Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

B2 và F117 thường đi 1 mình vì nó tàng hình nếu như bay theo phi đội với mấy tên không tàng hình thì bị phát hiện là cái chắc nên nó thường bay 1 mình tuy nhiên cách nó 1 khoảng X nào đó luôn có 1 phi đội bay yểm trợ 1 khi máy bay chỉ huy như AWAC hay tàu sân bay hoặc bản thân thằng B2 F117 bị truy đuổi bởi đối phương thì lập tức phi đội kia bay đến yểm trợ nó ngay không thì toi 1 thằng B2 hay F117 đắt lắm đắt lắm.

With these advanced weapon the WW3 will be fought ,but in the WW4 they will fight with sticks and stones (Albert Einstein)

Em xin lỗi bác một tý , bác có thể xoá bài viết này sau khi đọc .
Topic này mở ra sẽ rất hay , sẽ có rất nhiều người quan tâm , song theo em cần có một số lượng thành viên và bài viết đúng nội quy , chất lượng , không để chủ đề bị loãng , em rất quan tâm đến vấn đề này , mong sẽ được cùng cộng tác với bác .Tất nhiên nếu bác cho phép .... Sau khi đọc , mong bác xoá bài này , tránh sai lệch chủ đề .
Sanu*lch_h
Mãi Yêu Lương Cẩm Hà

Em xin lỗi bác một tý , bác có thể xoá bài viết này sau khi đọc .
Topic này mở ra sẽ rất hay , sẽ có rất nhiều người quan tâm , song theo em cần có một số lượng thành viên và bài viết đúng nội quy , chất lượng , không để chủ đề bị loãng , em rất quan tâm đến vấn đề này , mong sẽ được cùng cộng tác với bác .Tất nhiên nếu bác cho phép .... Sau khi đọc , mong bác xoá bài này , tránh sai lệch chủ đề .
Sanu*lch_h
Mãi Yêu Lương Cẩm Hà

B-2 là chuyên về ném bom rồi nên không có khả năng tấn công máy bay địch, chỉ có khả năng phòng về như gây nhiễu, hoặc tung hoả mù.
F-117 thì có khả năng tấn công máy bay đối phương nhưng tính cơ động rất kém có khi còn kém hơn cả Mig-21

B-2 là chuyên về ném bom rồi nên không có khả năng tấn công máy bay địch, chỉ có khả năng phòng về như gây nhiễu, hoặc tung hoả mù.
F-117 thì có khả năng tấn công máy bay đối phương nhưng tính cơ động rất kém có khi còn kém hơn cả Mig-21

Các đồng chí đừng tưởng chống máy bay tàng hình dễ như ngày xưa các cụ nhà ta chống nhiễu B52 ( dùng radar Nga không thấy lấy radar Trung Quốc ra ) hay chỉ đơn giản là lấy radio ra dò để biết máy bay sắp đến ư... phải mất hàng giờ để theo dõi... thay đổi các dải tần, phân loại nhiễu..v.v. thì trên màn hình mới hiện lờ mờ nhỏ xíu hình của máy bay thôi... mấy ông máy bay tấn công thì chỉ dựa vào toạ độ radar mặt đất rồi dùng mắt thường quan sát tìm đối phương thôi... Tưởng thằng Mỹ ngu mà mất hàng tỷ USD cho dự án chế tạo máy bay mà bị phát hiện dễ dàng như thế sao
Trước khi tấn công ( tức là khi vừa có lệnh ) thì đã có một tổ vạch ra đường bay đến mục tiêu dựa trên cả các hình chụp của vệ tinh quân sự ( thường là bay thấp trên các địa hình gồ ghề tận dụng triệt để các khoảng mù radar ) nhưng nếu địa hình bằng phẳng thì kích hoạt hệ thống tàng hình hoặc gây nhiễu rồi đàng hoàng bay trên cao. Nếu cần thiết yêu cầu nhóm hỗ trợ từ 3-4 máy bay phản lực chiến đấu như F22 bay theo ( nhưng mình biết thì mấy cái tàng hình không cần hỗ trợ và nếu có thể thì chúng sẽ hoạt động theo nhóm 2-3 chiếc để bọc lẫn nhau ). Gần đến mục tiêu thì sẽ cắt bom và bom thường có dẫn hướng. Khi mục tiêu đã bị tấn công thì các hệ thống quan sát mới thay đổi chiến thuật để tìm kẻ xâm nhập sau đó cho máy bay lên dò tìm hay nếu quá gần thì 2-3 quả đất đối không lên thám thính nhưng thường không xảy ra chuyện này vì máy bay ném bom dại gì bay gần các nhóm tên lửa phòng không đã được vệ tinh chụp ảnh. Nếu có lệnh hay xem tình hình có thể ''nhai'' được các máy bay lên dò tìm thì F117 sẽ xin lệnh tấn công còn không nếu máy bay ném bom mà chạy được ra chỗ nhóm hỗ trợ thì ta sẽ được thưởng thức một màn trình diễn của các phi công...
Khả năng phát hiện mục tiêu của radar phụ thuộc rất nhiều yếu tố khác nhau như thời tiết mưa, mây mù, sấm chớp hoặc chỉ đơn giản là các đám mây tích điện trước cơn giông... trước đây Nga từng cách chức mấy vị lãnh đạo trong quân đội vì để một máy bay của phi công nghiệp dư Mỹ hạ cánh chiếc máy bay cánh quạt xuống ngay quảng trường đỏ... lúc đó là trong thời kỳ chiến tranh lạnh nên những thông tin như vậy gây nên những phản ứng trái ngược từ hai phía
Các bạn có thể tìm các phim sau đây để nghiên cứu thêm về máy bay tàng hình ( phần lớn có bán tại amazon )
Interceptor

This movie has great shots of the F-117 Stealth Fighter and the C-5 Galaxy Air Force cargo airplane.
It also hase some short shots of the C-130 Hercules, F-4 Phantom and f-16 Falcon.
This is a very good movie with some great air to air refueling scenes

Air Supremacy
This is America?Ts first line of Defense...catch a ride aboard the F-117A 'Stealth' Fighter, the B-1B Bomber, and the most powerful aircraft ever assembled... the SR-71 'Blackbird', capable of traveling coast to coast in just one hour! Color. 28 min.

Stealth Technology
Modern Marvels
Take to the skies with the most advanced planes ever built. Learn how the radical design and cutting-edge technology of the F-117 and its larger cousin, the B-2 Bomber, allow these planes to avoid detection by even the most sophisticated radar systems. In exclusive interviews, Air Force officials and company executives recall the long struggle to perfect an "invisible" airplane, and combat pilots reveal what it is like to fly the most effective strike aircraft ever built. 50 min.

Active Stealth (1999)
Very Bad Customer Reviews
Stealth Fighter
Description
Witness the still super secret F-117 Stealth Fighter that has been America's greatest threat to hostile nations. You'll witness the complete fighter arsnel of the U.S. Air Force and what it has to offer in new fighter technology. See the F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Falcon fly-off in a Red Flag exercise.You'll see test flights of the F-16XL, performances by the A-10 and F-16 Voice command system. Finally you'll witness test pilots in a simulated combat mission between Navy F-14s and the Air Forces F-15s.

Stealth
Flying Invisible Stealth aircraft are capable of attacking targets with pinpoint accuracy - without being detected by radar. Through engrossing footage and interviews with the designers of these mysterious aircraft and the elite pilots who fly them, view the definitive perspective on one of aviation's most stunning technological achievements and the countermeasures being developed to defeat them. Includes the F-117, the B-2 Bomber, as well as the F-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter. 53 min.

Stealth Fighter (1999)
You gotta see this one. Four out of four viewers gave this movie a one star rating. In order to get this bad of a rating, the movie must have really stunk. Maybe it's a stealthy good movie, you just can't see the good in it.

Stealth Jets
Nighthawk - Secrets of the Stealth (1992)
The F-117 Stealth fighter was designed to be invisible to radar, and beginning with its development in the 1970s, it was also invisible to the public and almost all of the U.S. military for many years. In this look at the Stealth, from the drawing board to test flights to steady combat duty in the Gulf War, the viewer is treated to information and film footage that was once highly classified. There are plenty of stirring shots of Stealth fighters in flight, but this goes beyond being a high-altitude action video. The technology behind the Stealth is explained in lucid layman's terms by its designers, and members of an Air Force squadron who fly the Stealth offer their unique insights into the most advanced weapon in the American arsenal. The pilots, Gulf War vets, recount missions to Baghdad, which was hit heavily by the Stealth during Desert Storm. Reminding us that these planes are extremely lethal tools, a pilot also comments on a heavily publicized incident in the war, the mistaken bombing of a bunker filled with Iraqi civilians. Lockheed delivered only 59 Stealth fighters to the Air Force, at a cost of $42.6 million per plane, but despite that small number the Stealth has become a symbol of the modern American military. This video provides a comprehensive look at the strange black plane which seems to have flown out of the future. --Robert McNamara

Desert Storm: The Gun
Camera Footage
This video contains the actual footage from cameras on board the F-111, F-117 Stealth, A-10, nose cameras of PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions), and Navy and Marine aircraft. Strategic targets are sighted and destroyed; battle tanks explode upon impact. A collector's cassette, this is raw footage. You won't hear music; you won't see pretty camera work; there isn't any narrator telling you what you are seeing. What you will see is what the pilots saw. 45 min.

Pilots of Desert Storm
Air Combat II
Riveting, action-packed battle footage of the multi- national forces flying against Iraq in one of the most ambitious air campaigns ever mounted. They pitted their F-15s, Tornados, and new Stealth fighters against the Iraqi war machine in the most perfectly orchestrated air mission in history. Color, 45 min.

​

Các đồng chí đừng tưởng chống máy bay tàng hình dễ như ngày xưa các cụ nhà ta chống nhiễu B52 ( dùng radar Nga không thấy lấy radar Trung Quốc ra ) hay chỉ đơn giản là lấy radio ra dò để biết máy bay sắp đến ư... phải mất hàng giờ để theo dõi... thay đổi các dải tần, phân loại nhiễu..v.v. thì trên màn hình mới hiện lờ mờ nhỏ xíu hình của máy bay thôi... mấy ông máy bay tấn công thì chỉ dựa vào toạ độ radar mặt đất rồi dùng mắt thường quan sát tìm đối phương thôi... Tưởng thằng Mỹ ngu mà mất hàng tỷ USD cho dự án chế tạo máy bay mà bị phát hiện dễ dàng như thế sao
Trước khi tấn công ( tức là khi vừa có lệnh ) thì đã có một tổ vạch ra đường bay đến mục tiêu dựa trên cả các hình chụp của vệ tinh quân sự ( thường là bay thấp trên các địa hình gồ ghề tận dụng triệt để các khoảng mù radar ) nhưng nếu địa hình bằng phẳng thì kích hoạt hệ thống tàng hình hoặc gây nhiễu rồi đàng hoàng bay trên cao. Nếu cần thiết yêu cầu nhóm hỗ trợ từ 3-4 máy bay phản lực chiến đấu như F22 bay theo ( nhưng mình biết thì mấy cái tàng hình không cần hỗ trợ và nếu có thể thì chúng sẽ hoạt động theo nhóm 2-3 chiếc để bọc lẫn nhau ). Gần đến mục tiêu thì sẽ cắt bom và bom thường có dẫn hướng. Khi mục tiêu đã bị tấn công thì các hệ thống quan sát mới thay đổi chiến thuật để tìm kẻ xâm nhập sau đó cho máy bay lên dò tìm hay nếu quá gần thì 2-3 quả đất đối không lên thám thính nhưng thường không xảy ra chuyện này vì máy bay ném bom dại gì bay gần các nhóm tên lửa phòng không đã được vệ tinh chụp ảnh. Nếu có lệnh hay xem tình hình có thể ''nhai'' được các máy bay lên dò tìm thì F117 sẽ xin lệnh tấn công còn không nếu máy bay ném bom mà chạy được ra chỗ nhóm hỗ trợ thì ta sẽ được thưởng thức một màn trình diễn của các phi công...
Khả năng phát hiện mục tiêu của radar phụ thuộc rất nhiều yếu tố khác nhau như thời tiết mưa, mây mù, sấm chớp hoặc chỉ đơn giản là các đám mây tích điện trước cơn giông... trước đây Nga từng cách chức mấy vị lãnh đạo trong quân đội vì để một máy bay của phi công nghiệp dư Mỹ hạ cánh chiếc máy bay cánh quạt xuống ngay quảng trường đỏ... lúc đó là trong thời kỳ chiến tranh lạnh nên những thông tin như vậy gây nên những phản ứng trái ngược từ hai phía
Các bạn có thể tìm các phim sau đây để nghiên cứu thêm về máy bay tàng hình ( phần lớn có bán tại amazon )
Interceptor

This movie has great shots of the F-117 Stealth Fighter and the C-5 Galaxy Air Force cargo airplane.
It also hase some short shots of the C-130 Hercules, F-4 Phantom and f-16 Falcon.
This is a very good movie with some great air to air refueling scenes

Air Supremacy
This is America?Ts first line of Defense...catch a ride aboard the F-117A 'Stealth' Fighter, the B-1B Bomber, and the most powerful aircraft ever assembled... the SR-71 'Blackbird', capable of traveling coast to coast in just one hour! Color. 28 min.

Stealth Technology
Modern Marvels
Take to the skies with the most advanced planes ever built. Learn how the radical design and cutting-edge technology of the F-117 and its larger cousin, the B-2 Bomber, allow these planes to avoid detection by even the most sophisticated radar systems. In exclusive interviews, Air Force officials and company executives recall the long struggle to perfect an "invisible" airplane, and combat pilots reveal what it is like to fly the most effective strike aircraft ever built. 50 min.

Active Stealth (1999)
Very Bad Customer Reviews
Stealth Fighter
Description
Witness the still super secret F-117 Stealth Fighter that has been America's greatest threat to hostile nations. You'll witness the complete fighter arsnel of the U.S. Air Force and what it has to offer in new fighter technology. See the F-15 Eagle and the F-16 Falcon fly-off in a Red Flag exercise.You'll see test flights of the F-16XL, performances by the A-10 and F-16 Voice command system. Finally you'll witness test pilots in a simulated combat mission between Navy F-14s and the Air Forces F-15s.

Stealth
Flying Invisible Stealth aircraft are capable of attacking targets with pinpoint accuracy - without being detected by radar. Through engrossing footage and interviews with the designers of these mysterious aircraft and the elite pilots who fly them, view the definitive perspective on one of aviation's most stunning technological achievements and the countermeasures being developed to defeat them. Includes the F-117, the B-2 Bomber, as well as the F-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter. 53 min.

Stealth Fighter (1999)
You gotta see this one. Four out of four viewers gave this movie a one star rating. In order to get this bad of a rating, the movie must have really stunk. Maybe it's a stealthy good movie, you just can't see the good in it.

Stealth Jets
Nighthawk - Secrets of the Stealth (1992)
The F-117 Stealth fighter was designed to be invisible to radar, and beginning with its development in the 1970s, it was also invisible to the public and almost all of the U.S. military for many years. In this look at the Stealth, from the drawing board to test flights to steady combat duty in the Gulf War, the viewer is treated to information and film footage that was once highly classified. There are plenty of stirring shots of Stealth fighters in flight, but this goes beyond being a high-altitude action video. The technology behind the Stealth is explained in lucid layman's terms by its designers, and members of an Air Force squadron who fly the Stealth offer their unique insights into the most advanced weapon in the American arsenal. The pilots, Gulf War vets, recount missions to Baghdad, which was hit heavily by the Stealth during Desert Storm. Reminding us that these planes are extremely lethal tools, a pilot also comments on a heavily publicized incident in the war, the mistaken bombing of a bunker filled with Iraqi civilians. Lockheed delivered only 59 Stealth fighters to the Air Force, at a cost of $42.6 million per plane, but despite that small number the Stealth has become a symbol of the modern American military. This video provides a comprehensive look at the strange black plane which seems to have flown out of the future. --Robert McNamara

Desert Storm: The Gun
Camera Footage
This video contains the actual footage from cameras on board the F-111, F-117 Stealth, A-10, nose cameras of PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions), and Navy and Marine aircraft. Strategic targets are sighted and destroyed; battle tanks explode upon impact. A collector's cassette, this is raw footage. You won't hear music; you won't see pretty camera work; there isn't any narrator telling you what you are seeing. What you will see is what the pilots saw. 45 min.

Pilots of Desert Storm
Air Combat II
Riveting, action-packed battle footage of the multi- national forces flying against Iraq in one of the most ambitious air campaigns ever mounted. They pitted their F-15s, Tornados, and new Stealth fighters against the Iraqi war machine in the most perfectly orchestrated air mission in history. Color, 45 min.

​

Picture Murky as China Updates Force Capabilities
People's Liberation Army, Navy & Air Force Making Technological Leaps; U.S. Unsure of PRC Status
E***or's Note: This is part two of a two-part series on China's increasing military capabilities, as reported by findings of the Congressional China Security Commission. Open part one in a new window.
A Pentagon report on China's military capability, the "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," follows a report released by the China Security Review Commission, [E***or: discussed in part 1 or the series] which concluded that the United States has a dangerously inadequate level of knowledge and understanding of China, their beliefs and their plans for the future. Unlike the Congressional report, the Pentagon report is far more focused on the hardware of war, its capabilities and the PRC's strategies for using the equipment. The report, which was developed as per a request from Congress, is an in depth picture into the military-industrial complex of one of the world's most secretive countries. The Report discuses, "(1) gaps in knowledge of China's military power; (2) China's grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy; (3) development in advanced technologies that would enhance China's military capabilities; (4) China's relations with the former Soviet Union; and (5) the security situation in the Taiwan Strait."
Immediately, the report notes that China has never been forthcoming with their technological abilities. Since the 1980s, Pentagon reports show that U.S. military exchange delegations have never seen any Chinese military units that would be classified as technologically advanced nor have the delegations seen any units perform operational training. Instead, the military envoys have only been shown what U.S. officials refer to as "showcase" units.
The so-called 'gaps' in the United States knowledge into the PRC are widespread. The Pentagon reports that over the last few years the PRC's military force, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is in the process of upgrading their arsenal to better suit a new strategy for dealing with situations far from China's borders. These upgrades in military strength and preparedness come in the form of missile developments, naval, air, and ground forces advancements as well as continuing upgrades in intelligence gathering and command and control.
The report explains that while the PLA has roughly 3,400 aircraft at their command, only a small number, around 100 are deemed modern fourth- generation fighters. These include Russian-designed Su-27 and Su-30s. While in the past, the air fleet has been used primarily in the local interceptor role, the PRC hopes to incorporate more fourth-generation aircraft to allow for a wider range of action. This new scope of action would include, "defending against aircraft at long ranges from China's coast, defeating high-value air assets, denying U.S. naval operations and striking other targets such as airbases and air defense sites." Along with the growing fleet of Su-27 and Su-30 fighters China has laid out plans for the continuation of their indigenous fighters, the F-7, FB-7 and the F-8, with improvements in the plane's radar, weapons, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and night attack avionics and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. China has also designated considerable funds to the research and development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), confirms that China has already built a number of short-range UAVs as well as some longer-range models. China operates the Chang Hong (CH-1) among others. Classified as a long-range, air launched, autonomous reconnaissance drone, The CH-1 has been in operation since the 1980s. The U.S. military believes the CH-1 was derived from the reverse engineering of recovered U.S. Firebee reconnaissance drones shot down during the Vietnam War. Further developments in UAV programs continue to enhance reconnaissance, surveillance, and EW technologies.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is dogged by personnel issues. Chinese pilots, by western standards, are ill equipped to operate their aircraft to the fullest potential. The Pentagon's report believes that the PLAAF will have "developed operational concepts and the training needed to fight as an integrated force" by 2010. In 2001, the PLAAF and the People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) participated in tactical training in hopes to modernize their combat tactics. These training sessions were to focus on "mobility, air defense, and support to amphibious assault forces. China hopes that these simulations will help to equip their pilots with the know-how to effectively perform in combat situations, U.S. military officials believe these exercises to be "highly scripted and the scenarios lacked realism." This conclusion leads to the belief that minimal benefit may have been found by the participating pilots.
The Chinese Navy, like the PLAAF has also initiated movements toward modernization. Over the last decade the DoD reports that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with approximately 290,000 active personnel, has begun to streamline its operational force. PLAN fleet has a compliment of 60 destroyers and frigates, 50 diesel and six nuclear submarines, 40 amphibious landing ships and some 350 smaller ships. Along with their surface fleet, the PLAN has also cut down their submarine force by nearly half. With a newer and smaller fleet, the Chinese are hoping to extend their defense perimeter further out to sea, allowing for both increased security and the further expansion of their physical presence in the Pacific Ocean. The introduction of two Russian-manufactured Sovremennyy-class destroyers (the PLAN has two more on order from Moscow) has gone a long way toward making this goal a reality. These ships have greatly increased the range and capability of the Chinese navy. The report shows U.S. military analysts have raised concerns in regards to the Russian ships especially relating to the Chinese skills at reverse engineering. This would allow for larger number of highly capable warships to be introduced into the PLAN. American officials also believe that by 2010 a new class of Chinese destroyers will be operational possibly alongside a new class of frigates. With the advancements in both naval and aviation technologies, questions have been raised about the possibility of China raising an aircraft carrier group, a move that would greatly increase China's defensible perimeter. Pentagon personnel respond in the report by stating "while continuing to research and discuss possibilities, China appears to have set aside indefinitely plans to acquire an aircraft carrier."
One of the most important arms of any modern navy is that of the submarine fleet. The Pentagon report concludes that China's military strategy will include the acquisition of a large number of submarines. At this point in time, the PLAN's submarine forces are used mostly to interdict enemy surface ships with the use of mines and torpedoes. While this may be the case for now, the report goes on *****ggest that China will field submerged-launched cruise missiles in the near future.
Chinese diesel-electric submarines feature a combination of homegrown technology found in the Ming- and Song-class submarines, as well as the Russian-built KILO-type. It should be noted that China does still have in operation 30 Russian-designed ROMEO-type subs, however the Department of Defense considers these submarines obsolete. The Ming-class submarine is by far the most plentiful of the modern fleet with 21 vessels at sea. The Ming is understood to be an improvement on the ROMEO-type subs. The Song-class on the other hand, is cre***ed with being China's first new-design diesel electric submarine. The Song is expected to launch cruise missiles while submerged. With a skewed propeller to minimize cavitations (the sounds created by collapsing air bubbles created by the disruption of water by the propeller), French-designed flank-array sonar and German-designed diesel engines; many submarine analysts see the Song subs as a blending of conventional Chinese technology with that of modern western submarine programs. Many submarine experts see the Russian-built KILO-type submarine, of which the PLAN has four with a possible fifth on the way, as one of the quietest conventional submarines at sea today. The Pentagon report identifies two KILO variants: the first, designated the 877E or the Varshavyanka-class is considered the export model of the KILO-type sub, while the 636E or Amur-class was designated solely for Russian naval use only. With this in mind, it is no surprise that the military communities in the western nations found it disturbing when it was revealed that Russia would sell two Amur-class subs along with the two 877s already agreed upon between Moscow and Beijing. There is no doubt that China will attempt to incorporate Russian technology found within the KILO-type subs; but the Pentagon report concludes that China will not be able to use this technology to its full potential for some time. The KILO subs have ranges between 6,000 and 7,500 miles submerged with a snorkel but have a sea endurance of only 45 days. A nuclear-powered sub may stay at sea indefinitely, with its only limitation being the amount of food stored aboard.
The PLAN nuclear submarine fleet includes both nuclear-powered attack fast attack submarines (SSN) and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The Chinese Navy now operates five Han-class SSNs. Commissioned between 1970 and 1990, the Han-class is due to be replaced by 2020 when a new SSN known to the Chinese as the 093-class will come on line. The single Chinese SSBN is known as the Xia-class. This sub will likely remain in service until 2012, when the Pentagon believes it will be relieved by the 094-class, which is expected to carry a payload of highly advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
On land as well as on sea, the PLA has initiated sweeping reforms and improvement to equip the world's largest standing army with the skills and support it will need for the twenty-first century. More than one million persons comprise the PLA ground forces. Divided into approximately "20 group armies, more than 40 maneuver divisions, and some 40 maneuver brigades," according to the Pentagon report. Many of the divisions and brigades have been developed and organized for what the PLA refers to as "rapid reaction." In an effort to streamline the army, 2000 saw the commencement of a downsizing expected to reduce the force by as many as to 500,000. it appears, however, that downsizing was achieved by the reassignment of many soldiers and personnel to the People's Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary force acting as a reserve for PLA ground forces.
The U.S. DoD believes that the modernizations will conclude with a larger focus on "infantry, airborne, armor and army aviation units." The armored divisions in the PLA are built around the T-59 tank. Based on the 1950s-era Russian T-54, the T-59 has been the mainstay of the Chinese armored divisions up to the present day. There are approximately 14,000 tanks and armored vehicles in the PLA. While the actual numbers are not known, analysts believe the tanks could number as high as 10,000. This mobile force is complimented by a stockpile of over 30,000 pieces of artillery.
There are a number of major obstacles that the PLA will have to hurdle. Some in Washington believe that Beijing still sees the PLA as too "infantry-heavy." This belief would lead to further consolidations in an effort to increase the forces "mobility, lethality, and survivability." Findings also show that due to the sheer size of the PLA, the modernization has become difficult for the majority of ground units, especially infantry divisions. The new weapons are being sent to what military leaders see as strategically important areas of the country, namely in the southeastern region of the country.
Along with the redeployment of conventional weapons to defend its borders, Beijing has begun to look more carefully at it's ground-based air and missile defense systems. The Pentagon is fairly confident in its assessment of the weakness of the current systems. The report notes that,
China currently lacks a coherent, national, strategic-level integrated air defense system (IADS). It has a variety of major defense weapon systems; however, the bulk of China's air defense system is based on obsolete weapon systems, which, when combined with an antiquated and inefficient C3 system, [command, control, and communications] allow for routine operations, such as providing point air defense for major cities and other high-value assets, but does not allow for an in-depth or flexible air defense throughout the country.
The modernization of the system was set into play following Chinese observations of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in 1999. These two operations demonstrated the limitations of China's air defense system would be against "precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft and airborne C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems. Among other changes, the Chinese military has begun to purchase a number of older Russian surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs). The Pentagon is of the belief that these missiles will allow for a "stop-gap measure" to guard against a cruise missile attack.
Perhaps more important than China's growing domestic missile system, are the constant advancements in the PRC's ballistic missile programs. The Pentagon report concludes that Beijing's new strategic stockpile will further deter the United States. Military analysts report that the PRC has approximately 20 intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States and that this number will grow to 30 by 2005 and possibly as many as 60 by the end of this decade. China, while still using liquid fuel ballistic missiles, is in the process of developing a solid-fuel ICBM, and should be successful by the middle of this decade. The XiaéÊlass submarine is expected to be equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This ad***ional firepower will be a strategic tool in any attempt the PRC would make in defeating an American ballistic missile defense system, along with what the Pentagon believes to be an advanced penetration system for their ICBMs.
In the midst of all of the modernization programs now in effect in China, Beijing announced that the annual military budget for 2002 would rise only by 17.6 percent. This $3 billion increase is expected to bring the budget to roughly the $20 billion mark making the PRC Asia's largest defense spender, and second in the world only to the United States. This number is said to not incorporate many aspects of military spending, weapons-research costs as well as the costs of foreign weapons are not included. This being the case, the United States believes that total Chinese expen***ures are closer to $65 billion, over three times the amount announced by Beijing.
Sales of Russian technology and weapons continue to provide China with modern military systems. During the 1990s, the PRC reportedly spent approximately $10 billion on arms deals with Russia, a number the report believes accounts for 25 percent of total Russian arms sales. Evidence has also shown that since 1999 the PRC has spent nearly twice that amount. No unclassified figures exist to show an accurate size of the arms deals between the former Soviet Union and the PRC. American analysts believe that the deals made since 1990 range from "$10 billion to $20 billion, with actual deliveries to date ranging from $7 billion to $10 billion." Of all the countries of the former Soviet Union the Pentagon lists Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as the PRC's largest arms dealers; of these three countries, Russia represents nearly 90 percent of the total sales.
For the United States, much of what has been said becomes dangerously clear when put into a situation involving Taiwan. In recent years the PLA has been conducting major amphibious war games, maneuvers that are believed by many in Washington to be a clear message that China is indeed willing to use force. Taiwan as of now does have a level of military superiority over the PLA. Taiwan's air force has three times as many fourth-generation aircraft and better-trained pilots. This technological advantage extends to the Taiwanese navy as well. While these advantages do exist, the Pentagon does admit that China will most likely have the upper hand in a war of attrition.
The Pentagon report concludes that Beijing is in the process of developing a "strategic configuration of power." China "must maintain con***ions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity" while pursuing "long term political goals". While many of these political goals will invariably involve the United States, China is believed to perceive the U.S. as a "significant long-term challenge" to its power. Through their military modernization, Chinese leaders have become more aggressive in promoting Chinese policies throughout Asia. The Pentagon report notes that the issue of Taiwan's defense is the major catalyst for Beijing's military modernization regardless of the diplomatic steps China will take in the future. This fact will weigh heavily on future Sino-Russian, Sino-American, and U.S.-Russian relationships in the years to come. The Pentagon report paints a complex picture of China as a rising world power that will exert enormous influence in Asia and will challenge the United States there as the dominant power in the years to come.
Written by JINSA Research Assistant Jason Peller

Picture Murky as China Updates Force Capabilities
People's Liberation Army, Navy & Air Force Making Technological Leaps; U.S. Unsure of PRC Status
E***or's Note: This is part two of a two-part series on China's increasing military capabilities, as reported by findings of the Congressional China Security Commission. Open part one in a new window.
A Pentagon report on China's military capability, the "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China," follows a report released by the China Security Review Commission, [E***or: discussed in part 1 or the series] which concluded that the United States has a dangerously inadequate level of knowledge and understanding of China, their beliefs and their plans for the future. Unlike the Congressional report, the Pentagon report is far more focused on the hardware of war, its capabilities and the PRC's strategies for using the equipment. The report, which was developed as per a request from Congress, is an in depth picture into the military-industrial complex of one of the world's most secretive countries. The Report discuses, "(1) gaps in knowledge of China's military power; (2) China's grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy; (3) development in advanced technologies that would enhance China's military capabilities; (4) China's relations with the former Soviet Union; and (5) the security situation in the Taiwan Strait."
Immediately, the report notes that China has never been forthcoming with their technological abilities. Since the 1980s, Pentagon reports show that U.S. military exchange delegations have never seen any Chinese military units that would be classified as technologically advanced nor have the delegations seen any units perform operational training. Instead, the military envoys have only been shown what U.S. officials refer to as "showcase" units.
The so-called 'gaps' in the United States knowledge into the PRC are widespread. The Pentagon reports that over the last few years the PRC's military force, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), is in the process of upgrading their arsenal to better suit a new strategy for dealing with situations far from China's borders. These upgrades in military strength and preparedness come in the form of missile developments, naval, air, and ground forces advancements as well as continuing upgrades in intelligence gathering and command and control.
The report explains that while the PLA has roughly 3,400 aircraft at their command, only a small number, around 100 are deemed modern fourth- generation fighters. These include Russian-designed Su-27 and Su-30s. While in the past, the air fleet has been used primarily in the local interceptor role, the PRC hopes to incorporate more fourth-generation aircraft to allow for a wider range of action. This new scope of action would include, "defending against aircraft at long ranges from China's coast, defeating high-value air assets, denying U.S. naval operations and striking other targets such as airbases and air defense sites." Along with the growing fleet of Su-27 and Su-30 fighters China has laid out plans for the continuation of their indigenous fighters, the F-7, FB-7 and the F-8, with improvements in the plane's radar, weapons, electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and night attack avionics and Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. China has also designated considerable funds to the research and development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), confirms that China has already built a number of short-range UAVs as well as some longer-range models. China operates the Chang Hong (CH-1) among others. Classified as a long-range, air launched, autonomous reconnaissance drone, The CH-1 has been in operation since the 1980s. The U.S. military believes the CH-1 was derived from the reverse engineering of recovered U.S. Firebee reconnaissance drones shot down during the Vietnam War. Further developments in UAV programs continue to enhance reconnaissance, surveillance, and EW technologies.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is dogged by personnel issues. Chinese pilots, by western standards, are ill equipped to operate their aircraft to the fullest potential. The Pentagon's report believes that the PLAAF will have "developed operational concepts and the training needed to fight as an integrated force" by 2010. In 2001, the PLAAF and the People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) participated in tactical training in hopes to modernize their combat tactics. These training sessions were to focus on "mobility, air defense, and support to amphibious assault forces. China hopes that these simulations will help to equip their pilots with the know-how to effectively perform in combat situations, U.S. military officials believe these exercises to be "highly scripted and the scenarios lacked realism." This conclusion leads to the belief that minimal benefit may have been found by the participating pilots.
The Chinese Navy, like the PLAAF has also initiated movements toward modernization. Over the last decade the DoD reports that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with approximately 290,000 active personnel, has begun to streamline its operational force. PLAN fleet has a compliment of 60 destroyers and frigates, 50 diesel and six nuclear submarines, 40 amphibious landing ships and some 350 smaller ships. Along with their surface fleet, the PLAN has also cut down their submarine force by nearly half. With a newer and smaller fleet, the Chinese are hoping to extend their defense perimeter further out to sea, allowing for both increased security and the further expansion of their physical presence in the Pacific Ocean. The introduction of two Russian-manufactured Sovremennyy-class destroyers (the PLAN has two more on order from Moscow) has gone a long way toward making this goal a reality. These ships have greatly increased the range and capability of the Chinese navy. The report shows U.S. military analysts have raised concerns in regards to the Russian ships especially relating to the Chinese skills at reverse engineering. This would allow for larger number of highly capable warships to be introduced into the PLAN. American officials also believe that by 2010 a new class of Chinese destroyers will be operational possibly alongside a new class of frigates. With the advancements in both naval and aviation technologies, questions have been raised about the possibility of China raising an aircraft carrier group, a move that would greatly increase China's defensible perimeter. Pentagon personnel respond in the report by stating "while continuing to research and discuss possibilities, China appears to have set aside indefinitely plans to acquire an aircraft carrier."
One of the most important arms of any modern navy is that of the submarine fleet. The Pentagon report concludes that China's military strategy will include the acquisition of a large number of submarines. At this point in time, the PLAN's submarine forces are used mostly to interdict enemy surface ships with the use of mines and torpedoes. While this may be the case for now, the report goes on *****ggest that China will field submerged-launched cruise missiles in the near future.
Chinese diesel-electric submarines feature a combination of homegrown technology found in the Ming- and Song-class submarines, as well as the Russian-built KILO-type. It should be noted that China does still have in operation 30 Russian-designed ROMEO-type subs, however the Department of Defense considers these submarines obsolete. The Ming-class submarine is by far the most plentiful of the modern fleet with 21 vessels at sea. The Ming is understood to be an improvement on the ROMEO-type subs. The Song-class on the other hand, is cre***ed with being China's first new-design diesel electric submarine. The Song is expected to launch cruise missiles while submerged. With a skewed propeller to minimize cavitations (the sounds created by collapsing air bubbles created by the disruption of water by the propeller), French-designed flank-array sonar and German-designed diesel engines; many submarine analysts see the Song subs as a blending of conventional Chinese technology with that of modern western submarine programs. Many submarine experts see the Russian-built KILO-type submarine, of which the PLAN has four with a possible fifth on the way, as one of the quietest conventional submarines at sea today. The Pentagon report identifies two KILO variants: the first, designated the 877E or the Varshavyanka-class is considered the export model of the KILO-type sub, while the 636E or Amur-class was designated solely for Russian naval use only. With this in mind, it is no surprise that the military communities in the western nations found it disturbing when it was revealed that Russia would sell two Amur-class subs along with the two 877s already agreed upon between Moscow and Beijing. There is no doubt that China will attempt to incorporate Russian technology found within the KILO-type subs; but the Pentagon report concludes that China will not be able to use this technology to its full potential for some time. The KILO subs have ranges between 6,000 and 7,500 miles submerged with a snorkel but have a sea endurance of only 45 days. A nuclear-powered sub may stay at sea indefinitely, with its only limitation being the amount of food stored aboard.
The PLAN nuclear submarine fleet includes both nuclear-powered attack fast attack submarines (SSN) and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). The Chinese Navy now operates five Han-class SSNs. Commissioned between 1970 and 1990, the Han-class is due to be replaced by 2020 when a new SSN known to the Chinese as the 093-class will come on line. The single Chinese SSBN is known as the Xia-class. This sub will likely remain in service until 2012, when the Pentagon believes it will be relieved by the 094-class, which is expected to carry a payload of highly advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
On land as well as on sea, the PLA has initiated sweeping reforms and improvement to equip the world's largest standing army with the skills and support it will need for the twenty-first century. More than one million persons comprise the PLA ground forces. Divided into approximately "20 group armies, more than 40 maneuver divisions, and some 40 maneuver brigades," according to the Pentagon report. Many of the divisions and brigades have been developed and organized for what the PLA refers to as "rapid reaction." In an effort to streamline the army, 2000 saw the commencement of a downsizing expected to reduce the force by as many as to 500,000. it appears, however, that downsizing was achieved by the reassignment of many soldiers and personnel to the People's Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary force acting as a reserve for PLA ground forces.
The U.S. DoD believes that the modernizations will conclude with a larger focus on "infantry, airborne, armor and army aviation units." The armored divisions in the PLA are built around the T-59 tank. Based on the 1950s-era Russian T-54, the T-59 has been the mainstay of the Chinese armored divisions up to the present day. There are approximately 14,000 tanks and armored vehicles in the PLA. While the actual numbers are not known, analysts believe the tanks could number as high as 10,000. This mobile force is complimented by a stockpile of over 30,000 pieces of artillery.
There are a number of major obstacles that the PLA will have to hurdle. Some in Washington believe that Beijing still sees the PLA as too "infantry-heavy." This belief would lead to further consolidations in an effort to increase the forces "mobility, lethality, and survivability." Findings also show that due to the sheer size of the PLA, the modernization has become difficult for the majority of ground units, especially infantry divisions. The new weapons are being sent to what military leaders see as strategically important areas of the country, namely in the southeastern region of the country.
Along with the redeployment of conventional weapons to defend its borders, Beijing has begun to look more carefully at it's ground-based air and missile defense systems. The Pentagon is fairly confident in its assessment of the weakness of the current systems. The report notes that,
China currently lacks a coherent, national, strategic-level integrated air defense system (IADS). It has a variety of major defense weapon systems; however, the bulk of China's air defense system is based on obsolete weapon systems, which, when combined with an antiquated and inefficient C3 system, [command, control, and communications] allow for routine operations, such as providing point air defense for major cities and other high-value assets, but does not allow for an in-depth or flexible air defense throughout the country.
The modernization of the system was set into play following Chinese observations of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Allied Force in 1999. These two operations demonstrated the limitations of China's air defense system would be against "precision-guided munitions, stealth aircraft and airborne C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems. Among other changes, the Chinese military has begun to purchase a number of older Russian surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs). The Pentagon is of the belief that these missiles will allow for a "stop-gap measure" to guard against a cruise missile attack.
Perhaps more important than China's growing domestic missile system, are the constant advancements in the PRC's ballistic missile programs. The Pentagon report concludes that Beijing's new strategic stockpile will further deter the United States. Military analysts report that the PRC has approximately 20 intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States and that this number will grow to 30 by 2005 and possibly as many as 60 by the end of this decade. China, while still using liquid fuel ballistic missiles, is in the process of developing a solid-fuel ICBM, and should be successful by the middle of this decade. The XiaéÊlass submarine is expected to be equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This ad***ional firepower will be a strategic tool in any attempt the PRC would make in defeating an American ballistic missile defense system, along with what the Pentagon believes to be an advanced penetration system for their ICBMs.
In the midst of all of the modernization programs now in effect in China, Beijing announced that the annual military budget for 2002 would rise only by 17.6 percent. This $3 billion increase is expected to bring the budget to roughly the $20 billion mark making the PRC Asia's largest defense spender, and second in the world only to the United States. This number is said to not incorporate many aspects of military spending, weapons-research costs as well as the costs of foreign weapons are not included. This being the case, the United States believes that total Chinese expen***ures are closer to $65 billion, over three times the amount announced by Beijing.
Sales of Russian technology and weapons continue to provide China with modern military systems. During the 1990s, the PRC reportedly spent approximately $10 billion on arms deals with Russia, a number the report believes accounts for 25 percent of total Russian arms sales. Evidence has also shown that since 1999 the PRC has spent nearly twice that amount. No unclassified figures exist to show an accurate size of the arms deals between the former Soviet Union and the PRC. American analysts believe that the deals made since 1990 range from "$10 billion to $20 billion, with actual deliveries to date ranging from $7 billion to $10 billion." Of all the countries of the former Soviet Union the Pentagon lists Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as the PRC's largest arms dealers; of these three countries, Russia represents nearly 90 percent of the total sales.
For the United States, much of what has been said becomes dangerously clear when put into a situation involving Taiwan. In recent years the PLA has been conducting major amphibious war games, maneuvers that are believed by many in Washington to be a clear message that China is indeed willing to use force. Taiwan as of now does have a level of military superiority over the PLA. Taiwan's air force has three times as many fourth-generation aircraft and better-trained pilots. This technological advantage extends to the Taiwanese navy as well. While these advantages do exist, the Pentagon does admit that China will most likely have the upper hand in a war of attrition.
The Pentagon report concludes that Beijing is in the process of developing a "strategic configuration of power." China "must maintain con***ions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity" while pursuing "long term political goals". While many of these political goals will invariably involve the United States, China is believed to perceive the U.S. as a "significant long-term challenge" to its power. Through their military modernization, Chinese leaders have become more aggressive in promoting Chinese policies throughout Asia. The Pentagon report notes that the issue of Taiwan's defense is the major catalyst for Beijing's military modernization regardless of the diplomatic steps China will take in the future. This fact will weigh heavily on future Sino-Russian, Sino-American, and U.S.-Russian relationships in the years to come. The Pentagon report paints a complex picture of China as a rising world power that will exert enormous influence in Asia and will challenge the United States there as the dominant power in the years to come.
Written by JINSA Research Assistant Jason Peller

U.S. Policy Change Toward Beijing
Posted June 26, 2003
By J. Michael Waller
President Bush may decide to keep his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, at arm?Ts length.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is losing its hard-won image as a force for stability in Asia as key thinkers in and around the Bush administration are beginning to view it as a dangerous and often reckless power that is fomenting fear and instability. If this change sweeps through the government leadership like other recent paradigm shifts - for instance, the quickly spreading view that Saudi Arabia no longer is a stable force in the Middle East but a corrupt and unpopular financier of terrorism - Sino-American relations will be headed for the rocks. That's bad news for the Chinese Communist Party leadership and the U.S. and other companies that have built their fortunes on it.
The stakes are tremendous. Much of the U.S. economy now depends heavily on the Chinese status quo. The nature and aspirations of China's government could do to the region what the Soviet Union had done to many of its neighbors: combine subtle or actual threats and subversion with positive instruments of economics and diplomacy to intimidate or "Finlandize" the region in*****bmission.
In practically every category - from human rights to border disputes, weapons proliferation to terrorism, free navigation of the seas to control of satellite orbits in space - official Washington sees the unelected Chinese government as being more of a problem than a solution. This view is gaining acceptance in part because of the work of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a bipartisan, congressionally chartered panel that issued its first report last year. It is preparing a follow-up under the chairmanship of former National Security Council official Roger W. Robinson (see "New Reports Detail the China Threat," Aug. 19, 2002).
Critics of the China skeptics say the PRC is militarily incapable of projecting its power and presents no short-term threat. A recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) study concludes, "The Chinese military is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability," and the advantage will "remain decisively in America's favor beyond the next 20 years" if U.S. military-acquisition and spending trends continue. However, even the CFR admits that its conclusions might be premature.
Military experts are paying attention. Richard Fisher, e***or of the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief and an adjunct Asia scholar at the Center for Security Policy, cre***s the CFR report with addressing current and potential Chinese threats, but says the conclusions are premised on faulty assumptions about the risks of predicting what Beijing will do and the means by which the PRC obtains high-tech assets to modernize its forces.
Advances in military hardware and communications aren't the only keys to the PRC's growing arsenal. Beijing has invested considerably in psychological coercion of other countries, preying on the fears of its smaller neighbors, subverting some from within through business deals and payoffs, and offering the carrot of trade deals, favorable loans and military cooperation. Its economic policy of building and selling weapons of mass destruction to any customer with enough cash has an added benefit, in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, of threatening the interests of its enemies - the United States and its European and Australasian allies, as well as emerging democratic rivals such as India. China has been a principal supplier of advanced technologies in communications, nuclear weapons and missiles for Iran, North Korea and the late Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq - the triad President George W. Bush calls the "Axis of Evil."
At the same time, Beijing calls itself an ally in the fight against weapons proliferation and terrorism, but with less and less credibility. A recent closed-door meeting of sinologists and defense experts in Washington underscored the evolving shift. "What has China done as an ally in the war on terrorists?" one participant asked. The rest looked at each other around the table. No one could think of a thing.
"They support our position on Xinjiang," quipped a participant, prompting a round of head-shaking and chuckling. Xinjiang province, whose ethnically Turkic population has been seething with resentment and resistance against Beijing's political, cultural and ethnic controls, is the site of strong, underground, anticommunist activity. For decades the central government harshly has repressed the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang, much as it has the conquered peoples of Tibet. But because the Xinjiang population is mostly Muslim, Beijing has tried to justify its repression in the name of fighting al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden. Incredibly, the U.S. State Department voiced support for the PRC's get-tough approach in Xinjiang, prompting the ironic quip.
The Chinese leadership has used its "partner" status in the world war on terrorism to crack down even further on religious, political and social movements. According to Al Santoli, e***or of the American Foreign Policy Council's China Reform Monitor, "Beijing is using the war on terror as an excuse to imprison and execute political opponents and religious leaders," including underground Roman Catholic clergy, democracy activists and the outlawed Falun Gong spiritual movement.
Even the State Department responded to this, at least expressing "deep concern" over the life sentence imposed on Wang Bingzhang last February, stressing that "the war on terrorism must not be misused to repress legitimate political grievances or dissent."
The sheer volume of evidence presents a damning indictment of the PRC as a fomenter of instability and fear, a purveyor of weapons of mass destruction to the world's most dangerous state-sponsors of terrorism, a supplier of nuclear-missile technology to the planet's most tense hot spots and a unilateral force committed to changing the world's political map. Analysts see Beijing pursuing a two-track strategy of sustained, low-level military pressure with positive inducements of trade, loans, development assistance and even security cooperation - which combined create a sense of fear and dependency on the part of China's neighbors.
A survey of countries shows the pattern that is causing some in Washington to reassess their perspectives about the PRC's role in the world.
Burma: Chinese support for the military junta in Burma, now known as Myanmar, is crucial to the survival of that diplomatically isolated regime. Beijing is seen as dominating the Burmese economy through massive infrastructure projects, large loans, debt forgiveness and the upgrading of naval port facilities and electronic intelligence outposts on the Bay of Bengal - prompting India to worry that China will use Burma to open up a "west coast" to the Indian Ocean.
Cambodia: Beijing is stepping up its military relations with Phnom Penh, has begun training Cambodian military officers and appears poised to replace the World Bank as a major lender to the Hun Sen government's programs. Beijing continues to oppose genocide trials for leaders of the former Khmer Rouge regime.
India: China's nuclear-weapons buildup, and its proliferation of nuclear-weapons and missile technology to Indian archenemy Pakistan, are among the reasons India is deploying a nuclear-missile arsenal of its own. "To tackle the situation today we must have the same strength that our neighbors have," Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes told reporters last fall. "China is not only economically stronger, but has conducted nuclear tests much before us. They are also well-armed. Pakistan's arrogance is because of China's backing."
Japan: China's new assertiveness in the context of its own nuclear-missile modernization and naval expansion, and its unrelenting support for North Korea's nuclear-missile program, have prompted Japanese leaders publicly to consider amending their constitution to allow building of an independent nuclear force.
Korea: Arguably the tensest hot spot in the world, the Korean peninsula remains divided, with the heavily militarized Communist regime in the north kept in power largely from PRC aid and technology. Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, sees Pyongyang capable of building a nuclear-missile force capable of striking Japan, U.S. military bases in Okinawa and Guam, and much of the Pacific. In recent months the North Korean government openly has threatened "war" against the United States and its allies, with Beijing alternating between obstruction and conciliation. Earlier this year the PRC blocked an attempt at the United Nations by the United States, Britain and France to condemn North Korea for selling weapons of mass destruction.
Pacific Islands: Small islands in the Pacific, so vital to the Allies in World War II and to U.S. national security today, are coming under increasing Chinese influence. The island nation of Kiribati, near the U.S. missile-defense testing site in Kwajalein, Marshall Islands, erupted in controversy in December 2002 when former president Ieremia Tabai accused the PRC of meddling in his country's elections. President Teburoro Tito, who was re-elected amid the scandal, had allowed the Chinese military to build a satellite base on the island, which intelligence sources say lets Beijing spy on U.S. missile-defense tests.
Philippines: Beijing calls for antiterrorism cooperation with Manila in the Asia-Pacific region, but it continues to occupy a Philippine reef it militarized in the South China Sea off Palawan province.
Singapore: This staunch U.S. ally, which recently completed port upgrades to host U.S. Navy warships, including aircraft carriers, announced it is withdrawing its military-training facilities in Taiwan and moving them to the PRC.
Sudan: Through oil deals and sales of military hardware, Beijing is propping up the Islamist regime in Khartoum, helping it to wipe out the country's Christian population in the south. Sudanese Christians and animists have been resisting government brutality in a civil war, driven in part by the regime's attempts to clear huge swaths of land to enable the state-owned PRC oil company, Petro China, to drill in a multibillion-dollar deal.
Taiwan: The PRC slowly is escalating the prospect of a military attack on Taiwan, maintaining the view that the independently governed island is a renegade province to be "reunited" with the mainland under Communist Party rule. Beijing continues to emplace CSS-5 and CSS-6 medium-range ballistic missiles within striking distance of Taipei. Through a combination of threats, business incentives and infiltration of Taiwan's new multiparty democracy, the PRC leadership works to squeeze the island country into an unwilling merger.
Thailand: Longtime ally Thailand is becoming more anti-American and pro-Beijing. The Bangkok newspaper Matichon recently accused the Thai government of moving closer to the PRC and Burma, while acting "as though the U.S. is an adversary." The paper observes, "Through the government's propaganda campaign, the Thai public is led to believe that the United States is bent on taking advantage of Thailand. ... Since we hate the United States [according to government logic], we now turn to another superpower, China."
Venezuela: Beijing finds a new Latin American friend in the regime of Col. Hugo Chavez, the anti-U.S. strongman who fancies himself a 21st century Simón Bolívar. U.S. defense sources tell Insight that, following the withdrawal of American Special Forces trainers from Venezuela, Chavez invited China to send in about 100 special-operations experts to train his army.
Pentagon officials tell this magazine that other trends also worry U.S. strategists. Beijing continues to make illegal, unilateral claims on international waters that threaten freedom of navigation, specifically in the South China Sea. Despite the near-constant presence of U.S. military aircraft to show a commitment to freedom of the waters in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese military continues aggressively to attempt interceptions of reconnaissance aircraft, similar to that which provoked the May 2001 incident that forced down a U.S. Navy EP-3 plane and its crew.
Chinese ambitions to challenge U.S. domination of space are another worry at the Defense Department. Fisher, author of a forthcoming book on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), attended the recent Zuhai Air Show and saw the exhibition of three new solid-fueled space-launch vehicles he says "are intended to form the basis for a direct-ascent antisatellite ballistic missile and the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile." Combined with miniature antisatellite weapons the PLA already has developed, and an emerging doctrine to blind the United States by destroying key satellites in the event of a conflict, the development has U.S. planners fearful of a threat against which the United States has no defense. "If the PLA is able to disable or destroy enough critical U.S. military satellites," Fisher says, the "20-year [U.S.] technical advantage would be rapidly diminished."
Meanwhile, U.S. counterintelligence sources say Beijing's extremely aggressive espionage operations continue unabated. "The Chinese remain fully focused on collecting intelligence on all aspects of American political, economic, industrial and military technology, and maintain a host of political-warfare capabilities in place to limit the U.S. ability to respond," one official says. U.S. counterintelligence remains in disarray over the disclosure of major Chinese penetrations of the FBI, in which an alleged PRC agent maintained affairs with two FBI agents on behalf of Beijing's spy service. The case against the alleged spy and the two former agents now is in federal court.
Beijing's "long-term strategic objective is to drive American bases and influence out of the Pacific region and to exercise hegemony over it," according to Australia-based sinologist Peter Zhang. "I wrote those words nearly four years ago," he said in a recent essay for the New Australian. "Since then events in the region have only strengthened my assessment."