Tin Tình báo- Tin về tình hình quân sự ASEAN (P1)

Tàu chiến Ấn Độ sẽ ghé thăm VN trong khỏang thời gian từ 15/10 đến 9/11.Hiện Ấn Độ có 50 chiến hạm và 19 chiếc khác đang được chế tạo.(theo TTXVN)

Theo Pravda, Bắc Hàn đã đào tạo được khoảng 500 hacker thuộc hàng cao thủ tại Kim il Sung''s military academy. Mỗi năm truòng này cho ra lò khoảng 100 chú, và lực lượng này đã tấn công 1 số WEBSITE của Nam Hàn, xoá sạch nội dụng và thay vào đó 1 lá cờ Bắc Hàn to tướng. Theo các quan chức Hàn Quốc, họ thực sự lo ngại khi thấy hệ thống thông tin của Bộ Quốc Phòng, các cơ quan an ninh bị đột nhập, họ đánh giá đối phương đạt đến trình độ của các nước phát triển Được biết trường này do con trai đồng chí Kim, người đã học Computer tại Nga và Thuỵ Sỹ sáng lập

Theo Pravda, Bắc Hàn đã đào tạo được khoảng 500 hacker thuộc hàng cao thủ tại Kim il Sung''s military academy. Mỗi năm truòng này cho ra lò khoảng 100 chú, và lực lượng này đã tấn công 1 số WEBSITE của Nam Hàn, xoá sạch nội dụng và thay vào đó 1 lá cờ Bắc Hàn to tướng. Theo các quan chức Hàn Quốc, họ thực sự lo ngại khi thấy hệ thống thông tin của Bộ Quốc Phòng, các cơ quan an ninh bị đột nhập, họ đánh giá đối phương đạt đến trình độ của các nước phát triển Được biết trường này do con trai đồng chí Kim, người đã học Computer tại Nga và Thuỵ Sỹ sáng lập

NC và India đã thoả thuận tắng cường hợp tác quân sự trong các lãnh vực mua bán vũ khí,đào tạo sĩ quan,trao đối các chiến hạm viếng thăm,sửa chữa và đóng tàu chiến.(theo tạp chí cộng sản).

NC và India đã thoả thuận tắng cường hợp tác quân sự trong các lãnh vực mua bán vũ khí,đào tạo sĩ quan,trao đối các chiến hạm viếng thăm,sửa chữa và đóng tàu chiến.(theo tạp chí cộng sản).

Eight months after the Cope India exercise, the losing performance of U.S. fighter pilots (3rd Wing) in simulated air-to-air combat against the Indian air force continues to produce concern among some military circles. Aviation Week & Space Technology reported on October 4, 2004 that the exercise also shocked some in Congress and the Pentagon who used the event to renew the call for modernizing the U.S. fighter force with the F/A-22s and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. When asked to explain what led to the poor American performance, Maj. Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing''s chief of air-to-air tactics, cited the widely claimed factor that none of the F-15Cs was equipped with the newest long-range, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars. Snowden, interestingly, also stated that "the outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected...India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force."
On August 24, 2004 Robert O. Blake, the US charge d''affaires in India, disclosed that the US had approved sales of military equipment worth $233 million to New Delhi, UPI reported. Blake noted that 12 Firefinder weapon-locating radars worth $190 million had already been sold to India, and that planned sales included P-3 Orion naval reconnaissance planes and engines for the Light Combat Aircraft. He also said that India had made a request for chemical and biological protection equipment. Any defense item less than $14 million can be sold to India directly without Congressional notice.
In February 2004, the United States and India engaged in a joint exercise named Cope India. Cope India 04 was an Air Force level exercise between the USAF and the Indian Air Force (IAF) and marked the beginning of a new chapter in Indo-US bilateral relations. This was the first opportunity since 1963, for USAF fighters to operate from Indian soil. The exercise brought together leading fighter combat aircraft and aircrew and ground crew of both air forces. The USAF flew in F-15Cs, while the IAF was represented by Mirage 2000, Su-30K, MiG-27s and MiG-21 (upgraded). The meeting ground provided a strong foundation and deep understanding towards developing a new relationship between the IAF and USAF for the future.
Source: GlobalSecurity.org

Eight months after the Cope India exercise, the losing performance of U.S. fighter pilots (3rd Wing) in simulated air-to-air combat against the Indian air force continues to produce concern among some military circles. Aviation Week & Space Technology reported on October 4, 2004 that the exercise also shocked some in Congress and the Pentagon who used the event to renew the call for modernizing the U.S. fighter force with the F/A-22s and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. When asked to explain what led to the poor American performance, Maj. Mark A. Snowden, the 3rd Wing''s chief of air-to-air tactics, cited the widely claimed factor that none of the F-15Cs was equipped with the newest long-range, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars. Snowden, interestingly, also stated that "the outcome of the exercise boils down to [the fact that] they ran tactics that were more advanced than we expected...India had developed its own air tactics somewhat in a vacuum. They had done some training with the French that we knew about, but we did not expect them to be a very well-trained air force."
On August 24, 2004 Robert O. Blake, the US charge d''affaires in India, disclosed that the US had approved sales of military equipment worth $233 million to New Delhi, UPI reported. Blake noted that 12 Firefinder weapon-locating radars worth $190 million had already been sold to India, and that planned sales included P-3 Orion naval reconnaissance planes and engines for the Light Combat Aircraft. He also said that India had made a request for chemical and biological protection equipment. Any defense item less than $14 million can be sold to India directly without Congressional notice.
In February 2004, the United States and India engaged in a joint exercise named Cope India. Cope India 04 was an Air Force level exercise between the USAF and the Indian Air Force (IAF) and marked the beginning of a new chapter in Indo-US bilateral relations. This was the first opportunity since 1963, for USAF fighters to operate from Indian soil. The exercise brought together leading fighter combat aircraft and aircrew and ground crew of both air forces. The USAF flew in F-15Cs, while the IAF was represented by Mirage 2000, Su-30K, MiG-27s and MiG-21 (upgraded). The meeting ground provided a strong foundation and deep understanding towards developing a new relationship between the IAF and USAF for the future.
Source: GlobalSecurity.org

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/politics/19china.html?oref=login&pagewanted=print&position=
Secret Papers About China Are Released by the C.I.A.
By DOUGLAS JEHL
WASHINGTON, Oct. 18 - The Central Intelligence Agency made public on Monday a rich trove of previously classified documents on China, including the supposedly authoritative National Intelligence Estimates issued over the 30-year period of Mao Zedong''s rule.
For scholars of what Mao called China''s "continuous revolution," of its tumultuous and intertwined relationships with the United States, the Soviet Union and Taiwan, and of the American intelligence efforts aimed at understanding the unfolding events, the documents disclose a mixed record of insights and miscues.
A National Intelligence Estimate published in June 1954 said that "no clearly established factions" existed within the Chinese leadership. In fact, the first major party purge had taken place earlier that year, but did not become public for another year.
Yet in the confusion and chaos of the Cultural Revolution of the 1960''s, when radicals published so many documented exposés and denunciations that the flow of data became a glut, a 1967 intelligence estimate correctly predicted the probability that cautious military and political leaders would find common cause eventually.
"As long as Mao is capable of political command, China''s situation will probably be tense and inherently unstable," it said; a "disorderly and contentious" struggle would follow, and eventually a move away from "discre***ed" policies to "secure modest economic growth."
In an introduction to the collection of 71 documents, which are on the agency''s Web site at www.cia.gov and will be released by the Government Printing Office on compact disc, Robert L. Suettinger, a career intelligence analyst and China scholar, says that "unfortunately, the collection provides only a few examples of this kind of cogent analysis on China''s leadership situation." But Mr. Suettinger described the record as "nonetheless an impressive one" in which "the fundamentals are consistently right."
Among the most important judgments, Mr. Suettinger wrote, was a consistently accurate assessment that the Communist Party in China was never challenged from 1948 on in its predominance of power on the Chinese mainland.
Other assessments contained in the documents include one written in 1950, on the eve of China''s entry into the Korean War. It correctly said that Chinese forces were capable of either halting the northward path of United Nations forces or of "forcing U.N. withdrawal further south through a powerful assault."
A pair of Special National Intelligence Estimates on China''s response and involvement in the Vietnam War made clear that China would not risk an open confrontation with the Untied States. One of the estimates, issued in 1966, said, "At present levels of American action [in North Vietnam], we continue to believe that China will not commit its ground or air forces *****stained combat against the U.S."
The documents show that American intelligence agencies were slow to recognize the emergence of differences between the Soviet Union and China in what is known as the Sino-Soviet split. As late as 1966, three years before clashes along the border took the relationship to its lowest state, an estimate described an open break in relations between the Soviet Union and China as unlikely.
A main shortcoming, Mr. Suettinger wrote in his assessment, was "overestimating the importance of ideological solidarity and other centripetal forces within the Communist Bloc at least during the 1950''s."
Documents on the emergence and status on China''s strategic nuclear forces, the subject of 13 estimates between 1962 and 1974, were heavily censored, Mr. Suettinger writes, but if nothing else, they "reveal that estimating a country''s nuclear capabilities - much less intentions - on the basis of a few photographs and other scarce clues has been an imprecise science from the start."
It is a lesson that will not be lost on students of intelligence still looking at the agency''s work on Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Robert L. Hutchings, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, described the documents as presenting "a unique historical record of a formative stage in China''s development" between 1948 and 1978, including "the drama of the Chinese Civil War, the establishment and consolidation of Communist rule, and the Sino-Soviet split."
The collection of documents is the most extensive to be released by the C.I.A. on China. Since 1996, the C.I.A. has released a series of similar collections on the Soviet Union, but those documents were largely retrospectives on the cold war. By contrast, Mr. Suettinger noted that the China documents contained "formative thinking on an existing state, an ongoing challenge to American interests and security."

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/politics/19china.html?oref=login&pagewanted=print&position=
Secret Papers About China Are Released by the C.I.A.
By DOUGLAS JEHL
WASHINGTON, Oct. 18 - The Central Intelligence Agency made public on Monday a rich trove of previously classified documents on China, including the supposedly authoritative National Intelligence Estimates issued over the 30-year period of Mao Zedong''s rule.
For scholars of what Mao called China''s "continuous revolution," of its tumultuous and intertwined relationships with the United States, the Soviet Union and Taiwan, and of the American intelligence efforts aimed at understanding the unfolding events, the documents disclose a mixed record of insights and miscues.
A National Intelligence Estimate published in June 1954 said that "no clearly established factions" existed within the Chinese leadership. In fact, the first major party purge had taken place earlier that year, but did not become public for another year.
Yet in the confusion and chaos of the Cultural Revolution of the 1960''s, when radicals published so many documented exposés and denunciations that the flow of data became a glut, a 1967 intelligence estimate correctly predicted the probability that cautious military and political leaders would find common cause eventually.
"As long as Mao is capable of political command, China''s situation will probably be tense and inherently unstable," it said; a "disorderly and contentious" struggle would follow, and eventually a move away from "discre***ed" policies to "secure modest economic growth."
In an introduction to the collection of 71 documents, which are on the agency''s Web site at www.cia.gov and will be released by the Government Printing Office on compact disc, Robert L. Suettinger, a career intelligence analyst and China scholar, says that "unfortunately, the collection provides only a few examples of this kind of cogent analysis on China''s leadership situation." But Mr. Suettinger described the record as "nonetheless an impressive one" in which "the fundamentals are consistently right."
Among the most important judgments, Mr. Suettinger wrote, was a consistently accurate assessment that the Communist Party in China was never challenged from 1948 on in its predominance of power on the Chinese mainland.
Other assessments contained in the documents include one written in 1950, on the eve of China''s entry into the Korean War. It correctly said that Chinese forces were capable of either halting the northward path of United Nations forces or of "forcing U.N. withdrawal further south through a powerful assault."
A pair of Special National Intelligence Estimates on China''s response and involvement in the Vietnam War made clear that China would not risk an open confrontation with the Untied States. One of the estimates, issued in 1966, said, "At present levels of American action [in North Vietnam], we continue to believe that China will not commit its ground or air forces *****stained combat against the U.S."
The documents show that American intelligence agencies were slow to recognize the emergence of differences between the Soviet Union and China in what is known as the Sino-Soviet split. As late as 1966, three years before clashes along the border took the relationship to its lowest state, an estimate described an open break in relations between the Soviet Union and China as unlikely.
A main shortcoming, Mr. Suettinger wrote in his assessment, was "overestimating the importance of ideological solidarity and other centripetal forces within the Communist Bloc at least during the 1950''s."
Documents on the emergence and status on China''s strategic nuclear forces, the subject of 13 estimates between 1962 and 1974, were heavily censored, Mr. Suettinger writes, but if nothing else, they "reveal that estimating a country''s nuclear capabilities - much less intentions - on the basis of a few photographs and other scarce clues has been an imprecise science from the start."
It is a lesson that will not be lost on students of intelligence still looking at the agency''s work on Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
Robert L. Hutchings, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council, described the documents as presenting "a unique historical record of a formative stage in China''s development" between 1948 and 1978, including "the drama of the Chinese Civil War, the establishment and consolidation of Communist rule, and the Sino-Soviet split."
The collection of documents is the most extensive to be released by the C.I.A. on China. Since 1996, the C.I.A. has released a series of similar collections on the Soviet Union, but those documents were largely retrospectives on the cold war. By contrast, Mr. Suettinger noted that the China documents contained "formative thinking on an existing state, an ongoing challenge to American interests and security."

Rioters burn and loot in west China demonstration
Source: Reuters
By Lindsay Beck
BEIJING, Oct 20 (Reuters) - Rioters in the western Chinese region of Chongqing burned police cars and looted government buildings after a quarrel between residents escalated into a riot involving thousands, residents and officials said.
The angry crowds gathered on Monday night during a quarrel between fruit market workers and a delivery boy, after one worker passed himself off as an official and threatened to use his rank to resolve the dispute in his favour, state media said.
That caused bystanders, angry at the attempted abuse of privilege, to become involved in the dispute. Residents said crowds grew to more than 20,000 after cars and buses passing through the area stopped to watch.
A report on the Web site of the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao said that, after the trouble flared, some 1,000 fully armed riot police intervened and, after fierce clashes with brick-throwing rioters, finally dispersed them with tear gas and rubber bullets.
An official news report posted on the Wanzhou government''s Web site (www.wz.gov.cn) said five were detained for burning and overturning police cars and stealing a computer from a local government building. It did not say what caused the disturbance.
A Wanzhou official said more than 10 had been detained.
"I heard some protesters burned police vehicles and police fired tear gas," said a hotel employee at the Changcheng Chang Hotel in Wanzhou district near the riot scene.
China has seen mounting anger against abuse of privilege as the gap between rich and poor widens, with hundreds of millions of peasants left out of its economic boom.
A case last year in which a woman killed a farmer with her BMW but was let off with a suspended sentence attracted wide attention and the investigation was eventually reopened.
A Wanzhou police officer acknowledged there had been a "security disturbance" on Monday but declined to give details.
EMERGENCY MEETING
Ming Pao reported that the trouble was sparked by a trivial matter.
"A man carrying a pole hit a woman passing by and the two of them started an argument. The woman then called a man, who later arrived at the scene and beat and injured the man carrying the pole and even threatened to pay money to ''buy'' his life," said the Web site article, monitored by the BBC.
"The crowd could not stand by and watch and therefore stopped the couple from leaving. The police later took them away. When it was speculated that the man was a government official, the people became very angry and swarmed the district government to seek reasons, leading eventually to the violent incident," Ming Pao added.
Local officials were still appealing for calm on Wednesday and the Wanzhou Web site said local government and Communist Party officials had held an emergency meeting at 4 a.m. on Tuesday to discuss the situation.
"Everyone has a responsibility to preserve stability," said one headline on the Wanzhou Web site.
Government and party officials pledged at the meeting "to seriously punish the lawbreakers and troublemakers in this mass incident in accordance with the law, and seriously punish any party members who ... participated in it to stir up others to create trouble", the Web site said.
They also stressed that no officials were involved in the dispute that sparked the protest, only a man who passed himself off as one.
A report in the official People''s Daily put the crowd only at "hundreds", but referred to "beatings, robbing and burning" and said those involved would be punished.
Protests have become increasingly common in China, fuelled by corruption and the widening wealth gap, but authorities are keen to quickly quash dissent and preserve stability.