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South Asia Analysis Group


India-Vietnam Strategic Partnership: The Convergence of Interests
"Vietnam treats India with strategic importance" is what President Tran Duch Luang expressed to India?Ts Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during the latters visit to Vietnam in mid-November 2000 1 in connection with the 10th Indo-Vietnam Joint Commission meeting. Available reports on statements by Indian leaders do not transparently reflect similar sentiments. India still shies away from coming out unequivocally on expressing its strategic preferences for countries which are vital or whose strategic partnerships are desirable for furthering India?Ts national security interests. Along with Myanmar, in South East Asia, India needs to build up a relationship of strategic partnership with Vietnam.
India and Vietnam enjoy a convergence of strategic interests which could provide the basis for building and reinforcing strategic cooperation between the two countries. India in the past, stood by Vietnam in opposing US military intervention at the cost of embittering Indo-US relations.2 India stood up in the UN against USA and China on the Cambodia issue and its good relations with the pro-Vietnamese Hang Samarin government generated antagonisms in the US Congress and US establishment .3 With such a backdrop there should be no impediments for India to build up a strategic partnership with Vietnam in all fields- political, diplomatic, military and economic.
India has long under nourished its bilateral relationships with countries which demanded strategic cooperation due to our non-aligned fixations which predicated that India should never mention or define strategic relationships, defence cooperation or military to military contacts with any country.
However, the turn of the millennium presents a complex strategic environment in Asia-Pacific and impinging on India?Ts security and its national security interests. In India?Ts search for strategic bilateral cooperation with important regional countries, Vietnam should be the logical choice. India and Vietnam share a wide area of convergence of interests on which a solid strategic partnership can be built up.
Strategic Calculus of India and Vietnam - The China factor
The China factor weighs heavily and figures prominently in the respective strategic calculus of both India and Vietnam. India?Ts Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes was accurate when in 1998 he described China as a "major threat" to India. Prime Minister Vajpayee had also in 1998 mentioned the Chinese threat as an impulse for India?Ts nuclear weaponisation .4 Recently a Vietnamese Foreign Ministry official had remarked "we don?Tt trust China";5 in other words, Vietnam is suspicious of China and fearful of China?Ts intentions.
Both India and Vietnam have very good reasons for China?Ts figuring in their respective threat perception as this record indicates:
* Both India and Vietnam share long land borders with China. Vietnam also shares sea borders.
* China has disputed its existing borders with both India and Vietnam.
* China launched punitive military attacks on both India (1962) and Vietnam(1979). India fared badly because Nehru never suspected that China would attack India. Vietnam?Ts record was remarkable.
* China again attacked Vietnamese garrisons in the Spratly Islands group and forcibly occupied six of them. However, once again the Vietnamese Navy met Chinese aggression squarely.
* China?Ts recent expressions professing friendship with both India and Vietnam respectively do not get matched up with genuine efforts to settle border issues.
* China?Ts perceived strategic concerns regarding India and Vietnam forced it to create strategic pressure points to destabilise these two countries. In the case of India, China created the Pakistani threat (nuclear and missile threat) and in the case of Vietnam, it posed proxy military challenges in Kampuchea, besides direct military force on both land and sea borders.
India and Vietnam therefore have a natural strategic congruence as to how to restrain China from aggressive actions in future, while keeping it engaged diplomatically.
India?Ts strategic and national security interests demand that Vietnam emerges as a strong state. Relatively, India is better placed to contribute towards this aim in all fields - defence cooperation, political cooperation, economic and technical assistance and technology transfers.
India-Vietnam: Defence Cooperation and Assistance
Defence cooperation between India and Vietnam has taken place over the years in a limited manner with exchange of some military delegations and visits of naval ships. Indian military delegations visited Vietnam after the Sino-Vietnam War of 1979 to study how Vietnamese border troops defeated attacks by China?Ts regular army formations. As part of former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao?Ts ?~Look East?T policy, an agreement on Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1994, but not followed up vigorously.
The imperatives of defence cooperation with Vietnam seem to have been realised belatedly leading to the visit to Vietnam by India?Ts Defence Minister, George Fernandes in March 2000 and signing of a fresh protocol on defence cooperation which incorporates some of the following major points:
* Institutionalised framework for regular discussions between the Indian and Vietnamese Defence Ministers.
* Such discussions to incorporate sharing of strategic threat perceptions and intelligence.
* Naval exercises between Indian Navy and Vietnam Navy and also those of coast guards of both countries.
* Pilot training of Vietnam Air Force by the Indian Air Force
These are welcome steps towards achievement of what should be India?Ts strategic aim to assist in building Vietnam?Ts armed forces to be militarily strong and self reliant. To this end India could extend defence cooperation to Vietnam in the following fields:
* Vietnam?Ts Air Force and Navy have Russian origin hardware which is operationally limited due to lack of spares and advanced repairs and maintenance. India is well placed to assist.
* India has a sizeable defence production infrastructure. India should provide such indigenously produced equipment at ?~friendship prices?T or even as aid.
* India should assist in development of indigenous defence production infrastructure in Vietnam.
* India should upgrade Vietnam?Ts Air Force and Navy military hardware by rendering all technical assistance.
* Military training facilities in India both combat and technical training should be opened in a big way for training of Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel.
* India should also consider providing missile assembly technology of non-nuclear missiles to Vietnam.
Hackles should not be raised on the last point. If China could with impunity arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons and IRBMs, China should logically have no moral right to raise a hue and cry on this subject. At some stage India will have to learn and develop strategic pressure points against China, to counter what China has done all along so far on India?Ts periphery.
India and Vietnam - Political and Diplomatic Cooperation
In terms of political and diplomatic cooperation between India and Vietnam, the convergence of interests, once again tend to get focused on China. To pre-empt China apologists from disputing the above, attention needs to be drawn to the following worthwhile analysis of China:
"Clearly it is both foolish and dangerous to depreciate China or to doubt its long term potential. Yet that very potential could well be threatening for other nations including US Pacific allies like Japan, Korea and Indonesia, not to mention countries like India and Vietnam, even should China not so intend. The Middle Kingdom?Ts expansive territorial claims and pronounced self-absorption virtually guarantee that foreign anxieties will persist." 6
The same author further amplifies the reasons for apprehensions about China, thus:
"A major element in foreign apprehension about China is the pervasive uncertainty about its long term geostrategic intentions. Some of this is rooted in the unpredictability of Chinese politics, which have been extraordinarily volatile across the past half century and may well continue to be so. But such uncertainty is greatly intensified by the chronic lack of transparency in Chinese defence planning, weapons acquisitions and even defense budgeting..." 7
Major effort will be required on the part of both India and Vietnam to pursue politically and diplomatically the following initiatives:
* India?Ts permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Vietnam is on record supporting India?Ts candidature.
* Vietnam?Ts role in ASEAN and its forums should be strengthened in all ways possible where India can assist.
* India with its expanding economy and its linkages with the Asia-Pacific region made to emerge as an influential member of APEC. Vietnam?Ts support would be helpful.
* India and Vietnam should jointly work towards making the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) an effective mechanism in the Asia Pacific for confidence building measures (CBMs) preventive diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution. Besides keeping China engaged in multi-lateral forums, one could optimistically hope that China would submit itself and respect ARF formulations. So far it has opposed ARF efforts on the South China sea disputes.
On the last mentioned initiative both India and Vietnam can expect wide support from a number of Asia-Pacific nations harbouring similar apprehensions about China.
India and Vietnam- Cooperation in the economic spheres
Similar to the wide convergence of interests existing in the defence sphere the economic sphere too holds promising prospects for an India-Vietnam partnership. Vietnam after more than half-a-century of war-ravaged economy has embarked on a major economic re-construction programme. However, in terms of absorption of technologies for its industrial development, it does not require hitech inputs readily available from countries like Japan. It needs intermediate levels of technology. India is well placed to fill this slot and also assist in the development of industrial and economic infrastructure. Vietnam is not some backward nation that requires development from scratch, as some selected economic indicators below would indicate: 8
Current Account balance $ 0.7 bn
GDP Growth 4%
Per Capita GDP $ 1,775
Per Capita GNP $ 375
Reserves $ 2.1 bn
Exports last 12 months $ 10 bn
Population 82 mn
Population Growth 2.3%
Literacy 91.9%
India must encourage and induce its private sector to invest in the following fields in Vietnam:
* Automobiles
* Two Wheelers
* Telecommunications
* Information Technology
* Agro-tech Industries and fertiliser production
* Pharmaceuticals
* Electrical consumer appliances
* Railway construction and supply of engines/coaches
* Civil aviation
Vietnam is strongly placed to help India in the energy sector both in terms of oil supplies and further joint prospecting for oil and gas. India has adequate experience in oil and gas prospecting, especially in offshore deposits. In fact India could go in for special concessions in this field as it has reached with Iraq.
The recently launched Mekong Ganga Cooperation ( Nov 10, 2000 at Vientiane, capital of Laos) comprising India, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam aims to focus on cooperation in tourism, culture, education and communication. The scope could be expanded to trade and industry and economic cooperation.
Vietnam?Ts importance in South East Asia has suddenly increased strategically as well as economically. Vietnam seems well poised to emerge as the new economic hub of Asia Pacific luring Japanese and other investors. India should exploit its tra***ional relations with Vietnam to enlarge its economic ties. A militarily strong Vietnam, necessarily has to be an economically strong nation. India is well placed to assist Vietnam in both fields. Both nations could work out mutually beneficial incentives to expand trade and commerce and economic cooperation.
Conclusion
India and Vietnam are both geostrategically important countries, vital to all major nations with a stake in the freedom of high seas. Both countries share disputed borders with China and both have been subjected to military aggression by China. A highly proud and nationalistic country with rugged determination and plucky courage, Vietnam enjoys the unique distinction in the second half of the twentieth century of having inflicted military defeats on three major powers i.e. France, USA and China.
Current indicators in the Asia Pacific security environment point towards China?Ts emergence as a major strategic destabilising entity, bent on challenging United States predominance in the region. It also claims South and South East Asia as its natural and historical area of influence. China in its pursuance of its power aspirations stands guilty of strategically destabilising India?Ts and Vietnam?Ts neighbourhood i.e. Pakistan and Cambodia earlier. The changing international security environment also presents an ironic picture where Russia which earlier stood by India and Vietnam in terms of strategic needs, today is engaged in building up the military might and force projection capabilities of China- a threat perception common to both India and Vietnam.
In such a strategic environment, while making all efforts towards keeping China peacefully engaged in the Asia-Pacific, India and Vietnam should work towards building a bilateral strategic partnership based on the convergence of interests analysed above. Such a strategic partnership is in India?Ts national security interests and India should not fight shy of proclaiming it as such. Vietnam has already declared that it views its relations with India with "Strategic importance" . It is time India reciprocates the sentiment and no better occasion merits this than the forthcoming visit of Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee to Vietnam in January 2001.
2.1. 2001
Notes:
1. S.Prasamrajan . ?~Ahoy Hanoi: With India and Vietnam reviving old bonds, the chances of a strategic tie-up become stronger?T. India Today: November 20, 2000, New Delhi P 50.
2. J.N.Dixit, ?~Across Borders: Fifty years of India?Ts Foreign Policy?T , New Delhi, Picus Books,1998. P 91.
3. Ibid. P 174.
4. Ibid. P 408.
5. See Note 1.
6. Kent E. Calder, ?~Asia?Ts Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threatens to Destabilise Asia Pacific?T. London, Nicholas Brealy Publishing,1996, P 216.
7. Ibid.
8. Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec 22, 2000, P 56.





Được Nimbus_2000 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 13:05 ngày 21/12/2004

Cám ơn TimeBreak và n23 nhé.
Quả này có người chết có người bị thương roài.
Tớ là Female đấy, có người bảo tớ máy bay phản lực cất cánh như máy bay lên thẳng là phát minh của riêng tớ, thế có buồn không cơ chứ.
Lại 1 lần nữa cám ơn 2 cậu.
Ớ, nhưng mà tớ xem hình có phải cất cánh thẳng vèo 1 cái lên đâu, vẫn phải dùng đường băng mà?
Thế túm lại là sao đây nhờ?
Được CNN_Viahe sửa chữa / chuyển vào 17:16 ngày 21/12/2004

Tôn kính Mẹ Cha, yêu mến đàn bà
Bạn là FM, thế là tớ nhiệt tình liền mà
Vui tí thôi, CNN- Viahe về nói cái vị gì mà đang tranh luận ấy, vào mấy cái link vừa rồi mà xem!
Còn vị ấy mà đã không thể xem được hàng súng ống dùi cui thì bảo đi tìm đĩa "True Lie - Lời nói dối chân thật" về mà xem, sẽ thấy ngay !
Bọn V/STOL này hoàn toàn cất cánh thẳng đứng nhờ các ống phản lực có thể chọc thẳng xuống mặt đất, không hề cần đường băng! Mấy ảnh bạn xem có thể thấy nó hạ cánh trên đường băng của tàu sân bay đấy mà!
Đây, ở đây người ta định nghĩa về V/STOL đây, bạn cứ lôi cái này ra mà cho hắn "bị thương" nhé
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/V/STOL
V/STOL
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
V/STOL is an acronym for Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing. V/STOL aircraft can take-off or land vertically or on short runways. The Hawker Siddeley Harrier is perhaps the most famous production V/STOL airplane.
V/STOL has been replaced by STOVL in popularity because it reduces the amount of energy required to lift a fully laden aircraft from the ground.
Types of take-off and landing
CTOL - Conventional Take-Off and Landing
STOL - Short Take-Off and Landing
STOVL - Short Take-Off, Vertical Landing
VTOL - Vertical Take-Off and Landing (or VTOVL)
VTOHL - Vertical Take-Off, Horizontal Landing
V/STOL - Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing
STOBAR - Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery
JATO - Jet-Assisted Take-Off
RATO - Rocket-Assisted Take-Off

QuickLive - QuickLove
Được TimeBreak sửa chữa / chuyển vào 18:00 ngày 21/12/2004

Cám ơn TimeBreak.
Đồng chí kia cũng chỉ có thời gian xem hình ảnh và vì nhìn thấy cái đường băng nên khăng khăng là loại máy bay này do CNN phát minh ra.
Nhưng dù sao đi nữa đàn ông tranh luận với phụ nữ thắng cũng chả vẻ vang gì mà thua thì hơi xí hổ tí, nhờ.
Thế nên CNN cho qua vụ này, coi như chưa có tranh luận gì hết.
Cũng may là biết đường tìm đến đây để hỏi, thế là tiến bộ lắm rồi ý nhờ!
Chúc các đồng chí một mùa Giáng Sinh vui vẻ cùng người thân và bạn bè!

F-22 rơi gần Las Vegas
http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041220-084623-6913r.htm

Sáng định post bài đang up hình lên thì uỵch một phát IE báo lỗi chán hẳn ....

Hôm nọ vô tình đọc 1 quyển sách hình như là 10 vạn câu hỏi vì sao về lĩnh vực kỹ thuật quân sự có nói đến chuyện bọn Mĩ bây giờ đang phát triển lại các phi thuyền dùng để bảo vệ cho các tầu chiến từ trên không. Thấy trong quyển đấy nó miêu tả phi thuyền là khí cụ bay được nhờ các túi khí nhẹ hơn không khí ở xung quanh. Có anh nào cho em biết có loại vũ khí như vậy không, nếu có thì các anh có hình ảnh nào về nó không vậy

Các bạn có biết tên của loại máy bay mà không cần đường băng mà tự bay lên không.Nghe các bạn nói mà không biết nó tên là gì.Mong các bạn chỉ giáo

Em biết có mấy loại thôi:Sea Harrie của Anh hay Yak-141(?) của Nga.Các loại này dùng cho lực lượng Không quân của quân chủng Hải quân.Nó cất cánh nhờ động cơ phản lực dưới bụng(?).Em xem Sea Harrie cất cánh một lần trên truyền hình nên nghĩ vậy.
Còn một loại nữa là Trực thăng,không cần đường băng.Chỉ cần bãi đất rộng,phẳng là đủ rồi.

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Tên lửa Hellfire chủ yếu được bố trí trên máy bay trực thăng tấn công. Đài Loan quyết định đặt mua số vũ khí này có thể sẽ nâng cao được năng lực phối hợp tác nghiệp giữa quân đội Đài Loan với lục quân, thủy quân lục chiến và bộ đội đặc chủng quân đội Mỹ ở hải ngoại