm, who defended very well against his team mate Arjen Robben. Lahm, a right-footed defender who fills in at left-back for his country had the advantage of protecting against Robben’s inside runs with his stronger foot and prevented Robben from making his usual threatening runs. Germany’s excellent defensive performance also stood clear from the tackling chart (below), and from the fact that the Germans won 65% of the duels, a record high rate at European Championships since 1980.
Another reason for the disappointing wing performance was the complete lack of offensive contribution of the full-backs. Jetro Willems had his hands more than full defending Thomas Müller and Gregory van der Wiel failed to overlap and lend support to Robben.

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Schweinsteiger

The main man for Germany was Bastian Schweinsteiger. The Bayern München midfielder smartly advanced in central midfield and teaming up with Sami Khedira, he overloaded Van Bommel on occasions that Özil had already dislodged De Jong sideways. This 3v2 battle in midfield proved crucial to created the two goal scoring chances that striker Gomez showed his clinical finishing skills on.

The second half

The second half started with Klaas-Jan Huntelaar up front, Robin van Persie in behind him, coming mainly from a left wing role with the invisible Afellay removed, and with Rafael van der Vaart introduced for Mark van Bommel. The Dutch captain was the scapegoat for the disastrous first half, both in terms of tactical developments and in terms of players underperforming. After an initial ten minutes where Germanycould and perhaps should have taken advantage of a few good opportunities, Hollandslowly fought their way back into the match.


Around the hour mark, Van Marwijk opted to switch Van Persie and Sneijder, much like he did in the closing stages of the Denmark game. For Sneijder, who already operated in that zone, not all too much changed, but Van Persie seemed liberated in his role as a second striker, sometimes joining up high with Huntelaar, sometimes dropping deeper to escape the attention of the German centre-backs. Another notable advantage of this change was that without a nominal wide left winger, it was easier to pose threats to the German defense. Before, the German defense was sure to outnumber the Dutch centrally, with Sneijder and Afellay by and large working in the same part of the pitch. But Van Persie’s vertical movement from a deeper lying striker position posed more problems for the German defense and more options for Sneijder’s passing from a static lateral position.

The improvement brought about by this chances was evident in the Dutch goal, where an Van Persie once again showed his excellent skills in creating, and this time also finishing, his own goal scoring chance.
Overall it didn’t prove enough for the win and in fact the best chances in the second half fell to the Germans with goal keeper Stekelenburg proving his worth on attempts by Özil and Badstuber.

In the end

In a match where both the tactical performance and the individual player performances were below-par, Holland didn’t deserve anything more than this defeat. Germany smartly exploited the distance between the Dutch front four and the defensive unit and two well-timed runs from deep by Schweinsteiger were enough for the win.

Let’s not forget that Holland are not eliminated yet, a two goal win over Portugal might still do the trick if Germany beats Denmark in their final game.