Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

Thailand considers acquisition of F-16C/D aircraft
Sunday, June 12, 2005 - Thailand is considering to purchase F-16C/D fighters from the United States with a total budget of 1.13 billion US dollars, said the Commander of Royal Thai Airforce. The Thai airforce has contacted Lockheed Martin and both parties are now studying the con***ions of the deal
The purchase of the more advanced F-16 fighters would upgrade the Thai airforce''''s equipment to an international standard. This should in return improve the Thai airforce''''s capability in multi-lateral military exercises and actions.
The deal with a total value of 1.13 billion dollars will be conducted in the form of barter trade, with the Thai side paying in agriculture products.
The total budget will probably also cover the purchase of suitable missiles and maintenance fees.
Thailand has not yet decided the number of fighters to buy and the form of agriculture products to pay.
Thai airforce is looking for high-capacity fighters, which are not too expensive to replace its decommissioned OV-10 fighters and the F-5 A/B jets to be decommissioned this year.
The US F-16 C/D, Sweden''''s JAS 39 Gripen and the Russian SU-30 jet have been all reportedly on the choice list of Thailand.
However, the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld offered F-16 jets with a special con***ion during talk with his Thai counterpart Thamarak Isarangkura na Ayudhaya in Bangkok on Monday, ccording to the Bangkok Post.
Singapore recently donated its F-16A/B fleet to Thailand at the start of 2005. Those F-16s are used by the RTAF *****pplement the assets already in service with its Air Force.
Thailand has received 36 new and 16 refurbished F-16A/Bs in four previous buys delivered between 1988 and 2003. With the latest Peace Naresuan IV order, the Thai AF also ordered two F-16s for spare parts reclamation.
Thailand''''s has been operating F-16 for over 17 years now.

F-117 Nighthawks train in South Korea alongside F-16 Fighting Falcons
Tuesday, June 07, 2005 - A squadron of 15 F-117A Nighthawks flew to South Korea last week as part of an Air Expe***ionary Forces (AEF) rotation. It provides F-117 pilots and crews with the opportunity to train alongside the F-16 and to conduct operations in a deployed environment with a variety of weather con***ions.
The 49th Fighter Wing announced the deployment on Monday. The F-117 stealth fighters took off from Holloman AFB, New Mexico and flew to Gunsan Air Base, South Korea, some 270 km south of Seoul.
The deployment also tests the unit''''s ability to manage the movement of people and assets.
It is the third time that US stealth fighters from Holloman have been deployed to the Gunsan since 2003. This standard AEF deployment typically lasts for about four months.
People, airplanes, and equipment of the 49th Fighter Wing played a key role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The wing''''s F-117s dropped the first bombs against an Iraqi leadership target in Baghdad on March 19, 2003. In all, F-117 pilots flew more than 80 missions and dropped nearly 100 enhanced guided bomb units against key targets.
About 32,500 US troops are currently stationed in South Korea. The deployment comes as North Korea threatens a nuclear weapons test.

Được gulfoil sửa chữa / chuyển vào 10:40 ngày 19/06/2005

Ôi! VN, chẳng biết đằng nào mà lần. Đem cái này ra đây để bác nào đem qua network54 hù bọn ASEAN cho chúng sợ, cộng thêm cái mới sắm và một đống tái sử dụng nữa.
http://www.angelfire.com/tx2/VNmilitary/airforce.html
Có vài tấm hình ở trong đó, nó nói đây là Mig21:
Và đây là Su22:

Được giangnam_hynb sửa chữa / chuyển vào 14:49 ngày 20/06/2005

Ôi! VN, chẳng biết đằng nào mà lần. Đem cái này ra đây để bác nào đem qua network54 hù bọn ASEAN cho chúng sợ, cộng thêm cái mới sắm và một đống tái sử dụng nữa.
http://www.angelfire.com/tx2/VNmilitary/airforce.html
Có vài tấm hình ở trong đó, nó nói đây là Mig21:
Và đây là Su22:

Được giangnam_hynb sửa chữa / chuyển vào 14:49 ngày 20/06/2005

By Megan Goldin
JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Israel publicly apologized to the United States on Sunday over arms exports to China that have drawn criticism from Washington and strained U.S.-Israeli security ties.
"It is impossible to hide the crisis between Israel and the United States with regard to the security industries. We are doing everything possible to put it behind us," Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said on Israel Radio.
The dispute centers on Israel''s sale of Harpy attack drones and other advanced technology to China that the Pentagon fears could tilt the balance of power and make it difficult to defend Taiwan, which Beijing deems a renegade province.
"If things were done that were not acceptable to the Americans then we are sorry but these things were done with the utmost innocence," Shalom said in comments that coincided with a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
"The United States is our biggest ally and none of the things that were done were done with the intention of harming U.S. interests," Shalom added.
The dispute has strained security ties between Israel and the United States, its main ally and provider of about $2 billion in annual defense aid, at a time when it seeks U.S. assistance to help implement its planned withdrawal from Gaza.
Commenting on the arms dispute ahead of her trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories, Rice said Israel should be "sensitive" to U.S. concerns on arms sales to China particularly given its close defense cooperation with Washington.
"We have had some very difficult discussions with the Israelis about this. I think they understand now the seriousness of the matter and we''ll continue to have those discussions," Rice said.
An Israeli official is negotiating an agreement which would likely enable the United States *****pervise Israeli arms sales to countries that Washington deems problematic, including China and India.
Washington torpedoed Israel''s multi-billion dollar sale of Phalcon strategic airborne radar systems to China in 2000, citing concerns it could upset the regional balance of power.
U.S. displeasure over the Harpy deal played a role in a decision in April *****spend Israel from involvement in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project.
Israel xin lỗi Mỹ vì việc bán vũ khí công nghệ cao cho Trung Quốc, trong đó có cường kích không người lái - Harpy attack drones và các công nghệ cao khác, theo Mỹ có thể sử dụng để tấn công Đài loan.
Vì vậy Mỹ đang phanh lại các dự án quân sự có sự tham gia của Israel trong đó có dự án tiêm kích thê hệ thứ năm Joint Strike Fighter, cũng như ngừng cung cấp cho Israel các thiết bị công nghệ cao trong quân sự .

By Megan Goldin
JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Israel publicly apologized to the United States on Sunday over arms exports to China that have drawn criticism from Washington and strained U.S.-Israeli security ties.
"It is impossible to hide the crisis between Israel and the United States with regard to the security industries. We are doing everything possible to put it behind us," Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said on Israel Radio.
The dispute centers on Israel''s sale of Harpy attack drones and other advanced technology to China that the Pentagon fears could tilt the balance of power and make it difficult to defend Taiwan, which Beijing deems a renegade province.
"If things were done that were not acceptable to the Americans then we are sorry but these things were done with the utmost innocence," Shalom said in comments that coincided with a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
"The United States is our biggest ally and none of the things that were done were done with the intention of harming U.S. interests," Shalom added.
The dispute has strained security ties between Israel and the United States, its main ally and provider of about $2 billion in annual defense aid, at a time when it seeks U.S. assistance to help implement its planned withdrawal from Gaza.
Commenting on the arms dispute ahead of her trip to Israel and the Palestinian territories, Rice said Israel should be "sensitive" to U.S. concerns on arms sales to China particularly given its close defense cooperation with Washington.
"We have had some very difficult discussions with the Israelis about this. I think they understand now the seriousness of the matter and we''ll continue to have those discussions," Rice said.
An Israeli official is negotiating an agreement which would likely enable the United States *****pervise Israeli arms sales to countries that Washington deems problematic, including China and India.
Washington torpedoed Israel''s multi-billion dollar sale of Phalcon strategic airborne radar systems to China in 2000, citing concerns it could upset the regional balance of power.
U.S. displeasure over the Harpy deal played a role in a decision in April *****spend Israel from involvement in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project.
Israel xin lỗi Mỹ vì việc bán vũ khí công nghệ cao cho Trung Quốc, trong đó có cường kích không người lái - Harpy attack drones và các công nghệ cao khác, theo Mỹ có thể sử dụng để tấn công Đài loan.
Vì vậy Mỹ đang phanh lại các dự án quân sự có sự tham gia của Israel trong đó có dự án tiêm kích thê hệ thứ năm Joint Strike Fighter, cũng như ngừng cung cấp cho Israel các thiết bị công nghệ cao trong quân sự .

Russian Arms Trade with Southeast Asia and The Republic of Korea
Dmitry Vasiliev
Introduction
The ongoing development of Russian military-technical cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia in recent years allows us to speak about the region as a third pole in the consumption of Russian arms, after China and India. Primarily, the question of consumption concerns Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In 2003, these three countries concluded contracts with Rosobornexport for military equipment deliveries with a total sum of more than 1.5 bln USD, and overcame, in this sense, the tra***ional importers of Russian arms ?" China and India.1 Implementation of these 2003-year contracts will occur from 2005-2007 and provide the respective Southeast Asian importers with a significant share of the total volume of Russian arms exports.
Military-Economic Indicators
As can be seen from the tables below, The Republic of Korea and Malaysia are the wealthiest countries among the given analyzed states as their respective GDP per capita significantly surpass the corresponding indicators of other countries. South Korea, in turn, significantly outstrips Malaysia, especially in absolute terms, being the largest among the countries considered.
The economic potential of Malaysia and South Korea allows them to spend large funds on defense. From 2001 to 2003 these countries demonstrated stable growth rates in military expen***ures, while, however, this did not lead to an increase in the military component of their GDPs. On the contrary, the military burden on the economies of South Korea and Malaysia for the examined period actually decreased. In Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, The Republic of Korea stands a distant third for military expen***ures after China and Japan, leaving far behind the military budgets of other states. This can be explained by the constant confrontation between North and South Korea that results in both countries keeping large armed forces in constant states of alert. At the same time, as far as military weight in GDP is concerned, Vietnam is steadily leading the way, being stimulated *****ch high expen***ures by the increasing military power of China.
The recent natural disaster in the region of Southeast Asia will not greatly affect the macroeconomic indicators of the countries. The expected slowdown of economic growth in Indonesia, the country hit hardest, is estimated at only 0.2-0.3%.2 This is largely due to the fact that the national energy complex, making up more than half of Indonesian GDP, was not in any significant way damaged by the storm. Also, active and generous financial help from other states directly proceeding the disaster also contributes to this stability. Thailand, in turn, generates 12.2% of GDP from its tourist industry, which is expected to completely recover by 2006.3 It is obvious, however, that Indonesia and Thailand, being guided by questions of morale, will hardly increase their military budgets in the immediate future and at the best case will maintain them at former levels ?" the lowest among the countries of the region. As table 3 shows, Indonesia and Thailand spent less than 1.5% of their GDP on military needs in 2003.
Table 1. Gross Domestic Product in current prices, bln of USD
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
143.03
32.69
87.98
115.55
481.89

2002
172.97
35.00
94.91
126.91
546.93

2003
208.31
39.00
103.16
143.18
605.36

Source: Key Indicators 2004 // The Asian Development Bank
Table 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita in current prices, USD
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
684.37
415.37
3664.14
1836.73
10188.00

2002
815.92
438.98
3869.14
2000.72
11490.11

2003
968.71
482.08
4118.21
2238.57
12637.98

Source: Key Indicators 2004 // The Asian Development Bank
Table 3. Military Expen***ure in real terms 2000, bln of USD (% of GDP)
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
1.74 (1.1)
2.2 (6.73)
1.91 (2.2)
1.77 (1.4)
13.08 (2.8)

2002
1.84 (1.2)
2.6 (7.43)
2.17 (2.4)
1.85 (1.4)
13.53 (2.7)

2003
2.1 (1.0)
2.9 (7.44)
2.42 (2.35)
1.84 (1.28)
14.62 (2.42)

Source: SIPRI, 2004; Military Balance, 2004-2005; for 2003 - calculations by the author with data from SIPRI and The Asian Development Bank.
External and Internal Threats
For many years, the region of Southeast Asia has remained a flashpoint of instability. Even now, a large part of states in the region have no clearly demarcated borders with their neighbors, which in turn is often the root of periodic low intensity conflicts and also admits the probability of emerging limited armed confrontation.
A latent struggle for the right to control the South China Sea, complicated by a constant war with piracy, smuggling and poaching, can be attributed to tra***ional conflict of the region. The strategic importance of the South China Sea lies in the fact that supremacy provides control over the transport lanes, including transport of coal and mineral ore products from the Near and Middle East to the Asia Pacific Region. In this connection, Southeast Asian states are particularly concerned about the involvement of China in an eventual conflict which is attracted not only by the long-term perspective of domination in the region, but also by the immediate desire to increase her reserves of natural energy resources. It is known that the Spratly Islands, located in the South China Sea, are rich in oil and gas deposits and for a long time have been an apple of discord between China, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.4
Actually, the growing power of China is one of the main incentives driving the arms acquisition process among the region?Ts countries. Moreover, concerning the import of aircraft, one of the main tendencies is an orientation towards acquisition programs of other countries (Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia have relatively homogeneous fleets of military aircraft) with the purpose of arms unification and the creation of integrated aviation structures, the presence of which will allow a possible deterrent to the significant superiority of Chinese Air Forces.5
Internal conflicts of the countries of the region are mainly based on ethnic and religious disagreements. In the case of Thailand, there is a threat of terrorism coming from the southern part of the country where Moslems prevail (making up 10% of the state population).6 Likewise, the internal security of Indonesia is threatened by separatist moods in provinces, especially amplified after the independence of East Timor in 2002.7
Arms purchases by the Republic of Korea stem from its opposition policy to North Korea. The conflict recently received a new impetus as North Korea announced that it now possesses nuclear weapons.8 It should be noted, by the way, that in the summer of 2004, against the background of the conflict, a South Korean Defense Minister was dismissed owing to information leakage about the latest collision with North Korea forces.9
Arms Trade with Russia
Indonesia
For more than 30 years the US remained the main supplier for military equipment to Indonesia. Consequently, as a result of the American embargo imposed on deliveries of military equipment in 1999, Indonesia has experienced a gradual degradation of its National Armed Forces.10 In light of the situation, the Indonesian leadership took the decision to diversify its sources of military deliveries to weaken the country?Ts dependence on American weaponry. This, in particular, has served as an occasion for rapprochement with Russia.
Negotiations with Indonesia for deliveries of Russian arms began in 1997. At that time Indonesia was intent on purchasing 12 Su-30 fighters, but the devastating financial crisis prevented the transaction. Negotiations were renewed in 2003 and resulted in the signing of a contract for delivery of 2 Su-27SK fighters, 2 Su-30MK aircrafts and 2 Mi-35 combat helicopters for a total sum of 192.9 mln USD.11 About 165 mln USD of this sum was paid in the form of Indonesian goods, mainly in palm oil (108 mln USD). The contract was concluded in April 2003 soon after the signing of the general Russian-Indonesian agreement for military-technical cooperation and became the largest contract concerning arms between the two countries.
In 2004 Indonesia stated its intention to buy 8 more Russian fighters in correspondence with the purpose of incorporating a full squadron of these aircraft in the structure of its National Air Forces.12 These plans were impeded by the natural disaster in December 2004. Nevertheless, as it has been shown above, the cancellation of the order is explained not only by economic reasons and, thus, there is a high probability of returning this question to the national agenda in the near future.
Indonesia is also experiencing a serious need in updating its naval fleet, which has been worn out by the ongoing struggle against piracy at sea. However, the country hopes to renew its fleet with obsolete American ships being decommissioned from US Naval Forces as part of the Deepwater program.13
Malaysia
The first large Russian?"Malaysian transaction was made in 1994, when Russia delivered 18 MiG?"29SE/UB fighters at a cost of 550 mln USD.14
The next landmark in military cooperation development between the two countries was in 2003 when Malaysia purchased 18 Su-30MKM multipurpose aircraft for 900 mln USD.15 To a high extent, this decision was influenced by the invasion of American forces into Iraq that defined the international position of the US as in open opposition to the Islamic world. As in the case of Indonesia, the contract implies offset obligations according to which 270 mln USD will be paid in palm oil. Herein it is necessary to note that Malaysia, perhaps, is the only country in Southeast Asia that follows the most diversified policy of arms procurement. A fear of becoming dependent on any single country in the field of military cooperation sometimes leads Malaysia to unusual actions. Thus, the intention to buy Russian fighters has not prevented Malaysia from speaking about plans for purchasing American F-18 Super Hornets.16
In 2003 Malaysia also concluded a contract worth 71 mln USD for delivery of 12 Mi-171Sh helicopters. The Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant, the main contractor under agreement, probably completed the order in 2004.17
Among other items, it is worth mentioning a contract signed in 2001 for delivery to Malaysia of ?oMetis?"2? ATGM systems for 30 mln USD, and in 2002 the sale of a batch of portable ?oIglâ?"9K38? SAM systems for 48 mln USD. The final shipment of ?oIglâ? is expected in 2005.18
As far as Naval armaments are concerned, Malaysia (like Thailand and Singapore) has set the task of creating a national submarine fleet and, in this connection, revealed its demand for diesel submarines. Partly, French and Spanish contractors will satisfy Malaysian demand for 10 submarines.19
Vietnam
For a long time Ukraine was Russiâ?Ts major competitor on the arms market of Vietnam, supplying the country with large quantities of military boats, R-27 missiles and MiG-21UM advanced jet trainers. Recently, however, Vietnam has given preference to Russian arms. Moreover, in contrast to its neighbors, Vietnam doesn?Tt diversify its sources of arms deliveries.
During the 1990?Ts Vietnam bought from Russia 12 Su-27 aircraft for a total sum of 360 mln USD (two contracts, in 1994 and in 1997).20 In 2003 Vietnam also placed an order for delivery of 4 Su-30MK2V fighters for 110 mln USD. The planes were subsequently transferred in November - December 2004.
In comparison with its neighbors, Vietnam is the most active in completing the structure of its Naval Forces with Russian military equipment. In 1999 Russia delivered to Vietnam 2 missile boats ?oTarantul-2? of project 1241RE. Also, in 1999 Severnoye Design Bureau finished developing the PS-500 missile ship (construction completed in 2001) and a corvette of project 2100 (construction of 10-14 units proposed). Under a contract from 2001, the Almaz shipbuilding company constructed two patrol boats ?oSvetlyak? of project 10412 for 40 mln USD. The ships were delivered at the end of 2002. According to a 2003 contract worth 120 mln USD, Russia will transfer to Vietnam 2 large missile boats ?oMolniyâ? of project 1241.8 and 8 more will be locally assembled under license using Russian components (Vietnamese designation Ho-A Class).21
A huge volume of contracts was concluded in 2003. Besides the purchase of the ?oMolniyâ? ships, Vietnam contracted delivery of 2 batteries of S-300PMU1 SAM systems for 250-300 mln USD (which made Vietnam the second country in Asia after China to receive such hi-tech weaponry), and the delivery of 4 Su-30MK fighters worth 110 mln USD.22
In 2002, a contract was signed for delivery of 50 portable ?oIglâ? SAM systems and for a technology transfer for its manufacture at cost of 64 mln USD.
Thailand
The USA is the main supplier of arms to Thailand. This, in part, explains the failure of Russian enterprises in all military tenders conducted by Thailand. In the past, Russia had offered ?oMetis? ATGM systems, BTR-80/80 APCs and portable Iglâ? SAM systems but, unfortunately none of the bids were successful.
Nevertheless, certain progress began to take shape in 2003: both parties agreed that Russia will pay off its debt of 36.5 mln USD for deliveries of Thai rice in the form of goods and equipment, including space systems. In 2003 the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding on Rear and Technical Maintenance of Armies was also signed.23
Recently, the main focus of Russian-Thai relations has been the possible delivery of 6 Su-30MKI fighters worth 210-250 mln USD in exchange for deliveries of chicken meat. In autumn of 2004, however, intelligence revealed that Thailand had made the decision to purchase fighters from the Swedish company Saab. Thailand will receive the Swedish planes also via barter.24 At the same time, the status of negotiations with Russia on the Su-30MKI fighters remains unknown.
South Korea
South Korea possesses the most advanced defense industry among the considered countries. In this connection, the question of technology transfers and participation of national enterprises in the fulfillment of military contracts occupies one of the key places in negotiations on arms deliveries. Although the American defense industry has strongly contributed to the formation of the South-Korean defense industry, these requirements also concern the US. Moreover, the frequent unwillingness of the Americans to transfer defense technologies to the Republic of Korea has induced the country to diversification in arms procurement, first of all, by means of Israeli and Russian weaponry.25 Nevertheless, even today, US influence on South Korea in questions of military cooperation is rather significant.
Military technical cooperation between Russia and South Korea continues within the framework for payment of Russian debt, which currently amounts to 1.7 bln USD. Part of this debt has been paid by deliveries of Ka-32S helicopters, T-80U main battle tanks, IFVs BMP-3, ?oIglâ? portable SAM systems and ?oMetis-M? ATGM systems. Particularly, in 2004 South Korea received 17 BMP-3, at least one Ka-32S helicopter and an unnamed quantity of ATGM systems ?oCornet - E? and ?oMetis ?" M?.26 Also in 2004, four Il-103 planes were transferred to South Korea within a 2003 contract for delivery of 23 units. The remaining 19 planes are expected to be shipped in 2005-2006. According to a statement by the Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation Sergey Kolotukhin, from 2003-2006, Russia will provide South Korea with arms and military equipment for a sum of 300 mln USD in payment of Russian debt.27
South Korea is currently conducting a tender for delivery of attack helicopters. The Russian-Israeli Ka-50-2 and the American AH-64 and AH-1Z SuperCobra helicopters are competing for the tender. The value of the potential contract is estimated at 1.8 bln USD. The tender has been repeatedly postponed and it is unknown when the results will be announced.28
With regard to Naval armaments, in 2002 South Korea signed a contract with Russia for delivery of three ?oMurena-E? type hovercraft for 100 mln USD.29 The contract will be carried out in cooperation with the Ukrainian enterprise Zorya-Mashproekt.
Conclusions
On the basis of the aforesaid it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
In part, today?Ts increased activity of Southeast Asian countries in the field of purchases of Russian military equipment can be viewed as a consequence of non-realized intentions at the end of the 1990?Ts when the Asian economic crisis compelled the region?Ts countries to decline many arms programs and to cut down military expen***ures under pressure from the IMF. Herein it is pertinent to draw a parallel with the recent natural disaster in the region. Taking into account the rather insignificant consequences for the economies of the affected countries, it is quite probable that negotiations on canceled (postponed) contracts will be resumed within the next 2-3 years that will cause a next wave of military-technical cooperation between Russia and the countries of Southeast Asia in 2007-2008. By that time, the transfer of combat fighters to Malaysia and air defense systems to Vietnam will be completed. In today?Ts con***ions the most appropriate step for Russian enterprises will be an offer of dual-purpose technical equipment to Indonesia. Here we could speak about helicopters and amphibious planes.
Although at the moment we notice an increasing influence of the Southeast Asian region in Russian arms trade system, it is hardly meaningful to speak of a qualitative alternative to China and India from the point of view of reliability and long-term intentions on account of the more modest requirements and financial resources of the countries of the region.
The states of Southeast Asia conclude deals for arms delivery in direct relation to the armament policy of their neighbors in the region. This can be explained as a race of ambitions (reasons of prestige), with a desire to unify military equipment in the face of the Chinese threat. This situation allows Russia to count on a ?ochain? conclusion of contracts. At present, there is an opportunity to create a uniform policy in the field of promotion and technical maintenance of military equipment in the region as three Southeast Asian states have already bought similar Russian fighters.
The negative tendency of the concluded contracts is that many of them are paid via barter (palm oil, chicken meat and so forth), instead of hard currency. Although Rosobornexport assures that the distribution system of those goods has already been adjusted, such a scheme of contract realization, certainly, raises transaction costs and reduces deal profitability.
Having occupied a significant share in the market segment for deliveries of military aircraft, Russia, nevertheless, takes a weak position in such an extensive naval sector. According to some estimations30, the Russian share in the overall volume of Naval arms deliveries to Southeast Asia is only 8%. It is not difficult to notice that the majority of this share falls to orders from Vietnam

Russian Arms Trade with Southeast Asia and The Republic of Korea
Dmitry Vasiliev
Introduction
The ongoing development of Russian military-technical cooperation with the countries of Southeast Asia in recent years allows us to speak about the region as a third pole in the consumption of Russian arms, after China and India. Primarily, the question of consumption concerns Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In 2003, these three countries concluded contracts with Rosobornexport for military equipment deliveries with a total sum of more than 1.5 bln USD, and overcame, in this sense, the tra***ional importers of Russian arms ?" China and India.1 Implementation of these 2003-year contracts will occur from 2005-2007 and provide the respective Southeast Asian importers with a significant share of the total volume of Russian arms exports.
Military-Economic Indicators
As can be seen from the tables below, The Republic of Korea and Malaysia are the wealthiest countries among the given analyzed states as their respective GDP per capita significantly surpass the corresponding indicators of other countries. South Korea, in turn, significantly outstrips Malaysia, especially in absolute terms, being the largest among the countries considered.
The economic potential of Malaysia and South Korea allows them to spend large funds on defense. From 2001 to 2003 these countries demonstrated stable growth rates in military expen***ures, while, however, this did not lead to an increase in the military component of their GDPs. On the contrary, the military burden on the economies of South Korea and Malaysia for the examined period actually decreased. In Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, The Republic of Korea stands a distant third for military expen***ures after China and Japan, leaving far behind the military budgets of other states. This can be explained by the constant confrontation between North and South Korea that results in both countries keeping large armed forces in constant states of alert. At the same time, as far as military weight in GDP is concerned, Vietnam is steadily leading the way, being stimulated *****ch high expen***ures by the increasing military power of China.
The recent natural disaster in the region of Southeast Asia will not greatly affect the macroeconomic indicators of the countries. The expected slowdown of economic growth in Indonesia, the country hit hardest, is estimated at only 0.2-0.3%.2 This is largely due to the fact that the national energy complex, making up more than half of Indonesian GDP, was not in any significant way damaged by the storm. Also, active and generous financial help from other states directly proceeding the disaster also contributes to this stability. Thailand, in turn, generates 12.2% of GDP from its tourist industry, which is expected to completely recover by 2006.3 It is obvious, however, that Indonesia and Thailand, being guided by questions of morale, will hardly increase their military budgets in the immediate future and at the best case will maintain them at former levels ?" the lowest among the countries of the region. As table 3 shows, Indonesia and Thailand spent less than 1.5% of their GDP on military needs in 2003.
Table 1. Gross Domestic Product in current prices, bln of USD
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
143.03
32.69
87.98
115.55
481.89

2002
172.97
35.00
94.91
126.91
546.93

2003
208.31
39.00
103.16
143.18
605.36

Source: Key Indicators 2004 // The Asian Development Bank
Table 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita in current prices, USD
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
684.37
415.37
3664.14
1836.73
10188.00

2002
815.92
438.98
3869.14
2000.72
11490.11

2003
968.71
482.08
4118.21
2238.57
12637.98

Source: Key Indicators 2004 // The Asian Development Bank
Table 3. Military Expen***ure in real terms 2000, bln of USD (% of GDP)
country
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Republic of Korea

year

2001
1.74 (1.1)
2.2 (6.73)
1.91 (2.2)
1.77 (1.4)
13.08 (2.8)

2002
1.84 (1.2)
2.6 (7.43)
2.17 (2.4)
1.85 (1.4)
13.53 (2.7)

2003
2.1 (1.0)
2.9 (7.44)
2.42 (2.35)
1.84 (1.28)
14.62 (2.42)

Source: SIPRI, 2004; Military Balance, 2004-2005; for 2003 - calculations by the author with data from SIPRI and The Asian Development Bank.
External and Internal Threats
For many years, the region of Southeast Asia has remained a flashpoint of instability. Even now, a large part of states in the region have no clearly demarcated borders with their neighbors, which in turn is often the root of periodic low intensity conflicts and also admits the probability of emerging limited armed confrontation.
A latent struggle for the right to control the South China Sea, complicated by a constant war with piracy, smuggling and poaching, can be attributed to tra***ional conflict of the region. The strategic importance of the South China Sea lies in the fact that supremacy provides control over the transport lanes, including transport of coal and mineral ore products from the Near and Middle East to the Asia Pacific Region. In this connection, Southeast Asian states are particularly concerned about the involvement of China in an eventual conflict which is attracted not only by the long-term perspective of domination in the region, but also by the immediate desire to increase her reserves of natural energy resources. It is known that the Spratly Islands, located in the South China Sea, are rich in oil and gas deposits and for a long time have been an apple of discord between China, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.4
Actually, the growing power of China is one of the main incentives driving the arms acquisition process among the region?Ts countries. Moreover, concerning the import of aircraft, one of the main tendencies is an orientation towards acquisition programs of other countries (Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia have relatively homogeneous fleets of military aircraft) with the purpose of arms unification and the creation of integrated aviation structures, the presence of which will allow a possible deterrent to the significant superiority of Chinese Air Forces.5
Internal conflicts of the countries of the region are mainly based on ethnic and religious disagreements. In the case of Thailand, there is a threat of terrorism coming from the southern part of the country where Moslems prevail (making up 10% of the state population).6 Likewise, the internal security of Indonesia is threatened by separatist moods in provinces, especially amplified after the independence of East Timor in 2002.7
Arms purchases by the Republic of Korea stem from its opposition policy to North Korea. The conflict recently received a new impetus as North Korea announced that it now possesses nuclear weapons.8 It should be noted, by the way, that in the summer of 2004, against the background of the conflict, a South Korean Defense Minister was dismissed owing to information leakage about the latest collision with North Korea forces.9
Arms Trade with Russia
Indonesia
For more than 30 years the US remained the main supplier for military equipment to Indonesia. Consequently, as a result of the American embargo imposed on deliveries of military equipment in 1999, Indonesia has experienced a gradual degradation of its National Armed Forces.10 In light of the situation, the Indonesian leadership took the decision to diversify its sources of military deliveries to weaken the country?Ts dependence on American weaponry. This, in particular, has served as an occasion for rapprochement with Russia.
Negotiations with Indonesia for deliveries of Russian arms began in 1997. At that time Indonesia was intent on purchasing 12 Su-30 fighters, but the devastating financial crisis prevented the transaction. Negotiations were renewed in 2003 and resulted in the signing of a contract for delivery of 2 Su-27SK fighters, 2 Su-30MK aircrafts and 2 Mi-35 combat helicopters for a total sum of 192.9 mln USD.11 About 165 mln USD of this sum was paid in the form of Indonesian goods, mainly in palm oil (108 mln USD). The contract was concluded in April 2003 soon after the signing of the general Russian-Indonesian agreement for military-technical cooperation and became the largest contract concerning arms between the two countries.
In 2004 Indonesia stated its intention to buy 8 more Russian fighters in correspondence with the purpose of incorporating a full squadron of these aircraft in the structure of its National Air Forces.12 These plans were impeded by the natural disaster in December 2004. Nevertheless, as it has been shown above, the cancellation of the order is explained not only by economic reasons and, thus, there is a high probability of returning this question to the national agenda in the near future.
Indonesia is also experiencing a serious need in updating its naval fleet, which has been worn out by the ongoing struggle against piracy at sea. However, the country hopes to renew its fleet with obsolete American ships being decommissioned from US Naval Forces as part of the Deepwater program.13
Malaysia
The first large Russian?"Malaysian transaction was made in 1994, when Russia delivered 18 MiG?"29SE/UB fighters at a cost of 550 mln USD.14
The next landmark in military cooperation development between the two countries was in 2003 when Malaysia purchased 18 Su-30MKM multipurpose aircraft for 900 mln USD.15 To a high extent, this decision was influenced by the invasion of American forces into Iraq that defined the international position of the US as in open opposition to the Islamic world. As in the case of Indonesia, the contract implies offset obligations according to which 270 mln USD will be paid in palm oil. Herein it is necessary to note that Malaysia, perhaps, is the only country in Southeast Asia that follows the most diversified policy of arms procurement. A fear of becoming dependent on any single country in the field of military cooperation sometimes leads Malaysia to unusual actions. Thus, the intention to buy Russian fighters has not prevented Malaysia from speaking about plans for purchasing American F-18 Super Hornets.16
In 2003 Malaysia also concluded a contract worth 71 mln USD for delivery of 12 Mi-171Sh helicopters. The Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant, the main contractor under agreement, probably completed the order in 2004.17
Among other items, it is worth mentioning a contract signed in 2001 for delivery to Malaysia of ?oMetis?"2? ATGM systems for 30 mln USD, and in 2002 the sale of a batch of portable ?oIglâ?"9K38? SAM systems for 48 mln USD. The final shipment of ?oIglâ? is expected in 2005.18
As far as Naval armaments are concerned, Malaysia (like Thailand and Singapore) has set the task of creating a national submarine fleet and, in this connection, revealed its demand for diesel submarines. Partly, French and Spanish contractors will satisfy Malaysian demand for 10 submarines.19
Vietnam
For a long time Ukraine was Russiâ?Ts major competitor on the arms market of Vietnam, supplying the country with large quantities of military boats, R-27 missiles and MiG-21UM advanced jet trainers. Recently, however, Vietnam has given preference to Russian arms. Moreover, in contrast to its neighbors, Vietnam doesn?Tt diversify its sources of arms deliveries.
During the 1990?Ts Vietnam bought from Russia 12 Su-27 aircraft for a total sum of 360 mln USD (two contracts, in 1994 and in 1997).20 In 2003 Vietnam also placed an order for delivery of 4 Su-30MK2V fighters for 110 mln USD. The planes were subsequently transferred in November - December 2004.
In comparison with its neighbors, Vietnam is the most active in completing the structure of its Naval Forces with Russian military equipment. In 1999 Russia delivered to Vietnam 2 missile boats ?oTarantul-2? of project 1241RE. Also, in 1999 Severnoye Design Bureau finished developing the PS-500 missile ship (construction completed in 2001) and a corvette of project 2100 (construction of 10-14 units proposed). Under a contract from 2001, the Almaz shipbuilding company constructed two patrol boats ?oSvetlyak? of project 10412 for 40 mln USD. The ships were delivered at the end of 2002. According to a 2003 contract worth 120 mln USD, Russia will transfer to Vietnam 2 large missile boats ?oMolniyâ? of project 1241.8 and 8 more will be locally assembled under license using Russian components (Vietnamese designation Ho-A Class).21
A huge volume of contracts was concluded in 2003. Besides the purchase of the ?oMolniyâ? ships, Vietnam contracted delivery of 2 batteries of S-300PMU1 SAM systems for 250-300 mln USD (which made Vietnam the second country in Asia after China to receive such hi-tech weaponry), and the delivery of 4 Su-30MK fighters worth 110 mln USD.22
In 2002, a contract was signed for delivery of 50 portable ?oIglâ? SAM systems and for a technology transfer for its manufacture at cost of 64 mln USD.
Thailand
The USA is the main supplier of arms to Thailand. This, in part, explains the failure of Russian enterprises in all military tenders conducted by Thailand. In the past, Russia had offered ?oMetis? ATGM systems, BTR-80/80 APCs and portable Iglâ? SAM systems but, unfortunately none of the bids were successful.
Nevertheless, certain progress began to take shape in 2003: both parties agreed that Russia will pay off its debt of 36.5 mln USD for deliveries of Thai rice in the form of goods and equipment, including space systems. In 2003 the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding on Rear and Technical Maintenance of Armies was also signed.23
Recently, the main focus of Russian-Thai relations has been the possible delivery of 6 Su-30MKI fighters worth 210-250 mln USD in exchange for deliveries of chicken meat. In autumn of 2004, however, intelligence revealed that Thailand had made the decision to purchase fighters from the Swedish company Saab. Thailand will receive the Swedish planes also via barter.24 At the same time, the status of negotiations with Russia on the Su-30MKI fighters remains unknown.
South Korea
South Korea possesses the most advanced defense industry among the considered countries. In this connection, the question of technology transfers and participation of national enterprises in the fulfillment of military contracts occupies one of the key places in negotiations on arms deliveries. Although the American defense industry has strongly contributed to the formation of the South-Korean defense industry, these requirements also concern the US. Moreover, the frequent unwillingness of the Americans to transfer defense technologies to the Republic of Korea has induced the country to diversification in arms procurement, first of all, by means of Israeli and Russian weaponry.25 Nevertheless, even today, US influence on South Korea in questions of military cooperation is rather significant.
Military technical cooperation between Russia and South Korea continues within the framework for payment of Russian debt, which currently amounts to 1.7 bln USD. Part of this debt has been paid by deliveries of Ka-32S helicopters, T-80U main battle tanks, IFVs BMP-3, ?oIglâ? portable SAM systems and ?oMetis-M? ATGM systems. Particularly, in 2004 South Korea received 17 BMP-3, at least one Ka-32S helicopter and an unnamed quantity of ATGM systems ?oCornet - E? and ?oMetis ?" M?.26 Also in 2004, four Il-103 planes were transferred to South Korea within a 2003 contract for delivery of 23 units. The remaining 19 planes are expected to be shipped in 2005-2006. According to a statement by the Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation Sergey Kolotukhin, from 2003-2006, Russia will provide South Korea with arms and military equipment for a sum of 300 mln USD in payment of Russian debt.27
South Korea is currently conducting a tender for delivery of attack helicopters. The Russian-Israeli Ka-50-2 and the American AH-64 and AH-1Z SuperCobra helicopters are competing for the tender. The value of the potential contract is estimated at 1.8 bln USD. The tender has been repeatedly postponed and it is unknown when the results will be announced.28
With regard to Naval armaments, in 2002 South Korea signed a contract with Russia for delivery of three ?oMurena-E? type hovercraft for 100 mln USD.29 The contract will be carried out in cooperation with the Ukrainian enterprise Zorya-Mashproekt.
Conclusions
On the basis of the aforesaid it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
In part, today?Ts increased activity of Southeast Asian countries in the field of purchases of Russian military equipment can be viewed as a consequence of non-realized intentions at the end of the 1990?Ts when the Asian economic crisis compelled the region?Ts countries to decline many arms programs and to cut down military expen***ures under pressure from the IMF. Herein it is pertinent to draw a parallel with the recent natural disaster in the region. Taking into account the rather insignificant consequences for the economies of the affected countries, it is quite probable that negotiations on canceled (postponed) contracts will be resumed within the next 2-3 years that will cause a next wave of military-technical cooperation between Russia and the countries of Southeast Asia in 2007-2008. By that time, the transfer of combat fighters to Malaysia and air defense systems to Vietnam will be completed. In today?Ts con***ions the most appropriate step for Russian enterprises will be an offer of dual-purpose technical equipment to Indonesia. Here we could speak about helicopters and amphibious planes.
Although at the moment we notice an increasing influence of the Southeast Asian region in Russian arms trade system, it is hardly meaningful to speak of a qualitative alternative to China and India from the point of view of reliability and long-term intentions on account of the more modest requirements and financial resources of the countries of the region.
The states of Southeast Asia conclude deals for arms delivery in direct relation to the armament policy of their neighbors in the region. This can be explained as a race of ambitions (reasons of prestige), with a desire to unify military equipment in the face of the Chinese threat. This situation allows Russia to count on a ?ochain? conclusion of contracts. At present, there is an opportunity to create a uniform policy in the field of promotion and technical maintenance of military equipment in the region as three Southeast Asian states have already bought similar Russian fighters.
The negative tendency of the concluded contracts is that many of them are paid via barter (palm oil, chicken meat and so forth), instead of hard currency. Although Rosobornexport assures that the distribution system of those goods has already been adjusted, such a scheme of contract realization, certainly, raises transaction costs and reduces deal profitability.
Having occupied a significant share in the market segment for deliveries of military aircraft, Russia, nevertheless, takes a weak position in such an extensive naval sector. According to some estimations30, the Russian share in the overall volume of Naval arms deliveries to Southeast Asia is only 8%. It is not difficult to notice that the majority of this share falls to orders from Vietnam

An RTAF F-16A prepares to receive fuel from a U.S. Air Force (USAF) KC-135 air refueling aircraft during COPE TIGER 2003.
Photo by SSgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr., USAF

éu?c spirou s?a vo 17:21 ngy 21/06/2005

An RTAF F-16A prepares to receive fuel from a U.S. Air Force (USAF) KC-135 air refueling aircraft during COPE TIGER 2003.
Photo by SSgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr., USAF

éu?c spirou s?a vo 17:21 ngy 21/06/2005

Quan hệ quân sự giữa NC và Ấn Độ
The Indian Express, 8 June 2005
Navy to rush spares to Vietnam Deal was arrived at during Vietnam Defence minister visit in March
NEW DELHI, JUNE 7: Taking ahead its south-east Asia policy, the Indian Navy is all set to reach more than 150 tonnes of critical spares to Vietnam on June 9 for its Petya and OSA-II class Russian-made missile boats. Shortly after Admiral Arun Prakash''s fruitful visit to the region, which included an agreement with Thailand on monitoring common waters, the Navy will send its amphibious vessel INS Magar with 900 boxes of crucial spares that the Vietnamese Navy desperately needs. An understanding on this was struck when the Vietnamese Defence Minister visited New Delhi in March. ''''The spares would be of immense value to the Vietnamese Navy that operates a number of Russian-built Petya and OSA-II class missile boats,'''' a Navy spokesperson said. ''''Vietnam is an important part of extended maritime neighbourhood and the Indo-Vietnam friendly bilateral relations have gone from strength to strength in recent years.'''' Vietnam, which shares borders with Cambodia, Laos and China, has a coast all along the South China sea, across from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Philippines. The South China Sea area is a region the Indian Navy has set its sights on for comprehensive power projection. With warming relations between India and China - and the possibility of Sino-Indian joint Naval exercises this year in the Arabian sea - the Navy is keen to get an ''''equal share'''' of recognition in the area for progressive deep water capabilities, far from Indian shores.
The Tribune, 11 June 2005
Spare parts for Vietnam
In a bid to expand its maritime diplomacy with the strategically significant Southeast Asian nations, the Indian Navy is offering them spare parts of the same type of equipment which is being used by both countries. An Indian ship has carried almost 150 tonnes of spare parts for Vietnam. These include spare parts of missiles and warships. The spare parts have been carried by Indian ship INS Magar and the consignment, comprising of 900 boxes were handed over to the Vietnamese Navy at a ceremony earlier in the week. The spares are for the Russian-built Petya class frigate and OSA II class missile boats. The two boats are also used by the Indian Navy which feels that Vietnam has been a key partner in maritime cooperation.