Tiềm lực quân sự Liên bang Nga (phần 4)

Status-6 tàu ngầm không người lái mang đầu đạn hạt nhân của Nga. 6 chiếc chứa trong tàu mẹ Project 09851 ' KHABAROVSK '. Còn hột le này dùng làm gì thì bác lấy dt gọi ngay cho putin để biết thêm chi tiết

Theo em nhớ ko nhầm thì ngư lôi mang đầu đạn hột nhơn có sức huỷ diệt ghê gớm ở chỗ nếu nó được bắn đi và kích nổ ở dưới biển tại vị trí gần bờ biển thì nó dẽ gây sụt lún và chấn động mạnh đến đáy biển và sẽ tạo ra con sóng cao tầm 20-30m quét sạch bờ biển phía Tây USA. Tính ra chắc sức tàn phá còn ghê hơn khi nổ trên bờ mà lại khá sạch sẽ.

Sao lại sạch sẽ? Nó hủy diệt đại dương bằng phóng xạ đấy

Kô ăn cá vs ngao sò nữa , cắt khúc bờ biển cho đấu thầu Bê Ô Tê làm rì sọt kết hợp nghỉ dưỡng + xạ trị , mô hình Fờ Lờ Cê xứ vịt

Do em nhớ ngày xưa LX có 3M10 Granit hột le Khủng hơn vì nó tên lửa hành trình tầm xa được phóng từ tàu ngầm. Do hiệp ước LX phải xxx em nó đi. Tác hại hột le của nó thì quá tay rồi. Với 1 quả ngư lôi hiện đại g thì 1 trái thì chắc tầm destroyer cũng muốn chìm rồi.

Bác cùi không hiểu ý em. Sạch sẽ ở đây theo mình là kiểu ném đá dấu tay, cũng khó đoán biết được ai làm với lại công chúng người ta ám ảnh bởi quả bom hình nấm chứ nó nổ dưới biển thì sao mà thấy mà ám ảnh được? Còn sinh vật biển bị ảnh hưởng thì cũng khá chung chung, đến giờ vẫn chưa thấy con Gozila nào cả! Nhất là bờ biển Thái Bình Dương bị Mẽo và Phớp cày nát bởi mấy quả bom H chứ chẳng phải bom A nữa!

http://technika.specwar.info/pozemni/rubikon/rubikon.png
Có bác biết thứ này là cái gì ko vậy - mình gg ra toàn tiếng nga, dùng gg dịch thì nói đại khái là trạm thu phát tín hiệu di động.

Hệ thống định vị và giám sát vô tuyến SHF 1RL243 Rubikon bác ợ

Bài viết vè KQ Nga, có so sánh giữa cuộc chiến 2008 và Syria.
Ngại dịch, mời các cụ đọc chơi
If the Russian Aerospace Forces’ performance took NATO by surprise, it is because earlier Russian operations did not suggest that level of ability. Russian aviation took serious losses in the 2008 conflict with Georgia: 7 aircraft shot down including a Tu-22M bomber, 4 damaged, or one loss per each 17 combat missions. There was practically no new aircraft procurement since 1994. Russian aircrews flew far fewer hours than their NATO counterparts.

But the Georgia conflict served as a wake-up call and led to reforms which proved both crucial and successful.

Russian airpower was reduced in numbers, and reorganized into 8 air bases, each supporting several air groups based on individual airfields, which allowed individual pilots to get more flying time. In 2012, the air bases and air groups were renamed divisions and regiments.

Starting with 2012, new and modernized aircraft began to enter service in large numbers. By 2014 and 2015, Russian air forces were receiving 100 new or thoroughly modernized aircraft a year, and that pace is expected to continue in 2016. By 2020, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) are expected to have at their disposal about 1500 mostly modern combat aircraft, including 130 heavy bombers such as the Tu-160, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M, over 800 fighters, and over 500 tactical bombers and attack aircraft.

These reforms led to the Russian VKS demonstrating a number of capabilities which seemed beyond its reach only seven years earlier:

• The ability to deploy and sustain a force of 100 combat aircraft for several months in difficult con***ions, and the ability *****stain a high rate of combat missions.
• The ability to function in a “reconnaissance-strike complex” mode, which enables intelligence data obtained by a variety of sources, including aircraft, satellites, drones, and agents, to be converted into targeting data to allow even mobile targets, such as enemy mobile troop or supply columns to be quickly targeted.
• The ability to conduct close air support as well as battlefield interdiction and suppression against an enemy practiced in concealment.
• The ability to operate in any weather con***ions, at any time of day.
• The ability to use precision-guided munitions.
• The ability to integrate long-range aerial early warning aircraft such as the A-50 and intelligence and ground surveillance aircraft, such as the Il-20 and Tu-214R, into the overall concept of operations.
• The ability to use drones on a large scale and as part of an integrated aerial operation.
• Granted, the picture is not perfect. Here is what Russian airpower has not demonstrated in Syria:
• The ability to organize and operate large aerial “strike packages” against sophisticated aerial and anti-aircraft defenses. To be sure, while US and some NATO forces may have had that ability a decade ago, it has been degraded by NATO airpower being used in Afghanistan and Iraq.
• The ability to use large numbers or a large variety of precision-guided munitions. Russian aircraft did use many satellite-guided KAB-500R bombs and Kh-29L laser-guided missiles. But most of the munitions dropped were unguided bombs and aerial rockets, aided by sophisticated on-board digital ballistic computers which allowed them to strike their targets with a fair degree of accuracy. Russia does not have tactical stand-off munitions like the SDB or AASM or the JASSM tactical cruise missile. Such weapons are in development and have been shown at MAKS-2015, but they will not be in service for years. On the other hand, perhaps there is a silver lining in this, because Russia is not over-reliant on satellite navigation systems to the same extent as NATO which might well experience a shock once it tries to use such weapons against opponents more sophisticated than the Taliban.

The maturity of some of the most modern aerial systems which entered service only very recently. The Su-30SM, Su-35S and Su-34 do appear to have at least minimum operational capabilities, as their performance in Syria did not give reason to doubt their performance. At the same time, the conflict did not push them to the edge of their performance, as most of the missions were performed equally well but much older though upgraded Su-24 bombers. Russian aircraft in Syria did not include the Mi-28N or Ka-52 attack helicopters, which raises questions about the degree of their operational maturity. However, nothing suggests these aircraft are failures in the same sense as the F-35, for example.

Everything suggests that the Russian VKS will not rest on their laurels but instead will continue to build on their strengths and eliminate weaknesses, so that it will be an even more capable force in the next conflict it has to fight.

Tớ lại sợ sau này cá mập lại bé tí như cá trích thì món súp vi cá đắt lắm.