Những trận không chiến trên bầu trời Bắc Việt, 1965-1972 (Phần 1)

]To Hanoi and Back
The United States Air Force and North Vietnam
1966?"1973
Wayne Thompson
Air Force History and Museums Program
United States Air Force
Washington, D.C. 2000
Năm 1972, trong đợt 12 ngày đêm
Khu dân cư Khâm thiên bị bom
Bệnh viện Bạch mai
Trinh sát trước lúc đánh phá
RF 4 chụp ảnh mục tiêu mặt đất
EC 121 trinh sát điện tử chống Mig và cảnh báo không để đội hình chiến đấu bay quá sang lãnh thổ TQ
Trinh sát không người lái, thả bằng C 130 bay vào từ cửa sông
Tiếp dầu trong khi bay tới và bay ra khỏi mục tiêuF 105
F4
B 52

Author Purdham, Aldon E
Title America''s first air battles : lessons learned or lessons lost? / Aldon E. Purdham Jr
Publish info Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Air University Press, [2003]
About the Author
Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr., is chief, Future Plans Branch, Headquarters US Central Command, Directorate of Intelligence, Plans Division, MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a career intelligence officer who has served as a Soviet strategic threat analyst and command briefer at the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing and Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, Nebraska; as a member of the National Intelligence Community?Ts Targeting Team at the Pentagon in support of Operation Desert Storm; as chief, Operational Intelligence for the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea; as a North Korean politicalmilitary intelligence analyst and briefer for the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence, in the Pentagon; as a program element monitor on the Air Staff; and as a human intelligence operations officer, command briefer/speechwriter, and congressional liaison at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Colonel Purdham is a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and a Master of Science degree in Education from Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Chapter 3Initial Period of Operations in the Vietnam
War, 2 March?"1 April 1965
In retrospect, I?Tm absolutely convinced that we lost the war wrong. We should have fought that war in an advisory mode and remained in that mode. When the South Vietnamese failed to come up and meet the mark at the advisory level, then we never should have committed US forces. We should have failed at the advisory effort and withdrawn.
?"Gen Voney F. Warner, 1983
After the Korean War, President Dwight D. ?oIkê? Eisenhower declared that never again would the United States become involved in a war such as the one in Korea in which the full capability of the US armed forces could not be employed.1 As a result, military strategists focused on nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation instead of conventional warfare. The Air Force was no exception. In fact, until about 1960, the Air Force continued to believe that its robust nuclear capability would satisfy the requirements of any limited war.2 Gen T. R. Milton, former commander of Thirteenth Air Force, corroborated this con***ion when he noted that the theater air forces in the 1950s were ?oall trying to be little SACs with the primary and almost the only mission being the nuclear one.?3 Many senior defense and Air Force officials did not view this lack of balance as inimical. In fact, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson believed ?othe problem of deterring small wars cannot be considered separately from the problem of deterring war generally [and that] the capability to deter large wars also serves to deter small wars.?4 The Air Forcê?Ts belief that it could tailor airpower entirely for nuclear war and still handle any lesser form of warfare was inherently shortsighted.
Gen John P. McConnell recognized this and concluded that the Air Force was very unprepared for conventional warfare in the early 1960s.5 President John F. Kennedy recognized this ill-preparedness as well. He assumed office just two weeks after Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev?Ts speech decrying Soviet support for ?owars of national liberation.?6 Contrary to the nuclear exchanges on which the US military had focused, a war of national liberation consisted of guerilla actions aimed at subversion. While such actions would not trigger nuclear retaliation, they could, nonetheless, weaken the power of the targeted state until it was defeated. Consequently, the Soviet premier?Ts remarks led to an intense reexamination of US national security and military strategy. President Kennedy did not think his predecessor?Ts massive retaliation strategy was appropriate for this new international environment. Consequently, he initiated a strategy of flexible response, which allowed the military to respond to potential threats with a variety of force options.
As part of this effort, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 1 February 1961 to train and equip US troops for counterinsurgency warfare. As Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, retired, points out in Air Power in Three Wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, ?oThis reorientation of our defense priorities toward smaller conflicts prompted considerable debate about how best to cope with [wars of national liberation].? In the Air Force, the debate ensued between two sides.
One side advocated that existing tactical forces could adjust to counterinsurgency warfare without major changes, while the other believed that counterinsurgency was the combat of the future that required a special force. By 1964 the US armed forces were fully engaged in combat operations in Vietnam. Early that same year, General LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, called for concentrated air attacks against targets in North Vietnam. The JCS agreed that air strikes against North Vietnam would show the resolve of the US commitment to South Vietnam and would force North Vietnam to end its support to the Vietcong. However, the joint chiefs favored a graduated response that would enable them to gain their objectives without severely straining US military resources.10 The US military began its combat involvement in Vietnam with these competing strategies.
Doctrine
Not surprisingly, the Air Forcê?Ts growing preoccupation with nuclear war had a significant influence. Even General LeMay?Ts views on Air Force doctrine changed as the Soviet nuclear capability became an increasing threat to the United States.
During the postwar years, LeMay believed that the United States ?ocould afford the luxury of devoting a substantial portion of [its] Air Force effort *****pport ground forces,? because none
of the world?Ts hostile countries had the capability to threaten America.11 He declared, ?oThe enemy didn?Tt have the capability to destroy us. He couldn?Tt initiate an effective air offensive blow against us because he couldn?Tt mount one.?12 However, by 1956 LeMay was convinced that Soviet aircraft were capable of attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. In light of this development, LeMay argued, ?oOffensive air power must now be aimed at preventing the launching of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its Allies. This transcends
all other considerations, because the price of failure may be paid with national survival.?
Consequently, in 1955 the Air Force released its new doctrine, Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, with the backdrop of this Cold War mentality. Air Force vice chief of staff Gen Thomas D. White stated that this e***ion of AFMAN 1-2 provided ?oa clear discussion of the area between the two extremes of conflict [general war and full peace] so as to permit emphasis on the broad potentialities of air forces as a persuasive instrument in combating the international tension brought about by Cold War con***ions.?
Ad***ionally, while the old doctrine associated the control of air only with wartime activity, the new doctrine stated, ?oControl of the air is achieved when air forces, in peace or war, can affect the desired degrees of influence over other specific nations.?15 Col Jerry Page and Col Royal Roussel of the Air War College Doctrine Division added that control of the air did not require continuous attacks against something. Rather, they contended that the Air Force could have much influence even when it did not drop a bomb or fire a bullet. They believed this to be the case during the Korean War.
Due to this focus on the Cold War and the national security strategy of massive retaliation, neither the Air Forcê?Ts 1955 nor its 1959 doctrine was well suited for the Kennedy administration?Ts new national security strategy in 1961 of flexible response. In fact, Air Force doctrine had changed so little since its origin that LeMay remarked in the autumn of 1961, ?oI think we have been consistent in our concepts since the formation for the GHQ Air Force in 1935. Our basic doctrine has remained generally unchanged since that time.? Despite this preoccupation with nuclear warfare, the Air Force leadership anticipated the Kennedy administration?Ts interest
in counterinsurgency. In fact, in March 1961, the Air Force presented a study on ?oCold War problems? to President Kennedy.
As part of this study, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 4400th was tasked to develop tactics and techniques for counterinsurgency operations. However, in reality, the Air Forcê?"as well as the other services?"paid only lip service to counterinsurgency and continued to focus on its strategic nuclear role. It considered the 4400th to be adequate for counterinsurgency commitments.
Consequently, three years would pass before the Air Force published its newest doctrinal document, AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, in August 1964. AFMAN 1-1 reflected the Air Forcê?Ts desire to look forward?"not backward. The previous e***ion of Air Force doctrine stated, ?oBasic doctrine evolves from experience and from analysis of the continuing impact of new developments.?21 But the new manual declared, ?oBasic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and testing of military operations in the light of national objectives and the changing military environment.? By choosing to exclude experience from doctrinal development, Air Force doctrine makers in 1964 failed to incorporate valuable lessons from the Korean War. The US Air Force entered the Korean War convinced that it would fight an unlimited war against an industrialized nation by attacking clearly defined strategic targets. Although none of these assumptions proved to be true for Korea, the Air Force viewed Korea as an anomaly. Consequently, the 1964 doctrine was based on the same assumptions as the Joint Training Directive of 1950. Worse yet, the Air Force in 1964 distanced itself even further from its tactical doctrine upon which Air Force leaders in the Korean War heavily relied. As a result, the Air Force struggled to overcome some of the same problems in Vietnam that it had faced in Korea.
Command and Control
As early as 1962, Air Force chief of staff General LeMay advocated a more imaginative and responsive employment of airpower.23 According to General Momyer (Seventh Air Force commander from 1966 to 1968) on 23 April 1962, LeMay made the following observations to Gen Paul D. Harkins, commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. ?oThe command system was too cumbersome; the TACS was not being allowed to operate as efficiently as it had during World War II and the Korean War. Requests for air cover and for strikes against the ambush forces operating along most of the major roads were being processed much too slowly.?24 LeMay recommended that to correct all these things, airpower would have to be centrally controlled by an air operations center (AOC) using the facilities of the already established tactical air control system (TACS). He added that the proper use of TACS would eliminate much of the delay.25 The AOC of the 2d Air Division was selected to fulfill the former recommendation. Meanwhile, the latter recommendation would take longer to resolve because all four services in Vietnam were using both the South Vietnamese Air Forcê?"USAF TACS and the US Army air-ground system.
According to the Air Force, these dual systems resulted in a lack of overall air efficiency and safety.26 To resolve this dispute, the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff eventually signed a ?oConcept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination? in March and April 1965.27 This agreement specified that the joint commander would determine the daily proportion of aircraft for CAS, air superiority, and interdiction missions. In turn, the air commander had to report the apportionment for CAS to the ground commander, who would then allocate the CAS missions to his subordinate commanders. By early 1965, this agreement also led the Army and Air Force to restructure TACS for more timely and responsive CAS, thereby fulfilling LeMay?Ts recommendation.28 The focus of the new TACS was TACC. TACC ordered all preplanned CAS missions to the South Vietnamese Army and US Army forces.
Although the kinks in TACS had been worked out by the start of Rolling Thunder in March 1965, the unity of control of the Air Force assets employed against North Vietnam had not. Instead of acting under a single commander, the air organizations operated under several different commanders. In Southeast Asia, Air Force assets were part of Thirteenth Air Force, which was located in the Philippines and was subordinate to the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander in Hawaii. In South Vietnam, meanwhile, Air Force assets belonged to the 2d Air Division (redesignated Seventh Air Force on 14 March 1966), which was located at Tan Son Nhut airfield in South Vietnam. The commander of the 2d Air Division was expected to perform two roles: air component commander for MACV and forward commander for Thirteenth Air Force (2d Air Division?Ts higher echelon). Finally, Navy carrier air units in the Gulf of Tonkin were organized as Task Force (TF)-77 and received their orders from the Seventh Fleet and from the commander in chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Hawaii. In an effort to centralize control of airpower, the Air Force sought to place carrier aircraft under the operational control of CINCPACAF. However, CINCPACFLT preferred that the naval air assets stay under his control. Specifically, the CINCPACFLT wanted TF-77 to have the same relationship with the 2d Air Division that it had with Fifth Air Force during the Korean War.30 The commander in chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) concurred with CINCPACFLT on this issue; and in March 1965, PACAF was designated the ?ocoordinating authority? for Rolling Thunder.31 As was the case when FEAF was appointed the ?ocoordinating authority? for air operations during the Korean War, such authority did not provide PACAF with operational control over TF-77 during Vietnam. As was the case during Korea, PACAF and the 2d Air Division still struggled to transform ?ocoordinating authority? into a harmonious relationship with TF-77. This impasse was finally overcome by a proposal to divide North Vietnam into six ?oroute packages,? or areas of operations, beginning at the demilitarized zone.32 The Air Force was assigned three of the areas?"route packages one, four, and fivê?"while the Navy was assigned four. However, the Air Force did not consider this to be an ideal solution. General Momyer represented the Air Forcê?Ts view in stating, ?oDividing North Vietnam into route packages compartmentalized our airpower and reduced its capabilities.? Consequently, the route package system, which was a compromise effort to produce a unified and concentrated air effort, failed to effectively control two air forces from two different services. While such an arrangement rested outside of the control of the Air Force, it, nonetheless, had a tremendous impact on Air Force operations and decisions.

Author Purdham, Aldon E
Title America''s first air battles : lessons learned or lessons lost? / Aldon E. Purdham Jr
Publish info Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. : Air University Press, [2003]
About the Author
Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr., is chief, Future Plans Branch, Headquarters US Central Command, Directorate of Intelligence, Plans Division, MacDill AFB, Florida. He is a career intelligence officer who has served as a Soviet strategic threat analyst and command briefer at the 544th Strategic Intelligence Wing and Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, Nebraska; as a member of the National Intelligence Community?Ts Targeting Team at the Pentagon in support of Operation Desert Storm; as chief, Operational Intelligence for the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB, Republic of Korea; as a North Korean politicalmilitary intelligence analyst and briefer for the assistant chief of staff, Intelligence, in the Pentagon; as a program element monitor on the Air Staff; and as a human intelligence operations officer, command briefer/speechwriter, and congressional liaison at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Colonel Purdham is a distinguished graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, and Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and a Master of Science degree in Education from Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Chapter 3Initial Period of Operations in the Vietnam
War, 2 March?"1 April 1965
In retrospect, I?Tm absolutely convinced that we lost the war wrong. We should have fought that war in an advisory mode and remained in that mode. When the South Vietnamese failed to come up and meet the mark at the advisory level, then we never should have committed US forces. We should have failed at the advisory effort and withdrawn.
?"Gen Voney F. Warner, 1983
After the Korean War, President Dwight D. ?oIkê? Eisenhower declared that never again would the United States become involved in a war such as the one in Korea in which the full capability of the US armed forces could not be employed.1 As a result, military strategists focused on nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation instead of conventional warfare. The Air Force was no exception. In fact, until about 1960, the Air Force continued to believe that its robust nuclear capability would satisfy the requirements of any limited war.2 Gen T. R. Milton, former commander of Thirteenth Air Force, corroborated this con***ion when he noted that the theater air forces in the 1950s were ?oall trying to be little SACs with the primary and almost the only mission being the nuclear one.?3 Many senior defense and Air Force officials did not view this lack of balance as inimical. In fact, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson believed ?othe problem of deterring small wars cannot be considered separately from the problem of deterring war generally [and that] the capability to deter large wars also serves to deter small wars.?4 The Air Forcê?Ts belief that it could tailor airpower entirely for nuclear war and still handle any lesser form of warfare was inherently shortsighted.
Gen John P. McConnell recognized this and concluded that the Air Force was very unprepared for conventional warfare in the early 1960s.5 President John F. Kennedy recognized this ill-preparedness as well. He assumed office just two weeks after Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev?Ts speech decrying Soviet support for ?owars of national liberation.?6 Contrary to the nuclear exchanges on which the US military had focused, a war of national liberation consisted of guerilla actions aimed at subversion. While such actions would not trigger nuclear retaliation, they could, nonetheless, weaken the power of the targeted state until it was defeated. Consequently, the Soviet premier?Ts remarks led to an intense reexamination of US national security and military strategy. President Kennedy did not think his predecessor?Ts massive retaliation strategy was appropriate for this new international environment. Consequently, he initiated a strategy of flexible response, which allowed the military to respond to potential threats with a variety of force options.
As part of this effort, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on 1 February 1961 to train and equip US troops for counterinsurgency warfare. As Gen William W. Momyer, USAF, retired, points out in Air Power in Three Wars: World War II, Korea, Vietnam, ?oThis reorientation of our defense priorities toward smaller conflicts prompted considerable debate about how best to cope with [wars of national liberation].? In the Air Force, the debate ensued between two sides.
One side advocated that existing tactical forces could adjust to counterinsurgency warfare without major changes, while the other believed that counterinsurgency was the combat of the future that required a special force. By 1964 the US armed forces were fully engaged in combat operations in Vietnam. Early that same year, General LeMay, the Air Force chief of staff, called for concentrated air attacks against targets in North Vietnam. The JCS agreed that air strikes against North Vietnam would show the resolve of the US commitment to South Vietnam and would force North Vietnam to end its support to the Vietcong. However, the joint chiefs favored a graduated response that would enable them to gain their objectives without severely straining US military resources.10 The US military began its combat involvement in Vietnam with these competing strategies.
Doctrine
Not surprisingly, the Air Forcê?Ts growing preoccupation with nuclear war had a significant influence. Even General LeMay?Ts views on Air Force doctrine changed as the Soviet nuclear capability became an increasing threat to the United States.
During the postwar years, LeMay believed that the United States ?ocould afford the luxury of devoting a substantial portion of [its] Air Force effort *****pport ground forces,? because none
of the world?Ts hostile countries had the capability to threaten America.11 He declared, ?oThe enemy didn?Tt have the capability to destroy us. He couldn?Tt initiate an effective air offensive blow against us because he couldn?Tt mount one.?12 However, by 1956 LeMay was convinced that Soviet aircraft were capable of attacking the United States with nuclear weapons. In light of this development, LeMay argued, ?oOffensive air power must now be aimed at preventing the launching of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its Allies. This transcends
all other considerations, because the price of failure may be paid with national survival.?
Consequently, in 1955 the Air Force released its new doctrine, Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, with the backdrop of this Cold War mentality. Air Force vice chief of staff Gen Thomas D. White stated that this e***ion of AFMAN 1-2 provided ?oa clear discussion of the area between the two extremes of conflict [general war and full peace] so as to permit emphasis on the broad potentialities of air forces as a persuasive instrument in combating the international tension brought about by Cold War con***ions.?
Ad***ionally, while the old doctrine associated the control of air only with wartime activity, the new doctrine stated, ?oControl of the air is achieved when air forces, in peace or war, can affect the desired degrees of influence over other specific nations.?15 Col Jerry Page and Col Royal Roussel of the Air War College Doctrine Division added that control of the air did not require continuous attacks against something. Rather, they contended that the Air Force could have much influence even when it did not drop a bomb or fire a bullet. They believed this to be the case during the Korean War.
Due to this focus on the Cold War and the national security strategy of massive retaliation, neither the Air Forcê?Ts 1955 nor its 1959 doctrine was well suited for the Kennedy administration?Ts new national security strategy in 1961 of flexible response. In fact, Air Force doctrine had changed so little since its origin that LeMay remarked in the autumn of 1961, ?oI think we have been consistent in our concepts since the formation for the GHQ Air Force in 1935. Our basic doctrine has remained generally unchanged since that time.? Despite this preoccupation with nuclear warfare, the Air Force leadership anticipated the Kennedy administration?Ts interest
in counterinsurgency. In fact, in March 1961, the Air Force presented a study on ?oCold War problems? to President Kennedy.
As part of this study, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The 4400th was tasked to develop tactics and techniques for counterinsurgency operations. However, in reality, the Air Forcê?"as well as the other services?"paid only lip service to counterinsurgency and continued to focus on its strategic nuclear role. It considered the 4400th to be adequate for counterinsurgency commitments.
Consequently, three years would pass before the Air Force published its newest doctrinal document, AFMAN 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, in August 1964. AFMAN 1-1 reflected the Air Forcê?Ts desire to look forward?"not backward. The previous e***ion of Air Force doctrine stated, ?oBasic doctrine evolves from experience and from analysis of the continuing impact of new developments.?21 But the new manual declared, ?oBasic doctrine evolves through the continuing analysis and testing of military operations in the light of national objectives and the changing military environment.? By choosing to exclude experience from doctrinal development, Air Force doctrine makers in 1964 failed to incorporate valuable lessons from the Korean War. The US Air Force entered the Korean War convinced that it would fight an unlimited war against an industrialized nation by attacking clearly defined strategic targets. Although none of these assumptions proved to be true for Korea, the Air Force viewed Korea as an anomaly. Consequently, the 1964 doctrine was based on the same assumptions as the Joint Training Directive of 1950. Worse yet, the Air Force in 1964 distanced itself even further from its tactical doctrine upon which Air Force leaders in the Korean War heavily relied. As a result, the Air Force struggled to overcome some of the same problems in Vietnam that it had faced in Korea.
Command and Control
As early as 1962, Air Force chief of staff General LeMay advocated a more imaginative and responsive employment of airpower.23 According to General Momyer (Seventh Air Force commander from 1966 to 1968) on 23 April 1962, LeMay made the following observations to Gen Paul D. Harkins, commander of US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. ?oThe command system was too cumbersome; the TACS was not being allowed to operate as efficiently as it had during World War II and the Korean War. Requests for air cover and for strikes against the ambush forces operating along most of the major roads were being processed much too slowly.?24 LeMay recommended that to correct all these things, airpower would have to be centrally controlled by an air operations center (AOC) using the facilities of the already established tactical air control system (TACS). He added that the proper use of TACS would eliminate much of the delay.25 The AOC of the 2d Air Division was selected to fulfill the former recommendation. Meanwhile, the latter recommendation would take longer to resolve because all four services in Vietnam were using both the South Vietnamese Air Forcê?"USAF TACS and the US Army air-ground system.
According to the Air Force, these dual systems resulted in a lack of overall air efficiency and safety.26 To resolve this dispute, the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff eventually signed a ?oConcept for Improved Joint Air-Ground Coordination? in March and April 1965.27 This agreement specified that the joint commander would determine the daily proportion of aircraft for CAS, air superiority, and interdiction missions. In turn, the air commander had to report the apportionment for CAS to the ground commander, who would then allocate the CAS missions to his subordinate commanders. By early 1965, this agreement also led the Army and Air Force to restructure TACS for more timely and responsive CAS, thereby fulfilling LeMay?Ts recommendation.28 The focus of the new TACS was TACC. TACC ordered all preplanned CAS missions to the South Vietnamese Army and US Army forces.
Although the kinks in TACS had been worked out by the start of Rolling Thunder in March 1965, the unity of control of the Air Force assets employed against North Vietnam had not. Instead of acting under a single commander, the air organizations operated under several different commanders. In Southeast Asia, Air Force assets were part of Thirteenth Air Force, which was located in the Philippines and was subordinate to the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) commander in Hawaii. In South Vietnam, meanwhile, Air Force assets belonged to the 2d Air Division (redesignated Seventh Air Force on 14 March 1966), which was located at Tan Son Nhut airfield in South Vietnam. The commander of the 2d Air Division was expected to perform two roles: air component commander for MACV and forward commander for Thirteenth Air Force (2d Air Division?Ts higher echelon). Finally, Navy carrier air units in the Gulf of Tonkin were organized as Task Force (TF)-77 and received their orders from the Seventh Fleet and from the commander in chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) in Hawaii. In an effort to centralize control of airpower, the Air Force sought to place carrier aircraft under the operational control of CINCPACAF. However, CINCPACFLT preferred that the naval air assets stay under his control. Specifically, the CINCPACFLT wanted TF-77 to have the same relationship with the 2d Air Division that it had with Fifth Air Force during the Korean War.30 The commander in chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) concurred with CINCPACFLT on this issue; and in March 1965, PACAF was designated the ?ocoordinating authority? for Rolling Thunder.31 As was the case when FEAF was appointed the ?ocoordinating authority? for air operations during the Korean War, such authority did not provide PACAF with operational control over TF-77 during Vietnam. As was the case during Korea, PACAF and the 2d Air Division still struggled to transform ?ocoordinating authority? into a harmonious relationship with TF-77. This impasse was finally overcome by a proposal to divide North Vietnam into six ?oroute packages,? or areas of operations, beginning at the demilitarized zone.32 The Air Force was assigned three of the areas?"route packages one, four, and fivê?"while the Navy was assigned four. However, the Air Force did not consider this to be an ideal solution. General Momyer represented the Air Forcê?Ts view in stating, ?oDividing North Vietnam into route packages compartmentalized our airpower and reduced its capabilities.? Consequently, the route package system, which was a compromise effort to produce a unified and concentrated air effort, failed to effectively control two air forces from two different services. While such an arrangement rested outside of the control of the Air Force, it, nonetheless, had a tremendous impact on Air Force operations and decisions.

Tiếp
Training
Despite the Kennedy administration?Ts new national security strategy of flexible response, the Air Force?Ts training prior to the Vietnam War remained locked to its nuclear-oriented doctrine.
General McConnell stated in 1968 that ?o[The Air Force] did not even start doing anything about tactical aviation until about 1961 or 1962.? In September 1961, TAC teamed with the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the Air Force Reserve, and the Army?Ts 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions to conduct Swift Strike, an exercise that included more than 15,000 airborne troops. If
the exercises that occurred up to 1965, perhaps the most prominent was Operation Desert Strike, which was held in the western United States and involved more than 100,000 soldiers and airmen.36 Fifteen squadrons from TAC flew from a total of 25 airfields located between Texas and Oregon, and MATS completed 2,500 tactical transport sorties. Consequently, while TAC was engaged in tactical training during its large scale exercises prior to the Vietnam War, that training was not focused heavily on missions such as air superiority and CAS. In light of its inattention to CAS since the end of the Korean War, the Air Force dismantled the TACS that successfully directed strikes on the battlefields of World War II and Korea and rebuilt a new one for Vietnam.37 The forward air controllers (FAC) and their O-1 aircraft were an important component of the new control system. The aircrews who flew the O-1s in the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron received training in visual reconnaissance and strike control at the Tactical Air Command?Ts FAC School.38 While waiting to receive more than 100 more O-1s from the Army in early 1965, TAC accelerated its training to ensure that three new squadrons of O-1s would be
available in Vietnam later that summer.
Meanwhile, SAC continued to train its bombers for its nuclear mission. However, in light of the focus on flexible response, this training was not intended to prepare bombers only for a strategic role as had historically been the case. Rather, the training was meant to mold SAC bombers into a conventional retaliatory force. The Kennedy administration was determined to optimize the use of the existing bomber force for this purpose.39 In that light, the B-58 proved to be a particularly
valuable member of the retaliatory force. This was evident from the B-58 training in 1961 alone that included flights from New York to Paris, New York to Los Angeles and back, and Tokyo to London. Similarly, the B-52 showed its prowess for worldwide deployability with training flights of more than 12,500 miles from Okinawa to Spain and more than 11,300 miles during a route that began and ended in North Carolina.
Based on the Air Force?Ts focus on SAC, US aircrews were very effective in employing nuclear weapons, but they were far less effective in employing conventional weapons as the Vietnam War approached. At the onset of Rolling Thunder, the average circular error probable (the radius of a circle centered on the target within which half of the bombs fall) was approximately 750 ft.40 Such a level of inaccuracy was relatively insignificant when nuclear weapons were used. However, it could prove very costly when trying to hit small targets with conventional weapons. Conventional air training was so far behind that the Air Force needed several years to improve the circular error probable of its conventional bombing to roughly 365 ft.
Equipment
In early 1965, the Air Force was only beginning to build up its air strength in South Vietnam. At that time, the Air Force had deployed more than 200 aircraft to the country. Just three years later, Air Force strength in South Vietnam consisted of more than 750 aircraft.42 The increase in the number of KC-135 refueling aircraft in Southeast Asia is a particularly telling example of this buildup. In March 1965, four KC-135s were based in Thailand; by 1972, that number was 110, not including the Okinawa-based tankers that supported B-52s. In ad***ion to the low number of aircraft at the start in Vietnam, the Air Force also relied heavily on old aircraft that were near the end of their useful service. The F-100, F-104, RF-101, and F-102 are a few examples of such aircraft. The most significant air-to-air threat facing USAF aircraft during the initial period of operations in the Vietnam War was the MiG-17. While the F-105 was faster at all altitudes than
the MiG-17, the MiG was far more maneuverable; and North Vietnam?Ts ground-control intercept (GCI) radar network further enhanced the MiG?Ts capability by vectoring it directly to ingressing F-105s. Since the F-105D had been developed to employ tactical nuclear weapons, it was designed to ingress and egress target areas at extremely high speeds. Thus, F-105s ?onever tried to out turn or out climb a MiG.?44 Instead, F-105s chose to outrun MiG-17s. To improve its performance against the MiG-17, the Air Force began replacing the F-100Ds with F-4Cs. The F-4C was superior to the F-100D in speed, acceleration, climb rate, and radar-intercept capability. Although it lacked the maneuverability of the MiG-17, the F-4 could dictate the terms of an air-to-air engagement because of its greater power. The Air Force?Ts CAS and interdiction capability underwent significant improvements from 1964 to 1965. The impetus for these improvements was the severe problems that the USAF experienced with its B-26 bomber and T-28 air-to-ground aircraft. All of the B-26s and T-28s were grounded in 1964 because of flying mishaps attributed to wing failures. This measure caused Maj Gen Joseph Moore, the commander of the 2d Air Division, to state that ?oSecond Air Division is practically out of business.?46 In May 1964, an excellent replacement was found in the Navy?Ts A-1 airframe. With its long loiter times and large ordnance loads, the A-1 was ideally suited for CAS operations. The only major weakness of the A-1 was its low airspeed, which occasionally resulted in long response times to tasked targets. Following the authorization to employ jet aircraft in South Vietnam, B-57 aircrews flew the first jet air strikes in South Vietnam on 19 February 1965. Soon after, F-100 and F-4 jets also began flying attack missions. The F-100, with its multiple arrays of weapon loads, and the F-4, which could carry as many as seventeen 750 lb bombs, represented a substantial increase in firepower.48 Modified versions of USAF undergraduate training airframes, such as the T-38 (became the F-5) and T-37 (became the A-37), also joined the war effort in early 1965. The fact that each was highly maneuverable, maintainable, and forgiving contributed to their success.
Air Superiority
The air superiority tactics employed in Vietnam were fundamentally different from those of Korea. In Korea, the USAF achieved air superiority early. It maintained air superiority by preventing Chinese air units from using the North Korean air bases located behind the positions held by the Chinese army in North Korea. It did so by damaging North Korean airfields. During the Vietnam War, on the other hand, the USAF?Ts protective fighter screen covered only Thailand and South Vietnam.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese air force (NVAF) operated from airfields that were immune to attack until the third year of the Rolling Thunder campaign.51 Ad***ionally, in 1965 the NVAF began bolstering its integrated air defense system by gradually increasing its number of surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Consequently, beginning in 1965, the Air Force carried out air missions, such as interdiction, while simultaneously trying to gain air superiority.
While the US Air Force was concerned about the air-to-air threat in South Vietnam, the most significant threat facing US aircraft at the beginning of 1965 was antiaircraft fire. At that time, older US aircraft were ideally suited for missions over North and South Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese were also rapidly increasing their air defense threat in 1965. In September 1964, North Vietnam had 22 early warning (EW) and four fire control (FC) radars.53 By March 1965, the North Vietnamese had increased their EW radars to 31 and their FC radars to nine. SAMs would later pose a significant threat to USAF aircrews in Vietnam. However, that was not the case as early as March 1965.
In fact, North Vietnam did not launch the first of thousands of SA-2 SAMs at Air Force aircraft until July 1965. On 21 March 1965, Air Force aircraft began attacking North Vietnamese supply routes south of the 20th parallel and gradually shifted their assault north. Over the first month of these attacks, US aircraft did not face any NVAF fighters. However, NVAF training proved its effectiveness when a MiG-17 first downed a US aircraft on 4 April 1965. In response to the increased MiG-17 threat, the Air Force deployed EB-66 electronic warfare aircraft to Southeast Asia in April 1965. The EB-66s carried radar jammers that could mask the approach of US strike aircraft and degrade the effectiveness of North Korean GCI radars.57 As mentioned earlier, the F-4C was also introduced into the Vietnam War at this time. The F-4?Ts extended range AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile (AAM), and close range AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared AAM provided the F-4 with a tremendous air-to-air capability.
Even though the F-4 was not as maneuverable as the MiG-17, the AIM-7 and AIM-9 allowed the F-4 to counter the MiG-17 without engaging in a dogfight. With its radar and AIM-9 capabilities,
the F-4C could detect and destroy enemy aircraft before they were close enough to pose a threat.58 However, in Vietnam, the F-4 was unable to capitalize on these advantages, because US Air Force rules of engagement (ROE) required that aircrews identify aircraft visually before attacking them.59 Consequently, when pursued by an F-4, a MiG-17 could stay just outside of the effective threat envelope of the AIM-7 and use its maneuverability to overcome the high speed and acceleration of the F-4. Although NVAF pilots did not achieve air superiority, they did challenge US air dominance in Vietnam more so than Chinese pilots did in the Korean War.
Close Air Support
Because counterinsurgency operations provide only few and fleeting opportunities for the employment of CAS, the CAS system in Vietnam developed gradually, and that development was sometimes painful and uneven.60 In fact, after examining this system in one study in 1965, the Air Force?Ts Special Air Warfare Board concluded, ?oThe present tactical air control system has grown up in the absence of a framework of doctrine for the conduct of tactical operations.?61 General Momyer corroborated this conclusion when he stated that prior to 1965 ?oit required a magician to figure out where the planes were flying.? To improve this situation, CINCPAC announced in April 1965 that the primary air mission in South Vietnam would be CAS, with the highest priority given to troops in contact. CAS sorties increased dramatically following this mandate from approximately 2,000 sorties in January to more than 13,000 in December. This new focus on CAS required the Air Force to perform a mission for which two decades of doctrine and training had poorly prepared it. This new emphasis on support of the ground war differed greatly from the Air Force?Ts strategic mission that had monopolized its attention since World War II. While the CINCPAC mandate to focus on CAS was issued in April 1965, the impetus for the change had already begun. The Air Force provided advisors to each Army echelon down to the battalion level. These advisors served as FACs and ALOs in TACPs. In this arrangement, ground commanders would specify targets, prioritization, and desired effects. The Air Force advisors, meanwhile, would inform the ground commanders how tactical airpower could best satisfy their requests. Even though FACs had operated very effectively from the air during the Korean War, the Air Force largely ignored this practice between the Korean War and the beginning of US involvement in Vietnam, preferring to limit FAC operations to the ground. For this reason, the Air Force gave all of its light spotter planes to the Army after the Korean War. It was not until 1963 that the Army provided the Air Force with O-1 aircraft for FAC training.
On 9 March 1965, the Air Force removed most of the remaining restrictions on the use of jet aircraft in Vietnam. Removing these restrictions required new tactics and procedures for CAS. An important consideration in formulating these tactics was striking a balance between attacking the target accurately and avoiding ground fire. To achieve this balance, Air Force pilots flew at 1,500 ft as frequently as possible, because the enemy used predominately small arms fire and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) against ingressing aircraft. Air Force pilots also devised a plan of attack to confuse the enemy forces and keep them from determining from which direction the strikes would come. A flight of four jets normally would coordinate with the FAC, who would provide the flight leader with ad***ional details of the mission. The flight leader could then recommend changes, and the FAC would determine whether to implement them. Finally, the FAC would mark the target with smoke, and the flight leader would strike the target while still operating under control of the FAC.
Despite improved coordination and practices, the CAS mission continued to encounter difficulties. Ultimately, foliage, terrain, and weather con***ions of South Vietnam hindered CAS operations. More importantly, the nature of the war itself in March and April 1965 was not ideally suited for CAS. Unlike conventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations rarely involved definitive battles of large-scale forces. Instead, most engagements in Vietnam consisted of small-size hit-and-run raids by the Vietcong that normally lasted 20 minutes or less. Consequently, very seldom did US aircrews have well-defined CAS targets to attack. Even when they did, enemy soldiers usually took cover before the aircrews arrived. Of note, USAF achieved more favorable CAS results as larger battles developed in late 1965 and early 1966. However, such results remained elusive in early 1965.
Interdiction
After the North Vietnamese and Vietcong attacked US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in early 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson moved from a strategy of exchanging retaliatory strikes to one of gradually increasing pressure. The first strikes implementing this strategy were initiated in February 1965 in Operation Flaming Dart. These attacks were soon followed by those on 2 March 1965, which marked the start of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that would continue through October 1968.
The initial plans for Rolling Thunder called for attacks against LOCs in Laos and below the 19th parallel in North Vietnam. Generals LeMay and McConnell?"the Air Force chiefs of staff immediately before and after February 1965, respectively?"strongly argued that the initial view of Rolling Thunder was overly restrictive. While they agreed that LOCs in the southern part of North Vietnam were valid targets, they thought the most significant elements of the enemy?Ts logistical network were ports, railroads, marshalling yards, supply centers, and bridges in the northern part of North Vietnam. They argued that attacks against hundreds of jungle trails in the
South would be less effective than attacks against key logistical targets in the North. On 2 March 1965, the first Rolling Thunder attack struck the Xom Bang ammunition depot just north of the 19th parallel. The next attack, which targeted an island off the coast of Vietnam and another ammunition depot north of the 19th parallel, was not conducted until 13 days later on 15 March.72 While Air Force senior leaders were displeased with the focus and irregularity of the bombing, they could not blame the process for the poor results of the bombing operations. The bomb damage assessment of the Flaming Dart raids during February 1965 revealed that air attacks destroyed less than 10 percent and damaged less than 5 percent of the 491 buildings that were targeted.73 As mentioned earlier, the Air Force?Ts training focus on nuclear bombing between the Korean and Vietnam Wars largely accounted for this poor performance. While it would take some time, the Air Force would improve its bombing effectiveness.
By the end of March, the purpose of Rolling Thunder had shifted from attacking North Vietnam?Ts will to fight to interdicting the country?Ts supply routes. As a result, target selection became even more focused on interdiction targets such as bridges, tunnels, rail lines, roads, river transportation, and other key rail, road, and river chokepoints. Looking beyond the initial period of operations, Rolling Thunder sorties flown each week increased fourfold to fivefold from the outset of the campaign. These attacks began to degrade North Vietnam?Ts rudimentary transportation system. However, ultimately, the Rolling Thunder attacks would not be successful in bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.
Conclusion
After the Korean War, the United States was convinced that never again would it become involved in a war like the one in Korea, where the full capability of the US military could not be employed. Consequently, Air Force strategy and doctrine remained as committed to nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation as ever. While the Air Force attempted to develop counterinsurgency doctrine, it essentially only paid lip service to this form of warfare. Lack of joint doctrine also resulted in a chaotic C2 structure that involved even less coordination and integration of air operations than was the case in Korea.
Because much of the Air Force?Ts training prior to the Vietnam War corresponded with its nuclear-oriented strategy and doctrine, US aircrews were very effective in employing nuclear weapons but not conventional ones. However, unlike their counterparts in the Korean War, these aircrews were able to operate at airfields in-country for several years prior to the initial period of operations. This advantage likely assisted them in making adjustments during that initial period, thus resulting in improved CAS and interdiction operations. Ad***ionally, the A-1 and F-4 CAS aircraft that aircrews flew in Vietnam were more effective than the F-51 and F-80 CAS platforms that aircrews flew in Korea. Yet, despite the employment of a new fighter and AAMs, the Air Force was not as successful in improving its air superiority capability. This diminished success
was largely due to restrictive ROE and a robust North Vietnamese effort to strengthen its air defense system as the war ensued.
By the end of the Vietnam War, enemy tactics had evolved from counterinsurgency to conventional force-on-force operations. Given that, as the US Air Force looked to the future, it would once again be faced with the dilemma of predicting on which type of war it should base its strategy and doctrine.

Tiếp
Training
Despite the Kennedy administration?Ts new national security strategy of flexible response, the Air Force?Ts training prior to the Vietnam War remained locked to its nuclear-oriented doctrine.
General McConnell stated in 1968 that ?o[The Air Force] did not even start doing anything about tactical aviation until about 1961 or 1962.? In September 1961, TAC teamed with the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), the Air Force Reserve, and the Army?Ts 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions to conduct Swift Strike, an exercise that included more than 15,000 airborne troops. If
the exercises that occurred up to 1965, perhaps the most prominent was Operation Desert Strike, which was held in the western United States and involved more than 100,000 soldiers and airmen.36 Fifteen squadrons from TAC flew from a total of 25 airfields located between Texas and Oregon, and MATS completed 2,500 tactical transport sorties. Consequently, while TAC was engaged in tactical training during its large scale exercises prior to the Vietnam War, that training was not focused heavily on missions such as air superiority and CAS. In light of its inattention to CAS since the end of the Korean War, the Air Force dismantled the TACS that successfully directed strikes on the battlefields of World War II and Korea and rebuilt a new one for Vietnam.37 The forward air controllers (FAC) and their O-1 aircraft were an important component of the new control system. The aircrews who flew the O-1s in the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron received training in visual reconnaissance and strike control at the Tactical Air Command?Ts FAC School.38 While waiting to receive more than 100 more O-1s from the Army in early 1965, TAC accelerated its training to ensure that three new squadrons of O-1s would be
available in Vietnam later that summer.
Meanwhile, SAC continued to train its bombers for its nuclear mission. However, in light of the focus on flexible response, this training was not intended to prepare bombers only for a strategic role as had historically been the case. Rather, the training was meant to mold SAC bombers into a conventional retaliatory force. The Kennedy administration was determined to optimize the use of the existing bomber force for this purpose.39 In that light, the B-58 proved to be a particularly
valuable member of the retaliatory force. This was evident from the B-58 training in 1961 alone that included flights from New York to Paris, New York to Los Angeles and back, and Tokyo to London. Similarly, the B-52 showed its prowess for worldwide deployability with training flights of more than 12,500 miles from Okinawa to Spain and more than 11,300 miles during a route that began and ended in North Carolina.
Based on the Air Force?Ts focus on SAC, US aircrews were very effective in employing nuclear weapons, but they were far less effective in employing conventional weapons as the Vietnam War approached. At the onset of Rolling Thunder, the average circular error probable (the radius of a circle centered on the target within which half of the bombs fall) was approximately 750 ft.40 Such a level of inaccuracy was relatively insignificant when nuclear weapons were used. However, it could prove very costly when trying to hit small targets with conventional weapons. Conventional air training was so far behind that the Air Force needed several years to improve the circular error probable of its conventional bombing to roughly 365 ft.
Equipment
In early 1965, the Air Force was only beginning to build up its air strength in South Vietnam. At that time, the Air Force had deployed more than 200 aircraft to the country. Just three years later, Air Force strength in South Vietnam consisted of more than 750 aircraft.42 The increase in the number of KC-135 refueling aircraft in Southeast Asia is a particularly telling example of this buildup. In March 1965, four KC-135s were based in Thailand; by 1972, that number was 110, not including the Okinawa-based tankers that supported B-52s. In ad***ion to the low number of aircraft at the start in Vietnam, the Air Force also relied heavily on old aircraft that were near the end of their useful service. The F-100, F-104, RF-101, and F-102 are a few examples of such aircraft. The most significant air-to-air threat facing USAF aircraft during the initial period of operations in the Vietnam War was the MiG-17. While the F-105 was faster at all altitudes than
the MiG-17, the MiG was far more maneuverable; and North Vietnam?Ts ground-control intercept (GCI) radar network further enhanced the MiG?Ts capability by vectoring it directly to ingressing F-105s. Since the F-105D had been developed to employ tactical nuclear weapons, it was designed to ingress and egress target areas at extremely high speeds. Thus, F-105s ?onever tried to out turn or out climb a MiG.?44 Instead, F-105s chose to outrun MiG-17s. To improve its performance against the MiG-17, the Air Force began replacing the F-100Ds with F-4Cs. The F-4C was superior to the F-100D in speed, acceleration, climb rate, and radar-intercept capability. Although it lacked the maneuverability of the MiG-17, the F-4 could dictate the terms of an air-to-air engagement because of its greater power. The Air Force?Ts CAS and interdiction capability underwent significant improvements from 1964 to 1965. The impetus for these improvements was the severe problems that the USAF experienced with its B-26 bomber and T-28 air-to-ground aircraft. All of the B-26s and T-28s were grounded in 1964 because of flying mishaps attributed to wing failures. This measure caused Maj Gen Joseph Moore, the commander of the 2d Air Division, to state that ?oSecond Air Division is practically out of business.?46 In May 1964, an excellent replacement was found in the Navy?Ts A-1 airframe. With its long loiter times and large ordnance loads, the A-1 was ideally suited for CAS operations. The only major weakness of the A-1 was its low airspeed, which occasionally resulted in long response times to tasked targets. Following the authorization to employ jet aircraft in South Vietnam, B-57 aircrews flew the first jet air strikes in South Vietnam on 19 February 1965. Soon after, F-100 and F-4 jets also began flying attack missions. The F-100, with its multiple arrays of weapon loads, and the F-4, which could carry as many as seventeen 750 lb bombs, represented a substantial increase in firepower.48 Modified versions of USAF undergraduate training airframes, such as the T-38 (became the F-5) and T-37 (became the A-37), also joined the war effort in early 1965. The fact that each was highly maneuverable, maintainable, and forgiving contributed to their success.
Air Superiority
The air superiority tactics employed in Vietnam were fundamentally different from those of Korea. In Korea, the USAF achieved air superiority early. It maintained air superiority by preventing Chinese air units from using the North Korean air bases located behind the positions held by the Chinese army in North Korea. It did so by damaging North Korean airfields. During the Vietnam War, on the other hand, the USAF?Ts protective fighter screen covered only Thailand and South Vietnam.
Therefore, the North Vietnamese air force (NVAF) operated from airfields that were immune to attack until the third year of the Rolling Thunder campaign.51 Ad***ionally, in 1965 the NVAF began bolstering its integrated air defense system by gradually increasing its number of surface-to-air missiles (SAM). Consequently, beginning in 1965, the Air Force carried out air missions, such as interdiction, while simultaneously trying to gain air superiority.
While the US Air Force was concerned about the air-to-air threat in South Vietnam, the most significant threat facing US aircraft at the beginning of 1965 was antiaircraft fire. At that time, older US aircraft were ideally suited for missions over North and South Vietnam. However, the North Vietnamese were also rapidly increasing their air defense threat in 1965. In September 1964, North Vietnam had 22 early warning (EW) and four fire control (FC) radars.53 By March 1965, the North Vietnamese had increased their EW radars to 31 and their FC radars to nine. SAMs would later pose a significant threat to USAF aircrews in Vietnam. However, that was not the case as early as March 1965.
In fact, North Vietnam did not launch the first of thousands of SA-2 SAMs at Air Force aircraft until July 1965. On 21 March 1965, Air Force aircraft began attacking North Vietnamese supply routes south of the 20th parallel and gradually shifted their assault north. Over the first month of these attacks, US aircraft did not face any NVAF fighters. However, NVAF training proved its effectiveness when a MiG-17 first downed a US aircraft on 4 April 1965. In response to the increased MiG-17 threat, the Air Force deployed EB-66 electronic warfare aircraft to Southeast Asia in April 1965. The EB-66s carried radar jammers that could mask the approach of US strike aircraft and degrade the effectiveness of North Korean GCI radars.57 As mentioned earlier, the F-4C was also introduced into the Vietnam War at this time. The F-4?Ts extended range AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided air-to-air missile (AAM), and close range AIM-9 Sidewinder infrared AAM provided the F-4 with a tremendous air-to-air capability.
Even though the F-4 was not as maneuverable as the MiG-17, the AIM-7 and AIM-9 allowed the F-4 to counter the MiG-17 without engaging in a dogfight. With its radar and AIM-9 capabilities,
the F-4C could detect and destroy enemy aircraft before they were close enough to pose a threat.58 However, in Vietnam, the F-4 was unable to capitalize on these advantages, because US Air Force rules of engagement (ROE) required that aircrews identify aircraft visually before attacking them.59 Consequently, when pursued by an F-4, a MiG-17 could stay just outside of the effective threat envelope of the AIM-7 and use its maneuverability to overcome the high speed and acceleration of the F-4. Although NVAF pilots did not achieve air superiority, they did challenge US air dominance in Vietnam more so than Chinese pilots did in the Korean War.
Close Air Support
Because counterinsurgency operations provide only few and fleeting opportunities for the employment of CAS, the CAS system in Vietnam developed gradually, and that development was sometimes painful and uneven.60 In fact, after examining this system in one study in 1965, the Air Force?Ts Special Air Warfare Board concluded, ?oThe present tactical air control system has grown up in the absence of a framework of doctrine for the conduct of tactical operations.?61 General Momyer corroborated this conclusion when he stated that prior to 1965 ?oit required a magician to figure out where the planes were flying.? To improve this situation, CINCPAC announced in April 1965 that the primary air mission in South Vietnam would be CAS, with the highest priority given to troops in contact. CAS sorties increased dramatically following this mandate from approximately 2,000 sorties in January to more than 13,000 in December. This new focus on CAS required the Air Force to perform a mission for which two decades of doctrine and training had poorly prepared it. This new emphasis on support of the ground war differed greatly from the Air Force?Ts strategic mission that had monopolized its attention since World War II. While the CINCPAC mandate to focus on CAS was issued in April 1965, the impetus for the change had already begun. The Air Force provided advisors to each Army echelon down to the battalion level. These advisors served as FACs and ALOs in TACPs. In this arrangement, ground commanders would specify targets, prioritization, and desired effects. The Air Force advisors, meanwhile, would inform the ground commanders how tactical airpower could best satisfy their requests. Even though FACs had operated very effectively from the air during the Korean War, the Air Force largely ignored this practice between the Korean War and the beginning of US involvement in Vietnam, preferring to limit FAC operations to the ground. For this reason, the Air Force gave all of its light spotter planes to the Army after the Korean War. It was not until 1963 that the Army provided the Air Force with O-1 aircraft for FAC training.
On 9 March 1965, the Air Force removed most of the remaining restrictions on the use of jet aircraft in Vietnam. Removing these restrictions required new tactics and procedures for CAS. An important consideration in formulating these tactics was striking a balance between attacking the target accurately and avoiding ground fire. To achieve this balance, Air Force pilots flew at 1,500 ft as frequently as possible, because the enemy used predominately small arms fire and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) against ingressing aircraft. Air Force pilots also devised a plan of attack to confuse the enemy forces and keep them from determining from which direction the strikes would come. A flight of four jets normally would coordinate with the FAC, who would provide the flight leader with ad***ional details of the mission. The flight leader could then recommend changes, and the FAC would determine whether to implement them. Finally, the FAC would mark the target with smoke, and the flight leader would strike the target while still operating under control of the FAC.
Despite improved coordination and practices, the CAS mission continued to encounter difficulties. Ultimately, foliage, terrain, and weather con***ions of South Vietnam hindered CAS operations. More importantly, the nature of the war itself in March and April 1965 was not ideally suited for CAS. Unlike conventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations rarely involved definitive battles of large-scale forces. Instead, most engagements in Vietnam consisted of small-size hit-and-run raids by the Vietcong that normally lasted 20 minutes or less. Consequently, very seldom did US aircrews have well-defined CAS targets to attack. Even when they did, enemy soldiers usually took cover before the aircrews arrived. Of note, USAF achieved more favorable CAS results as larger battles developed in late 1965 and early 1966. However, such results remained elusive in early 1965.
Interdiction
After the North Vietnamese and Vietcong attacked US installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon in early 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson moved from a strategy of exchanging retaliatory strikes to one of gradually increasing pressure. The first strikes implementing this strategy were initiated in February 1965 in Operation Flaming Dart. These attacks were soon followed by those on 2 March 1965, which marked the start of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign that would continue through October 1968.
The initial plans for Rolling Thunder called for attacks against LOCs in Laos and below the 19th parallel in North Vietnam. Generals LeMay and McConnell?"the Air Force chiefs of staff immediately before and after February 1965, respectively?"strongly argued that the initial view of Rolling Thunder was overly restrictive. While they agreed that LOCs in the southern part of North Vietnam were valid targets, they thought the most significant elements of the enemy?Ts logistical network were ports, railroads, marshalling yards, supply centers, and bridges in the northern part of North Vietnam. They argued that attacks against hundreds of jungle trails in the
South would be less effective than attacks against key logistical targets in the North. On 2 March 1965, the first Rolling Thunder attack struck the Xom Bang ammunition depot just north of the 19th parallel. The next attack, which targeted an island off the coast of Vietnam and another ammunition depot north of the 19th parallel, was not conducted until 13 days later on 15 March.72 While Air Force senior leaders were displeased with the focus and irregularity of the bombing, they could not blame the process for the poor results of the bombing operations. The bomb damage assessment of the Flaming Dart raids during February 1965 revealed that air attacks destroyed less than 10 percent and damaged less than 5 percent of the 491 buildings that were targeted.73 As mentioned earlier, the Air Force?Ts training focus on nuclear bombing between the Korean and Vietnam Wars largely accounted for this poor performance. While it would take some time, the Air Force would improve its bombing effectiveness.
By the end of March, the purpose of Rolling Thunder had shifted from attacking North Vietnam?Ts will to fight to interdicting the country?Ts supply routes. As a result, target selection became even more focused on interdiction targets such as bridges, tunnels, rail lines, roads, river transportation, and other key rail, road, and river chokepoints. Looking beyond the initial period of operations, Rolling Thunder sorties flown each week increased fourfold to fivefold from the outset of the campaign. These attacks began to degrade North Vietnam?Ts rudimentary transportation system. However, ultimately, the Rolling Thunder attacks would not be successful in bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.
Conclusion
After the Korean War, the United States was convinced that never again would it become involved in a war like the one in Korea, where the full capability of the US military could not be employed. Consequently, Air Force strategy and doctrine remained as committed to nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation as ever. While the Air Force attempted to develop counterinsurgency doctrine, it essentially only paid lip service to this form of warfare. Lack of joint doctrine also resulted in a chaotic C2 structure that involved even less coordination and integration of air operations than was the case in Korea.
Because much of the Air Force?Ts training prior to the Vietnam War corresponded with its nuclear-oriented strategy and doctrine, US aircrews were very effective in employing nuclear weapons but not conventional ones. However, unlike their counterparts in the Korean War, these aircrews were able to operate at airfields in-country for several years prior to the initial period of operations. This advantage likely assisted them in making adjustments during that initial period, thus resulting in improved CAS and interdiction operations. Ad***ionally, the A-1 and F-4 CAS aircraft that aircrews flew in Vietnam were more effective than the F-51 and F-80 CAS platforms that aircrews flew in Korea. Yet, despite the employment of a new fighter and AAMs, the Air Force was not as successful in improving its air superiority capability. This diminished success
was largely due to restrictive ROE and a robust North Vietnamese effort to strengthen its air defense system as the war ensued.
By the end of the Vietnam War, enemy tactics had evolved from counterinsurgency to conventional force-on-force operations. Given that, as the US Air Force looked to the future, it would once again be faced with the dilemma of predicting on which type of war it should base its strategy and doctrine.

Số lượng phân bố KQ Mỹ ở khu vực Đông nam Á cho chiến tranh Việt nam
Trước khi tiến công, địch bao giờ cũng cho máy bay trinh sát đi chụp hình đường bay chiến đấu. RF 101, RA 5C, RF 4C là loại trinh sát có người lái, được cải tiến từ máy bay tiêm kích (R - reconnaisance: trinh sát. F - Fighter tiêm kích). Loại trinh sát không người lái được lập quỹ đạo trước và đem "thả" vào bằng C 130.
Dưới đây là ảnh chụp trinh sát của một chiếc RF 101
Trận địa tên lửa
Máy bay gây nhiễu điện tử EB 66. Thằng này có nhiệm vụ chế áp điện tử với rađa tên lửa. Đội hình bay thường có 2 chiếc, bay đan hình cũi lợn, quỹ đạo elip ở địa phận Tuyên Quang - Hoà bình. Chúng bảo vệ đội hình đánh phá rất hiệu quả, làm giảm đáng kể hiệu suất chiến đấu của tên lửa và cao xạ điều kiển bằng rađa của ta. Quân chủng quyết tâm tìm diệt chúng, nhưng rất khó khăn. Chỉ có một số rất ít trận mật phục của ta đem lại kết quả, diệt được một số chiếc. Nhưng trong quá trình tìm diệt, phi công và tên lửa ta thiệt hại cũng không nhỏ.
Thằng EB 66 bao giờ cũng được đội hình F4 bay theo yểm hộ.
Cứu giặc lái nhảy dù

Số lượng phân bố KQ Mỹ ở khu vực Đông nam Á cho chiến tranh Việt nam
Trước khi tiến công, địch bao giờ cũng cho máy bay trinh sát đi chụp hình đường bay chiến đấu. RF 101, RA 5C, RF 4C là loại trinh sát có người lái, được cải tiến từ máy bay tiêm kích (R - reconnaisance: trinh sát. F - Fighter tiêm kích). Loại trinh sát không người lái được lập quỹ đạo trước và đem "thả" vào bằng C 130.
Dưới đây là ảnh chụp trinh sát của một chiếc RF 101
Trận địa tên lửa
Máy bay gây nhiễu điện tử EB 66. Thằng này có nhiệm vụ chế áp điện tử với rađa tên lửa. Đội hình bay thường có 2 chiếc, bay đan hình cũi lợn, quỹ đạo elip ở địa phận Tuyên Quang - Hoà bình. Chúng bảo vệ đội hình đánh phá rất hiệu quả, làm giảm đáng kể hiệu suất chiến đấu của tên lửa và cao xạ điều kiển bằng rađa của ta. Quân chủng quyết tâm tìm diệt chúng, nhưng rất khó khăn. Chỉ có một số rất ít trận mật phục của ta đem lại kết quả, diệt được một số chiếc. Nhưng trong quá trình tìm diệt, phi công và tên lửa ta thiệt hại cũng không nhỏ.
Thằng EB 66 bao giờ cũng được đội hình F4 bay theo yểm hộ.
Cứu giặc lái nhảy dù

Phân bố máy bay
Báo cáo của Mỹ về số máy bay bị mất trong năm 72
Các bác có ai biết gì về hệ thống sân bay trong nam không? Không nói đến các sân bay nhỏ, dưới đây là list các sân bay lớn:
Hệ thống các sân bay lớn của Miền nam (Có cái lớn so với phản lực, có cái lớn so với trực thăng).
1. Sân bay Tuy hoà (đậu F 100 Mỹ)
2. Sân bay Biên Hoà (F100, F4, F5, A37,...)
3. Sân bay Tân Sân Nhất (F4, F5, A37,...)
4. Sân bay Đà nẵng (F5, A 37)
5. Sân bay Phú bài
6. Sân bay Nha trang
7. Sân bay Khe sanh
8. Sân bay Phước long (lớn với trực thăng)
9. Sân bay Chu lai
10. Sân bay Phan rang
11. Cam Ranh

Phân bố máy bay
Báo cáo của Mỹ về số máy bay bị mất trong năm 72
Các bác có ai biết gì về hệ thống sân bay trong nam không? Không nói đến các sân bay nhỏ, dưới đây là list các sân bay lớn:
Hệ thống các sân bay lớn của Miền nam (Có cái lớn so với phản lực, có cái lớn so với trực thăng).
1. Sân bay Tuy hoà (đậu F 100 Mỹ)
2. Sân bay Biên Hoà (F100, F4, F5, A37,...)
3. Sân bay Tân Sân Nhất (F4, F5, A37,...)
4. Sân bay Đà nẵng (F5, A 37)
5. Sân bay Phú bài
6. Sân bay Nha trang
7. Sân bay Khe sanh
8. Sân bay Phước long (lớn với trực thăng)
9. Sân bay Chu lai
10. Sân bay Phan rang
11. Cam Ranh

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