Những câu chuyện về Stalin

Nanemo không nên cứng nhắc như vậy, chúng ta cần nhiều ý kiến khác nhau để tranh luận. Nếu cứ tự khen nhau thì khác chi monkey bắt chí cho nhau. Tôi luôn ủng hộ ý kiến đa chiều.
 Trung đoàn tăng thiết giáp 202

Hey, này bác tổ lái, tôi đâu có cứng nhắc, cũng chỉ là đang tranh luận để đảm bảo thông tin nhiều chiều đó thôi. Tự khen nhau thì không hay, nhưng điều đó không có nghĩa là không được phép chê, nhỉ

Stalin có tài nhưng đó là tài về chính trị, diệt các đối thủ cạnh tranh để vươn lên cầm quyền. Nếu đọc các cuốn sách về lịch sử chiến tranh thế giới thứ Hai thì sẽ rất khó tìm thấy những ví dụ chứng tỏ tài năng của Stalin và ngược lại, lại rất dễ thấy những sai lầm của ông ta. Các bạn chứng minh tài năng của Stalin thì tốt nhất là đưa ra dẫn chứng về tài năng quân sự của ông ta thể hiện như thế nào chứ không phải là việc nhân vật này, nhân vật kia đánh giá thế nào về ông ta, đặc biệt là những người cùng thời lại có nhiều dính dáng với ông ta về quền lợi, trách nhiệm....Các ý kiến đánh giá của những người khác chỉ nên mang tính tham khảo thôi, không phải ông này đáng tin, thông minh, tài giỏi, trung thực... thì nhận xét của ông ấy là chính xác. Có lẽ căn cứ vào sự kiện (fact) thì khách quan hơn là vào quan điểm (opinion).

Bạn bảo phải đưa dẫn chứng về tài năng quân sự của Stalin, nhưng những người viết về nó thì bạn lại chỉ cho là tham khảo và chưa chắc đã chính xác, nếu vậy thì theo bạn như nào mới chính xác?. Còn căn cứ vào sự kiện thì cũng phải có người viết về nó (tiếc là bạn lại không tin tưởng vào những người viết về các sự kiện ), nếu sự kiện bằng hình ảnh thì chả ai có thời gian mà 24/24 quay phim về Stalin suốt trong thời gian chiến tranh được.

Xin lỗi ! Thế bạn đọc sách gì vậy mà chỉ toàn thấy sai lầm thế.

Stalin có rất nhiều kẻ thù vì vậy không ngạc nhiên nếu nhiều sách chê bai ông! Về tài quân sự, thật ra cũng chẳng có gì là xuất sắc lắm nhưng cũng chẳng phải là kẻ ngu dốt phá hoại (chuyện thanh trừng sĩ quan là chuyện khác ngoài lĩnh vực quân sự). Stalin từng trực tiếp cầm quân từ thời nội chiến và như đã nói một trong những trận quan trọng mà ông đánh thắng quân Bạch vệ là ở thành phố sau này là Stalingrad. Khác với các nhà lãnh đạo Anh Mỹ, ông tham gia khá sâu vào việc chỉ huy các hoạt động quân sự, trong đó dẫn đến các chiến thắng Stalingrad 1942 và Cuôcxcơ 1943 và toàn bộ cuộc chiến tranh Vệ quốc vĩ đại. Về mặt quân sự, có lẽ ông cũng có những sai lầm đâu đó, giống như những vị tướng Nga khác thôi.

Giai đoạn thâu tóm quyền lực của Stalin :
Stalin-The Rise of Terror
A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.?-Joseph Stalin

It is hard to believe that one man was able to shape the world in such a way as Joseph Stalin. This Georgian born man, named Joseph Vissarionovich Djugashvili would go from an anti-Tsarist rebel to the most powerful man on earth. This man shaped the world stage for over 40 years, and shaped the modern world in a way that no one else ever has. But all of his power comes from one time. January 1924, Lenin, the founder of the revolution, was dead. The second deity of Communism had fallen. One question arose, who was to replace him.

While some say Stalin?Ts rise was inevitable, it was not simple. Stalin?Ts rise to power relied most directly on his rise in the party. Only if Stalin could eliminate opposition inside the Communist party, only then, could he control Russia. The elimination of political opponents came in three steps. 1st, Stalin had to remove the most direct heir to the throne of Lenin, Leon Trotsky. Next, Stalin had to remove the conservative forces inside the party, and finally Stalin would remove the right, under Bukharin. Each step Stalin took would reflect his ingenious understanding of Soviet politics in the 1920?Ts, and his ability to play his opponents against one and other.

Enemy #1-Trotsky

Commissar of War, hero of the revolution, victor of the Civil War. Trotsky had quite a reputation. He was a hero to the people, but had angered many inside the party[ii]. He had, during the period of the New Economic Policy, and during Soviet isolation, actively protested the Central Committee?Ts[iii]. This man, who promised a World Wide Revolution, one which he had failed to bring in the earlier invasion of Poland, would not be an easy opponent for Stalin. Trotsky was a brilliant speaker, and had the ability to gain people?Ts support. However, Stalin had two tools which would destroy Trotsky.

The first was nationalism. Trotsky was a die-hard Communist[iv]; he believed that for Communism *****cceed, it must spread. Stalin found it more political to think otherwise. ?oSocialism in One Country?[v], as Stalin put it, was another name for nationalism. One of the most influential causes for the Great War would also be the great tool in Stalin?Ts rise to power. ?oSocialism in One Country? was the opposite of Trotsky?Ts world wide revolution. Stalin stated that if Russia was unable to create itself as a strong Socialist state then the ?oCapitalist encirclement? would ?ocrush us.? By creating the fear of this capitalist encirclement and of a strong Russia, Stalin gained public support. Although the remnants of the Russian Empire did contain many nationalities[vi], the Russians still dominated both the elected branch (A rubber stamp government) and the party (the true power). So, while Stalin proposed a strong Russia for Russians, Trotsky proposed that efforts be made to look outside of Russia, because Russia could do nothing on its own.

So, Stalin had the people behind him, but more importantly, he had the support of two men. Kamenev and Zinoviev, two conservative, pro-NEP (New Economic Policy) politicians had been battling Trotsky in the CC for many years. Now, with Stalin, they were determined to keep Trotsky from power. The three men, Stalin, holder of many upper positions in Russia including a seat in all three upper branches of the party[vii]; Kamenev, head of the Communist International, and Zinoviev, famous for the Zinoviev letter[viii] to England, allied in the Troika to rid themselves of Trotsky?Ts power. When Lenin?Ts letter condemning Stalin[ix] was read aloud to the CC, Zinoviev and Kamenev were able to reduce its significance and save Stalin?Ts career. As Lenin, in 1922 wrote,

?oComrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has concentrated unlimited power in his hands, and I am not sure he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution. Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the CC? has already proven, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present CC, but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive pre-occupation with the purely administrative side of the work?
?I shall just recall that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev, was of course, no accident?

? (speaking of Bukharin) his theoretical views can be classified as fully Marxist only with great reserve.?-

no one was sacred. Stalib would later reward them by expelling them from the party. These three men, with their political power combined were able to discre*** and destroy Trotsky?Ts political position. Stalin had, with help from Zinoviev and Kamenev, defeated the most powerful of his enemies easily.

Now, he had to strike at the Troika before it struck at him.

Original Sin- betrayals

With the fall of Trotsky, Stalin had divided the Party into four camps. The first was his own. He occupied a precarious position. Neither Zinoviev nor Kamenev would agree to his dominance, and he held differing political views from Bukharin. The second camp was that of Bukharin, the Communist right. The remaining groups followed Zinoviev and Kamenev, or were the moderate party members who?Ts support was being fought for. The division between Kamenev?Ts and Zinviev?Ts leftist views, and Bukharin?Ts rightist views would be the key to Stalin?Ts victory. The Troika collapsed after the common enemy was deamed defeated. Zinoviev weakened his position by turning it into a more Trotsky-esque position [x] by combating the NEP and socialism in one country. Thus he became an enemy to both Bukharin (an NEP supporter) and Stalin, founder of socialism in one country. The same force that drove the Troika now drove Stalin to Bukharin.

By out-casting the right, Zinoveiv and Kamenev created for Stalin, the perfect situation. Stalin and Bukharin were far more powerful and covered a wider spectrum then the United Opposition[xi]. Then the UO doomed themselves. Although he had been politically defeated, Trotsky was not ready to give up. In a united opposition to Stalin, Trotsky joined with the left to combat Stalin. However, by allying themselves with their former enemy, Zinoviev and Kamenev discre***ed themselves without help from Stalin. By the end of 1927 the political left and their supporters were expelled from the party. All that was left was Stalin and the right. Many former allies of Stalin would later be put to death in his mock trials for crimes against Communism.

The Final Act- Defeating the Right

Stalin was left with nearly absolute power in the party. Only three men remained as political figureheads against him. Although not foolish enough to openly combat Stalin?Ts new stance on Collectivism and the expansion of Socialism[xii], the right did debate them in the CC and politburo. Bukharin, Alexei Rykov and Mikhal Tomsky all formed the leadership of the Communist right. These men were all that stood in Stalin?Ts way. Because of the expulsion of the left, many positions were opened within the party. As mentioned earlier, Stalin held a high position in the party. He was able to position supporters of his throughout the Party lines. After long enough, Stalin and his supporters (mostly young party members who followed Stalinism, not Marxism) had a stronger base then Bukharin and the old Bolsheviks.

Now that Stalin had a strong base, by personal appointment, he could end the last thread of opposition. Stalin and his supporters began systematically denouncing the Right?Ts position. Through mass propaganda and the Communist paper, Pravda (Truth), Stalin was able to destroy Bukharin?Ts position in the party. He was able to convince the CC to expel Bukharin and censor his supporters. Stalin was unquestioned, and his rise was complete.


Stalin once said, ?oIf the opposition disarms, well and good. If it refuses to disarm, we shall disarm it ourselves.? This describes Stalin?Ts rise to power completely. When his enemies attempted to fight him, he destroyed them. When they allied with him, they were betrayed. When they became settled, he attacked them. Nothing was sacred and no one was safe from Stalin?Ts power. His ?oRevolution from above? would set a series of amazing changes through the Russian state. However none of his infamous history would be known had he not been able to ?odisarm? his political opponents in the years following Lenin?Ts death

Churchill , Roosevelt và Stalin trên bàn đàm phán qua sự nhận định của Anthony Eden . Eden là bộ trưởng ngoại giao Anh từ 1940-45 , ông được Churchill chọn làm người kế nhiệm và trở thành thủ tướng Anh năm 1953 , nhưng từ chức năm 1955 sau khi giải quyết thất bại vụ kênh đào Suez. Có mấy câu em chẳng biết dịch thế nào nên cứ post nguyên tiếng Anh lên:
"Roosevelt was, above all else, a consummate politician. Few men could see more clearly their immediate objective, or show greater artistry in obtaining it. As a price of these gifts, his long-range vision was not quite so sure. The President shared a widespread American suspicion of the British Empire as it had once been and, despite his knowledge of world affairs, he was always anxious to make it plain to Stalin that the United States was not ''ganging up'' with Britain against Russia. The outcome of this was some confusion in Anglo-American relations which profited the Soviets.
Roosevelt did not confine his dislike of colonialism to the British Empire alone, for it was a principle with him, not the less cherished for its possible advantages. He hoped that former colonial territories, once free of their masters, would become politically and economically dependent upon the United States, and had no fear that other powers might fill that role.
Winston Churchill''s strength lay in his vigorous sense of purpose and his courage, which carried him undismayed over obstacles daunting to lesser men. He was also generous and impulsive, but this could be a handicap at the conference table. Churchill liked to talk, he did not like to listen, and he found it difficult to wait for, and seldom let pass, his turn to speak. The spoils in the diplomatic game do not necessarily go to the man most eager to debate.
Marshal Stalin as a negotiator was the toughest proposition of all. Indeed, after something like thirty years'' experience of international conferences of one kind and another, if I had to pick a team for going into a conference room, Stalin would be my first choice. Of course the man was ruthless and of course he knew his purpose. He never wasted a word. He never stormed, he was seldom even irritated. Hooded, calm, never raising his voice, he avoided the repeated negatives of Molotov which were so exasperating to listen to. By more subtle methods he got what he wanted without having seemed so obdurate.
There was a confidence, even an intimacy, between Stalin and Molotov such as I have never seen between any other two Soviet leaders, as if Stalin knew that he had a valuable henchman and Molotov was confident because he was so regarded. Stalin might tease Molotov occasionally, but he was careful to uphold his authority. Only once did I hear Stalin speak disparagingly of his judgment and that was not before witnesses

Alan Brook , tham mưu trưởng quân Anh , nhận định về Stalin tại Teheran : " Tôi rất nhanh nhận thấy rằng Stalin thực sự có khả năng quân sự ở mức độ cao nhất , trong lời nói của mình ông ta không bao giờ nhầm một điểm chiến thuật nào , ông ta nắm toàn bộ vấn đề một cách nhanh chóng và chính xác . Về điểm này Stalin vượt trội hoàn toàn so với Roosevelt và Churchill"

Stalin thực sự là giết rất nhiều người Liên xô,nhưng vì hoàn cảnh lúc đó khác bây giờ.Quân Đức lúc đầu nghĩ sẽ đánh Liên xô dễ dàng vì cho rằng Liên xô vẫn vô chính phủ như thời kỳ Thế chiến 1.Dân Ucraina lúc đầu rất hoan nghênh quân Đức và ghét Stalin nen những quân đoàn Ucraina đều bỏ chạy hết nhưng sau đó thì quân Đức thi hành chính sách diệt chủng nên họ lại thấy Stalin dầu sao vẫn "đỡ hơn".Còn nói la Stalin bị bất ngờ thì cũng không đúng.Trên thế giới lúc đó ai cũng biết là Đức-Nga cuối cùng sẽ đánh nhau.Thậm chí thang 5/41 Liên xô còn biết tên 3 chỉ huy phương diện quân của Đức.Nhưng Liên xô lúc đó vẫn là một nước lạc hậu nên không thể chống nổi.Xe tăng thì nhiều nhưng là loại lac hậu,không được bảo hành.T34 thì không đủ đạn bắn,không có máy bộ đàm.Không quân thì thậm chí còn phải vẫy cánh làm hiệu.Nưóc Đức lúc đó là nước công nghệ tiên tiến nhât trên thế giới.Vũ khí của họ không mạnh như Liên xô nhưng rất chính xác và hoạt động ổn đinh.Bây giờ nghe thì buồn cười nhưng thời đấy máy báy đang bay tự nhiên chết máy là chuyện thường.Công nghệ của Anh Pháp lúc đó cũng không bằng Đức được.

LX lúc đó mặc dù biết sớm muộn gì cũng chiến tranh nhưng đúng là bị bất ngờ! Mặc dù có tin tình báo về ngày chiến tranh bắt đầu nhưng vì đã nhận được quá nhiều tin báo động giả như thế nên Stalin mặt kệ!
Nhiều người trình bày Hiệp Định Xô-Đức Không xâm lược lẫn nhau như là hiệp định đồng minh (phương Tây hay gọi là Hiệp định Xô Viết -Quốc Xã!), nhưng thật ra LX ký cả tá hiệp định như vậy với các nước tư bản, ký với Pháp hiệp định tương tự cả chục năm trước.