SEAD và Phòng tránh - Đánh trả !

Ngoài GPS, trong tên lửa còn trang bị song song các hệ dẫn đường quán tính, dẫn đường theo địa vật. Bản đồ số dùng chung cho các hệ dẫn đường này.

Để định vị mục tiêu với tên lửa hành trình thì cần GPS và bản đồ số hóa. Nếu thiếu 1 trong 2 cũng không được, ngoài ra để tăng thêm độ chính xác cần thêm hệ thống định vị quang học (Optical Homing System).
Đối với tên lửa đạn đạo ngoài hệ dẫn đường quán tính cần bổ sung thêm hoặc là GPS hoặc OHS.

Tui mới tìm thấy bài báo về chiến tranh Nam Tư năm 1999, bác nào thạo ngại ngữ dịch dùm cho mọi người cùng xem:
(tạp chí Military parade của Nga)
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Issue 34. July - August 1999
LESSONS OF THE BALKAN WAR
Yuri Rodin-Sova, President of the Defence Systems Financial and Industrial Group
March 1999 was marked by the beginning of yet another war in the world, one in a long series of armed conflicts. However, this war was different. First, it began in the center of Europe, and second, it was blatantly aggressive. The situation reminded one of a school fight when a gang of high school guys beat up a junior school pupil, while other students stand around them, feeling sorry for the boy and wondering why he still keeps on resisting. Indeed, why did Yugoslavia resist NATO air raids for so long? Why did NATO''s anticipated ''blitzkrieg'' fail? NATO obviously planned to carry out a small victorious war to mark its forthcoming 50th anniversary, but those plans failed.
Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf area had been such a success! The anti-Iraq Coalition''s first air raid quickly shattered Iraq''s air defenses, and soon after Coalition aircraft freely flew above Iraq, destroying targets without being afraid that they could be shot down. Also, they showed to the whole world how they could guide their missiles-even into a targeted window of a building.
And now such a failure in Yugoslavia! Yugoslavia had the same air defense systems that Iraq had, and made at the same time, but the effect was quite different. The war in the Balkans has proved once again the old truth: it is not the weapons that fight but the people who control them that makes the difference. A well-organized fire system, an efficient combination of different arms and fire means, and a good knowledge of the enemy and the enemy''s tactics, enabled Yugoslav air defense troops to down NATO aircraft, including the much-vaunted F-117 stealth plane, cruise missiles and other aircraft.
In the not so remote past, during the wars in Vietnam and the Middle East, aircraft that participated in air raids had to fight air defenses in order to make their way to targets. Both aircraft and air defenses suffered heavy losses in such fighting. According to an established practice, if aviation losses reached 20 percent in fighting air defense systems, pilots terminated their missions and returned to their bases. The self-preservation instinct prevailed over combat orders.
To reduce pilots'' deaths, many countries around the world began to develop pilotless aircraft to break through air defenses and deliver strikes at targets. Emphasis in those efforts was made on cruise missiles (Tomahawks, ALCMs and others). The first cruise missiles were far from perfect: they had a small range, were not accurate, and were intended to destroy targets largely owing to the great capacity of their (usually nuclear) charges.
Now things have changed. The understanding that a global nuclear war would be suicidal, together with the strong wish to flex their muscles and show to the world who the real boss is, prompted the United States and its NATO allies to develop precision-guided weapons. These are really very accurate missiles capable of delivering a high-yield conventional charge into any window at a distance of 2,500 kilometers. To ensure this accuracy, a global navigation, communications and information support system was set up, comprising satellites and ground-based centers equipped with state-of-the-art computers.
Why put pilots'' lives at risk now? Today, one can hit targets from the deck of the Missouri battle ship, while drinking coffee after each Tomahawk launch. Usually cruise missiles break through air defenses at a low altitude and in a narrow sector, covered by jamming. This factor faces air defenses with the need to destroy all cruise missiles breaking through them. Now one cannot expect that heavy missile losses will lead to the termination of combat missions, so targets will remain in danger until the last missile is destroyed. Air defense systems have to concentrate all of their available means to repulse missile attacks, fire very many antiaircraft missiles, and use all reconnaissance and target designation means available. The enemy easily reconnoiters an intensively operating air defense system, detects its active elements and then destroys them. After that, pilots can fulfill their missions, fearing no resistance. Such tactics were used in Iraq.
Of course, it is difficult to say how exactly Yugoslav air defenses operated, but the little information that was made public gives one an idea about some elements of their tactics.
Yugoslavia''s air defenses were comprised mostly of Soviet-made medium-range missile systems built in the 1970s-1980s. It was these systems that quickly cooled down the combative NATO warriors. Deployed on advanced defense lines and mutually connected by a system of control from highly protected command posts, the systems created zones and belts of defense, forcing enemy aviation to act in extremely unfavorable con***ions. The systems did not attack cruise missiles, but tried not to let piloted aircraft reach their targets. Their efforts produced good results, forcing NATO pilots to make very many mistakes. The pilots either dropped their bombs onto the wrong targets, or their missiles flew into neighboring countries. NATO aviation suffered losses too, despite its immense superiority.
To combat cruise missiles, Yugoslav air defenses took avail of the missiles'' weak points in combat uses. The main weak point of a cruise missile is that to fulfill its combat mission it must reach and hit its target, just like a kamikaze. The Yugoslavs placed small-range air defense systems and small-caliber antiaircraft artillery around and at possible targets and successfully downed cruise missiles while they were approaching a target.
These tactics resulted in the high survivability and high efficiency of the Yugoslav air defenses. The use of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery instead of medium-range anti-aircraft missiles (this factor was very important in con***ions of a total blockade) made the Yugoslav air defense system efficient and mobile.
One may ask, if the Yugoslav air defense was so well-organized and efficient, why did NATO keep destroying facilities and buildings and killing people in Yugoslavia?
First, NATO ensured an overwhelming superiority of forces for itself (remember the example with high school guys beating up a junior school pupil?). Second, it achieved complete isolation of Yugoslavia, after which it began an all-out war of extermination. The damage inflicted on the Yugoslav air defenses was not repaired and kept increasing, resulting, in the final analysis, in their reduced efficiency.
Other factors that weakened the air defenses included the lack of an early warning system and insufficient electronic intelligence and radar reconnaissance.
So, what conclusions can one draw from the war in Yugoslavia?
1. Short and medium-range air defense missile systems should be placed not around potential targets in a bid to defend them on all sides, but on advanced lines, creating zones of solid fire and defense lines far from the targets, on the country''s borders. Such zones will keep piloted aircraft at a distance, forcing them to deploy into combat formations while they are away from the targets, imposing on them direct land-air fighting, inflicting heavy losses on them and forcing them to cancel their mission. Such air defense systems must not combat cruise missiles, or they would expose their fire systems too early, or it would be the equivalent to shooting at sparrows from a cannon.
2. To defend target facilities properly, it is advisable to use highly mobile, short-range air defense missile systems and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. These armaments are characterized by their high accuracy, high rate of fire and short reaction time, and are capable of destroying all types of cruise missiles and, if armed with hypersonic air defense missiles, even individual warheads of tactical missiles at the final stage of their approach to targets. Being highly maneuverable, these air defense means can create, within a short period of time, a high density of fire in a narrow sector of an enemy cruise missiles'' breakthrough, thus ensuring their maximum destruction.
Also, they can quickly disperse, avoiding enemy strikes. Their high cross-country ability and small size make it possible to use them inside large-area targets (towns, areas of troops'' location, etc.) and thus increase the depth of the air defense fire zone. Small-size air defense systems can be used to cover larger systems from air and ground attacks.
3. It requires a stable and reliable control system to allow such air defense systems to function, and thus to ensure the high efficiency of all air defenses. Today, the creation of a centralized air defense control system is a must for any country wishing to have highly efficient air defense.
The main elements of any modern air defense system must include stationary and mobile command posts which must be equipped with automated control systems that will ensure the automatic solution of a majority of arising problems, and allow people to concentrate on strategic issues in forthcoming or current land-air fighting.
Other important elements are large-scale reconnaissance and communications. An early detection of the enemy, exposure of its plans, and the fast transmission of information about them to command posts will help to quickly and efficiently distribute tasks among the system''s elements and concentrate the main air defense means on the main axis of the enemy''s advance. The lack of such a system will lead to the scattering of forces, require the creation of circular defense zones around facilities, and cause a sharp increase in the cost of the air defense system to achieve the required efficiency, or a decrease in its efficiency, which is unacceptable.
In this article I have deliberately not mentioned possible actions of air defense fighter aircraft and electronic warfare means. First, these issues must be analyzed by specialists from those arms, and second, I believe their analysis will only confirm the main conclusion of this article, namely that the future belongs to zone-based air defense groupings. Attempts to create circular defense zones around facilities will only cause the undesirable scattering of forces and means and reduce their efficiency.
The main element of zone-based groupings must be automated command posts capable of controlling various air defense means, united by a high-speed and reliable communications system, while being provided with all kinds of reconnaissance information.

Tomahawk BGM-109 của Mẽo đi vào hoạt động từ những năm 70 còn hệ thống GPS đến năm đó vẫn còn trong giai đoạn phát triển và testing. Đến năm 1993 thì thế hệ Block III của BGM-109 mới có tích hợp GPS bên cạnh các hệ dẫn đường sẵn có là TERCOM - Terrain Contour Matching và DSMAC Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation để tăng độ chính xác. Nhiễu hệ GPS thì nó vẫn có độ chính xác như giai đoạn trước khi xài GPS thôi chứ không thể vô hiệu hóa được.