Những trận không chiến trên bầu trời Bắc Việt, 1965-1972 (Phần 1)

Lúc di chuyển đến các sân bay dã chiến phục kích đánh địch, phải cất cánh ở đường băng không đủ độ dài tiêu chuẩn, Mig 21 lắp 2 quả tên lửa đẩy ở đuôi nhằm tăng tốc và tăng lực nâng.
Hồi đầu chưa sử dụng tốt tên lửa K-13 (Atol 2) để đánh đối không, nhiều trận Mig 21 treo kết hợp tên lửa và rocket để đánh địch. Đã nhiều lần Mig 21 lập công bằng rocket.
Mig 21 đời đầu, giống như F4-A,B,C,D, cũng không được lắp súng. Về sau do nhu cầu thực tế chiến đấu mới lắp thêm súng ở dưới bụng:

Đôi chút thông tin về Chiến dịch Sấm Rền từ KQ Mỹ:
Nguồn
http://www.af.mil/history/spotlight.asp?storyID=123009921
Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder was a frequently interrupted bombing campaign that began on March 2, 1965 and lasted until the end of October 1968. During this period U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft engaged in a bombing campaign designed to force North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh to abandon his ambition to take over South Vietnam.
...
The perceived danger from Communist China influenced President Johnson''s choice of means for ensuring the survival of a South Vietnam independent of the North. In 1950, when United Nations forces threatened to overrun North Korea, China had come to the aid of its Communist neighbor. As the Vietnam War intensified in 1965 and 1966, so, too, did the Chinese commitment to the survival of North Vietnam. By the spring of the latter year, some 50,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam, a total that may have tripled before China began to withdraw its forces in 1968. During this period of involvement, China made no secret of its sympathy for the Hanoi government; prudence therefore required that the Johnson administration consider the possibility of further Chinese intervention.
...
Air Force losses during Rolling Thunder were 531 aircraft destroyed and 547 airmen killed, captured, or missing over the entire campaign. Ironically, Secretary McNamara''s gradual application of air power contributed to the toll by giving North Vietnam time to improve its defenses with weapons imported from China and the Soviet Union. In the Spring of 1968 the North Vietnamese manned thousands antiaircraft weapons.
...
To persuade the North Vietnamese to negotiate, President Johnson restricted the bombing of North Vietnam to the southern part of the country on March 31, 1968, in effect, bringing Operation Rolling Thunder to an end. Preliminary discussions began in Paris in May but stymied over trivial issues. In November, Johnson made another concession, ending the bombing throughout the north, and serious negotiations began in January 1969.
Source: Air Force History Support Office

Đôi chút thông tin về Chiến dịch Sấm Rền từ KQ Mỹ:
Nguồn
http://www.af.mil/history/spotlight.asp?storyID=123009921
Operation Rolling Thunder
Operation Rolling Thunder was a frequently interrupted bombing campaign that began on March 2, 1965 and lasted until the end of October 1968. During this period U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft engaged in a bombing campaign designed to force North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh to abandon his ambition to take over South Vietnam.
...
The perceived danger from Communist China influenced President Johnson''s choice of means for ensuring the survival of a South Vietnam independent of the North. In 1950, when United Nations forces threatened to overrun North Korea, China had come to the aid of its Communist neighbor. As the Vietnam War intensified in 1965 and 1966, so, too, did the Chinese commitment to the survival of North Vietnam. By the spring of the latter year, some 50,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam, a total that may have tripled before China began to withdraw its forces in 1968. During this period of involvement, China made no secret of its sympathy for the Hanoi government; prudence therefore required that the Johnson administration consider the possibility of further Chinese intervention.
...
Air Force losses during Rolling Thunder were 531 aircraft destroyed and 547 airmen killed, captured, or missing over the entire campaign. Ironically, Secretary McNamara''s gradual application of air power contributed to the toll by giving North Vietnam time to improve its defenses with weapons imported from China and the Soviet Union. In the Spring of 1968 the North Vietnamese manned thousands antiaircraft weapons.
...
To persuade the North Vietnamese to negotiate, President Johnson restricted the bombing of North Vietnam to the southern part of the country on March 31, 1968, in effect, bringing Operation Rolling Thunder to an end. Preliminary discussions began in Paris in May but stymied over trivial issues. In November, Johnson made another concession, ending the bombing throughout the north, and serious negotiations began in January 1969.
Source: Air Force History Support Office

Thông tin do Mỹ claim về không chiến:
Overall, during the air war over North Vietnam, the United States had a 2.63 : 1 victory-loss ratio comparing all U.S. losses to Vietnamese losses, and, when non-fighter aircraft are removed from the comparison, this rose to a 2.85: 1 air superiority edge over the North Vietnamese Air Force in fighter vs. fighter combat. But even given better radar and missile technology, the primary U.S. air-to-air fighter, the joint service and multipurpose McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II, had only a 3.46 : 1 overall exchange rate against various (and more agile) MiG opponents.
This reflected primarily training, restrictive rules of engagement, and usage deficiencies, but also the problems of operating a heavy airplane never really intended for hard-maneuvering dogfighting against opponents optimized for the air-to-air combat arena. (In Korea, by comparison, F-86 Sabre pilots shot down ten MiG-15?Ts for every Sabre lost, and sometimes as many as
fourteen per friendly lost).
When Vietnam?Ts numbers are looked at in even greater detail, far more serious lessons are drawn: while 1960?Ts Mach 1.5-Mach 2 supersonic American fighters had a 5.70 : 1 advantage over the subsonic Korean War-vintage MiG-17, they only had a 3.33 : 1 advantage over the Mach 1.5 supersonic MiG-19, and but a 1.8 : 1 advantage over the Mach 2 MiG-21.

Thông tin do Mỹ claim về không chiến:
Overall, during the air war over North Vietnam, the United States had a 2.63 : 1 victory-loss ratio comparing all U.S. losses to Vietnamese losses, and, when non-fighter aircraft are removed from the comparison, this rose to a 2.85: 1 air superiority edge over the North Vietnamese Air Force in fighter vs. fighter combat. But even given better radar and missile technology, the primary U.S. air-to-air fighter, the joint service and multipurpose McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II, had only a 3.46 : 1 overall exchange rate against various (and more agile) MiG opponents.
This reflected primarily training, restrictive rules of engagement, and usage deficiencies, but also the problems of operating a heavy airplane never really intended for hard-maneuvering dogfighting against opponents optimized for the air-to-air combat arena. (In Korea, by comparison, F-86 Sabre pilots shot down ten MiG-15?Ts for every Sabre lost, and sometimes as many as
fourteen per friendly lost).
When Vietnam?Ts numbers are looked at in even greater detail, far more serious lessons are drawn: while 1960?Ts Mach 1.5-Mach 2 supersonic American fighters had a 5.70 : 1 advantage over the subsonic Korean War-vintage MiG-17, they only had a 3.33 : 1 advantage over the Mach 1.5 supersonic MiG-19, and but a 1.8 : 1 advantage over the Mach 2 MiG-21.

CONTROL OF THE AIR: THE ENDURING
REQUIREMENT
By
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES
Air Force History and Museums Program
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111
September 8, 1999
Trang 18:
Overall, during the air war over North Vietnam, the United States had a 2.63 : 1 victory-loss ratio comparing all U.S. losses to Vietnamese losses, and, when non-fighter aircraft are removed from the comparison, this rose to a 2.85: 1 air superiority edge over the North Vietnamese Air Force in fighter vs. fighter combat. But even given better radar and missile technology, the primary U.S. air-to-air fighter, the joint service and multipurpose McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II, had only a 3.46 : 1 overall exchange rate against various (and more agile) MiG opponents. This reflected primarily training, restrictive rules of engagement, and usage deficiencies, but also the problems of operating a heavy airplane never really intended for hard-maneuvering dogfighting against opponents optimized for the air-to-air combat arena. (In Korea, by comparison, F-86 Sabre pilots shot down ten MiG-15â?Ts for every Sabre lost, and sometimes as many as fourteen per friendly lost).

CONTROL OF THE AIR: THE ENDURING
REQUIREMENT
By
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES
Air Force History and Museums Program
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111
September 8, 1999
Trang 18:
Overall, during the air war over North Vietnam, the United States had a 2.63 : 1 victory-loss ratio comparing all U.S. losses to Vietnamese losses, and, when non-fighter aircraft are removed from the comparison, this rose to a 2.85: 1 air superiority edge over the North Vietnamese Air Force in fighter vs. fighter combat. But even given better radar and missile technology, the primary U.S. air-to-air fighter, the joint service and multipurpose McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom II, had only a 3.46 : 1 overall exchange rate against various (and more agile) MiG opponents. This reflected primarily training, restrictive rules of engagement, and usage deficiencies, but also the problems of operating a heavy airplane never really intended for hard-maneuvering dogfighting against opponents optimized for the air-to-air combat arena. (In Korea, by comparison, F-86 Sabre pilots shot down ten MiG-15â?Ts for every Sabre lost, and sometimes as many as fourteen per friendly lost).

Mỹ thừa nhận hiệu quả của KQ ND Việt nam.
Ban đầu tỷ lệ chung chỉ dùng mỗi một máy bay tiêm kích hộ tống cho 5 phi cơ oanh tạc (1:5). Về sau đến giai đoạn năm 1968 đã phải đổi hẳn "thái độ", tỷ lệ chung cả đoàn bay thì cứ 1 máy bay oanh tạc cần có đến 2 tiêm kích hộ tống (2:1).
CONTROL OF THE AIR: THE ENDURING
REQUIREMENT
By
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES
Air Force History and Museums Program
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111
September 8, 1999
Trang 18:
Under these circumstances, even the presence of a few MiGs threatening airborne strike packages induced a defensive mindset that resulted in strikers jettisoning bombs.
As historian Wayne Thompson has written, ?oAlthough only a little more than ten percent of the USAF?Ts 625 aircraft losses in combat over North Vietnam were to MiGs, the MiG?Ts caused expensive jettisoning of bombs and the dedication of fighters to patrol duty rather than strike duty.?4 For example, by the end of 1967, there were only thirty MiG?Ts operating in North Vietnam--but the percentage of Air Force strike sorties jettisoning bombs rose from 2% to more than 10%; on December 19 of that year, fully fifty percent of the strikers on one mission--20 of 40 aircraft--jettisoned their bombs when confronted by twelve threatening MiG?Ts. As a result, by February 1968, the ratio of Air Force fighter sweep and fighter escort sorties to strike sorties rose from less than 1 : 5 to 2 : 1. In short, a numerically inferior force of enemy fighters had disrupted an entire campaign, even though that campaign, at least in theory, possessed ?oair superiority.?

Mỹ thừa nhận hiệu quả của KQ ND Việt nam.
Ban đầu tỷ lệ chung chỉ dùng mỗi một máy bay tiêm kích hộ tống cho 5 phi cơ oanh tạc (1:5). Về sau đến giai đoạn năm 1968 đã phải đổi hẳn "thái độ", tỷ lệ chung cả đoàn bay thì cứ 1 máy bay oanh tạc cần có đến 2 tiêm kích hộ tống (2:1).
CONTROL OF THE AIR: THE ENDURING
REQUIREMENT
By
Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES
Air Force History and Museums Program
Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111
September 8, 1999
Trang 18:
Under these circumstances, even the presence of a few MiGs threatening airborne strike packages induced a defensive mindset that resulted in strikers jettisoning bombs.
As historian Wayne Thompson has written, ?oAlthough only a little more than ten percent of the USAF?Ts 625 aircraft losses in combat over North Vietnam were to MiGs, the MiG?Ts caused expensive jettisoning of bombs and the dedication of fighters to patrol duty rather than strike duty.?4 For example, by the end of 1967, there were only thirty MiG?Ts operating in North Vietnam--but the percentage of Air Force strike sorties jettisoning bombs rose from 2% to more than 10%; on December 19 of that year, fully fifty percent of the strikers on one mission--20 of 40 aircraft--jettisoned their bombs when confronted by twelve threatening MiG?Ts. As a result, by February 1968, the ratio of Air Force fighter sweep and fighter escort sorties to strike sorties rose from less than 1 : 5 to 2 : 1. In short, a numerically inferior force of enemy fighters had disrupted an entire campaign, even though that campaign, at least in theory, possessed ?oair superiority.?

BAN CÁN SỰ ĐẢNG NGOÀI NƯỚC
***
VỤ TUYÊN HUẤN DÂN VẬN
CHUYÊN ĐỀ
KỶ NIỆM 30 NĂM CUỘC TỔNG TIẾN CÔNG MÙA XUÂN 1975 GIẢI PHÓNG HOÀN TOÀN MIỀN NAM, THỐNG NHẤT TỔ QUỐC (30/4/1975 ?" 30/4/2005)
THÁNG 3-2005
Trích trang 5:
"
Ngày 6/4/1972, Mỹ tiến hành chiến tranh phá loại bằng không quân và hải quân ra miền Bắc lần thứ 2, đánh phá ác liệt Hà Nội và các thành phố lớn, dùng Hạm đội 7 đánh phá ven biển, thả thuỷ lôi phong toả cảng và biển miền Bắc với quy mô và mức độ huỷ diệt chưa từng thấy.
Quân và dân miền Bắc vừa sản xuất vừa chiến đấu ngoan cường, sáng tạo, giáng cho không quân và hải quân Mỹ những đòn đích đáng. Từ 6/4/1972 đến 17/1/1973 đã bắn rơi 754 máy bay (có 61 B52, 10 F111), bắt sống hàng trăm giặc lái sừng sỏ, bắn cháy 9 tàu chiến. Đặc biệt trận ?oĐiện Biên Phủ trên không? trong 12 ngày đêm năm 1972 đã chôn vùi ?ouy thế không lực Hoa Kỳ? tới tận bùn đen. Để chi viện cho chiến trường miền Nam, Bộ Chính trị quyết định tăng cường lực lượng lớn và củng cố các tuyến vận tải chiến lược. Đến 1971 đã triển khai gần 1.000 km đường ống dẫn dầu vào Nam và tăng 10 lần số xăng dầu cho chiến trường. Chúng ta đã đưa vào miền Nam gần 20 vạn tấn vũ khí trang bị, gần 10 vạn cán bộ, chiến sĩ, điều 6 trung đoàn với đầy đủ vũ khí cho Khu 5 và Tây Nguyên, điều 10 tiểu đoàn, 100 đại đội và trung đội đặc công cho miền Nam."
Bắn rơi 61 B52 là một con số rất lớn.
Trong cuốn Tạp chí Lịch sử và Nhân chứng chuyên đề kỷ niệm 25 năm chiến thắng Điện Biên Phủ trên không 12/1997 có liệt kê rõ từng trận đánh, địa điểm đánh, đơn vị đánh, số lượng đạn sử dụng của từng trận trong số 60 trận (có một trận bắn rơi 2 B52 một lúc).
Tất nhiên con số của Mỹ đưa ra thì ít hơn rất nhiều.
" The campaign was expensive, and not merely in financial terms. 15 Buffs were lost and 33 of their aircrew killed or missing in action. While the Air Force justifiably regarded the B-52 losses as severe, in one minor compensation, North Vietnamese SAMs had hardly proven magical, with a kill ratio of only 2% to 3% of the number of SAMs fired. They had scored the kills by simply flooding the sky with SAMs, and the Soviets were not happy about the poor showing of their weapons. "
- - -
Mỹ: "In another small compensation, North Vietnamese MiG interceptors proved completely ineffective at taking on the Buffs, scoring no kills and with two of them shot down by the "quad-fifties" in B-52 tail turrets"
Trong khi phía ta báo cáo đã có phi công Phạm Tuân và Vũ Xuân Thiều bắn rơi 2 B-52 vào sau Noen.