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Tìm hiểu Biên giới Việt Nam-lào, Việt Nam-Campuchia

Chủ đề trong 'Lịch sử Văn hoá' bởi khansephiroth, 18/09/2005.

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  1. ngodong13

    ngodong13 Thành viên mới

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    Lạc đề,tự xử!
    Được ngodong13 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 17:28 ngày 11/10/2005
  2. bibop

    bibop Thành viên mới

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    ặ chuè? 'êè? naè?y 'ang laè? biên giặĂèi VN-CPC, VN-LAO cặĂ maè?, coè mÂèy baè?i baèo trên diêèfn 'aè?n cuè?a tuèÊi Campuchia tôi bôèt luôn vaè?o 'Ây 'êè? lÂèy thêm tặ liêèÊu
    The Expansionist õ?oDevelopment Triangleõ?
    by Dy Kareth, August 22, 2005.
    Currently, by launching a õ?oSpecial Economic Zoneõ? in Svay Rieng province, Mr Hun Sen and his ministers were actively preparing Cambodian opinion to the so-called "boundless benefaction" from economic cooperation projects with neighboring countries, particularly with Vietnam.
    In fact, there is a new Vietnamese-Lao-Cambodianõ?Ts ô economic cooperation ằ project which will be developped in parallel with the unceasing borders displacement towards the interior of Cambodia''s territory. Known as "Development Triangle," closely studied for several years, this project encompasses Cambodiaõ?Ts provinces of Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri. The establishment of this "Triangle" will be accompanied by the resettlement of new Vietnameseõ?armiesõ?of colonists on lands belonging to Khmer farmers living in the affected provinces. This is a new expansionist march perpetrated by Hanoi against Cambodia.
    The official Vietnamese newspapers provide ample information on the creation and the objectives of the õ?oTriangleõ? whereas the Royal Government of Cambodia, the Phnom Penh politicians and newspapers provide little to no information on this new agreement between the three countries.
    1. Recently, the highland Khmer population of Mondolkiri did not lie when they furiously denounce the forced seizures of their ancestral lands by the people from the Chinese company Wuzhishan on one side, following and during the annexations by the Vietnamese forces on the other side. For several years already, the ethnic people known as the õ?oMontagnardsõ? from Vietnam were chased from their lands: the insurgents are harshly punished, and even killed. In Laos, other õ?oMontagnardsõ? are subjected to the same fate. Whereas in Cambodia, the right to asylum is brutally refused to the Montagnards who are persecuted in Vietnam. Several governments and international and UN humanitarian organizations had sharply denounced the õ?oserious attacks on human rightsõ? in this vast area of about 120,400 sq. km. which is lightly populated.
    2. Obviously, these problems are linked to the establishment, for several years now, of a common Vietnamese-Lao-Khmer exploration project, the so-called õ?oDevelopment Triangleõ?, also known by the Vietnamese as the õ?oIndochinese Triangleõ?. The agreement on the establishment was officially announced in Vientiane on November 28, 2004 by Prime Ministers Phan Van Khai, Bounnhang Vorachith, and Hun Sen during the tenure of the 10th ASEAN reunion, and under the presence of Superpowers representatives. Cambodia, through the exclusive decision made by Mr. Hun Sen, committed three of her large eastern provinces: Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri.
    3. The project was revealed on October 20, 1999, at a meeting of the three Prime Ministers in Hanoi. At that time, Mr. Hun Sen just took back all the powers in Phnom Penh, following the 1998 election, and the 1997 bloody coup dõ?Tâtat which saw the bulk elimination of the armed forces belonging to other parties of the ex Khmer Resistance movement. In 2001, it was planned that this Triangle would extend on four provinces only: Gia Lai, Kon Tum (Vietnam), Attapeu (Laos), and Ratanakiri (Cambodia). In 2002, it was expanded to seven provinces: Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dac Lac (Vietnam), Attapeu, Sâkong (Laos), Ratanakiri, Stung Trăng (Cambodia). Afterwards, in 2004, ô in accordance with a Laoõ?Ts proposal ằ, it was expanded to ten provinces: Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dac Lac and Dac Nông (Vietnam), Attapeu, Sâkong and Saravan (Laos), Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri (Cambodia). Without doubt, the Triangle will be widened further to other neighboring provinces along with its õ?odevelopment.õ?
    Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri Neglected
    4. In Cambodia, the provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri were created after the (1953) Independence. Together, Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri, and Mondolkiri occupy an area of 36,162 sq. km, i.e., 20% of the national territory. According to the 2003 official numbers, the population would have been 207,700, i.e. 1.6% of a population of 13 million, thus a population density of 5.8 inhabitants per sq. km. The inhabitants of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri are almost exclusively õ?oethnic minoritiesõ?: Brao, Tampuon, Kravêt, Bu Noï, Stieng, Jaray, Saảch, Kuoy, Phnong, Rhadâ, etcõ?Ư, known under the name of õ?oKhmer Leuõ?, the highland Khmers. Even though since 1904, the Khmer-Lao-Vietnamese borders were delimited, these populations have established themselves not only in Cambodia, but also on the Lao Boloven Plateau, and the Vietnamese highland area in the provinces of Dac Lac (former Khmer territory of Stung Trăng forced to join Annam by the French in 1932 õ?" according to Mr. Sarin Chhak) and Pleiku. Historically, these mountains of the center and south of the Annamese cordillera were inhabited by Proto-Indochinese pushed out from the plains, they constituted with the Khmers, the original population of the entire peninsula.
    5. For several reasons, the provinces of Stung Trăng, Ratanakiri, and Mondolkiri were always neglected by the rest of Cambodia. Beginning in 1958, the Cambodian government decided to put priority on populating the provinces of Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri with Cambodians from other provinces in order to develop the region with the first aim of land improvement of the area, and also to counter the influx of Vietnamese settlers on the other side of the border in the [Vietnamese] provinces of Dac Lac and Pleiku. In fact, Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri are rich in precious woods (some of the trees are up to 50 meter high, and up to 2-meter in diameter), in semi-precious gems (zirconium, sapphire, ruby ores in Bor Kăo, and gold ore in Bor Kham), and zirconium, bauxite, iron, coal ores, as well as yet to be exploited richness such as cattle raising in the highland of Ratanakiri. However, up to 1959, Ratanakiri and Mondolkiri remained an autarchy, subsisting mostly on tra***ional nomadic agriculture of burn forest. Furthermore, most of the Cambodians from other part of the country never showed much enthusiasm to settle themselves in this unhealthy area. However, from 1960, public buildings included some 30 elementary schools for the two provinces, a high school in Lomphat and another one in Săn Monorom, concrete Buddhist temples in Lomphat, Labansiek, Virachey. There were also some infirmaries (which lacked everything) and a hospital center in Lomphat, but the sanitary con***ion remained deplorable in this area. The land improvement started with the creation of a state-run rubber plantation in Labansiek (Ratanakiri) under the management of a French company, the õ?oCompagnie du Cambodgeõ? [the Cambodia Company]: 2,200 hectares in 1966 and more than 3,000 hectares in 1969. However, it was also noted that the cost of rubber transportation to Phnom Penh or Sihanoukville were too high.
    6. From 1979 until now, besides the concessions given to military chiefs and foreign companies causing the dramatic deforestation, and the recent upgrade, with help provided by China, of the old road linking Stung Trăng to the Lao Border, nothing was done to improve the region, nor to encourage its population and its development. Ironically, to go to Mondolkiri or Ratanakiri, it is easier for the lowland Khmers to take roads coming from Vietnam than to take those crossing the Cambodian territory.
    õ?oStrategic Imperativesõ?
    7. According to Charles Meyer, a French geographer who had lived in Cambodia for a long period of time, the first directives of the Cambodian government in 1958-1959, was in effect aimed towards the improvement and extension of road infrastructures, following a õ?ostrategic imperativeõ?: allowing rapid troop movements for intervention against nationalist and communist Vietnamese infiltrations. Nevertheless, the roads and trails network avoided the dense forest area north of the Tonlâ San River, a very vulnerable area bordering Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. õ?oThe [land] improvement was barely started when in 1970 when the Vietnamese war exploded into Cambodia. The communist Vietnamese de facto occupied the two provinces of Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri. It was from these two provinces that they organized the total control of eastern Cambodia, even after the capture of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge. In fact, even before 1970, these Vietnamese never missed any opportunity to foment uprising and rebellions by the Khmer Leu against the Phnom Penh authority who was attempting (with brutality indeed) then to populate and to perform land improvement in the regionõ?.
    8. Also for õ?ostrategic imperatives,õ? Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri were constantly occupied by the Vietminh, Vietcong, and North Vietnamese forces since the French and American wars in Vietnam up to the latest occupation of Cambodia. Furthermore, according to the Hanoi and Phnom Penh governments, the area bordering the three countries (known as Kantuy Neak [Dragon Tail]) is still an area under õ?odispute.õ? However, trustworthy Cambodian witnesses had indicated in 2001, with geographic map backing, that the Vietnamese forces still occupy a large part of Khmer territory, at some locations these forces were found at up to 40 kilometers inside Cambodiaõ?Ts territory. In 2003, Cambodian soldiers belonging to the 1st military region reported õ?oat least 200 Vietnamese soldiersõ? patrolling inside Ratanakiri, with the alleged mission of õ?opushing the Montagnards from Vietnam back to their country.õ? There is no doubt that these Vietnamese troops still continue to occupy Cambodia, following their announce of õ?ototal pullbackõ? in 1989: an American task force report dated April 26, 1990 sent to the US Congress clearly indicated õ?oa significant de facto annexation act (since 1979) by Vietnam on the eastern Cambodian provinces of Mondolkiri, Ratanakiri, and Stung Trăng. The annexation is conducted through the massive installment of some 400,000 to 950,000 Vietnamese having their own militia of 100,000-man strong.õ? Obviously, these Vietnamese were not included in the official census by Phnom Penh of the population number inhabiting these three provinces.
    9. A similar situation is also encountered in the Lao provinces of Attapeu, Sâkong, and Saravan, an area covering 28,676 sq. km. having a population of about 534,500 inhabitants, according to 2004 data. The ethnic minorities of these provinces are known as the Lao Theung (the Lao from the mid-highland) who are the first inhabitants of Laos. Their tribes are spread all over the country. They donõ?Tt have writing, and are in general animists like the old Khmer people. Beaten by the Lao coming from the north, and pushed into the inhospitable highlands, they are considered slaves should they descend into the lowlands, and their current survival remains difficult. They also practice the agriculture of burn forest, and fruit and vegetable picking. For several years, the Vientiane authority tried to õ?oconvinceõ? them to descend to the lowlands for cultivating rice in rice fields. However, the Lao Theung prefer staying on their lands and defend them with tenacity. Furthermore, the Lao forces, undoubtedly encouraged by Hanoi, occupy several parts of the Khmer territory in Stung Trăng.
    Hanoiõ?Ts õ?ostrategicõ? NEZ
    10. For Vietnam, the central high plateau, the Tay Nguyen, which was designated since the communist victory in South Vietnam as a õ?oNew Economic Zone,õ? (NEZ) but more likely a õ?odeportation camp,õ? is composed of four provinces engaged in the õ?oDevelopment Triangleõ?: Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dac Lac, and Dac Nong extending over an area of 55,659 sq. km., a region inhabited almost exclusively by õ?oethnic minoritiesõ? (the most important ones are the Jaray, Edê, and Banar) up to the end of the war with America, and currently known as the õ?oMontagnards,õ?. The region saw its population grow rapidly in the 90s to about 6.1 million inhabitants in 2004. Ban Me Thuot is a major city in the area, and in Pleiku, one can find there one of the largest current Vietnamese airbase. The Montagnards of these central high plateau who are now a minority there (amounting to about 780,000), continue to maintain their primitive lifestyle, and they live spread out in the forests.
    11. Hanoiõ?Ts policy of demographic õ?ounblockingõ? of the Red River delta and large agglomerates from the south (in particular that of Ho Chi Minh city) is pursued without slack by pushing or sending those who are õ?ounproductiveõ? and undesirable towards the NEZ bordering Cambodia and Laos. Similarly, several NEZ (also known as õ?oDefense economic zones&rdquo are created on the central high plateau. According to AFP and Reuters articles published in 2001, more than 5 million of Vietnamese settlers coming from the overpopulated provinces of the Red River delta have established themselves in this area rich in red and very fertile soil. These lands were converted to õ?oprivateõ? coffee and tea plantations etcõ?Ư, at the expense of the Montagnards who have been expropriated of their lands, and push further into more remote and inaccessible areas. Exasperated, these ethnic minorities (in fact, indigenous populations) ended up revolting against the regime, and they demanded the return of their ancestral lands, as well as the freedom to practice their religion (protestant). The 2001 uprising was harshly repressed, more than one thousand victims who denounced the massacres committed by Hanoiõ?Ts forces, had to flee in March 2002 in search for a sanctuary in Cambodia. In April 2004, massive demonstrations of these populations took place again in the provinces of Gia Lai, Dac Lac, and Pleiku; it was followed by new and violent repressions perpetrated by Hanoiõ?Ts forces. This is far from the autonomy and the freedom that the communist Vietnamese promised them in exchange for their support during the anti-US war in Vietnam.
    12. Consequently, the crisis and the lack of security originated from Vietnam: the Hanoi regime does not always achieve success internally, it had accumulated severe demographic, economic, and social problems. However, right at the heel of its victory in South Vietnam, and adopting anew the former Vietnamese emperorsõ?T policy, Hanoi decided to transform these foreseeable internal Vietnamese difficulties as a tool for its expansionism by making their weaker neighbors, the ethnic minorities, Laos and Cambodia, absorb progressively these problems. In 1976, the Khmer Rouge government õ?" concerned about these NEZ established all along the borders of the Cambodian provinces of Svay Rieng, Prey Văng, and Takăo õ?" ended up launching military õ?owarningõ? and õ?opush backõ? operations. The successive negotiations between Phnom Penh and Hanoi failed and turned into a merciless real war between the two new communist states. After the Khmer Rouge defeat, the Vietnamese NEZ were further expanded again to receive new õ?osettlersõ?, and were pushed further into Cambodia itself, to the dramatic detriment of the Khmer population along the borders. The latter had denounced with anger and tears the Vietnamese who are protected by uniformed soldiers, and who came more and more deeply inside Cambodia, impudently took their lands, their houses, and their villages. The Khmers, without the protection from their own authorities, had to pull back with each Vietnamese advance. Those who decided to remain on their ancestral lands were forced to take the nationality of the new settlers.
    13. Thus, for several years, the news had regularly reported the forced Vietnamese occupation mainly in Svay Rieng (in the districts of Romeas Hăk, Kompong Rô, Svay Teap, Chantrea), in Takăo (Phnom Den), in Kandal (Chrey Thom), in Kompong Cham (Mâmut), in Kratiâ (Snuol). The creation of the Development Triangle must be a new step in Hanoiõ?Ts policy of occupation of new nurturing lands, a vast õ?ostrategicõ? NEZ dominated by Vietnam, after the systematic colonization by million of its people on Lao and Khmer lowlands in the 1970õ?T and the 1980õ?T. Hanoi further applied and will surely apply the tra***ional rule for the colonized spaces: the NEZ are accompanied by military forces used for both surveillance and protection of the new Vietnamese settlers. The Khmer Leu from Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri live for several years now the same fate faced by their compatriots in Svay Rieng, Kompong Cham, and Kratiâ.
    Historical Links
    14. Naturally, in the political speech, the creation of the Development Triangle is aimed towards very laudable objectives: for the happiness of the people. The common statement made in Ho Chi Minh City on January 27, 2002, announced that for the establishment of the Triangle, õ?othe fields of high priority will include the building of electric transmission lines and small to medium size hydroelectric power plants, postal and telecommunication facilities, the formation of human resources, agriculture and forestry, food industry, business and tourism.õ? Mr. Phan Van Khai further stressed on July 21, 2004, in Siemreap, that õ?othe Development Triangle occupies a strategic position for the three countries in the political, economical, social, environmental, ecological levels, however, presently, it [Development Triangle] remains still an underdeveloped region, with poor infrastructural and socio-economical basis õ?Ưõ? The three countries must cooperate, he added, õ?oin order to mobilize the funding sources for development of projects already approved, to plan a collaboration mechanism in the building of the Triangle õ?Ư in order to promote the growth and the elimination the misery, to improve the life level of the populations living in the Triangle.õ? In Vientiane, on November 28, 2004, Mr. Phan Van Khai had further suggested that õ?othe creation of a Coordination Committee to shoulder the leaders of the three countries on the issues related to the Triangle, to insure the tight collaboration between the three countries in the process of its edification, to unify the measures for the funding mobilization for projects decided upon at the global organization level õ?Ưõ?

  3. bibop

    bibop Thành viên mới

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    15. On the other hand, the political objectives are constantly put forward and they never vary. Mr. Phan Van Khai insured in January 2002, that the establishment of the Triangle is õ?oa contribution to peace and stability of the region, just like the maintenance of security and social order along the borders of the three countries, as well as the efficiency in the fight against terrorist attacks, transnational crimes, and drug traf*!#@ing.õ? On November 28, 2004, pleased with the signing of the Vientiane Declaration, Mr. Phan Van Khai is even more solemn to the speeches given by Messrs. Bounnhang Vorachith and Hun Sen: õ?oHistory had linked our three nations. The demand for development of each country and the current juncture demand that we are more tightly linked in the interest of peace, security, and prosperity. The formation of the Triangle õ?Ư contributes as an active part of the reinforcement of the tra***ional friendship cooperation relationships between the three peoples. The Vientiane Declaration marks the determination of the leaders of the three countries to bring the relations of the three countries to a new height in the tra***ional brotherhood, integral cooperation, understanding, and reciprocal trust.õ? Finally, according to the Vietnamese News Agency: õ?oLocated at the crossroads of the borders, the Development Triangle is sensitive to the security problems, Phan Van Khai repeated, he proposed the tight cooperation in the region to develop at the same time both the economy and the society, to insure the security for each of the three countries.õ?
    16. Undeniably, since 1979, all cooperation by Cambodia (or Laos) with Vietnam insist first and foremost on the needs for õ?othe security (or defense) of each of the two countries.õ? For Hanoi, even though it does not say it directly, it is õ?oBeijingõ? that represents the õ?omortal threatõ? to Vietnam, and this remains as a large pretext to justify to all, to the ASEAN countries and to other world superpowers, its domination over Laos and Cambodia õ?oto insure peace and stability of the regionõ?.
    Vietnamese-Khmer õ?oIntegral Cooperationõ?
    17. The terms of Mr. Phan Van Khaiõ?Ts speech are the same as those that were acknowledged in the õ?oPeace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treatyõ? õ?oproposedõ? by ex-Prime Minister Pham Van Dong to the Cambodian People Party (CPP) in Cambodia on February 18, 1979, they were applied with well know effects: military occupation, forced annexation of Khmer lands, islands, and seas, and systematic colonization of Cambodia by Vietnam. In truth, in 1979 and 1980, as well as nowadays, what could and would be able to bring to the õ?ointegral cooperationõ? between Vietnam and Cambodia by Mr. Hun Senõ?Ts government?
    18. A particular experience can be learned from the political-economical õ?ocooperationõ? between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Peopleõ?Ts Republic of Kampuchea since the July 7, 1982 Agreement: õ?owhile waiting for the maritime borders between the two states,õ? in regards to the so-called õ?ohistorical waters of Vietnam and Cambodia (measuring 10,000 sq. km. off shore of Koh Tral island, and in fact surrounding the Koh Tral itself) õ?Ư placed under the jurisdiction of their internal waters.õ? On the Agreement, recalling that õ?othe importance for the national defense, and the economy of the two countries,õ? it was planned clearly that õ?othe patrols and surveillance in these historical waters will be jointly carried out by both parties, the local populations will pursue their fishing and collecting of seafood operations in this zone in the same manners that existed up to now, the exploitation of natural resources in this zone will be decided by mutual agreement õ?Ưõ? In reality, since the Cambodians lack the human and material, civilian and military resources, it is only the Vietnamese forces which carried out the patrols and surveillance, which exploit by itself the natural resources in the area, and furthermore, the presence of local Khmer population was simply forbidden there, in the name of õ?osecurityõ? of national defenses.
    19. In the Triangle, Hanoiõ?Ts objectives are primarily political, its economical project õ?" difficult to realize under such conflicting con***ions õ?" was only a pretext for a deeper penetration in this area of Cambodia by its forces. Mr. Hun Sen himself õ?" who was so proud for being in power for more than 25 years and had received billions of US dollars in international aid, built numerous schools, formed hundred of thousands of administrators and technicians in all fields, built hundreds of roads and bridges, forged a large army and an important and fearsome police õ?Ư õ?" Mr. Hun Sen let it be known on July 21, 2004, in Siemreap, that Cambodia lacks everything (money, usable roads, schools, medical centers, doctors, qualified personnel, active population in good health, etc&hellip for these provinces for them to be able to efficiently participate in the establishment and exploitation of the Triangle. Thus he asked Vietnam õ?" or more accurately, he accepted the continuation of the accomplished fact perpetrated by Vietnam õ?" to take care of the building of roads in Cambodia, of forming the Khmer Leu in the improvement of the region, of providing technological and financial assistance, of organizing markets and flow of common productions and products in the Triangle õ?Ư and the application of the rule according to which õ?othe partner country who will contribute the most (to the organization and contribution of the Triangle) will reap the most benefit from its investments.õ?
    The Lionõ?Ts Share
    20. Hanoi can then rapidly send its õ?oarmiesõ? of workers, instructors, administrators, medical personnel, and also all kind of security forces to populate and administer these Khmer provinces, in order to hasten the organization, and the functioning of the Triangle. Therefore, when Mr. Hun Sen õ?oproposedõ? in July 2004 to the Vietnamese õ?oto study the creation of a market discovered in the Vietnamese-Khmer border zone at O Yadao, Ratanakiri province,õ? Hanoiõ?Ts troop immediately chased away the inhabitants and used force to annex Khmer Leuõ?Ts lands in the O Yadao border area and its neighborhood, and it immediately started to clear road paths across former Khmer agriculture lands. The Khmer authorities in the areas, õ?ounder orders of no protest from the higher up,õ? let the settlers do what they wanted. In Stung Trăng also, along the banks of the Tonlâ San River, the Vietnamese had also built a hospital, and next to it, an important military base õ?Ư These are examples of the application the agreement on the Triangle, which, according to the Vietnamese, was also õ?othe Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen, who defined the process of its implementation,õ? during the first official meeting in Hanoi on October 20, 1999.
    21. On the other hand, õ?oto mobilize funding sources for the development projects already agreed upon,õ? each of the three countries must reserve a õ?opriorityõ? portion of its own national budget for the creation of the Triangle. In the same time, each of the three countries will respectively appeal to international financial institutions (ADB, World Bank), and foreign governments (Japan, in particular) to either provide help or to lend money for its (Triangle) financing. However, it will be the õ?oCoordination Committeeõ? dominated by Hanoi which will administer the funds as was planned above by Mr. Phan Van Khai, and that Mr. Hun Sen had accepted *****rrender entirely to õ?ohigh competenceõ? of his Vietnamese partner. Even though with so much investments (political, financial, and natural resources) engaged by Cambodia in this affair, planned to become õ?othe epicenter of growth and prosperity,õ? it does not appear that the Cambodians from other areas of the country are informed, encouraged, and prepared to exercise the jobs that will be created in the Triangle, and to take part in its creation and exploitation. Is it done in this manner in order not to cause trouble for the õ?osecurityõ? of the Triangle? Finally, just like the case of the products of the õ?ohistorical watersõ? cited above, one can already see that the only markets aimed for the eventual Triangle products will logically be located on the Vietnamese side which is already better equipped with everything than Mr. Hun Senõ?Ts Cambodia. The Khmers will end up buying from Vietnam the products provided by their own lands.
    22. In charge of organizing everything, of building everything, of deciding everything as an ubiquitous chief, Vietnam will award itself the lionõ?Ts share from the profits of the Triangle, whereas Cambodia, and undoubtedly Laos as well, will have to settle with the somewhat edible remainders of the feast. Already in the Triangle agreement, Mr. Hun Sen had to solemnly plead with Vietnam - which shouldnõ?Tt have been this way between two õ?obrotherhood peoplesõ? õ?" to õ?oallow the sale of oil products and other common consumption products to the Khmer population along the border at the same fixed sale prices as those for Vietnamese consumersõ?!
    Towards New Conflicts
    23. Mr. Hun Sen is not wrong in wanting to develop the Cambodia border zones, or in establishing common exploitations with the neighbors and others. But, as we have seen before, under what con***ions is Mr. Hun Sen going to do it? He also insured Khmer people that these common exploitations with Vietnam (or with Thailand) were aimed õ?oat defending both the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Cambodia.õ? We canõ?Tt see how Mr. Hun Sen will be able to do it when he does not dare refuse anything to Hanoiõ?Ts request. Moreover, he refused to proceed to the immediate verification of the border delineations of Cambodia with Vietnam, as was proposed by King-Father Norodom Sihanouk, in order to fix beforehand in these areas the outline of the sovereignty of Cambodia, and to precisely refuse the abandonment of the Khmer sovereignty to the desiderata of the neighbor-partner more powerful and more domineering.
    24. However, what we can note is that after 30 years, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, even with their huge internal problems, was able to build a new might thank to the big profits of all kind, drawn from its õ?ofriendshipõ? and its political, military, and economical õ?ointegral cooperationõ? with Laos, and most of all with Cambodia, even though the latter two, its õ?obrothers,õ? remain abnormally poor and õ?ounder-developedõ? in numerous domains, in spite of the extraordinary international assistance. Regarding this Triangle, given the very weak Khmer means to engage in this endeavor, Cambodia will be compelled to a true abandonment of her Independence and Sovereignty on this part of her territory, in order to allow the establishment of infrastructural õ?osocio-economicalõ? bases and õ?osecurityõ? by Vietnam. Thus, the agreement for the creation of this õ?oDevelopment Triangleõ? is no more no less than a new degree of Vietnamese domination on Cambodia, and the programmed annexation of the new Khmer territories õ?" set under the precedence of the so-called õ?ohistorical watersõ? offshore of Kampot. In fact, while waiting for the problematic õ?odevelopmentõ? and the õ?oreduction of povertyõ? heavily promised, the õ?osecurityõ? of the vast region will be immediately insured, and the entire eastern part of Cambodia will first of all be õ?olegallyõ? colonized and de facto administered by Hanoiõ?Ts forces.
    Such an expansionist project is not a guarantee of peace and stability for the Khmer people or for the entire region, it will only create new dramas, followed by new repressions by the Phnom Penh regime, and generate destructing conflicts in Cambodia.
  4. bibop

    bibop Thành viên mới

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    Hun Sen and the Upcoming Negotiations on the Border Issues:
    Scenarios and Associated Implications
    by Preap Pisey, October 8 2005
    After having totally neutralized the Supreme National Council on Border Affairs (SNCBA) [1] presided by King-Father Norodom Sihanouk, Hun Sen and his team are getting ready to go to Vietnam on October 10, 2005, to sign an ad***ional convention to the 1985 Treaty related to the border delineation.
    The announcement of this trip made the front page of newspapers and launches important debates. The treaty, signed under the Vietnamese occupation, is in total contradiction with the 1954 Geneva Convention, and the 1991 Paris Agreements. Beside the continuous displacements of border towards the interior of Cambodiâ?Ts territory, this treaty would cede important portions of Cambodiâ?Ts territory to Vietnam. According to Mr. Sean Pengsè, the President of the Cambodiâ?Ts Border Committee, an organization based in France, this treaty brings into question again the border markers along 200 kilometers located in the South of the country.
    Given the seriousness of the subject and reports published in the news media, which was not the case for previously signed treaties, it appears to us that it is necessary to come up with scenarios that could result from Hun Sen?Ts trip to the lands of his master, and to analyze the implications associated which each of the scenarios considered.
    Based on our humble analysis, the possible scenarios are as follows:
    1.The ad***ional convention to the 1985 Treaty will be effectively signed;
    2.The convention will not be signed;
    3.The duration of the negotiation will be stretched out in time.
    Scenario No. 1 :
    The ad***ional convention to the 1985 Treaty will be effectively signed
    The signing of this ad***ional convention to the 1985 Treaty implies, of course, the transfer of one portion of Cambodiâ?Ts territory to Vietnam. However, beyond this transfer, the signature of a supplement to the 1985 Treaty, orchestrated with great fanfare, would also be interpreted as a very strong political will by Vietnam to become the absolute master of Indochina. By that, it would mean a launch of a ?ostrong signal? to the regional power houses and to the International community that Vietnam had become the absolute master of Laos and Cambodia, and that it intends to act as such.
    This scenario can be interpreted not only as an open aggression against the Khmer Nation, but it is also a provocation launched against China in which ?othe new generation of the Chinese leaders cherished their friendship with the Cambodian royal family as well as their relations with Cambodia [2]? from long ago. Vietnam, through the signing of this ad***ion to the 1985 Treaty, is testing the sincerity of China, one of the unavoidable great world superpowers, towards Cambodia before subjecting the latter completely under its yoke. It would be interesting to see what reaction this Great Superpower would have on this Vietnamese arrogant insult. How much would China be willing to allow Vietnam to trample on its ?osmall protégé? as reiterated so many times by the successive Chinese leaders? Would China be able to defend the interests of Cambodia, its so-called ?osmall protégé?? What would its other ?osmall protégés? think of China if it were to allow itself to be led by the nose by a ?osmall player? like Vietnam?
    Scenario No. 2
    The convention will not be signed
    As it was stated elsewhere, the ad***ion to the 1985 Treaty will not be signed, in which case the territorial and maritime integrity of Cambodia will not necessarily be preserved. In its actual application, Vietnam will continue to violate Cambodiâ?Ts territory through an ever massive ?odemographic? colonization along the border areas, in particular, those which are included in the ?oDevelopment Triangle [3]?.
    The latter case would correspond to Vietnam?Ts script aiming at transforming Hun Sen into a ?onational herô? able to resist against Vietnam. The Vietnamese strategy would consist of saying: not only did Hun Sen not sign the very contested 1985 Treaty but he also succeeded in taking back a portion of the territory classified as litigious zones ?" a statement which Hun Sen himself started to praise [4]. The objective being very clear, it is not only to give a new shining coat to Hun Sen?Ts image, so tarnished by corruption and persecution against the population, but also to confer to him the statute of ?oNational Herô? similar to that of King-Father Norodom Sihanouk?Ts during the ?oRoyal Crusadê? for Independence of Cambodia. According to this scenario, we will have another ?oherô? under a totally different circumstance. Hun Sen, very thirsty of power, accepts to ?oplay? blindly the Vietnamese strategists?T game by ignoring that the political, diplomatic and military supports provided by Vietnam are not free. The Vietnamese resettlers?T commitment, living in Cambodia, to vote for Hun Sen?Ts CPP is just a short term ?ocoin of exchangê? to satisfy personal and the clique of Hun Sen?Ts ambitions. What the latter forgets is that where there are Vietnamese, there where will be Vietnam.
    This scenario would correspond not only to a preparation in view of the re-election of Hun Sen in 2008, but also points to a change in strategy by Vietnam. In the past, the Vietnamese strategists had systematically eliminated all Cambodians who no longer serve the interests of Hanoi once they no longer needed them, such was the case of most of the founding members and/or fighters of the Khmer Rouge movement. This time, Vietnam is stretching the survival of its puppets in order to encourage others to come to serve Hanoi?Ts interests in exchange for a ?opersonal reward? proportional in size to the degree of their betrayal against the Khmer Nation. In this hypothetical case, we, the Khmer People, must pay attention to this kind of strategic manipulations which had always led us to destruction.
    At the sight of this Vietnamese hidden agenda, we strongly encourage the supporters of CPP to revise their position. It is not too late to save together Cambodia. Champa and Kampuchea Krom are the concrete examples to demonstrate Vietnam?Ts machiavellian intent behind the resettlement of Vietnamese in Cambodia with the pretext *****pport the CPP?Ts voting basis. You all know that the Cham people have no more their country and are constrained to live sometimes on their fishery boats and in countries that are not theirs. Regarding our Khmer Krom compatriots, you know also how much they have been suffered. Their fundamental rights are systematically flouted. They can?Tt access to any medical care. A lot of pregnant women can?Tt see their pregnancy reach its term. The access to education is also forbidden in a subtle form, the exams are organized as such the children of our Khmers Krom can?Tt go beyond the high school. They are condemned to be hard workers in the rice fields. And their ancestral lands are systematically grabbed. Their cultural identity is maintained just only for touristic purpose. For instance, they are forced to practise the boat race several times a year just to attract tourists and can?Tt have anything in return. So please, don?Tt let the same things to be repeated in our Cambodiâ?Ts today. Let us have the courage to defy our corrupted and short-sighted leaders who don?Tt care at all about the survival of the Nation.
    Scenario 3
    The duration of the negotiation will be stretched out in time
    This last scenario would consist of stretching in time the negotiation on the border delineation. The objective would consist of mobilizing all the Khmer resources in terms of manpower, thinking process, etc?, and to focus them on this issue of highly strategic importance to the eyes of the Khmer population. This strategy, similar to war and/or industrial and commercial competition strategies, consists of creating diversions and to ?odepletê? the resources of onê?Ts enemies or competitors in order to facilitate their killing. One of Vietnam fears is to see Cambodians emerging one day from poverty and becoming, with their ?obelly full,? true resistance fighters against the sprawling expansionism of Hanoi. Thus for Vietnam, the more the Cambodians are busy with a particular issue, the more their conquest strategy has a chance to be moved forward. As we knew well, it is rare that Vietnam has only a single strategy to shape their annexation ambitions. As it was implicitly underscored by Mr. Dy Kareth in his article [5], in parallel to the unceasing displacements of border lines towards the interior of Cambodiâ?Ts territory, Vietnam is also deploying another colonization arsenal disguised under the makeup of the concept of economic development, such as the famous development triangle of Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Dac Lac, and Dac, Nông (in Vietnam), Attapeu, Sekong, and Sravan (in Laos), Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, and Mondulkiri (in Cambodia). The establishment of the project follows with establishment of new ?oarmies? of Vietnamese settlers on our farmers?T lands in the above provinces, and where some of these farmers were constrained to adopt the Vietnamese citizenship. In some areas such as Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri, Vietnam has already started building sections of highways, electrical power lines, and schools to facilitate the establishment of its populations on the lands of our Khmer Leu Compatriots.
    Faced with such con***ions, we, the Khmer People, must pay attention to the machiavellian positioning of the Hanoi strategists. Let us join our strength to help those who fight against the expansionist/annexationist hungers of our aggressors.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------
    -----------
    [1] Phann Ana: ?oHun Sen Opposes Empowering Border Council?, The Cambodia Daily, June 16, 2005.
    [2] Xinhuanet : ?oSino-Cambodian friendship carried on?, April 07, 2005.
    [3] Regarding this subject of strategic importance, please refer to the excellent article by Mr. Dy Kareth, Vice-President of the Cambodiâ?Ts Border Committee, titled ?oThe Expansionist Development Triangle,? August 22, 2005, Paris, France.
    [4] Sakada Chun : ?oMr. Hun Sen Defends the Signing of Ad***ional Border Treaty to 1985 Treaty With Vietnam?, VOA 06/10/2005.
    [5] Dy Kareth, op. cit.
  5. Mr_Hoang

    Mr_Hoang Thành viên gắn bó với ttvnol.com

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    Đúng là gần mực thì đen gần đèn thì sáng nhỉ .
  6. great_sephiroth

    great_sephiroth Thành viên mới Đang bị khóa

    Tham gia ngày:
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    BBC và kiểu đưa tin nửa vời ????:


    Ký thoả thuận biên giới VN - Campuchia

    Hai nước ký thỏa thuận đường biên ở vùng Daklak và Mondolkiri "có thể có lợi đôi chút cho phía Campuchia"

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/story/2005/10/051010_viet_bordertreaty.shtml
    Ký thoả thuận biên giới VN - Campuchia


    Cựu vương Shihanouk là một trong những người Campuchia cương quyết không công nhận Thoả ước 1985
    Việt Nam và Campuchia hôm qua thứ Hai 10 tháng Mười 2005 đã ký một thỏa thuận then chốt về đường biên giới giữa hai nước.
    Mục đích của thoả thuận là để giải quyết các vụ tranh chấp lãnh thổ.
    Trong một buổi lễ tại Hà Nội, Thủ Tướng Phan Văn Khải và Thủ Tướng Hun Sen đã ký bản thỏa hiệp phụ, đính kèm thỏa ước về biên giới mà hai bên đã ký hồi năm 1985.
    Chi tiết của thỏa hiệp phụ này chưa được công bố.
    Tuy nhiên, hãng thông tấn của Pháp AFP đã trích lời của một nhà ngoại giao Việt Nam giấu tên, nói rằng thỏa hiệp này là để công nhận tính chất hợp pháp của thỏa ước ký hồi năm 1985.
    Thoả ước 1985 là văn bản mà các nhân vật Campuchia có đầu óc quốc gia đã nhất mực không chịu công nhận.
    Nhà ngoại giao này nói tiếp, hai nước đã ký thỏa ước về đường biên giới hồi năm 1982, 1983 và 1985, tuy nhiên các thỏa ước này không được một số nhân vật đối lập tại Phnong Penh công nhận, vì họ tố cáo Hà nội là đã chiếm đóng bất hợp pháp lãnh thổ của Campuchia.
    Ðược tin là trong số các nhân vật Campuchia chống lại thỏa ước năm 1985 có cả cựu Quốc Vương Sihanouk, người thường xuyên cáo buộc Việt Nam là đã chiếm đất của Campuchia.
    Một chuyên viên về các vụ tranh chấp lãnh thổ người Việt Nam cũng cho hãng thông tấn AFP biết, trước đây đường biên giới giữa hai nước được vẽ lại chủ yếu là tại tỉnh Dak Lak của Việt Nam và tỉnh Mondolkiri của Campuchia, mà theo chuyên viên này thì "có thể có lợi đôi chút cho phía Campuchia".
    Hiện nay, thỏa hiệp phụ này còn chờ được quốc hội hai nước phê chuẩn.

    BBC để ngay trang nhất mục VN một dòng như sau :
    Hai nước ký thỏa thuận đường biên ở vùng Daklak và Mondolkiri "có thể có lợi đôi chút cho phía Campuchia"

    Phải chăng BBC muốn lái người đọc rằng CSVN chuyển sang bán đất cho Miên ?
    Thật tầm bậy

  7. bibop

    bibop Thành viên mới

    Tham gia ngày:
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    Giám đốc đài phát thanh Cambodia bị bắt vì chỉ trích thủ tướng nhượng đất cho Việt Nam
    Tuesday, October 11, 2005
    Ðại diện hai chính phủ Việt Nam và Cambodia hôm Thứ Hai 10 Tháng Mười đã ký kết hiệp ước quan trọng về biên giới nhằm giải quyết tranh cãi suốt nhiều thập niên qua giữa hai lân bang. Trong khi đó, cảnh sát Cambodia bắt giữ một giám đốc đài phát thanh vì ông này chỉ trích Hun Sen đã nhượng đất cho Việt Nam.
    Ðại diện ký kết hiệp ước biên giới Việt Nam và Cambodia lần này là Thủ Tướng Phan Văn Khải của chính phủ Hà Nội và ông Hun Sen, nhân dịp ông này đang công du Việt Nam.
    Văn bản mới được ký kết bổ sung cho hiệp ước biên giới ký năm 1985. Quốc hội hai nước sẽ phê chuẩn hiệp ước do hai thủ tướng của hai nước ký kết.
    Mặc dù chi tiết của hiệp định mới được ký kết tại Hà Nội chưa được công bố; thế nhưng một nhà ngoại giao Việt Nam không muốn nêu danh đã cho hãng thông tấn AFP biết rằng hiệp ước bổ sung nhằm khẳng định tính hợp pháp của hiệp ước năm 1985.
    Tuy nhiên những nhà dân tộc Cambodia thì chống đối hiệp ước năm 1985, họ cho rằng hiệp ước đó không công bằng cho phía Cambodia.
    Việt Nam và Cambodia đã ký những hiệp ước về đường biên giới vào những năm 1982, 1983, và 1985. Ðường biên giữa hai lân bang dài chừng 1,100 km (680 miles).
    Ðược biết, hôm Thứ Hai 10 Tháng Mười, cùng lúc Thủ Tướng Hun Sen lên đường sang thăm chính thức Việt Nam 3 ngày, để ký vào văn bản bổ sung của hiệp ước biên giới năm 1985, thì nhà vua Norodom Sihamoni cũng lên đường sang Trung Quốc, để nghỉ ngơi tại một cung điện do chính phủ Trung Quốc xây cho cựu Quốc Vương Norodom Sihanouk tại Bắc Kinh.
    Nguồn tin chính thức từ văn phòng quốc trưởng cho biết là nhà vua Sihamoni sẽ không ký vào sắc lệnh công bố hiệp ước do ông Hun Sen và Hà Nội làm. Nhà vua sẽ ủy quyền cho ông Chea Xim, chủ tịch Thượng Nghị Viện, đang giữ quyền quốc trưởng, để tùy ông lựa chọn.
    Sáng Thứ Ba, một ngày sau khi hai bên ký kết hiệp ước, ông Mom Sonando, giám đốc đài phát thanh độc lập, FM 105 MHz, đã bị cảnh sát Cam Bốt bắt giam vào lúc 7 giờ sáng sáng tại thủ đô Phnom Penh. Lý do cảnh sát đưa ra là đài của ông tuyên truyền rằng ông Thủ Tướng Hun Sen nhường đảo Phú Quốc cho Việt Nam. Hiện nay, ông Mon Sonando đang bị tạm giam để chờ tòa án đưa ra xét xử.
    Nguồn tin từ tòa án Phnom Penh cho biết, chính phủ Cambodia đã kiện 2 người, bao gồm ông Mon Sonando, giám đốc Ðài FM 105 MHz, và ông Sean Pengse, chủ tịch Ủy Ban Biên Giới Campuchia ở hải ngoại, có trụ sở ở Paris, về tội xúc phạm danh dự nhân phẩm người lãnh đạo chính phủ, khi những ông này thực hiện một loạt bài phỏng vấn về vấn đề biên giới, trong đó tố cáo ông Hun Sen đã nhượng đất nhượng biển cho Việt Nam để đổi lấy quyền lực.
    Khi đề cập đến vấn đề nhường đảo Phú Quốc thì ông Hun Sen phản ứng lại một cách mạnh mẽ vào hôm mùng 6 Tháng Mười, rằng việc mất đảo Phú Quốc không phải là lỗi của ông ta, mà là lỗi của người Pháp. Ðồng thời ông Hun Sen dọa sẽ kiện một người. Nay, ông ta đã làm, và thực tế ông ta đã kiện 2 người.
    Ông Mom Sonando cũng biết trước là ông ta và ông Sean Pengse, một người Khmer quốc tịch Pháp, đang ở nước ngoài đã có lệnh triệu tập của tòa án Phnom Penh vào hôm Thứ Hai, ngày 10 Tháng Mười. Ông Mom Sonando cũng cố trốn tránh những không thoát được. Còn ông Sean Pengse, hiện vẫn còn đang ở nước ngoài.
    Ông Mom Sonando nói với đài RFA vào hôm Thứ Hai, lúc ông đang trốn ở một nơi bí mật tại thủ đô Phnom Penh nhưng sau: ?oKhi người ta cáo buộc ông ta một tội nào đó, ông ta muốn rằng họ thực hiện đúng pháp luật. Theo ông ta biết, có lẽ xuất phát từ lý do khoảng một tháng trước, ông ta có phỏng vấn ông Sean Pengse đang ở bên Pháp, ông ta có yêu cầu ông Sean Pengse trình bày rõ hơn về Hiệp Ước Biên Giới Việt-Cambodia được ký trong những năm 1979, 1982 và năm 1985.?
    Được bibop sửa chữa / chuyển vào 17:35 ngày 12/10/2005
  8. Cavalry

    Cavalry Thành viên rất tích cực

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    thế không hiểu các chí sĩ dân chủ sẽ ủng hộ CPC dân chủ hay là Csản Việt Nam đây?
  9. Susje

    Susje Thành viên mới Đang bị khóa

    Tham gia ngày:
    06/05/2004
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    Lúc này các chấy sỹ đang lên án chính quyền VN là dùng "bù nhìn Hunsen" tại Cambodia để cướp đất người ta . Cũng như lúc trước các chấy sỹ lên án rằng chính quyền VN xâm lược Cambodia .
    Nói tóm lại là cách nào thì các chấy sỹ cũng thắng, cũng đúng , cũng là chánh nghĩa cuốc ra cả .
  10. PeterI

    PeterI Thành viên mới

    Tham gia ngày:
    02/12/2003
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    Chắc thế, bây giờ các nhà "yêu nước" lại có dịp đứng lên mạnh mẽ tố cáo là CSVN tàn bạo, dã man đi cướp đất, bắt nạt dân tộc CPC hiền lành đây. Có khi lại còn tổ chức một hội nghị Diên Hồng nữa lấy tên là:
    Hội nghị Diên Hồng bảo toàn đất tổ ... cho Campuchia
    (Trước đâu các quý vị ấy đã từng tổ chức một hội nghị "rầm rộ" lấy tên là: Hội nghị Diên Hồng bảo toàn đất tổ)
    Được PeterI sửa chữa / chuyển vào 08:51 ngày 13/10/2005

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