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Tiềm lực kỹ thuật quân sự của Cộng hoà ND Trung Hoa

Chủ đề trong 'Giáo dục quốc phòng' bởi TenLuaVacvai, 24/12/2002.

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  1. Antey2500

    Antey2500 Thành viên rất tích cực

    Tham gia ngày:
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    Bạn vào cái link này chọn loại máy bay mình thích và kiếm số liệu:http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/index.html
    Còn nếu là các vủ khí TQ mua của Nga hay là Nga bán bản quyèn thì vào cảu Nga mà coi cho gọn

    With these advanced weapon the WW3 will be fought ,but in the WW4 they will fight with sticks and stones (Albert Eintein)
  2. Small_Dragon_new

    Small_Dragon_new Thành viên quen thuộc

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    Chào các bác. Lâu lắm mới quay lại TTVN. Rất vui là box này đã hoạt động trở lại và có phần vui hơn trước (lúc trước chỉ có mỗi bác Lê Kiên với tớ chán xì ).
    Tớ xin bổ sung thêm một số thông tin về tiềm lực quốc phòng của anh bạn Trung Quốc của chúng ta. Đây là tài liệu về loại tên lửa Dong Fen ( Đông Phong ) của Trung Quốc. Tôi rất tiếc chưa có thời gian dịch ra tiếng Việt cho các bạn.
    The DonFen in China
    In Asia, China's missile programme is the oldest (it started in the late 1950s) and the most advanced. Chinese nuclear weapons delivery systems are mainly land-based missiles, plus a few bombers and SLBMs. Chinese ballistic missiles are for the most part short- to intermediate-range systems (roughly 300 to 5,000 km/186 to 3,100 miles) presumably intended for use in local conflicts along the country's periphery or to attack targets throughout the Russian Far East (and as far as Moscow), as well as in the greater Pacific region. China also possesses a small ICBM force that is being modernised and growing in size with two new ICBMs (the DF-31 and DF-41) under development.
    A detailed analysis of the size of China's missile force is available in a separate document.
    Chinese SRBMs and IRBMs
    The first operational Chinese ballistic missile, the liquid-fuelled CSS-1, was reverse-engineered from two Russian R-2 (SS-3) IRBMs delivered in 1958. First flight tested in 1965, the CSS-1/DF-2 was a single stage system carrying a conventional high explosive warhead over a distance of some 1,200 km. The CSS-1 has since been largely superseded by the CSS-2, which can deliver a 3 mt nuclear warhead over a distance of some 2,800 km. Some 36 CSS-2s with conventional warheads were purchased by Saudi Arabia in 1988, where they are maintained and operated by Chinese personnel. The CSS-2 gives Saudi Arabia the longest-range TBM capability in the Gulf region, and enables them to target cities as far apart as Moscow, Algiers and Rome.
    According to a classified assessment by the U.S. National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) obtained in July 1997 by the Washington Times, China currently deploys 40 CSS-2s at six field garrisons and launch complexes. The report noted that this force is being reduced and will be replaced by solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBMs. The entire CSS-2 force could be phased out by 2002, according to the NAIC report. At the Tonghua Launch Complex in northeastern China near North Korea, China maintains 24 launchers, eight for CSS-2 class missiles and the rest for the CSS-5. An ad***ional four CSS-2 launchers are located at nearby Dengshahe Field Garrison, but training activity at this site has been low in the 1990s. Another 16 CSS-2 launch garrisons are in place at the Lianxiwang Launch Complex within striking distance of Taiwan. NAIC estimates that the CSS-2 force at this site will decline to eight launchers until "the system is retired" in the next decade. Two other launch sites were identified by NAIC: the Jianshui Launch Complex opposite Vietnam, which contains eight CSS-2 and eight CSS-5 launchers and allows target coverage of Southeast Asia and as far as India, and the Datong Field Garrison in central China, which contains CSS-2 and is apparently being modernized to accommodate the CSS-5.
    China's CSS-5 / DF-21 (Dong Feng or East Wind) MRBM and the CSS-3 / DF-4 IRBM are normally deployed with nuclear warheads. However recent reports suggest that China is reconfiguring some of its DF-21 missiles with conventional high explosive warheads following the Chinese military's analysis of the 1991 Gulf War. China is also reported to have started work on another IRBM, the DF-25, that can deliver conventional warheads up to a range of some 1,700 km. However reports during 1996 indicated that the DF-25 programme may now have been terminated. Chinese defence planners have apparently recognised that conventional, high-explosive missile warheads add an important deterrent and warfighting dimension, especially in regional conflict scenarios, permitting stand-off targeting without the need to cross the nuclear threshold.
    In the 1980s, China developed two new computer-guided SRBMs, the single-stage CSS-7 / DF-11 / M-11 and twin-stage CSS-6 / DF-15 / M-9 (M-11 and M-9 are the export designations). Both are solid-fuelled systems transported on an eight wheeled Transporter - Erector - Launcher Vehicle (TEL), and can be readied and launched far more rapidly than liquid-fuelled missiles. The CSS-7/DF-11/M-11 is a replacement for the liquid-fuelled Scud series, and entered service in China in 1992. The longer-range CSS-6/DF-15/M-9 is believed to have entered service in 1991. The DF-15 is designed so that, once launched, the missile body trails behind the separating warhead. This separating warhead system provides camouflage to the warhead, enhancing its chances of penetrating missile defence systems. Both the DF-11 and DF-15 are dual capable, (i.e. they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads). The 'missile tests' carried out near Taiwan in July 1995, and the exercises in March 1996, involved the firing of DF-15/M-9 SRBMs. In a 1997 report, the U.S. Department of Defense noted that the anti-Taiwan launches into specific missile closure areas "demonstrated a degree of accuracy not previously associated with Chinese missiles."
    Size of China's
    Missile Force
    China Table
    China Images
    Argentina
    Brazil
    Egypt
    India
    Iran
    Iraq
    Libya
    N. Korea Improving Accuracy
    In terms of overall accuracy improvements, China is incorporating Global Positioning System (GPS) updates into ballistic missile navigation systems, for example on guidance sets for the DF-15. China also may be working on a new radar-based terminal guidance system for the DF-21 MRBM. This radar-based guidance system would be similar to that employed on the highly-accurate and now defunct U.S. Pershing II missile, all of which were destroyed under the 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. If this proves to be as effective as the Pershing II, such a modification could potentially give the DF-21 an accuracy in the 50 m/164 ft. circular error probable (CEP) range.
    Chinese SRBM Exports
    Despite official denials from both parties, there is overwhelming evidence that China has exported at least 30 M-11s to Pakistan in contravention of the MTCR. China also appears to have reached an agreement with Iran *****pply components and/or production technology to produce the M-11. Some reports suggest that this production technology includes both propellant and guidance system facilities. China is also known to have built a production facility near Semnan in Iran which has been producing Oghab artillery rockets and the Iran-130 BSRBM since 1987. The status of China's exports of M-9s reportedly made to Syria in 1991 is unclear.
    A further Chinese programme, the CSS-8 / M-7 (project 8610) SRBM is a modified Russian SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) with solid-fuelled motors. China embarked on this programme after stealing Soviet SA-2 SAMs destined for North Vietnam via the Chinese rail network in 1966 or 1967 and reverse-engineering them as the HQ-2 SAM. China exported at least 20 CSS-8s to Iran in 1992, although their relatively short range means that they would be useful only in defence of Iranian territory or for limited strikes against neighbouring countries.
    Chinese ICBM Capabilities
    The most widely circulated estimate is that China maintains four to ten operational DF-5/5A ICBMs. However, this estimate may be dated. Recent credible reports from U.S. sources suggest that China actually fields 17-20 DF-5/5As. This ICBM is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a very high explosive yield of 4 to 5 megatons up to 13,000 km/8,060 miles. This missile was initially designed to target the continental United States, but it could be used to cover targets in Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as North America.
    Only two Chinese ICBM silos have been identified, both near Luoning in Henan Province in central China. Other Chinese land based strategic missile forces are known to be well dispersed and either road-mobile or located in hardened sites. Such deployments make China's missile forces hard for an opponent to target and thus highly survivable in the event of an attack, increasing China's potential political and military leverage in the event of war.
    Chinese ICBM Development Programmes
    China's ICBM programme has lagged that of the Former Soviet Union by almost 20 years. The CSS-4/DF-5 did not achieve full operational status until 1981, some ten years after its first successful flight test, and until the early 1990s, China's ICBM programme appeared to be stalled in the liquid-fuel stage. But China is now developing at least three new nuclear-armed ICBMs as part of its ongoing programme of military modernisation: the combined ICBM and SLBM DF-31/JL-2 programme, and the land-based DF-41. Significantly, these ICBMs differ only in detail from China's Changzhen (Long March) series of Space Launch Vehicles.
    Unlike the older CSS-4/DF-5 ICBM, the DF-31/JL-2, and the DF-41 are solid-fuelled systems, and indicate a significant advance in Chinese technical capabilities. The DF-31, one of which was test fired in land-based configuration in May 1995, is a road-mobile, three-stage ICBM with an anticipated range of 8,000 km. It is expected to be ready for service in the 1998-2000 timeframe. According to a classified U.S. Air Force assessment obtained in May 1997 by the Washington Times, the DF-31 "will give China a major strike capability that will be difficult to counterattacks at any stage of its operation, from pre-flight mobile operations through terminal flight phases." The DF-31 will likely incorporate "design aspects similar to those of current generation Russian missiles," according to this assessment. Such improvements include "upgraded mobility for the transporter-erector-launcher; advanced materials for the booster and payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff, and an improved solid propellant." US sources also suggest that the 1995 DF-31 test included deployment of MIRV. The DF-41, also a three-stage missile, will have a range of some 12,000 km and is scheduled to replace existing CSS-4/DF-5 ICBMs after 2000.
    Sea-Based Systems
    China has one operational Xia-class nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) armed with twelve CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBMs and one Golf-class conventionally-powered submarine, used initially as a test platform but now apparently deployed as an operational system and armed with two JL-1 SLBMs (the JL-1's range is 1,700 km/1,054 miles). The JL-1 SLBM, and its land-based counterpart the DF-21 MRBM, are China's first solid-fuel missiles, an important advance indicating China's growing technological capabilities. These Chinese SLBMs make it even more difficult for a potential adversary to neutralise China's strategic nuclear force.
    China is also developing a new class of SSBN, the Type 094, as well as a follow-on SLBM, the JL-2, with an anticipated range of 8,000 km/4,960 miles. According to a 1997 report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Type 094 SSBN will be "the largest submarine ever constructed in China." It will have improved quieting and sensor systems, and a more reliable propulsion system than the Xia. The initial Type 094 SSBN will be launched early in the next decade, and three boats may be operational by 2010. The Type 094 will carry 16 JL-2s. According to ONI, these SLBMs will enable China to "target portions of the United States for the first time from operating areas located near the Chinese coast."
    Threats to Taiwan
    The Chinese missile force is growing and provides Beijing with regional predominance. The Chinese can use this force as a deterrent, to exact bargaining leverage, or for intimidation purposes, as with their "missile tests" against Taiwan. China's high visibility missile threats directed at Taiwan involved a total of 10 launches, six in 1995 and four in 1996, demonstrating the serious impact ballistic missiles will have on the future regional security environment.
    Between 21-23 July 1995, the Chinese fired some six nuclear-capable DF-15 SRBMs from Fujian province to an East China Sea impact site 90 miles north of Taipei (one missile reportedly crashed in China due to a guidance system failure). Theses firings, conducted during a period of tensions in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, had an initial adverse impact on Taiwan's economy, including a one-day 4.2 percent drop in the stock market, until calm was restored.
    China launched its second set of "missile tests" on the eve of Taiwan's first democratic presidential election, firing another four DF-15s (two on 8 March and two on 13 March 1996) into two ocean impact zones that bracketed the island. Three missiles were fired into a closure zone that was 30 nm miles from the southern port of Kaohsiung and the other missile into a zone that was just 19 nm east of near the northern port of Keelung. The Chinese fired the missiles from the Huanan Mountain area.
    However, for Taiwan, these "missile tests" and related Chinese military manoeuvres caused serious concern and inspired more short-term economic panic. They also seriously impacted air and sea traffic flowing to and from Taiwan producing a virtual blockade. Indeed, subsequent analyses reveal that the March 1996 exercises, including the "missile tests", constituted the largest multi-service exercise ever conducted in the Taiwan Strait. The exercises were codenamed "Exercise Strait 961" and involved a full-scale contingency scenario for an invasion of Taiwan. These Chinese designed the exercise to show their resolve on the Taiwan sovereignty issue. According to a 1996 unclassified report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the Chinese forces taking part in this exercise were:
    ...forces from all three Chinese fleets, ground units, elements of the Second Artillery..., and at least one component of air defense missile troops equipped with the SA-10B [S-300/Grumble] surface-to-air missile.
    The SA-10B's presence [Naval Intelligence concluded] was 'both for exercise play and as a precautionary, defensive measure. The Chinese may have been concerned that Taiwan might miscalculate the nature and intent of the exercise.
    U.S. analyst Richard Fisher of Washington's Heritage Foundation has also learned from sources in Washington and Taipei that Beijing was prepared to launch between 20-30 DF-15s, which would have contributed to a serious escalation in regional tensions.
    China Tests DF-31 Missile
    China conducted a flight test of its Dong Feng (DF)-31 long-range missile on November 4, the Pentagon said December 12. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon would not provide many details on the test, saying simply, “The test was pretty much as expected in terms of timing and in terms of results.”
    The test, which was first reported in The Washington Times, advances China’s strategic modernization program, which is designed to increase the survivability and reliability of its small nuclear deterrent force.
    The DF-31 is a solid-fueled, road-mobile missile with an estimated range of 8,000 kilometers, meaning that, when deployed, it will be able to target portions of the northwestern United States. It was first flight-tested in August 1999. According to The Washington Times, China also tested the DF-31 in the spring of 2000 and in mid-December, but the Pentagon refused to confirm those tests.
    Currently, China is reported to have only about 20 ICBMs, known as DF-4s, capable of hitting the continental United States. The DF-4 is liquid-fueled and silo-based and has been in service for over 20 years. In ad***ion to the DF-31, China is developing another mobile ICBM that will have a longer range and will likely replace the DF-4.
    DF-21 / CSS-5
    The DF-21/21A (CSS-5) solid-fueled missile was originally developed as the two-stage JL-1. It was designed for deployment aboard China's SSBN, and it was decided to also develop it as a land-based missile, which was designated as the DF-21. Development of the DF-21 began in 1967 and had its first successful test in May 1985. Shortly thereafter, the DF-21 was deployed into an experimental regiment. Its range was later improved to 1800 kms (DF-21A) carrying a 600 kg warhead with a nuclear capability believed to be 200-300 kt. This mobile system is launched from a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle.
    It is believed that over 100 DF-21/JL-1 missiles have been built, and as of 1995 some 15 to 20 DF-21 missiles had been deployed, with deployments increasing to some 36 by 1997. Some DF-21s have been reconfigured with conventional warheads for use along China's southern and northwestern borders. From these locations, the DF-21 can hit targets throughout Northern India, the Republics of Central Asia, and most of Vietnam and Southeast Asia. As of late 1997 China had about 40 DF-3 refire-capable launchers at six field garrisons and launch complexes. Many of those launchers are being converted to handle new, solid-fuel DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 1] launchers and missiles. The number of CSS-2 sites will likely be reduced, since the United States no longer operates bases in the Philippines, and DF-15 [M-9] short-range missiles deployed along the eastern coast can be used to cover targets in Taiwan. The DF-21 deployments have been limited to areas closer to China's borders to ensure adequate target coverage of areas previously covered by the DF-3. In areas deeper inside China, where longer range is necessary for target coverage, DF-3 activities are relatively high, indicating the missile could remain in service in these regions until new missiles such as the DF-21 [CSS-5 Mod 2] are deployed. Once the DF-21 deployments are adequately under way, the CSS-2 will likely be removed completely from service, perhaps by 2002. The July 2000 Japan white paper on defense stated that China had 70 guided missiles capable of reaching Japan and other Asian countries. The white papernoted that China has been gradually replacing the old DF-3 missiles with the newer, more accurate DF-21 missiles.
    Work is believed to be ongoing to provide this missile with a sophisticated terminal guidance system. According to some reports the Mod 2 version of the CSS-5 will be comparable to the US Pershing II IRBM, employ advanced radar guidance to achieve extremely high accuracy.
    Specifications
    Contractor Academy of Rocket Motors Technology - ARMT
    Operator Second Artillery Corps
    Basing Chuxiong
    Jianshui
    Lianxiwang
    Tonghua
    Configuration Two Stage
    Length [meters] 10.7
    Diameter [meters] 1.4
    Mass [kilograms] 14,700
    Propellant Solid
    Guidance Inertial
    First Flight May 1985
    IOC 1989-1991
    Deployment Mobile
    Range (km) 1,800
    Re-entry Vehicle Mass (kg) 600
    Warhead Yield 200-300 KT
    CEP (meters) 300-400
    Launch Preparation Time 10-15 minutes


    Small Dragon

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