Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

EADS Signs Contract with Vietnamese Government for the Supply of a Satellite-Based Environmental And Natural Resources Monitoring System

PARIS --- EADS Defence and Communications Systems (DCS) has just signed a contract worth 19.3 million euros with the Vietnamese Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment for the turnkey provision of a complete environmental and natural resources monitoring system, to be operated by the national Centre for Remote Sensing in Vietnam.

The integrated system to be supplied by EADS DCS consists of a receiving station for satellite images from SPOT and ENVISAT, a centre for the processing and distribution of images, and 15 specialised application systems for operational and research purposes. These systems will be installed on the premises of the main public operators, namely Vietnamese ministries and other project partners such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Fisheries, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, the national civil defence agency and the Vietnam Petroleum Institute.

The fifteen applications will be employed in such activities as risk prevention and support for emergency rescue services, the observation and planning of agricultural land use for the cultivation of major crops including rice, the surveillance of maritime and coastal zones, research in connection with the preservation of resources in inland waters and forests, and geological studies for the petroleum and mining industries.

The project is expected to last 3 years, including installation of the system, training, technical assistance, a variety of pilot projects in each field of application, and assisting the systemâ?Ts future owners with the development of their national centre for remote sensing.

It is one of the most comprehensive and innovative projects of its type ever to have been launched in Asia, and forms the extension of a scientific and technological co-operation agreement in the field of remote sensing that was concluded between France and Vietnam in 1990, in which EADS has always played a key partnership role.

The Defence and Communications Systems (DCS) Business Unit is the "Systems House" of EADS and is an integrated part of the EADS Defence & Security Systems Division (DS). EADS Defence and Security Systems, with revenues of about EUR 5.4 billion in 2004 and roughly 24,000 employees across ten nations, forms the defence pole within EADS. It offers integrated systems solutions to the new challenges confronting armed forces and homeland security units. It is active in the areas of military aircraft, missile systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems with manned and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), battlefield management systems, defence electronics, sensors and avionics, and related services.

EADS is a global leader in aerospace, defence and related services. In 2004, EADS generated revenues of EUR 31.8 billion and employed a workforce of about 110,000.

China tests new AFV developments
By Christopher F Foss JDW Land Forces E***or
London
China is testing a number of new armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), including a modified Type 98/99 main battle tank (MBT) fitted with a 140 mm smoothbore gun, it has been revealed. If fielded, the latter would constitute the largest MBT armament currently deployed.
For many years Chinese AFVs have been based on foreign designs, especially Russian, or used foreign sub-systems. However, the Chinese defence industry has made rapid progress in recent years and is now self-sufficient in most of the key areas of AFV design, especially MBTs and light AFVs.
The Type 99 MBT is now in production and service with the People''s Liberation Army (PLA) and is a further development of the Type 98, which was first seen in public late in 1999 during a parade of Chinese equipment.
The main difference between the two MBTs is that the latter has a more advanced arrowhead passive armour package over the frontal turret arc, similar to that of the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Leopard 2A5/Leopard 2A6 MBT, which has been in service for some years.
The MBTs are both armed with a 125 mm smoothbore gun fed by an automatic loader, which has enabled the crew to be reduced to three: commander, gunner and driver.

http://www.vietnamnet.vn/thegioi/2005/07/468171/
Indonesia bắt đầu chiến dịch bảo vệ an ninh biển
15:17'' 13/07/2005 (GMT+7)
Hải quân Indonesia đã chính thức bắt đầu chiến dịch mang tên "Bạch tuộc" kéo dài ba tháng nhằm tăng cường an ninh tại Eo biển Malacca, Eo biển Singapore và vùng lãnh hải ngoài khơi bờ biển tỉnh Aceh.

Hải quân Indonesia.
Khoảng 20 tàu chiến, bốn đội người nhái, ba nhóm trinh sát thuỷ quân và lục quân, một nhóm tình báo chung, bốn máy bay N22, hai chiếc trực thăng, một tiểu đoàn bộ binh và một tiểu đoàn lính thuỷ đánh bộ đã tham gia chiến dịch.
Chiến dịch trên là một phần nỗ lực của Indonesia nhằm đảm bảo an ninh tại hai eo biển nằm giữa đảo Sumatra của nước này và bán đảo Malaysia.
Hiện nay ba nước ven Eo biển Malacca là Indonesia, Malaysia và Singapore đang tiến hành tuần tra phối hợp và Indonesia mong muốn tăng cường sự hợp tác giữa ba nước trong việc bảo vệ khu vực này.
(Theo TTXVN)

Không hiểu bác nào đi Pháp vừa rồi có mua được cái radar nào không. Indonesia đã mua mấy cái rồi. Radar này có tầm xa đến 440 km lận.
Indonesia Selects ThalesRaytheonSystems to Provide a New Master-T Radar System

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, France --- The Indonesian government has selected ThalesRaytheonSystems *****pply a new Air Defense radar system to be interfaced with the existing Command and Control System previously provided by the company.

Under this follow-on contract, ThalesRaytheonSystems will provide the highly mobile 3D Long Range Air Defense Master-T Radar operating in S-band with a range of 440 km.

Incorporating the fully solid state technology common to the Master 3D radar family, the Master-T radar is the ideal solution to meet the most demanding requirements for tactical long range Air Defense Radars today.

The Master-T radar has been designed for optimal detection and tracking of a large number of highly manoeuvrable aircraft, in heavy clutter and harsh Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) environment.

Already in service in Europe, Asia and Africa, and ordered by 7 different countries, the Master-T radar is currently the most advanced in its class.

ThalesRaytheonSystems has been working since the 1970s with the Indonesian Government to install a large scale Air Defense System. As part of this effort, ten long range radars and more than ten Air Command and Control Centers have been either successfully installed or placed on order.

ThalesRaytheonSystems is the worldwide leader in the supply of air defense, battlefield surveillance and coordination systems, ground-based radars and related operation centers. Its annual revenue is approximately 700 million dollars with 1 300 employees.

Quan hệ NC và India
INDIA-VIETNAM STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP NEEDS POLITICAL IMPETUS FROM INDIA
by Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Background:
India?Ts upward rise on the trajectory of a rising key global power carries with it an important responsibility. The Indian foreign policy establishment and the Indian Government of the day should acutely remember that in the process of rising stardom, India does not forget its tra***ional friends of long standing. Vietnam is one such country that deserves special consideration by virtue of its geo-strategic importance, potential to be a regional power and convergence of strategic interests with India.
India?Ts national security interests demand, more than those of Vietnam, that the strategic partnership is nurtured with care. The imperatives of this strategic partnership were first analysed in detail by this author in his paper: ?oIndia-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests? (SAAG Paper No.177 dated 10.01.2001).
Needless to say, that in the last four years, the imperatives of a strongly-bonded India-Vietnam strategic partnership have emerged more strongly. This is so because of the rapidly changing strategic and security environment in East Asia and the increasing geo-strategic and geo-political importance of Vietnam.
It is not for nothing that the United States, once a bitter foe of Vietnam (and ending with a Vietnamese-forced US military withdrawal in 1975 after a decade of war) is now wooing Vietnam. The United States is seeking to establish strategic co-operation with Vietnam. US Deputy Secretary of State visited Vietnam in April 2005 for this purpose and the Vietnamese Prime Minister will be visiting USA in June 2005, in ad***ion to a US visit by the Vietnamese Defence Minister. The stimulus in both India?Ts approaches and the American approaches seeking a strategic partnership/cooperation with Vietnam is the ?oChina Factor? in the Indian and American strategic calculus.
While America is likely to intensify its strategic approaches to Vietnam, there is a danger that India under the current political dispensation may de-value Vietnam in its strategic calculations, due to a combination of two reasons: (1) India?Ts new found love for China and appeasing China?Ts strategic sensitivities, and (2) Pre-occupation with playing around with the major powers of the world in a bid to break into the big league and in the process becoming indifferent to India?Ts tra***ional strategic partnerships with countries like Vietnam, which have been strategic assets for India.
In this instance, it becomes natural to comparatively analyse the approaches to Vietnam of India?Ts previous BJP-led Government and the present Congress-led Government.
India?Ts Approaches to Vietnam: A Comparative Analysis of the Record of the BJP Government and the Congress Government:
While the Nehruvian brand of India?Ts diplomats will hark on the tremendous Indian moral support extended to Vietnam during the hey days of India?Ts non-alignment era, the fact remains that much of it was just rhetorical support. Further this vocal support then was devoid of strategic under-pinning aimed at establishing strategic partnership of substance with Vietnam.
India?Ts meaningful approaches for a strategic partnership commenced with the BJP-led Government.
India?Ts then Defence Minister, George Fernandes visited Vietnam in March 2000. This was the first ever visit by an Indian Defence Minister to Vietnam and he hailed Vietnam as India?Ts ?o most trusted friend and ally?. He recalled that Vietnam stood by India after India?Ts nuclear weaponisation and also strongly supported India?Ts candidature for a Permanent Member of the United Nation?Ts Security Council.
During Indian Defence Minister Feranandes?Ts visit to Vietnam, agreements were signed with Vietnam on strategic issues like:
? Joint naval training.
? Joint anti-sea piracy exercises in the South China Sea.
? Jungle warfare training.
? Counter-insurgency training.
? Air Force pilots training in India.
? Repair Programmes for Vietnam Air Force fighter planes (MIGs).
? Assistance to Vietnam in establishing defence production facilities.
This was followed by then Prime Minister Vajpayee?Ts official visit to Vietnam, in which he significantly declared that:
? ?oTo the people of India, Vietnam is not just the name of a country. It is a byword for bravery and courage, for endurance and single minded determination to overcome the stillest of odds.?
? ?oHistory has willed that we become strategic partners in the new century to promise peace, stability, security and sustainable cooperation among countries in Asia?.
The BJP Government followed it up in May 2003 with signing a ?oJoint Declaration on Frame-work of Comprehensive Cooperation Between Republic of India and Socialist Republic of Vietnam as They Enter The 21st Century.? The more significant clauses incorporated were:
? Conduct regular high level meetings.
? Close cooperation in United Nations and international fora.
? Assist each other in protecting their respective interests in international arena.
? Significantly, agreed to take gradual steps to expand cooperation in the security and defence fields.
With the coming of the Congress Government in power in May 2004, Vietnam was visited in October 2004 by Foreign Minister Natwar Singh. As per media reports during this visit, India agreed to the following:
? Boost cooperation with Vietnam on economic, trade, culture and science and technology.
? Implement 2004-2006 Action Programme.
? Raise bi-lateral trade to $1 billion by 2006.
It is not understood as to why during this visit stress was not laid to boost and expand cooperation in security and defence as incorporated in the 2003 Joint Declaration for the 21st century. The absence of this reference if it was inadvertent, needs to be corrected and if by design, then it seems to be appeasing Chinese sensitivities by the Congress Government.
Other than this there are no indicators of any proposed visit to Vietnam, by Indian dignitaries such as, the President, Prime Minister or Defence Minister.
India on the other hand during the Congress Government tenure has been visited by the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and senior military officers delegations. What has been shocking was a media report (The Pioneer, March 2005) informing that during the visit of the Vietnamese Defence Minister and his Army Chief?Ts visit to Lucknow to visit to Hindustani Aeronautics he was not provided with security or escorts. India?Ts External Affairs Ministry and so also Defence Ministry faulted on protocol required, especially when the visit was to a government defence undertaking. Such insensitivities can be misconstrued as indicative of the new Government?Ts approaches to nations which do not figure in the major powers league. India needs to recognise that her strategic interests can be furthered only by regional strategic partnerships and not by her new found admirers from the major league powers.
Vietnam Still Strategically Relevant to India?Ts National Security Interests:
India?Ts BJP Government while forging new strategic relationships with the United States, or reaffirming existing strategic relationship with Russia or responding to strategic cooperation quest by China, continued to boost India?Ts strategic partnership with Vietnam. This was being done as Vietnam was vital to India?Ts national security interests.
Vietnam?Ts strategic relevance to India?Ts national security interests has not lessened. In fact its salience stands increased due to the rapidly changing and complicating security situation in East Asia.
Vietnam?Ts strategic relevance to India manifests itself in many ways and these need to be paid attention to by the Indian establishment:
? Politically, Vietnam has consistently supported India?Ts foreign policy formulations and approaches.
? Politically, Vietnam has all the potential of becoming a regional power in South East Asia. It has political stability and an annual economic growth rate of 7%. In the furtherance of India?Ts ?oLook East? policy, Vietnam could be a critical pivot.
? Strategically, Vietnam?Ts geo-strategic location, its demonstrated military process and its national will-power, its contiguity with China, and unlike India, repelling a Chinese invasion in 1979, impart to it a critical place in the strategic calculus of not only of India but also of United States, Japan and Singapore.
? Economically, Vietnam with its stress on liberalisation of economic policies and 7% growth rate offers very attractive and preferential prospects for Indian FDI (Foreign Direct Investment).
? In terms of India?Ts energy security, Vietnam?Ts offshore oil deposit should be a greater incentive for heightening India?Ts strategic partnership with Vietnam.
Strategically, to put it more bluntly, Vietnam offers India a long range option of developing and sustaining a vital strategic counter-pressure point against China. If China persists and can have a Pakistan in South Asia as a pressure point, then India too needs a strategic counter-pressure on China?Ts periphery, and Vietnam should be wooed for this purpose.
India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Way Ahead
The Joint Declaration for Comprehensive Cooperation on the 21st Century (2003) offers the framework to boost the strategic partnership between India and Vietnam. Just because this Declaration was signed by a BJP Government with Vietnam does not justify its devaluation by the present Government. India?Ts foreign policy and national security interests can best be secured by a bi-partisan approach.
Without lengthening this paper, the way ahead in boosting India-Vietnam strategic partnership in a comprehensive manner lies in :
? Greater political impetus be added by India to building a strategic partnership. Vietnam visits by Indian dignitaries should be a priority agenda. India should extend full political support to Vietnam?Ts entry into WTO.
? While various chambers of industry like the Confederation of Indian Industry have organised seminars recently to increase Indian investments in Vietnam, the Government of India needs to provide greater institutional support. Investments should also incorporate transfer of Indian technologies.
? India needs to establish institutional mechanisms at the government level to incorporate financial investments, joint exploration and production of Vietnam?Ts off-shore oil resources by India?Ts private sector.
But more important than all the above and which should be the core of a India-Vietnam strategic partnership, is the defence and security component. Priority areas for boosting defence and security cooperation with Vietnam should be the following:
? Building of Vietnam?Ts Navy and Coast-guard in terms of sea-denial and maritime surveillance capabilities. Outright donation of ships, fast-attack aircraft and maritime surveillance aircraft (Dornier types) and helicopters should be thought of. Subsequent ad***ional requirements can be considered on ?ofriendship prices?.
? Vietnam Air Force could be assisted more speedily in terms of refurbishing programmes for its MIG fighter fleet and increasing its aerial surveillance capabilities.
? Vietnam Army can best be helped by assistance in indigenous defence production of its weapon systems and ammunition requirements.
? Offering increased number of vacancies at Indian Armed Forces training establishments for Vietnam.
? Joint military exercises.
? Intelligence liaison and regular exchanges.
Concluding Observations:
Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong had remarked to then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh in mid-November 2000 that ?oVietnam treats India with strategic importance?. India today needs to re-affirm unequivocally that India too, despite change of Government, views Vietnam with equal strategic importance and would value a strategic partnership with Vietnam.
India?Ts national security interests demand that it forges strategic partnership in extended regions, both East and West. In the East, no other country is more deserving for nurturing strategic partnership than Vietnam which has the potential of being a regional power on the Eastern fringes of Asia with a long sea-board on the South China Sea and a country which has extensive convergence of strategic interests with India.
Strategic partnerships to be viable and effective need careful nurturing. They need to be nurtured and sustained on a long term basis. The word ?ostrategic? itself suggests that such relationships are long term and not one of tactical expediency. Sustaining the India-Vietnam strategic partnership needs re-affirmation of its value by the new Indian Government and by adding political impetus to it in visible terms.

India-Vietnam defence pact : A strategic gain for New Delhi
April 10, 2000
More comments have come in on the recently signed defence accord signed by India and Vietnam. With the signing of an agreement on defence cooperation by the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes and his Vietnamese counterpart, Lt. Gen. Pham Van Tra, the relations between New Delhi and Hanoi have attained new heights. ?oA close military cooperation between the two countries has strategic gains for New Delhi and hence needs to be followed up?, said defence expert, N.K. Pant.
The present agreement institutionalises the framework for periodical dialogue between the Defence Ministers of the two countries, besides visits by top military brass, regular exchange of security perceptions and intelligence inputs. It also covers cooperation between the Indian Coast Guard and Vietnamese Sea Police in combating the growing menace of piracy in the Eastern seas.
India will also assist Vietnam in repair and upgradation and building of warships and patrol craft. While the Indian Army will explore possibilities of drawing upon the expertise of the Vietnam People?Ts Army in jungle warfare and guerilla tactics, India will train technical manpower of Vietnam?Ts Navy, sea police and the force personnel besides providing flying training to its air force pilots.
In a tit-for-tat move, India is in a position to provide military assistance to China?Ts estranged southern neighbour in the similar manner as Beijing in the aftermath of 1962 attack on India has been bolstering Pakistan?Ts defence nuclear and military potential to contain New Delhi.
In combating the internal insurgencies, India has much to learn from Vietnam?Ts military art in the form of ?opeople?Ts war? to fight bigger and stronger forces by means of smaller and weaker ones to conquer the opponent through its weak points through the solidarity, sympathy and support of the people.
Moreover, the Indian defence public sector undertakings and the ordnance factories will surely be the substantial gainers from the defence co-operation agreement, if they deliver reasonably-priced quality combat hardware to the Vietnamese armed forces and stick to the delivery deadlines. The military equipment, being used by the Vietnamese forces, is mostly of Soviet vintage, obsolete and needs replacement. Resources permitting, Hanoi is likely to embark upon a fairly large scale modernisation programme for its army, navy and the air force and India must cash in on this godsend opportunity as a major supplier of indigenously produced military equipment. Vietnam has plans to upgrade its 125 odd MiG-21s and Hindustan Aeronautics can undertake the profitable task. Vietnam?Ts People?Ts Air Force is also interested in our Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) which is yet to see light of the day.

Tụi Sing đóng tàu khu trục này. NC chắc còn lâu mới theo kịp.
Launch of RSN''s Fourth Frigate
(Source: Singapore Ministry of Defence; issued July 15, 2005)
The Republic of Singapore Navy''s (RSN) fourth frigate, RSS Tenacious was launched on 15 July 2005, by Mrs Lalitha Jayakumar, wife of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Law, Prof S. Jayakumar, at Singapore Technologies Marine yard. Prof Jayakumar officiated at the launching ceremony.

The launch of RSS Tenacious marks another milestone for the Formidable-class frigate programme. She is the third frigate to be built locally. In the next phase, RSS Tenacious will undergo harbour and sea trials.

The RSN stealth frigates?T sophisticated sensor and weapon systems are concurrently undergoing shore-based integration testing while the ships are being built. This will mean significant time savings. With their enhanced anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, the frigates will enable the RSN to undertake a wide spectrum of missions and more effectively carry out its mission of defending Singapore and its vital Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs).

Minister for Manpower and Acting Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen, and other senior MINDEF and SAF officials were also present at the launch.


BACKGROUND NOTES:

--In March 2000, MINDEF signed a contract with Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) of France for the construction of six frigates for the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). DCN had designed and built the French Navy?Ts low signature La Fayette-class frigates. Under the technology transfer arrangement, DCN designed and built the first ship while the other five are built locally by Singapore Technologies Marine. These Formidable-class frigates will replace the RSN?Ts Missile Gunboats, which would have been in service for more than 25 years.

--The new frigates are highly capable warships. They are stealthy and equipped with advanced combat systems. They also have longer endurance, being able to stay at sea for longer periods. Each frigate is designed to carry a medium-class helicopter which can complement the ship in Anti-surface and Anti-submarine warfare. By leveraging on a high level of automation and enhanced work processes, each frigate requires a crew of only 71.

--The frigates will be equipped with advanced state-of-the-art combat capabilities allowing them to perform a wide spectrum of missions and to deal with various threats in all dimensions of naval warfare ?" surface, air and underwater. These systems include the Thales Herakles Multi-function Radar (MFR), the MBDA Aster SAM System, the EDO Active Low Frequency Towed Sonar (ALOFTS) system, the Eurotorp A244S torpedo and the Boeing Harpoon missile system. There is an indigenously developed Combat Management System (CMS) for command and control of the various sensor and weapon systems.

--The platform characteristics, the combat systems configuration and a computer-aided design picture of the RSN?Ts Formidable-class frigates are detailed in the appendix to this fact sheet.

--The frigate programme is progressing smoothly. All six frigates are in various stages of construction. Three have already been launched and are now in the final phases of construction.

--In tandem with the frigates?T construction, the combat system integration effort has also gradually intensified over the course of this year. The Shore Based Integration Centre (SBIC) has been set up in Changi Naval Base to allow the combat system suppliers, using the actual equipment and software, to test and demonstrate the exchange of information over the local area network, which closely replicates the one on the ship. The laboratory environment of the SBIC allows the integration team to run the required sequence of tests and to initiate trouble shooting and rectification measures before testing on board the ship commences.

--The frigates?T systems are also being put through various operational scenarios for extensive testing employing simulators. The shore-based integration testing approach will shorten the time taken for integration and help bring forward the delivery of the frigates by almost a year.

--The frigate programme represents the continuous effort of the RSN to improve its capabilities and enhance the operational effectiveness of the SAF.

Tàu giúp Indo sản xuất tên lửa. VN có lẽ cũng nên nhờ Ấn giúp.
Jakarta in missile deal with Beijing
By Shawn Donnan in Jakarta and Mure Dickie in Beijing
Published: July 31 2005 20:24 | Last updated: July 31 2005 20:24
Image Indonesia is seeking China''s help in reviving a 41-year-old programme to build short- and medium-range missiles that could be used to replace US fighter jets grounded by a long-running arms embargo, the country''s defence minister said on Sunday.
Chinese President Hu Jintao and his Indonesian counterpart, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, signed a series of agreements in Beijing last week meant to flesh out an April declaration that the two had formed a ?ostrategic partnership?.
According to a statement issued afterwards, one agreement called for the two countries to ?ointensify bilateral co-operation? in defence, ?owork together in developing each other''s defence industries?, and for ?oco-operation in defence technology?.
Indonesia''s defence minister, Juwono Sudarsono, said on Sunday that agreement was meant to help Jakarta develop propulsion and guidance systems for land- and ship-based missiles with a range of up to 150km. The plan was a revival of proposals to develop similar missiles, he said, and was intended to help Indonesia''s military diversify and end its current reliance on foreign-built fighter jets as a deterrent.
?oWe think it''s going to be cheaper to offer some kind of deterrence rather than relying on fighter planes,? Mr Sudarsono said.
Six of the country''s 10 F-16s are grounded as a result of a US arms embargo implemented in the 1990s because of human rights abuses by Indonesian troops in East Timor.
Jakarta has in recent years turned to Russia to buy Sukhoi fighters as an alternative.
Mr Sudarsono said he was not interested in Chinese fighter jets. Instead, Indonesian officials have been in contact with Chinese companies including North China Industries (Norinco), a state conglomerate, to line up help for a missile programme.
Washington imposed sanctions on Norinco in 2003 for allegedly helping Iran''s missile programme.
Indonesia''s missiles remain only an idea and any launch is at least five years away, the defence minister conceded.
Efforts dating back to 1964 by Jakarta to develop missile technology have achieved little ?obecause of mismanagement, incompetence, and inter-agency rivalry?, Mr Sudarsono said.
As a result, the agreement between Beijing and Jakarta may cause little alarm in Washington. But it highlights China''s growing security influence in Asia. Mr Sudarsono said he expected that within two years military relations with China would make up ?o40 per cent of our relations?.
Chinese analysts said the ?ostrategic partnership? agreements marked a significant step in the political warming between Beijing and Jakarta.
But they added that China could be reluctant to provide much help to an Indonesian missile programme because of international agreements it has signed.

Hồi nãy coi chương trình thời sự của VTV1(19h ngày 02/08/2005), nhân kỉ niệm ngày binh chủng hải quân, TT PhanVKhải đến thăm binh chủng, mình thấy có chiếu một xe quân sự chở một ống rất lớn - như ống cống vậy - rỗng ruột , xe đang dựng ống (cống) lại theo phương thẳng thì phải. Tất cả đều sơn màu xanh lá. Bác nào biết đấy là cái thứ gì xin giới thiệu cho mọi người cùng biết với. Thks
Được souri sửa chữa / chuyển vào 22:49 ngày 02/08/2005

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Đấy hình như là loại đất đối hải missile SS-C-1A (Shaddock) thì phải !
Hình nó đây phải không bác ?