Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

Có bác nào kiểm tra lại xem NC sản xuất loại manpad nào Igla (SA-16) hay Igla-S (SA-18)? Em đọc từ các nguồn tin đáng tin cậy trên net thì NC chỉ SX SA-16 thôi. Cái này tầm bắn thấp, lại bị tụi Ixrael phá được rồi, chắc tụi nó đã bán công nghệ cho BC rồi. NC lại đi mua bản quyền sản xuất tốn tới 60mil$ lận. Mắc quá!

Part I: Chinese dragon awakens

Second of two parts.

China is stepping up its overt and covert efforts to gather intelligence and technology in the United States, and the activities have boosted Beijing''s plans to rapidly produce advanced-weapons systems.
"I think you see it where something that would normally take 10 years to develop takes them two or three," said David Szady, chief of FBI counterintelligence operations.
He said the Chinese are prolific collectors of secrets and military-related information.
"What we''re finding is that [the spying is] much more focused in certain areas than we ever thought, such as command and control and things of that sort," Mr. Szady said.
"In the military area, the rapid development of their ''blue-water'' navy -- like the Aegis weapons systems -- in no small part is probably due to some of the research and development they were able to get from the United States," he said.
The danger of Chinese technology acquisition is that if the United States were called on to fight a war with China over the Republic of China (Taiwan), U.S. forces could find themselves battling a U.S.-equipped enemy.
"I would hate for my grandson to be killed with U.S. technology" in a war over Taiwan, senior FBI counterintelligence official Tim Bereznay told a conference earlier this year.
The Chinese intelligence services use a variety of methods to spy, including tra***ional intelligence operations targeting U.S. government agencies and defense contractors.

Part I: Chinese dragon awakens

Second of two parts.

China is stepping up its overt and covert efforts to gather intelligence and technology in the United States, and the activities have boosted Beijing''s plans to rapidly produce advanced-weapons systems.
"I think you see it where something that would normally take 10 years to develop takes them two or three," said David Szady, chief of FBI counterintelligence operations.
He said the Chinese are prolific collectors of secrets and military-related information.
"What we''re finding is that [the spying is] much more focused in certain areas than we ever thought, such as command and control and things of that sort," Mr. Szady said.
"In the military area, the rapid development of their ''blue-water'' navy -- like the Aegis weapons systems -- in no small part is probably due to some of the research and development they were able to get from the United States," he said.
The danger of Chinese technology acquisition is that if the United States were called on to fight a war with China over the Republic of China (Taiwan), U.S. forces could find themselves battling a U.S.-equipped enemy.
"I would hate for my grandson to be killed with U.S. technology" in a war over Taiwan, senior FBI counterintelligence official Tim Bereznay told a conference earlier this year.
The Chinese intelligence services use a variety of methods to spy, including tra***ional intelligence operations targeting U.S. government agencies and defense contractors.

Ad***ionally, the Chinese use hundreds of thousands of Chinese visitors, students and other nonprofessional spies to gather valuable data, most of it considered "open source," or unclassified information.
"What keeps us up late at night is the asymmetrical, unofficial presence," Mr. Szady said. "The official presence, too. I don''t want to minimize that at all in what they are doing."
China''s spies use as many as 3,200 front companies -- many run by groups linked to the Chinese military -- that are set up to covertly obtain information, equipment and technology, U.S. officials say.
Recent examples include front businesses in Milwaukee; Trenton, N.J.; and Palo Alto, Calif., Mr. Szady said.
In other cases, China has dispatched students, short-term visitors, businesspeople and scientific delegations with the objective of stealing technology and other secrets.
The Chinese "are very good at being where the information is," Mr. Szady said.
"If you build a submarine, no one is going to steal a submarine. But what they are looking for are the systems or materials or the designs or the batteries or the air con***ioning or the things that make that thing tick," he said. "That''s what they are very good at collecting, going after both the private sector, the industrial complexes, as well as the colleges and universities in collecting scientific developments that they need."
One recent case involved two Chinese students at the University of Pennsylvania who were found to be gathering nuclear submarine secrets and passing them to their father in China, a senior military officer involved in that country''s submarine program.
Bit by bit
To counter such incidents, the FBI has been beefing up its counterintelligence operations in the past three years and has special sections in all 56 field offices across the country for counterspying.
But the problem of Chinese spying is daunting.
"It''s pervasive," Mr. Szady said. "It''s a massive presence, 150,000 students, 300,000 delegations in the New York area. That''s not counting the rest of the United States, probably 700,000 visitors a year. They''re very good at exchanges and business deals, and they''re persistent."
Chinese intelligence and business spies will go after a certain technology, and they eventually get what they want, even after being thwarted, he said.
Paul D. Moore, a former FBI intelligence specialist on China, said the Chinese use a variety of methods to get small pieces of information through numerous collectors, mostly from open, public sources.
The three main Chinese government units that run intelligence operations are the Ministry of State Security, the military intelligence department of the People''s Liberation Army and a small group known as the Liaison Office of the General Political Department of the Chinese army, said Mr. Moore, now with the private Centre for Counterintelligence Studies.
China gleans most of its important information not from spies but from unwitting American visitors to China -- from both the U.S. government and the private sector -- who are "serially indiscreet" in disclosing information sought by Beijing, Mr. Moore said in a recent speech.
In the past several years, U.S. nuclear laboratory scientists were fooled into providing Chinese scientists with important weapons information during discussions in China through a process of information elicitation -- asking questions and seeking help with physics "problems" that the Chinese are trying to solve, he said.
"The model that China has for its intelligence, in general, is to collect a small amount of information from a large amount of people," Mr. Moore said during a conference of security specialists held by the National Security Institute, a Massachusetts-based consulting firm.

In the learning phase
Mr. Szady acknowledges that the FBI is still "figuring out" the methods used by the Chinese to acquire intelligence and technology from the United States.
Since 1985, there have been only six major intelligence defectors from China''s spy services, and information about Chinese activities and methods is limited, U.S. officials said.
Recent Chinese spy cases were mired in controversy.
The case against Katrina Leung, a Los Angeles-based FBI informant who the FBI thinks was a spy for Beijing, ended in the dismissal of charges of taking classified documents from her FBI handler. The Justice Department is appealing the case.
The case against Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee, who was suspected of supplying classified nuclear-weapons data to China, ended with Mr. Lee pleading guilty to only one count among the 59 filed.
The FBI has been unable to find out who in the U.S. government supplied China with secrets on every deployed nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, including the W-88, the small warhead used on U.S. submarine-launched nuclear missiles.
"I think the problem is huge, and it''s something that I think we''re just getting our arms around," Mr. Szady said of Chinese spying. "It''s been there, and what we''re doing is more or less discovering it or figuring it out at this point."
Mr. Bereznay said recently that Chinese intelligence activities are a major worry. FBI counterintelligence against the Chinese "is our main priority," he said.
In some cases, so-called political correctness can interfere with FBI counterspying. For example, Chinese-American scientists at U.S. weapons laboratories have accused the FBI of racial profiling.
But Mr. Szady said that is not the case.
China uses ethnic Chinese-Americans as a base from which to recruit agents, he said.
"They don''t consider anyone to be American-Chinese," Mr. Szady said. "They''re all considered overseas Chinese."
So the answer he gives to those who accuse the FBI of racial profiling is: "We''re not profiling you. The Chinese are, and they''re very good at doing that."

Pushing an agenda
China''s government also uses influence operations designed to advance pro-Chinese policies in the United States and to prevent the U.S. government from taking tough action or adopting policies against Beijing''s interests, FBI officials said.
Rudy Guerin, a senior FBI counterintelligence official in charge of China affairs, said the Chinese aggressively exploit their connections to U.S. corporations doing business in China.
"They go straight to the companies themselves," he said.
Many U.S. firms doing business in China, including such giants as Coca-Cola, Boeing and General Motors, use their lobbyists on behalf of Beijing.
"We see the Chinese going to these companies to ask them to lobby on their behalf on certain issues," Mr. Guerin said, "whether it''s most-favored-nation trade status, [World Health Organization], Falun Gong or other matters."
The Chinese government also appeals directly to members of Congress and congressional staff.
U.S. officials revealed that China''s embassy in Washington has expanded a special section in charge of running influence operations, primarily targeting Congress.
The operation, which includes 26 political officers, is led by Su Ge, a Chinese government official.
The office frequently sends out e-mail to selected members or staff on Capitol Hill, agitating for or against several issues, often related to Taiwan affairs.
Nu Qingbao, one of Mr. Su''s deputies, has sent several e-mails to select members and staff warning Congress not *****pport Taiwan.
The e-mails have angered Republicans who view the influence operations as communist meddling.
"The Chinese, like every other intelligence agency or any other government, are very much engaged in trying to influence, both covertly and overtly," Mr. Szady said.

Taking technology
The real danger to the United States is the loss of the high-technology edge, which can impair U.S. competitiveness but more importantly can boost China''s military.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a part of the Department of Homeland Security, is concerned because the number of high-profile cases of illegal Chinese technology acquisition is growing.
"We see a lot of activity involving China, and I think it would be fair to say the trend is toward an increase," said Robert A. Schoch, deputy assistant director in ICE''s national security investigations division.
Mr. Schoch said that one recent case of a South Korean businessman who sought to sell advanced night-vision equipment to China highlights the problem.
"We have an awesome responsibility to protect this sensitive technology," he said. "That gives the military such an advantage."
ICE agents are trying hard to stop illegal exports to China and several other states, including Iran and Syria, not just by halting individual exports but by shutting down networks of illegal exporters, Mr. Schoch said.
Another concern is that China is a known arms proliferator, so weapons and related technology that are smuggled there can be sent to other states of concern.
"Yes, some of this stuff may go to China, but then it could be diverted to other countries," Mr. Schoch said. "And that is the secondary proliferation. Who knows where it may end up."
As with China''s military buildup, China''s drive for advanced technology with military applications has been underestimated by the U.S. intelligence community.
A report prepared for the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found predictions that China was unable to advance technologically were false.
In fact, the report by former Pentagon official Michael Pillsbury highlights 16 key advances in Chinese technology -- all with military implications -- in the past six months alone.
The failure to gauge China''s development is part of the bias within the U.S. government that calls for playing down the threat from the growing power of China, both militarily and technologically, Mr. Pillsbury stated.
"Predictions a decade ago of slow Chinese [science and technology] progress have now proved to be false," the report stated.
Unlike the United States, China does not distinguish between civilian and military development. The same factories in China that make refrigerators also are used to make long-range ballistic missiles.
At a time when U.S. counterintelligence agencies are facing an array of foreign spies, the Chinese are considered the most effective at stealing secrets and know-how.
"I think the Chinese have figured it out, as far as being able to collect and advance their political, economic and military interests by theft or whatever you want to call it," Mr. Szady said. "They are way ahead of what the Russians have ever done."
Thefts of U.S. technology boost China''s weaponry
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
June 27, 2005
http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050627-124855-6747r_page2.htm

Ad***ionally, the Chinese use hundreds of thousands of Chinese visitors, students and other nonprofessional spies to gather valuable data, most of it considered "open source," or unclassified information.
"What keeps us up late at night is the asymmetrical, unofficial presence," Mr. Szady said. "The official presence, too. I don''t want to minimize that at all in what they are doing."
China''s spies use as many as 3,200 front companies -- many run by groups linked to the Chinese military -- that are set up to covertly obtain information, equipment and technology, U.S. officials say.
Recent examples include front businesses in Milwaukee; Trenton, N.J.; and Palo Alto, Calif., Mr. Szady said.
In other cases, China has dispatched students, short-term visitors, businesspeople and scientific delegations with the objective of stealing technology and other secrets.
The Chinese "are very good at being where the information is," Mr. Szady said.
"If you build a submarine, no one is going to steal a submarine. But what they are looking for are the systems or materials or the designs or the batteries or the air con***ioning or the things that make that thing tick," he said. "That''s what they are very good at collecting, going after both the private sector, the industrial complexes, as well as the colleges and universities in collecting scientific developments that they need."
One recent case involved two Chinese students at the University of Pennsylvania who were found to be gathering nuclear submarine secrets and passing them to their father in China, a senior military officer involved in that country''s submarine program.
Bit by bit
To counter such incidents, the FBI has been beefing up its counterintelligence operations in the past three years and has special sections in all 56 field offices across the country for counterspying.
But the problem of Chinese spying is daunting.
"It''s pervasive," Mr. Szady said. "It''s a massive presence, 150,000 students, 300,000 delegations in the New York area. That''s not counting the rest of the United States, probably 700,000 visitors a year. They''re very good at exchanges and business deals, and they''re persistent."
Chinese intelligence and business spies will go after a certain technology, and they eventually get what they want, even after being thwarted, he said.
Paul D. Moore, a former FBI intelligence specialist on China, said the Chinese use a variety of methods to get small pieces of information through numerous collectors, mostly from open, public sources.
The three main Chinese government units that run intelligence operations are the Ministry of State Security, the military intelligence department of the People''s Liberation Army and a small group known as the Liaison Office of the General Political Department of the Chinese army, said Mr. Moore, now with the private Centre for Counterintelligence Studies.
China gleans most of its important information not from spies but from unwitting American visitors to China -- from both the U.S. government and the private sector -- who are "serially indiscreet" in disclosing information sought by Beijing, Mr. Moore said in a recent speech.
In the past several years, U.S. nuclear laboratory scientists were fooled into providing Chinese scientists with important weapons information during discussions in China through a process of information elicitation -- asking questions and seeking help with physics "problems" that the Chinese are trying to solve, he said.
"The model that China has for its intelligence, in general, is to collect a small amount of information from a large amount of people," Mr. Moore said during a conference of security specialists held by the National Security Institute, a Massachusetts-based consulting firm.

In the learning phase
Mr. Szady acknowledges that the FBI is still "figuring out" the methods used by the Chinese to acquire intelligence and technology from the United States.
Since 1985, there have been only six major intelligence defectors from China''s spy services, and information about Chinese activities and methods is limited, U.S. officials said.
Recent Chinese spy cases were mired in controversy.
The case against Katrina Leung, a Los Angeles-based FBI informant who the FBI thinks was a spy for Beijing, ended in the dismissal of charges of taking classified documents from her FBI handler. The Justice Department is appealing the case.
The case against Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist Wen Ho Lee, who was suspected of supplying classified nuclear-weapons data to China, ended with Mr. Lee pleading guilty to only one count among the 59 filed.
The FBI has been unable to find out who in the U.S. government supplied China with secrets on every deployed nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal, including the W-88, the small warhead used on U.S. submarine-launched nuclear missiles.
"I think the problem is huge, and it''s something that I think we''re just getting our arms around," Mr. Szady said of Chinese spying. "It''s been there, and what we''re doing is more or less discovering it or figuring it out at this point."
Mr. Bereznay said recently that Chinese intelligence activities are a major worry. FBI counterintelligence against the Chinese "is our main priority," he said.
In some cases, so-called political correctness can interfere with FBI counterspying. For example, Chinese-American scientists at U.S. weapons laboratories have accused the FBI of racial profiling.
But Mr. Szady said that is not the case.
China uses ethnic Chinese-Americans as a base from which to recruit agents, he said.
"They don''t consider anyone to be American-Chinese," Mr. Szady said. "They''re all considered overseas Chinese."
So the answer he gives to those who accuse the FBI of racial profiling is: "We''re not profiling you. The Chinese are, and they''re very good at doing that."

Pushing an agenda
China''s government also uses influence operations designed to advance pro-Chinese policies in the United States and to prevent the U.S. government from taking tough action or adopting policies against Beijing''s interests, FBI officials said.
Rudy Guerin, a senior FBI counterintelligence official in charge of China affairs, said the Chinese aggressively exploit their connections to U.S. corporations doing business in China.
"They go straight to the companies themselves," he said.
Many U.S. firms doing business in China, including such giants as Coca-Cola, Boeing and General Motors, use their lobbyists on behalf of Beijing.
"We see the Chinese going to these companies to ask them to lobby on their behalf on certain issues," Mr. Guerin said, "whether it''s most-favored-nation trade status, [World Health Organization], Falun Gong or other matters."
The Chinese government also appeals directly to members of Congress and congressional staff.
U.S. officials revealed that China''s embassy in Washington has expanded a special section in charge of running influence operations, primarily targeting Congress.
The operation, which includes 26 political officers, is led by Su Ge, a Chinese government official.
The office frequently sends out e-mail to selected members or staff on Capitol Hill, agitating for or against several issues, often related to Taiwan affairs.
Nu Qingbao, one of Mr. Su''s deputies, has sent several e-mails to select members and staff warning Congress not *****pport Taiwan.
The e-mails have angered Republicans who view the influence operations as communist meddling.
"The Chinese, like every other intelligence agency or any other government, are very much engaged in trying to influence, both covertly and overtly," Mr. Szady said.

Taking technology
The real danger to the United States is the loss of the high-technology edge, which can impair U.S. competitiveness but more importantly can boost China''s military.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a part of the Department of Homeland Security, is concerned because the number of high-profile cases of illegal Chinese technology acquisition is growing.
"We see a lot of activity involving China, and I think it would be fair to say the trend is toward an increase," said Robert A. Schoch, deputy assistant director in ICE''s national security investigations division.
Mr. Schoch said that one recent case of a South Korean businessman who sought to sell advanced night-vision equipment to China highlights the problem.
"We have an awesome responsibility to protect this sensitive technology," he said. "That gives the military such an advantage."
ICE agents are trying hard to stop illegal exports to China and several other states, including Iran and Syria, not just by halting individual exports but by shutting down networks of illegal exporters, Mr. Schoch said.
Another concern is that China is a known arms proliferator, so weapons and related technology that are smuggled there can be sent to other states of concern.
"Yes, some of this stuff may go to China, but then it could be diverted to other countries," Mr. Schoch said. "And that is the secondary proliferation. Who knows where it may end up."
As with China''s military buildup, China''s drive for advanced technology with military applications has been underestimated by the U.S. intelligence community.
A report prepared for the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission found predictions that China was unable to advance technologically were false.
In fact, the report by former Pentagon official Michael Pillsbury highlights 16 key advances in Chinese technology -- all with military implications -- in the past six months alone.
The failure to gauge China''s development is part of the bias within the U.S. government that calls for playing down the threat from the growing power of China, both militarily and technologically, Mr. Pillsbury stated.
"Predictions a decade ago of slow Chinese [science and technology] progress have now proved to be false," the report stated.
Unlike the United States, China does not distinguish between civilian and military development. The same factories in China that make refrigerators also are used to make long-range ballistic missiles.
At a time when U.S. counterintelligence agencies are facing an array of foreign spies, the Chinese are considered the most effective at stealing secrets and know-how.
"I think the Chinese have figured it out, as far as being able to collect and advance their political, economic and military interests by theft or whatever you want to call it," Mr. Szady said. "They are way ahead of what the Russians have ever done."
Thefts of U.S. technology boost China''s weaponry
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
June 27, 2005
http://washingtontimes.com/specialreport/20050627-124855-6747r_page2.htm

Tin Kinh Tế : said Livoti. "And our companies would be interested in using Vietnam as an outsourcing-manufacturing capability primarily in the apparel business."
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/archive/2005/June/23/biz/stories/01biz.htm
Hy vọng Mẽo chuyển hướng đầu tư vào VN . Có tiền rồi khi đấy muốn mua MiG hay Su hào gì cũng được . heheee....quan trọng hơn là hy vọng mổi Bác có thêm cơ hội kinh doanh kiếm tiền mua mổi người một cái xe con chạy vòng vòng chơi . Nhớ khi đấy cho em đi quá giang với nhé .

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Hình như NC chưa có Igla-S đâu.Đang có vụ tranh cãi giữa Mỹ , Izrael và Nga về việc Siry mua tên lửa phòng không của Nga.Nga đồng ý bán loại "STRELETS" có khả năng dùng loại Igla-S
"STRELETS" set for firing of missiles of IGLA-type MANPADS
Purpose: to provide an automatic remote launch capability in single-round, sequence or salvo modes to fire IGLA-type missiles from various land-based, airborne and sea-borne platforms.

Employment options:
The Strelets can be used as a part of:
mobile SHORAD system based on IGLA-type missiles;
combat helicopters armed with IGLA-type missiles;
ship-based SHORAD system;
ship antenna station and TV surveillance system armed with IGLA-type missiles;
medium range air defence missile system and anti-aircraft artillery system.
Combat equipment - IGLA-type missile in the launching tube.
Components:
multiple-purpose launching module (fitted with two missiles provides their activation, pre-launch and launch sequence);
control and communications system (responsible for datalink with launch platform''s fire-control unit);
attachment set (to provide mechanical and electrical connection of the set and the carrier''s components).
Specifications: Quantity of launching modules/missiles up to 4/8
Reaction time (minimum time from missile activation till launch) 6.5 s
Missile max continuous operation time from activation to firing 60 s
Max number of activations of one missile up to 4
Firing mode single, salvo with 2 missiles from different sides
Reload time not longer than 4 min
Weight of loaded launching module 72 kg
Weight of control equipment no more than 24 kg
IGLA-S man-portable air defence missile system
Purpose: the system is designed to engage front line aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and UAVs under direct visibility con***ions and in the night time, head-on and tail chase, in background clutter and thermal countermeasures environment.
IGLA-S MANPADS is a new-generation system featuring considerably extended firing range and enhanced kill probability against aerial targets and possessing a new quality for this class of systems - high engagement effectiveness against small-size targets like cruise missiles and UAVs.
Main features of IGLA-S system:
enhanced kill probability against aerial targets and increased warhead lethality due to:
increased HE quantity (by 1.5 times as compared to IGLA system);
in-depth impact detonation of the missile warhead adjusting the rate of embedding to the approach speed;
proximity detonation of the missile warhead (in the event of mi****) with optimization of the detonation point;
detonation of the sustainer''s remaining solid propellant;
advanced missile accuracy characteristics.
extended firing range of up to 6.0 km as compared with 5.2 km for IGLA system due to missile improved aerodynamic characteristics;
night firing capability due to application of a night vision device holder and a light weight night vision device development.
easy installation on various platforms
Unified modules are the base for:
formation of "air-air" guided weapon system;
formation of a mobile air defence missile system of high covertness;
combination with AD gun systems;
combination with medium and long range air defence systems;
formation of shipborne air defence systems.
IGLA-S system is a successor of IGLA missile system family outperforming them in effectiveness, reliability, service life and survivability and retaining their best merits:
shoulder firing by a single gunner;
"fire-and-forget" concept;
high resistance to background clutter and thermal countermeasures;
easy aiming and launching;
easy maintenance and training;
high covertness of use;
retained operability in extreme operational environment.
Specification:
Range 6000 m
Target kill altitude 10-3500 m
Target velocity
in head-on 400 m/s
in tail chase 320 m/s
Combat equipment weight max 19 kg
Missile caliber 72 mm
Missile length 1635 mm
Missile weight 11.7 kg
Warhead weight 2.5 kg
Time to transfer the system from the travelling position to combat max 13 s
Jamming immunity high
IGLA 9K38 Man-Portable Air Defence Missile System
Purpose: the system is designed to engage fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles and UAVs at their optical visibility and in the night-time con***ions in head-on and tail chase in background clutter and thermal countermeasures environment.
- high immunity to jamming;
- round-the-clock operation with IFF interrogator;
- basic employment version - shoulder firing;
- capable of being used as part of "Dzhighit" supported launcher and "Strelets" system.
Main features of "Igla" system:
- a two-colour IR-seeker;
- automatic setting of angles of lead and elevation;
- target selection in IR jamming environment;
- software providing direct hit of the target;
- simultaneous detonation of the sustainer''s remaining solid propellant and the warhead;
- veto of missile launch against "friendly" targets.
The system consists of the following:
combat equipment:
- 9M39 missile;
- 9P516 launching mechanism;
enhancement equipment
maintenance equipment:
- 9V866 mobile test station;
- ammunition depot test set;
training aids:
- cut-away dummy of 9K38 system;
- full-scale dummy of 9K38 system;
- 9F663 training set;
- 9F635 field trainer.
Specifications:
Target kill altitude 10-3500 m
Range 5200 m
Target velocity
in head-on 360-400 m/s
in tail chase up to 320 m/s
Combat equipment weight 17 kg
Missile caliber 72 mm
Missile length 1670 mm
Missile weight 10.6 kg
Warhead weight 1.3 kg (plus detonation of remaining solid propellant)
Time to transfer the system from the travelling position to combat max 13 s
"Dzhighit"


Support Launching Unit "Dzhighit"
Purpose: designed to mount, aim at a target and fire in a single or salvo launch two missiles of IGLA MANPADS-type by one gunner. "Dzhighit" SLU features round-the-clock operation, external target designation and "friend or foe" target identification.

Support Launching Unit "Dzhighit" has no counterparts in salvo firing of MANPADS missiles.
Salvo firing improves the kill probability by up to 1.5 times.
Equipment set components for "Dzhighit" SLU to be mounted can be designed taking account of carriers'' peculiar features.
Components:
combat equipment:
- Support Launching Unit (SLU)
test and maintenance equipment intended for:
- to quickly check SLU in the field;
- to perform scheduled and diagnostic checks of SLU together with the standard test equipment for IGLA-type MANPADS.
training aids:
- the crew is trained by means of standard training aids for IGLA-type MANPADS;
optional SLU equipment:
SLU can be enhanced by:
- equipment that receives preliminary target designation from higher command;
- optical sight with day and night capabilities;
- Mk-XA, Mk-XII interrogator;
- equipment that allows to mount SLU on a vehicle body.
Specifications: SLU-loaded missiles 2
Launch types salvo, single-shot
Launch modes automatic and manual
Launch sector
azimuth 360o
elevation/depression о, -15o?до +60o
Overall dimensions in combat position
with missiles loaded 2180.1546.1304 mm
Overall dimensions in folded position
with missiles loaded 2200.1304.760 mm
SLU weight without missiles 128 kg
Time for deployment on firing position 3 min.
Time for missile reload 2 min.
Crew 1
SLU can be separated into three portable sections.
how to order
order side information


Đấy là thông tin về Igla-Enjoin

http://first.sipri.org/index.php?page=step2
Cái này mình lấy trên SIPRI nó nói là mình mua SA-18. Cái số 500 chắc là số lượng mình được sản xuất.
Search SA-18 là thấy ngay.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/sa-16.htm
http://www.star.co.yu/armtech/pages/tekst024.htm
http://www.taos-inc.com/airdef.htm
SA 16 hay SA 18 đều gọi là Igla SAM . có nhiều nguồn cho là SA 16 tốt hơn vì hệ thống tầm nhiệt của nó có thể xác định được airframe thay vì chỉ nhắm vào động cơ động cơ như SA 18 . Nhưng SA 18 tầm xa hơn tí chút . Cái nhà ta mua bản quyền sản xuất là SA-16 . Đây là tài liệu Mỹ xác định chuyện mua license này .
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/Yearbook%202004/03%20MANPADS.pdf
Được Phudongthienvuong sửa chữa / chuyển vào 11:35 ngày 30/06/2005

Theo Nga thì VN lăp ráp SA-18 đấy
Russia
Vietnam
20.02.02
A contract was signed with Vietnam on the delivery of 50 Igla man portable surface-to-air missiles (SA-18) and their production technology.
$ 64 mln
http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2002/ff/atd/?form=print