Thử bàn xem tiềm lực quân sự của nước nào mạnh nhất trong ASEAN?

mình có lẽ nên tiết kiệm tiền 1,2 năm rồi mua đồ chơi xịn xịn tí để xứng tầm quan trọng và chiến lược của ở ĐNÁ.
Hy vọng vài năm nửa cũng sắm 1 tá Su tương tự hay hơn Su-30MKM ( Su-30MKI càng tốt để chơi Bramos" cho đồng bộ.
theo tôi thì NC nên mua Mig-35 thì tốt hơn. Thêm vài diệt lôi hạm nữa là được.

lọ mọ thế nào lại thấy cái này, cũng không cũ đâu, mời các bác xem (lại thôi) toàn cảnh cái quân đội nhà mình:
B. Armed Forces Overview
TOTAL STRENGTH
489,000
Vietnam''s armed forces maintain three regular services, supported by a multi-million strong militia. The army is the dominant service, reflecting its historical and political role in the three conflicts that have defined the country''s efforts to gain independence from France, unite the country under communism and defend national sovereignty against China.
The army''s status is enshrined with the revolutionary mandate of the Communist Party of Vietnam to govern and will therefore not be challenged by the air and naval services. However, as Vietnam''s strategic environment becomes more complex due to China''s precipitous strive towards becoming an Asian hegemon and the steadier build-up of military capabilities among regional powers, greater emphasis can be expected to fall on the country''s ability to define and protect its often distant offshore claims.
Efforts to meet this air and naval-based requirement are now clearly evident, though financial constraints and other priorities mean the moves are often little more than symbolic. Further, the army leadership is unlikely to watch with equanimity if it considers that it is not receiving the material and financial support its position within the national pantheon merits. For this reason, the present army priority of maintaining disproportionately large regular and militia forces will prevail and air force and navy capabilities will remain limited.
Men and women become eligible for military service at the age of 18. Nearly a million men reach military age each year. However, the competing demands of the country''s economy, the growth in tertiary education and a marked reluctance by many young people to serve up to four years in the military has greatly reduced the number of potential recruits. This has been partially offset by inducting more women into the military, but the long-term solution will require the armed forces'' leadership to accept that the age of mass armies has given way to smaller, well-equipped and highly-motivated establishments.
Chain of Command
Commander in Chief : President Tran Duc Luong
Minister of National Defense: General Pham Van Tra
The military is slowly bringing forward officers into senior field command positions who were too young to have fought in the Vietnam War. The 30th anniversary of the end of the war in April 2005 may serve to accelerate this process. The absence of an immediate land-based threat and the recognition that armed forces modernization is essential for long-term defense needs will place a far greater emphasis on the country''s naval and air forces and their attendant requirement for technically adept commanders.
However, this reform process can be expected to be resisted by elements within the political and military establishments, notably the army.
Doctrine and Strategy
Vietnam''s military doctrine is rooted in the principals of Soviet and Chinese doctrine acquired by Vietnam''s commanders during the anti-colonial and civil wars that combine guerrilla and main force strategy and tactics. A considerable effort was made by General Giap in the 1970s to move Vietnamese doctrine away from emphasizing guerrilla operations and toward territorial defense, as reflected in the successful campaign against the Chinese in 1979. Ongoing territorial disputes with China along their land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, has also accelerated the development of a more comprehensive combined-services approach.
Strategic Weapons
Vietnam has no strategic weapons and is unlikely to be able to afford them in the near future. Any decision by Vietnam to develop and build indigenous short- and medium-range weapons will depend on cost and an assessment of its long-term strategic relationship with China.
Declared Policy
It is unclear whether or not Hanoi has a declared policy of non-use or non-development of strategic weapons. However, it is certain that it has not yet exercised the option to pursue strategic weapons programs.
Ballistic Missiles
In April 1999 it was reported that Vietnam had acquired a number of ''modified Scuds'', thought to be Scud-Cs, from North Korea to complement its existing stock of Russian-made SS-1/Scud-Bs. The purchase agreement for the missiles was signed in the mid-1990s and was part of a USD 100 million package for defense equipment which also included midget submarines. NO further information has been forthcoming as to whether Hanoi intends to buy more SSMs from Pyongyang, but bearing in mind North Korea''s willingness to sell, Vietnam''s previous interest and the reasonably close political ties between the two countries, it remains a distinct possibility.
Vietnam is thought to now favor cooperation with India, with reports that New Delhi is assessing whether to provide Hanoi with its Prithvi surface-to-surface missile. However, such a move may reflect India''s desire to put pressure on China over its Myanmar policy, which has led to the deployment of Chinese forces close to key Indian strategic bases in the Andaman Islands, rather than a serious offer to upgrade Vietnam''s ballistic missile forces.
Nuclear Weapons
It is thought possible that Vietnam is attempting to develop a nuclear capacity, although there is no hard evidence *****ggest this is actually the case and the country is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is therefore believed that this attempt has gone no further than a desire expressed by elements of the political elite. With Vietnam''s desire to be a more ''mainstream'' country it is highly unlikely this desire will ever come to fruition. Furthermore, the country has no civilian nuclear generation capability.
In 2000 a number of Japanese companies (Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Toshiba) announced their intention to set up a joint operation in Vietnam to bid for the construction of its first nuclear power plant. The proposal is believed to be undergoing scrutiny by the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission.
Vietnam''s civilian nuclear ambitions became apparent in November 2000 when the country''s Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment signed an agreement with South Korea''s Power Corporation to further develop their co-operation in the fields of nuclear power, the operation of the country''s research reactor in Da-lat, nuclear law, and the use of nuclear material in medicine.
In January 2002 local media reported that the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (EVN) planned to build the country''s first nuclear power plant by 2020. However, a pre-feasibility study acknowledged the problems such a project would entail, ranging from environmental factors to the country''s lack of trained nuclear scientists and technicians, and accepted that it could not be undertaken without extensive foreign expertise and support.
Biological Weapons
Vietnam signed the signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1980. There is no evidence of the country currently possessing biological weapons.
Chemical Weapons
A party to the Geneva Protocol, Vietnam has no proven history of the use of chemical weapons, although it has been accused of their usage in Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam signed the Chemical Weapons Convention upon its opening in January 1993, and deposited its ratification in 1998. Police units are equipped with non-persistent anti-riot irritants.
Assessment of Covert Programs
Vietnam has the technical capability to build some types of weapons of mass destruction but lacks the required funding and infrastructure to undertake such a project, as well as any obvious military necessity. The experience of the Vietnam War, when the Vietcong resistance and regular Vietnamese units were able to confront and ultimately prevail over the technologically superior United States military, suggests that Vietnam has the potential to master other asymmetric capabilities, such as information warfare and computer-hacking.
While there is no indication Vietnam has conducted research in this area, in 2002 the military indicated its potential ambition by making inquiries to Israel Aircraft Industries over the acquisition of military communications satellites. The system apparently discussed was the Amos communications satellite, sold to China earlier the same year at a cost of around USD100 million each. There is no indication that this project has moved beyond the enquiry stage.
Inventory: Strategic Weapons
Vietnam holds an unknown number of North Korean Scuds and may be seeking Indian-built short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. .
Source: Jane?Ts Information Group

C. Army
STRENGTH
420,000 (regular)
INFANTRY
Infantry division - 58
Mechanized infantry division - 3
ARMOUR
Brigade - 10+
ARTILLERY
Brigade - 10
Organization
The army is built around 61 infantry divisions, only three of which are mechanized. The size of these divisions varies from 5,000 to 12,500 troops depending on location and state of readiness. The infantry divisions are bolstered by autonomous armored and artillery brigades, with militia and paramilitary reserve forces also providing support.
Army HQ in Hanoi oversees eight military regional commands, each responsible for a number of divisions depending on the perceived local threat. The Army''s principal weakness is its lack of modern equipment and inadequate training.
Assessment
Despite a lack of equipment and other resources, Vietnamese soldiers remain highly capable. This reflects their senior commanders'' combat experience as junior officers in the Vietnam War, the brief but intense border war with China in 1979 and the decade-long Cambodian incursion that finally ended in the late 1980s. However, the passage of time is rapidly eroding this cadre of experienced senior officers. An absence of direct threats to national sovereignty can be expected to erode the military''s hard-earned skills base, while a shortage of funds will fail to offset this loss of experience through a greater dependence on technology.
Military service is still seen by the country''s conservative leadership as a rite of passage. However, the absence of a credible threat, membership of ASEAN, the demands of the economy and a young population that has little connection and probably less interest in the country''s revolutionary past, has challenged the rationale of the citizen-soldier. Many young men seek to avoid conscription through prolonging higher education and other strategies often only available to the elite and professional classes, leaving military service to the poor and those without skills or influence. Such inequalities may contain the seeds of a social division that could damage the armed forces'' perception among the next generation of administrative and commercial leaders. Such an outcome could result in the isolation or even marginalization of the military.
Further reductions in manpower, greater professionalism and career opportunities, as well as modernization, could help shape the country''s defense needs. However, any neutral appraisal of Vietnam''s strategic priorities would quickly identify the army''s grip on the defense agenda as the principal reason why more assets have not yet been allocated to the navy and air force. It is therefore uncertain whether a reassessment of the army''s objective needs and a reallocation of limited resources will be addressed within the short- to medium-term.
Role and Deployment
Of the 14 major bases at which army units are deployed in strength, all but Haiphong and Dien Bien Phu are located in what was South Vietnam.
Peace Support Contributions
The Vietnam Army has made no contributions to multinational peace support operations.
Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine
Operational art and tactical doctrine is based on the Soviet model. During the 1970s the army transferred its orientation from guerrilla operations to the requirements of territorial defense. The success of this shift in doctrine was highlighted in the brief conflict against the Chinese army, which ended in a humiliating defeat for China in 1979. Future doctrinal changes will, in common with most countries, reflect national threat perceptions. In the case of Vietnam, these can be expected to focus primarily on maintaining national borders, presenting a credible military deterrent to potential opponents and serve as the ultimate internal source of authority for the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam.
Army Bases
õ? Ban Me Thout
õ? Bien Hoa
õ? Binh Thuy
õ? Cam Ranh Bay
õ? Can Tho
õ? Da Nang
õ? Dien Bien Phu
õ? Haiphong
õ? Hue
õ? Khe Sanh
õ? Kontum
õ? Lang Son
õ? Pleiku
õ? Quang Tri
Inventory: Armor
Type Role Quantity
In Service
T-34/85 Main Battle Tank 50
n/a
T-54/55 Main Battle Tank 800 n/a
T-62 Main Battle Tank 60 n/a
Type-59 Main Battle Tank 350 n/a
Type-63 Light Tank 300 n/a
PT-76 Light Tank 300 n/a
BRDM-2 Reconnaissance Vehicle 90 n/a
BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicle 300 n/a
BTR-40,50,60, 152 Armored Personnel Carrier 350 n/a
Type YW531 Armored Personnel Carrier 100 n/a
M113 Mod Armored Personnel Carrier 50 n/a
Notes
1. The above figures are compiled from a number of unofficial sources and should only be treated as estimates. There are no reliable figures available with regard to the number of vehicles in service. Likewise, while much of the equipment may be included in inventories, considerable amounts are cannibalized for spare parts.
2. Probably unserviceable.
Inventory: Artillery
Type Role Quantity In Service
203 mm M110 Self-Propelled Howitzer 25 none
155 mm M109 Self-Propelled Howitzer 50 none
152 mm 2S3 Self-Propelled Howitzer 30 30
155 mm M114 Howitzer n/a n/a
152 mm M1937 Howitzer n/a n/a
152 mm D-1 Howitzer n/a n/a
152 mm Type 66 Gun-Howitzer n/a n/a
152 mm D-20 Gun-Howitzer 100 n/a
130 mm M46 Field Gun n/a n/a
130 mm Type 59 Field Gun n/a n/a
130 mm Type 59-1 Field Gun n/a n/a
122 mm D-30 Howitzer n/a n/a
122 mm M1938 Howitzer n/a n/a
122 mm D-74 Field Gun n/a n/a
122 mm M1931/7 Field Gun n/a n/a
122 mm Type 60 Field Gun n/a n/a
120 mm 2S9 Self-Propelled Gun 30 30
105 mm M101 Howitzer n/a n/a
105 mm M102 Howitzer n/a n/a
100 mm M1944 Field Gun n/a n/a
85 mm D-44 Field Gun n/a n/a
76 mm M1942 Field Gun n/a n/a
SU-100 Self-Propelled Gun 100 50
SU-85 Self-Propelled Gun 100 30
140 mm BM-14-16 Multiple Rocket System 36 n/a
122 mm BM-21 Multiple Rocket System 300 n/a
107 mm Type 63 Multiple Rocket System 300 n/a
160 mm M43 Mortar n/a n/a
120 mm M43 Mortar n/a n/a
107 mm M30 Mortar n/a n/a
82 mm M43 Mortar n/a n/a
81 mm M29 Mortar n/a n/a
60 mm M19 Mortar n/a n/a
Note
The above figures are compiled from a number of unofficial sources and should only be treated as estimates. Aside from these, there are 2,000 towed artillery pieces known to be in service, but no comprehensive breakdown by type is available.
Inventory: Anti-Tank Weapons
Type Role Quantity In Service
9K11/9M14 (AT-3) Anti-Tank Guided Missile n/a n/a
Fagot (AT-4) Anti-Tank Guided Missile n/a n/a
107 mm B-11 Recoilless Rifle n/a n/a
85 mm D-48 Anti-Tank Gun 100 100
82 mm B-10 Recoilless Rifle n/a n/a
75 mm Type 52, 57 Recoilless Rifle n/a n/a
RPG-2/7 series Rocket-Propelled Grenade 500 500
Inventory: Air Defense Weapons
Type Role Quantity In Service
Strela-2 (SA-7) Manportable SAM 1,000 250e
2K12 (SA-6) Medium-Altitude SAM 100 80
Strela-1 (SA-9) Low-Altitude SAM 500 400
Igla (SA-18) Low-Altitude SAM 50 n/a
57 mm ZSU-57-2 Twin Self-Propelled AAG 100 100
57 mm S-60 Anti-Aircraft Gun 100 100
37 mm M1939 Anti-Aircraft Gun 250 150e
30 mm M53 Anti-Aircraft Gun 500 300
23 mm ZSU-23-4 Quad Self-Propelled AAG 100 30e
23 mm ZU-23 Light Anti-Aircraft Gun 1,000 900
14.5 mm ZPU Light Anti-Aircraft Gun 1,000 400
12.7 mm M53 Light Anti-Aircraft Gun 500 none
Notes:
1. As of 2001 air defense came under the control of the air force.
2. In September 2003 Vietnam reached a USD 200 million deal with Russia for at least two battalions of S-300PMU1 surface-to-air missile systems. They are due for delivery in 2005.
Inventory: Infantry Weapons
Type Role
7.62 mm Tokarev Pistol
7.62 mm Type 68 Pistol
7.62 mm SKS Rifle
7.62 mm Type 56 Rifle
7.62 mm AK-47 Assault Rifle
7.62 mm AKM Assault Rifle
7.62 mm K-50M Sub-Machine Gun
7.62 mm MAT-49 Sub-Machine Gun
7.62 mm PPSh-41 Sub-Machine Gun
7.62 mm Type 53/67 Light Machine Gun
7.62 mm DPM/RPD Light Machine Gun
7.62 mm SGM Medium Machine Gun
12.7 mm DShK Heavy Machine Gun
Source: Janeõ?Ts Information Group

C. Navy
STRENGTH
39,000 (including 27,000 naval infantry and 3,000 conscripts)
FRIGATE
6
CORVETTE
5
SUBMARINE
2
FAST ATTACK CRAFT - MISSILE
10
Organization
The Navy has a complement of 9,000 regulars and 27,000 Naval Infantry. Conscripts serve a three to four year period of service.
From 1978 to 1990 the USSR transferred a number of ships and craft, as well as providing fuel in return for the use of Cam Ranh Bay Naval base. From 1 January 1991 the relationship became a formal one, with further transfers available only at market prices. Many of the ex-US craft have now been deleted, either by sale or by scrap.
Chain of Command
Chief of Naval Forces : Vice Admiral Mai Xuan Binh
Deputy Chief of Naval Forces: Rear Admiral Tran Quang Khue
Assessment
The Vietnamese Navy is relatively weak despite the country''s significant maritime interests, including its ambitious claim to islands in the South China Sea. As such, the Navy''s Order of Battle stands in stark contrast to its poor operational capability. Spares are in short supply and many ships can lay only a tentative claim to operational availability. The relationship which began with the Soviet Union during the Cold War is still important, not least in order to maintain a minimum of operational readiness among the fleet.
Most of the ex-US/South Vietnamese ships captured 30 years ago have been disposed of or sold. There are many hulks tied up alongside Vietnamese naval craft which are being cannibalized for spares for operational vessels. While it does have two coastal submarines transferred from North Korea, four new Russian-built Tarantul class corvettes and Osa class missile attack crafts, in comparison to other regional navies (China, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia) Vietnam''s capabilities are weak. Efforts to rectify this are likely to be slow and heavily dependent on the country''s economic performance. Further, the relatively benign offshore maritime security environment in the northern South China Sea and the absence of any recent territorial dispute with China serve to erode any sense of urgency over increased spending on naval capabilities.
The lease of Cam Ranh Bay to the Russian Navy was terminated in mid-2001. Vietnam has no overt intention to make the base available to other countries, although its size makes it attractive to the United States, India and China, who would all be able to provide both valuable funds and the opportunity for some training of the Vietnamese Navy. By mid-2005, there was however no obvious civil or military role for the huge facility. The port is one of the best deep-sea anchorages in Asia, and with a ship repair facility as well as a strategic position it remains a valuable asset for Vietnam.
One indicator of the general improvement in relations with the US is the continuing development of links between the two countries'' navies. There have been three port visits by US Navy warships since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975: November 2003 (Ho Chi Minh City), July 2004 (Danang) and April 2005 (Ho Chi Minh City). The most recent port visit was widely seen as part of the ceremonies to mark the 30th anniversary of the end of the war.
Training
Only a limited amount of training can be undertaken because of the Navy''s lack of funds. In October 2002 Vietnam asked India to provide submarine training, but it was unclear whether the move was linked to its 1997 acquisition of two small platforms from North Korea or to a new program. Vietnam''s interest in submarine training coincided with an expansion of undersea-warfare capabilities under way in Southeast Asia.
Naval Installations
The fleet is organized into four regions based on, from north to south, Haiphong (HQ), Da Nang, Nha Trang and Cân Tho. There are other bases at Cam Ranh Bay, Hue and Ha Tou.
Ad***ional smaller Navy installations are not depicted on the following map.
Inventory: Surface Fleet
Type Role Quantity Delivered
Petya II/III Frigate 5 1978/84
Barnegat Frigate 1 1971
Tarantul (Type 1241) Corvette 4 1998
BPS 500 Corvette 2 1998
Ho-A Class (Type Molnya 1241.8) Fast Attack Craft - Missile 3 2005?
Osa II Fast Attack Craft - Missile 8 1979/81
Shershen Fast Attack Craft ?" Torpedo 3 1973/83
Turya Fast Attack Craft - Torpedo 5 1984/6
Zhuk (Type 1400M) Fast Attack Craft - Patrol 18 1978/90
Stolkraft Large Patrol Craft 4 (+12)
Svetlak Large Patrol Craft 2 ((+2)
SO 1 Large Patrol Craft 3 1980/3
Poluchat Coastal Patrol Craft 2 1990
Various River Patrol Craft n/a n/a
Polnochny (Type 771) Landing Ship Medium 3 1979/80
1-510 Landing Ship Tank 1 1960s
511-1152 Landing Ship Tank 2 1960s
T 4 Landing Ship Utility 10 1967/9
Various Ex-US Landing Craft Mechanized/Utility 32 1960s
Yurka (Type 266) Minesweeper - Ocean 2 1979
Sonya (Type 1265) Minewarfare - Coastal 4 1987/90
Yevgenya Minehunter - Inshore 2 1979/90
K 8 Minesweeping Boat 5 1980
Ex-Soviet Floating Dock 2 1983/8
Ex-Chinese SL Transport 12 1960s
Ex-Chinese Tanker 4 1960s
Notes
1. Up to 10 ships in this class planned.
2. Locally assembled.
3. Plans to assemble further 8 boats in Vietnam.
4. The Vietnamese Navy also operates two Yog 5 fuel lighters, two floating cranes and two ex-Soviet unarmed Nyryat 2 diving tenders. Other auxiliaries may also be used.
Inventory: Submarines
Type Role Quantity Delivered
Yugo/Sang-O Midget Submarine 2 1997
Note
The Vietnamese Navy acquired the two 90-ton submarines from North Korea.
Inventory: Naval Aviation
Those assets responsible for Naval-Aviation type tasks are operated by the air force.
Source: Jane?Ts Information Group

D. Air Force
STRENGTH
30,000 (Including Air Defense force (merged with the Air Force in 2000)
FIGHTER
Su-27/Su30, MiG-23, MiG-21
ATTACK HELICOPTER
Mi-24
CLOSE SUPPORT
MiG-21, Su-22
TRANSPORT
An-26, Mi-6
Organization
The air force is based around three operational front-line divisions, consisting of nine (possibly ten) fighter and ground-attack squadrons. In ad***ion to this are two transport and helicopter squadrons. Most equipment is of Soviet origin.
Chain of Command

Assessment
The Vietnamese Air Force operates many obsolete and obsolescent aircraft, of which a significant number must have reached the end of their serviceable life. While the feat of keeping a core of this aging force operational should be acknowledged, it is now far behind such modern regional air forces such as Singapore and Thailand. Given the country''s economic priorities and the absence of any immediate threat, there is no likelihood that the air force will be modernized in the foreseeable future. Instead, the limited resources available have been used in upgrading existing equipment and acquiring a few new platforms to ensure that at least a cadre of personnel retains relatively current skills.
The combat capability of the air force rests on seven Su-27s, four Su-30s and around 140 MiG-21MF/bis and Su-22M3/M4/MRs. Many of the older aircraft are unlikely to be operational despite on-going upgrade program. In ad***ion, the modern aircraft will almost certainly have to be returned to Russia for overhaul and maintenance, further reducing their effectiveness. There are also serious doubts over the ability of the air force to integrate its modern equipment, the result of limited flying hours available to pilots and the lack of the maintenance regime skills-base. India has provided some technical and maintenance assistance, and this relationship can be expected to strengthen and deepen.
Overall, Vietnam''s air force remains capable of providing limited air superiority and a more credible support role for the country''s land and naval forces. However, in the unlikely event the country is in conflict with even a middle rank power it is difficult to see what contribution the Vietnamese air force could make in determining the outcome.
Role and Deployment
Unit Air Base Aircraft Type Role
370 Division, HQ Da Nang Air Base
929 FR Da Nang MiG-21bis Air Defense/Attack
935 FR Bien Hoa MiG-21 Air Defense/Attack
937 FR Phan Rang Su-22M-4 Attack
? FR Phan Rang Su-27 Air Superiority
? FR Phan Rang Su-30 Air superiority
371 Division, HQ Hanoi/Noi-Bai Air Base
921 FR Hanoi/noi-Bai MiG-21bis Air Defense/Attack
927 FR Kep MiG-21bis Air Defense/Attack
931 FR Yen Bai MiG-21 Air Defense/Attack
372 Division, HQ Bai Thuong
923 FR Bai Thuong Su-22M-3 Attack/Reconnaissance
925 FR MiG-21 Air Defense/Attack
933 FR Kien An? MiG-21 bis Air Defense/Attack
Direct Reporting Units
910 PTR Nha Trang L-39C Training
916 HTR Hoa Lac Mi-8/17 Assault Transport
Mi-6 Heavy Support
Mi-24 Assault/Attack
917 TR Tan-son-Nhut An-26 Transport
918 TR Hanoi/Gia Lam An-26 Transport
An-2 Utility
920 TR Phu Cat MiG-21bis Conversion Training
MiG-21UM
954 HR Danang Ka-25 ASW/Surveillance
Ka-28 ASW/Surveillance
Ka-32T Utility
Notes
FR - Fighter Regiment.
HR - Helicopter Regiment.
HTR - Helicopter Transport Regiment.
PTR - Pilot Training Regiment.
TR - Training Regiment.
Peace Support Operations
No contributions to multinational peace support operations have been made.
Training
Until 1991 nearly all flying training took place in the Soviet Union. Since the end of the Cold War all training has been conducted in Vietnam, although some Vietnamese pilots may travel to India for this purpose in the future. The training school can only offer relatively limited pilot instruction.
Air Force Bases
Bac Mai
Cam Ranh Bay
Da Nang
Gia Lam
Hoa Lac
Kep
Kien An
Nha Trang
Phu Cat
Phuc Yen
Tan Son Nhut
Tho Xuan
Yen Bai
Inventory: Fixed Wing
Type Role Current Total First Delivery
Su-27 SK Air Superiority 7 1994
Su-30K2V Air Superiority 4 2004
MiG-21MF/bis Air Defense/Attack 110 1979
Su-22M3/M4/MR Attack 32 n/a
M-28B Bryza-1R Martine Surveillance 4 2004
An-26 Transport 30(5) n/a
An-2 Utility 4 2002
Aero L-39C Trainer 28 1980
MiG-21UM Trainer 25 1979
Su-22UM-3 Combat Trainer 6 n/a
Su-27UB Combat Trainer 5 1994
Note
1. planned to acquire a further 12-24 Su-27s by 2001 but financial constraints limited this order. So far only four Su-30MKs have been delivered.
2. An upgrade project involving MiG-21bis is currently under way.
3. Possible order for further 10 aircraft.
4. Further six aircraft on order.
5. Many withdrawn from use and in storage.
6. Delivered January 2002; An-2 previously operated but no older aircraft believed to remain in service
7. A further 10 aircraft were delivered in 2004 to replace those lost through accidents.
Inventory: Rotary Wing
Type Role Current Total First Delivery
Mi-24 Combat Helicopter 28 1981
Mi-8/17 Assault Helicopter 51 1970
Ka-25PL ASW Helicopter 5 n/a
Ka-28 ASW Helicopter 7 n/a
Ka-32T Utility Helicopter 2 n/a
Mi-6 Heavy Transport 10 1966
Inventory: Missiles
Type Role Quantity In service
AA-2 ''Atoll'' Air-to-Air n/a n/a
AA-8 ''Aphid?T Air-to-Air n/a n/a
AA-10''Alamo'' Air-to-Air n/a n/a
AS-7 ''Kerry'' Air-to-Surface n/a n/a
AS-9 ''Kyle'' Air-to-Surface n/a n/a
Inventory: Air Defense Systems
Type Role Quantity In Service
S-300PMU1 Long-range SAM 12 n/a
S-75 Dvina (SA-2) Low-Medium Altitude SAM n/a(1) n/a(1)
S-125 Neva (SA-3) Low-Medium Altitude SAM n/a(2) n/a(2)
130 mm KS-30 Anti-Aircraft Gun 500 100
100 mm KS-19 Anti-Aircraft Gun 1,000 200
85 mm KS-12 Anti-Aircraft Gun 2,000 300
Notes
1. Ordered in August 2003 and due for delivery in 2005.
2. 20 regiments, each with 18 launchers.
3. 10 regiments, with a total of 160 launchers.
Source: Janê?Ts Information Group

11. Security and Foreign Forces
Police
TOTAL STRENGTH
40,000
National Police
The role of the national police forces, reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, lies less in combating law-breakers and more in upholding party doctrine. Conventional police are composed of the urban People''s Security Force (PSF - also known as People''s Police), and the rural/village-based People''s Public Security Service (PPSF - also known as People''s Security Service). A plain clothes, secret police force is also in operation under the Ministry of the Interior.
Non-State Armed Groups
TOTAL STRENGTH
n/a
Organization
Anti-government forces represent a limited and diminishing threat to civil order and the communist government. The most formidable groups are in exile - mainly in North America - and they have been linked to occasional terrorist attacks within Vietnam since 1975. Their ability to commission or conduct operations within Vietnam or against Vietnamese state interests overseas have been severely curtailed since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. Further, the impetus for such attacks has diminished as an increasing number of exiles, or their foreign-born children, have returned to Vietnam to pursue business opportunities or reunite with their families.
Unrest still occurs among the hill tribes of the Central Highlands region, as outbreaks of violence in 2001 linked to population movement into the region indicate. However, such unrest is generally tied to land rather than political issues and should not be seen as reflecting insurgent or separatist sentiments.
Border Guards
TOTAL STRENGTH
40,000
Organization
The Border Guard force is believed to consist of 40,000 troops. In 1998, responsibility for the Border Guards was shifted from the Ministry of Public Security to the Ministry of Defense.
Coast Guard
TOTAL STRENGTH
n/a
Organization
The country''s coast guard was formed in 1998 as a separate command under the navy. According to various sources the decision to create a separate coast guard was the result of Hanoi''s desire to come to grips with smuggling and organized crime. Its precise level of resources and assets are unclear, but given that the priority for seagoing forces lies with conventional naval forces, the coast guard will continue *****ffer from a lack of funding.
Security Forces
TOTAL STRENGTH
4,000,000-5,000,000
Note
õ? Including the People''s Self Defense Force (urban units) and the People''s Militia (rural units)
Organization
Vietnam''s pervasive security forces permeate throughout all tiers of society and are primarily concerned with clamping down upon subversive anti-state activity. The major arm is the quasi-military, rurally based People''s Armed Security Force (PASF).
Foreign Forces
TOTAL STRENGTH
There are no permanently based foreign forces in Vietnam, although Russian advisors and trainers may be present.
Source: Janeõ?Ts Information Group

Sao 36 con Su27 thế bác. Mà SU30 đâu? Bác xem lại thế nào ấy. Riêng lũ Su27 ấy (nếu cos thật) chắc đập chết bọn Thái cái một quá.
Theo em về QS dĩ nhiên là mạnh nhất ĐNÁ rồi, khỏi phải bàn cãi.
Các chú còn lại đều là những con gà cả thôi. Thịt lúc nào mà chẳng được. HEEe
Được sheva551984 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 20:55 ngày 16/02/2006

bác àh số Su 27 còan đang order thêm mấy chục coan nữa kìa chứ nói gì 27!còn Su 30 thì cóa 4 chiếc MKx...!Su 30 chỉ dùng comand Sừ tác chiến thôi, kô cần mua nhiều làm gì!
Submarine: 2 thì giờ thành giáo cụ học tập hết rài, của CHDCND Triều Tiên đó cũ xì àh!
còn mấy cái Army Base đọc vào sao giống mấy cái battefiled lớn trong CTVN!
Navy nên bổ sung thêm Gepard patrol boat : 4 chiếc !
và thêm hệ thống phòng thủ tên lửa mới mua của Nga nữa!

bác giangnam dịch dùm bài của bác nói về tiềm lực quân sự của VN ra tiếng Việt đi............. em trình độ ko đủ ! cảm ơn bác nhiều

các bác ạh nếu xét về tiềm lực quân sự thì thằng em ngu muội này xin được khẳng định đó là NC vì thực tế đã chứng minh và chúng ta đã thấy ai nổi danh nhất ĐNÁ đó là NC
nhiều vũ khí chưa chắc đã mạnh đơn cử như thằng mẽo đó
thôi vũ khí và đôla của nó nhiều như thế mà có nuốt đươc chúng
ta đâu