Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

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Tàu bán tên lửa phòng không cho Pakistan nhưng muốn lính Tàu chứ không phải lính Pakistan điều khiển hệ thống tên lửa này.
Chinese missile defence system for Pak
13 April 2005: As a favour for development and use of the Gwadar deep sea port, China has consented to export missile defence systems to Pakistan, and these will be deployed in Rawalpindi and sensitive nuclear and missile installations in Kahuta, Sargodha, and in the North West Frontier Province.
Following India?Ts Phalcon deal with Israel, it was reported in October 2003 that China would supply Pakistan an undisclosed number of FT-2000 missiles to counter India?Ts early warning capabilities.
Now with India likely to install a missile defence system, Pakistan has pressured China for some of its own, and this, whether the promised FT-2000s or the upgraded FT-2000As, will be sold without transfer of technology, at a cost of $5 billion, which Pakistan can pay back over ten years.
Diplomats said that Pakistan wanted to indigenise the missile defence system, but China refused, saying that while it was willing to transfer operational control, the technology would remain with it, and PLA Air Force air defence missile troops are likely to man the exported systems.
Insiders say that under the Gwadar deal, Pakistan was to entirely give it up to China, in return for defence equipment, but under US pressure, strategic control was retained over the port, but the Chinese kept to their term of developing it at their own cost and operating the transferred portion.
During Chinese premier Wen Jiabao?Ts recent visit, Pakistan wanted payment for Gwadar, which was bluntly refused, and so a request was made for a missile defence system, and since China had promised equipment in the port deal, it agreed, but rejected technology transfer.
The FT-2000 is said to be capable of destroying tactical ballistic missiles, much like the US Patriot and Russian S-300P system, and incorporates a passive radar target seeker which turns the target missile?Ts jamming frequencies against it, while transmitting no electromagnetic waves of its own, thus minimising chances of detection.
Diplomats said that Pakistan was not satisfied with the deal for four F-22P frigates from China, considering it miniscule for the favour of Gwadar, and so the sale of missile defence systems has been approved.

Tàu bán tên lửa phòng không cho Pakistan nhưng muốn lính Tàu chứ không phải lính Pakistan điều khiển hệ thống tên lửa này.
Chinese missile defence system for Pak
13 April 2005: As a favour for development and use of the Gwadar deep sea port, China has consented to export missile defence systems to Pakistan, and these will be deployed in Rawalpindi and sensitive nuclear and missile installations in Kahuta, Sargodha, and in the North West Frontier Province.
Following India?Ts Phalcon deal with Israel, it was reported in October 2003 that China would supply Pakistan an undisclosed number of FT-2000 missiles to counter India?Ts early warning capabilities.
Now with India likely to install a missile defence system, Pakistan has pressured China for some of its own, and this, whether the promised FT-2000s or the upgraded FT-2000As, will be sold without transfer of technology, at a cost of $5 billion, which Pakistan can pay back over ten years.
Diplomats said that Pakistan wanted to indigenise the missile defence system, but China refused, saying that while it was willing to transfer operational control, the technology would remain with it, and PLA Air Force air defence missile troops are likely to man the exported systems.
Insiders say that under the Gwadar deal, Pakistan was to entirely give it up to China, in return for defence equipment, but under US pressure, strategic control was retained over the port, but the Chinese kept to their term of developing it at their own cost and operating the transferred portion.
During Chinese premier Wen Jiabao?Ts recent visit, Pakistan wanted payment for Gwadar, which was bluntly refused, and so a request was made for a missile defence system, and since China had promised equipment in the port deal, it agreed, but rejected technology transfer.
The FT-2000 is said to be capable of destroying tactical ballistic missiles, much like the US Patriot and Russian S-300P system, and incorporates a passive radar target seeker which turns the target missile?Ts jamming frequencies against it, while transmitting no electromagnetic waves of its own, thus minimising chances of detection.
Diplomats said that Pakistan was not satisfied with the deal for four F-22P frigates from China, considering it miniscule for the favour of Gwadar, and so the sale of missile defence systems has been approved.

Tàu đang chuổn bị xây dựng 1 căn cứ tàu ngầm ở Indonesia. Úc phản đối kịch liệt.
New Chinese submarine base in Indonesia
14 May 2005: Deepening its ?ostrings of pearls? strategy of acquiring bases and cultivating ties from the Middle East to Southern China, China is now planning a submarine facility on one of the Indonesian islands close to the Malacca Straits, and Australia has protested this.
Diplomatic sources said that China ostensibly wants to protect the sealanes of communication in the Indian Ocean, especially the transit of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf, but it is also seen as a measure to preempt a US blockade of China?Ts energy sources in the event of a war with Taiwan.
In January, The Washington Times published an internal report for US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld in which the ?ostrings of pearl? strategy was posited, and the key under-construction Chinese bases that were identified were Gwadar in Pakistan, and facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and the South China Sea generally, but Indonesia is a new ad***ion.
The Pentagon report said, ?oChina is building strategic relationships along the sealanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China?Ts energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives.?
The report added that ?oChina?is looking not only to build a blue-water navy to control the sealanes, but also to develop undersea mines and missile capabilities to deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the US Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.?
?oThe Iraq War, in particular,? said the report, ?orevived concerns over the impact of a disturbance in Middle East supplies or a US naval blockade,? adding that Chinese military leaders wanted an ocean-going navy and ?oundersea retaliatory capability to protect the sealanes.?
As a direct consequence of such thinking, China will mass the Indian Ocean with attack submarines, and sources do not rule out deployment of nuclear submarines as well.
Because of anomalies in GPS data immediately available to undersea submarines, diplomatic sources warned that there would be a growing number of Chinese territorial violations in respect of India, and Australia has already objected to the upcoming Chinese facility in Indonesia.

Tàu đang chuổn bị xây dựng 1 căn cứ tàu ngầm ở Indonesia. Úc phản đối kịch liệt.
New Chinese submarine base in Indonesia
14 May 2005: Deepening its ?ostrings of pearls? strategy of acquiring bases and cultivating ties from the Middle East to Southern China, China is now planning a submarine facility on one of the Indonesian islands close to the Malacca Straits, and Australia has protested this.
Diplomatic sources said that China ostensibly wants to protect the sealanes of communication in the Indian Ocean, especially the transit of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf, but it is also seen as a measure to preempt a US blockade of China?Ts energy sources in the event of a war with Taiwan.
In January, The Washington Times published an internal report for US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld in which the ?ostrings of pearl? strategy was posited, and the key under-construction Chinese bases that were identified were Gwadar in Pakistan, and facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and the South China Sea generally, but Indonesia is a new ad***ion.
The Pentagon report said, ?oChina is building strategic relationships along the sealanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China?Ts energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives.?
The report added that ?oChina?is looking not only to build a blue-water navy to control the sealanes, but also to develop undersea mines and missile capabilities to deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the US Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.?
?oThe Iraq War, in particular,? said the report, ?orevived concerns over the impact of a disturbance in Middle East supplies or a US naval blockade,? adding that Chinese military leaders wanted an ocean-going navy and ?oundersea retaliatory capability to protect the sealanes.?
As a direct consequence of such thinking, China will mass the Indian Ocean with attack submarines, and sources do not rule out deployment of nuclear submarines as well.
Because of anomalies in GPS data immediately available to undersea submarines, diplomatic sources warned that there would be a growing number of Chinese territorial violations in respect of India, and Australia has already objected to the upcoming Chinese facility in Indonesia.

Tàu đang tăng cường chạy đua vũ trang. Liệu việc chạy đua này chỉ là tự vệ hay sẽ dùng để bành trướng sau này.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/AR2005051301405.html?
The Illusion of ''Managing'' China
By Robert Kagan
Sunday, May 15, 2005; Page B07
There has been much disc ussion recently about how to "manage the rise of China." The phrase itself is soothing, implying gradualism, predictability and time. Time enough to think and prepare, to take measurements of China''s trajectory and adjust as necessary. If China eventually emerges as a clear threat, there will be time to react. But meanwhile there is time enough not to overreact, to be watchful but patient and not to create self-fulfilling prophecies. If we prematurely treat China as an enemy, it is said, it will become an enemy.
The idea that we can manage China''s rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority. With proper piloting and steady nerves on our part, the massive Chinese ship can be brought safely into harbor and put at anchor. It can be "integrated" into the international system and thereby tamed and made safe for civilized existence in the postmodern world. Wisely "managed," China can be a friend. Badly managed, it can become a very dangerous power indeed. But at least the choice seems to be ours.

Chinese students at the Tongji University in Shanghai receive compulsory military training, August 29, 2004. Chinese university students are all required to go through military training to improve patriotism and self discipline. REUTERS/China Photos
Chinese students at the Tongji University in Shanghai receive compulsory military training, August 29, 2004. Chinese university students are all required to go through military training to improve patriotism and self discipline.
The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power. The most successful "management" of a rising power in the modern era was Britain''s appeasement of the United States in the late 19th century, when the British effectively ceded the entire Western Hemisphere (except Canada) to the expansive Americans. The fact that both powers shared a common liberal, democratic ideology, and thus roughly consonant ideas of international order, greatly lessened the risk of accommodation from the British point of view.
Other examples are less encouraging. Germany''s rise after 1870, and Europe''s reaction to it, eventually produced World War I. Even the masterly Bismarck, after a decade of successful German self-management, had a difficult time steering Europe away from collision. The British tried containment, appeasement and even offers of alliance, but never fully comprehended Kaiser Wilhelm''s need to challenge the British supremacy he both admired and envied. Right up until the eve of war, highly regarded observers of the European scene believed commercial ties among the leading powers made war between them unlikely, if not impossible.
Japan''s rise after 1868 produced two rounds of warfare -- first with China and Russia at the turn of the century, and later with the United States and Britain in World War II. The initial Anglo-American response to Japan''s growing power was actually quite accommodating. Meiji Japan had chosen the path of modernization and even Westernization, or so it seemed, and Americans welcomed its ascendancy over backward China and despotic Russia. Then, too, there was the paternalistic hope of assisting Japan''s entry into the international system, which was to say the Western system. "The Japs have played our game," Theodore Roosevelt believed, and only occasionally did he wonder whether "the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils inferior to themselves . . . and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our national jealousies, and beat us in turn."
Today we look back at those failures and ruminate on the mistakes made with the usual condescension that the present has for the past. But there is no reason to believe we are any smarter today than the policymakers who "mismanaged" the rise of Germany and Japan. The majority of today''s policymakers and thinkers hold much the same general view of global affairs as their forebears: namely, that commercial ties between China and the other powers, especially with Japan and the United States, and also with Taiwan, will act as a buffer against aggressive impulses and ultimately ease China''s "integration" into the international system without war. Once again we see an Asian power modernizing and believe this should be a force for peace. And we add to this the conviction, also common throughout history, that if we do nothing to provoke China, then it will be peaceful, without realizing that it may be the existing international system that the Chinese find provocative.
The security structures of East Asia, the Western liberal values that so dominate our thinking, the "liberal world order" we favor -- this is the "international system" into which we would "integrate" China. But isn''t it possible that China does not want to be integrated into a political and security system that it had no part in shaping and that conforms neither to its ambitions nor to its own autocratic and hierarchical principles of rule? Might not China, like all rising powers of the past, including the United States, want to reshape the international system *****it its own purposes, commensurate with its new power, and to make the world safe for its autocracy? Yes, the Chinese want the prosperity that comes from integration in the global economy, but might they believe, as the Japanese did a century ago, that the purpose of getting rich is not to join the international system but to change it?
We may not know the answers to these questions. But we need to understand that the nature of China''s rise will be determined largely by the Chinese and not by us. The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can do to change that. Partly this is due to our actions -- such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, which began during the Clinton administration, and our recent efforts to enhance strategic ties with India. Partly it is due to our different forms of government, since autocratic rulers naturally feel threatened by a democratic superpower and its democratic allies around their periphery. Partly it is due to the nature of the situation in East Asia. It used to be an article of faith among Sinologists that the Chinese did not want to drive the United States out of the region. Today many are not so sure. It would not be unusual if an increasingly powerful China wanted to become the dominant power in its own region, and dominant not just economically but in all other respects, as well.
When one contemplates how to "manage" that, however, comforting notions of gradualness, predictability and time begin to fade. The obvious choices would seem to lie between ceding American predominance in the region and taking steps to contain China''s understandable ambitions. Not many Americans favor the former course, and for sound political, moral and strategic reasons. But let''s not kid ourselves. It will be hard to pursue the latter course without treating China as at least a prospective enemy, and not just 20 years from now, but now. Nor, if that is the choice, can Chinese leaders be expected to wait patiently while the web of containment is strengthened around them. More likely, they will periodically want to challenge both the United States and its allies in the region to back off. Crises could come sooner than expected, and without much warning, requiring difficult judgments about the risks and rewards of both action and inaction.
That is likely what the future holds. The United States may not be able to avoid a policy of containing China; we are, in fact, already doing so. This is a sufficiently unsettling prospect, however, that we are doing all we can to avoid thinking about it. We conjure hopeful images of a modernizing China that seeks only economic growth and would do nothing to threaten commercial ties with us -- unless provoked -- even as we watch nervously the small but steady Chinese military buildup, the periodic eruptions of popular nationalism, the signs of Chinese confidence intermingled with feelings of historical injustice and the desire to right old wrongs.
Which China is it? A 21st-century power that wants to be integrated into a liberal international order, which would mean both a transformation of its own polity and a limitation of its strategic ambitions? Or a 19th-century power that wants to preserve its rule at home and expand its reach abroad? It is a worthy subject for debate, because the answer will determine the future as much as or more than anything we do. But it is unlikely we will have a definitive answer in time to adjust, to "manage" China''s "rise," any more than our predecessors did. As in the past, we will have to peer into the fog and make prudent judgments, informed by the many tragic lessons of history.
Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

Tàu đang tăng cường chạy đua vũ trang. Liệu việc chạy đua này chỉ là tự vệ hay sẽ dùng để bành trướng sau này.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/AR2005051301405.html?
The Illusion of ''Managing'' China
By Robert Kagan
Sunday, May 15, 2005; Page B07
There has been much disc ussion recently about how to "manage the rise of China." The phrase itself is soothing, implying gradualism, predictability and time. Time enough to think and prepare, to take measurements of China''s trajectory and adjust as necessary. If China eventually emerges as a clear threat, there will be time to react. But meanwhile there is time enough not to overreact, to be watchful but patient and not to create self-fulfilling prophecies. If we prematurely treat China as an enemy, it is said, it will become an enemy.
The idea that we can manage China''s rise is comforting because it gives us a sense of control and mastery, and of paternalistic superiority. With proper piloting and steady nerves on our part, the massive Chinese ship can be brought safely into harbor and put at anchor. It can be "integrated" into the international system and thereby tamed and made safe for civilized existence in the postmodern world. Wisely "managed," China can be a friend. Badly managed, it can become a very dangerous power indeed. But at least the choice seems to be ours.

Chinese students at the Tongji University in Shanghai receive compulsory military training, August 29, 2004. Chinese university students are all required to go through military training to improve patriotism and self discipline. REUTERS/China Photos
Chinese students at the Tongji University in Shanghai receive compulsory military training, August 29, 2004. Chinese university students are all required to go through military training to improve patriotism and self discipline.
The history of rising powers, however, and their attempted "management" by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power. The most successful "management" of a rising power in the modern era was Britain''s appeasement of the United States in the late 19th century, when the British effectively ceded the entire Western Hemisphere (except Canada) to the expansive Americans. The fact that both powers shared a common liberal, democratic ideology, and thus roughly consonant ideas of international order, greatly lessened the risk of accommodation from the British point of view.
Other examples are less encouraging. Germany''s rise after 1870, and Europe''s reaction to it, eventually produced World War I. Even the masterly Bismarck, after a decade of successful German self-management, had a difficult time steering Europe away from collision. The British tried containment, appeasement and even offers of alliance, but never fully comprehended Kaiser Wilhelm''s need to challenge the British supremacy he both admired and envied. Right up until the eve of war, highly regarded observers of the European scene believed commercial ties among the leading powers made war between them unlikely, if not impossible.
Japan''s rise after 1868 produced two rounds of warfare -- first with China and Russia at the turn of the century, and later with the United States and Britain in World War II. The initial Anglo-American response to Japan''s growing power was actually quite accommodating. Meiji Japan had chosen the path of modernization and even Westernization, or so it seemed, and Americans welcomed its ascendancy over backward China and despotic Russia. Then, too, there was the paternalistic hope of assisting Japan''s entry into the international system, which was to say the Western system. "The Japs have played our game," Theodore Roosevelt believed, and only occasionally did he wonder whether "the Japanese down at bottom did not lump Russians, English, Americans, Germans, all of us, simply as white devils inferior to themselves . . . and to be treated politely only so long as would enable the Japanese to take advantage of our national jealousies, and beat us in turn."
Today we look back at those failures and ruminate on the mistakes made with the usual condescension that the present has for the past. But there is no reason to believe we are any smarter today than the policymakers who "mismanaged" the rise of Germany and Japan. The majority of today''s policymakers and thinkers hold much the same general view of global affairs as their forebears: namely, that commercial ties between China and the other powers, especially with Japan and the United States, and also with Taiwan, will act as a buffer against aggressive impulses and ultimately ease China''s "integration" into the international system without war. Once again we see an Asian power modernizing and believe this should be a force for peace. And we add to this the conviction, also common throughout history, that if we do nothing to provoke China, then it will be peaceful, without realizing that it may be the existing international system that the Chinese find provocative.
The security structures of East Asia, the Western liberal values that so dominate our thinking, the "liberal world order" we favor -- this is the "international system" into which we would "integrate" China. But isn''t it possible that China does not want to be integrated into a political and security system that it had no part in shaping and that conforms neither to its ambitions nor to its own autocratic and hierarchical principles of rule? Might not China, like all rising powers of the past, including the United States, want to reshape the international system *****it its own purposes, commensurate with its new power, and to make the world safe for its autocracy? Yes, the Chinese want the prosperity that comes from integration in the global economy, but might they believe, as the Japanese did a century ago, that the purpose of getting rich is not to join the international system but to change it?
We may not know the answers to these questions. But we need to understand that the nature of China''s rise will be determined largely by the Chinese and not by us. The Chinese leadership may already believe the United States is its enemy, for instance, and there is nothing we can do to change that. Partly this is due to our actions -- such as the strengthening of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, which began during the Clinton administration, and our recent efforts to enhance strategic ties with India. Partly it is due to our different forms of government, since autocratic rulers naturally feel threatened by a democratic superpower and its democratic allies around their periphery. Partly it is due to the nature of the situation in East Asia. It used to be an article of faith among Sinologists that the Chinese did not want to drive the United States out of the region. Today many are not so sure. It would not be unusual if an increasingly powerful China wanted to become the dominant power in its own region, and dominant not just economically but in all other respects, as well.
When one contemplates how to "manage" that, however, comforting notions of gradualness, predictability and time begin to fade. The obvious choices would seem to lie between ceding American predominance in the region and taking steps to contain China''s understandable ambitions. Not many Americans favor the former course, and for sound political, moral and strategic reasons. But let''s not kid ourselves. It will be hard to pursue the latter course without treating China as at least a prospective enemy, and not just 20 years from now, but now. Nor, if that is the choice, can Chinese leaders be expected to wait patiently while the web of containment is strengthened around them. More likely, they will periodically want to challenge both the United States and its allies in the region to back off. Crises could come sooner than expected, and without much warning, requiring difficult judgments about the risks and rewards of both action and inaction.
That is likely what the future holds. The United States may not be able to avoid a policy of containing China; we are, in fact, already doing so. This is a sufficiently unsettling prospect, however, that we are doing all we can to avoid thinking about it. We conjure hopeful images of a modernizing China that seeks only economic growth and would do nothing to threaten commercial ties with us -- unless provoked -- even as we watch nervously the small but steady Chinese military buildup, the periodic eruptions of popular nationalism, the signs of Chinese confidence intermingled with feelings of historical injustice and the desire to right old wrongs.
Which China is it? A 21st-century power that wants to be integrated into a liberal international order, which would mean both a transformation of its own polity and a limitation of its strategic ambitions? Or a 19th-century power that wants to preserve its rule at home and expand its reach abroad? It is a worthy subject for debate, because the answer will determine the future as much as or more than anything we do. But it is unlikely we will have a definitive answer in time to adjust, to "manage" China''s "rise," any more than our predecessors did. As in the past, we will have to peer into the fog and make prudent judgments, informed by the many tragic lessons of history.
Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes a monthly column for The Post.

Theo tạp chí quốc phòng Jane Các nước Châu Á sẽ là thị trường tiêu thụ tàu chiến lớn nhất thể giới,trong đó 3 nước chủ chốt là Ấn độ ,TQ và HQ thúc đẩy sự tăng trưởng.Trong khi thị trường EU là 9 tỷ và HK là 11 tỷ.
http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jni/jni050520_1_n.shtml
Hai tàu chiến mới của TQ đang chế tạo:

Được Bradley sửa chữa / chuyển vào 20:19 ngày 22/05/2005

Theo tạp chí quốc phòng Jane Các nước Châu Á sẽ là thị trường tiêu thụ tàu chiến lớn nhất thể giới,trong đó 3 nước chủ chốt là Ấn độ ,TQ và HQ thúc đẩy sự tăng trưởng.Trong khi thị trường EU là 9 tỷ và HK là 11 tỷ.
http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jni/jni050520_1_n.shtml
Hai tàu chiến mới của TQ đang chế tạo:

Được Bradley sửa chữa / chuyển vào 20:19 ngày 22/05/2005

Thêm bài về quan hệ Nhật - ghẻ .
Internation al Herald Tribune
East Asia''s giants slip out of control
Ian Bremmer
FRIDAY, MAY 20, 2005
Newyork! The oft-cited reasons for the widening divide between China and Japan - Japan''s relatively unrepentant attitude toward its World War II history and the growing displays of resentment by many Chinese - are of course far from the whole story. While anxiety over the rift extends well beyond the region, the real source of the conflict is a fundamental reordering of power in Asia. China''s rising political, economic and military power and Japan''s reaction to it are generating a massive geopolitical shift there.
China vigorously opposes Japan''s bid to win a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Japan has angered China by publicly expressing support for Taiwan''s security. China is anxious over the ever more robust U.S.-Japanese strategic relationship and the possibility of Japan''s remilitarization.
Chinese-Japanese territorial disputes in the East China Sea are growing as speculation rises over the amount of oil and gas that may be buried under its seabed. Despite contested claims, China is scheduled to begin drilling for oil there in August, and Japan appears poised to announce drilling of its own. If the drilling goes forward, it will substantially up the ante in the growing political conflict. It would force Japan to provide its shipping with a naval escort - a move that would risk direct military confrontation and send markets tumbling.
But the main reason tensions will continue to rise is more structural: The Chinese and Japanese governments have limited ability, and incentive, to ease their angry populations back from the brink. On the Chinese side, Beijing has less-than-perfect control over the actions of local officials. Last year, there were reportedly some 47,000 demonstrations in China. Nearly all took place outside Shanghai and Beijing and were aimed at local - not central - authorities. China''s provincial officials therefore have good reason to capitalize on anti-Japanese sentiment and to channel growing social discontent toward Tokyo.
Essentially, China''s provincial leaders are again over-fulfilling their quotas: Beijing''s efforts to contain the overheating of the Chinese economy have largely been thwarted by local authorities who over-invest in pet projects. Local officials are now competing against one another to over-supply China with nationalist fury at Japan.
Japanese politicians are fanning the flames as well. The faction within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party loyal to the party''s secretary general, Shinzo Abe, is positioning itself for a post-Koizumi era in Japanese politics. They''ve discovered that reinvigorating Japanese nationalism at China''s expense is an effective way of containing the growing popularity of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan and a lot easier than tackling economic reform.
China-bashing is simply a winning formula in Japanese domestic politics. That''s part of why Japan has now expressed a clear interest in Taiwan''s security, pushed the envelope on territorial disputes with Beijing, and aligned its position on North Korea''s nuclear program more closely with Washington''s.
As a result, while both sides have ample reason to ensure the tensions don''t do lasting damage to their booming trade and investment, the list of cumulative grievances - growing by the week - is driving a dangerous wave of animosity that no one fully controls. And the conflict has not yet crested.
That this reordering of power relations is producing only uncertainty and aggressiveness in Asia makes it particularly unfortunate that there are no viable multilateral institutions in the region capable of arbitrating the clash of interests or even hosting face-to-face meetings between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Hu Jintao (who, for other reasons, rarely communicate directly).
There is, though, a precedent for the problem: Europe a hundred years ago. No international institutions existed there either that might have enabled European powers to hash out their disputes and to resolve conflicts. China and Japan will just have to sort out their differences on their own - and without a Metternich to help them out.
It''s in the interests of international stability that they get to work. The geopolitical and economic stakes are rising as quickly as the rivalry''s intensity.
(Ian Bremmer is president of the Eurasia Group and a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute. )