Tình hình quân sự tại vịnh Persian

Kịch bản của thời báo Bưu Điện Anh quốc về Iran.

Russia on Iran?Ts Market for Arms
Mikhail Barabanov
Russiâ?Ts long-standing history of arms trade with Iran entered a new phase in the late 1980s with a series of agreements for the delivery of about $5.1 bln worth of arms.
The first agreement, signed on November 5, 1989, stipulated the delivery of 2 MiG-29 fighters and four MiG-29UB trainers, twelve SU-24MK tactical bombers and two S-200VE Vega-E (SA-5) long-range air defence missile systems for a total of $1.3 bln, most of which were received in 1990-1991. From 1990-1994 a set of R-27 (AA-10) and R-60MK (AA-8) air-to-air missiles were delivered for the MiG-29 fighters. The deal also provided for spare parts for 10 years from the date of the last delivery of equipment.
A second agreement, signed on May 17, 1990, was for the construction of Project 877EKM (Kilo-class) diesel-electric submarines and the delivery of related armaments and equipment. Built at the Admiralteyskie Verfi shipyard in St. Petersburg, the first two craft were delivered in 1992-1993. Another four were planned, but it seems that due to Iran?Ts financial troubles in the early nineties and, perhaps, pressure from the US, only one more submarine was delivered to Iran?Ts Navy in 1996. The provision of technical assistance for the construction of six bases for the submarines in Bender-Abbas was the subject of a third agreement reached on April 24, 1991. The total cost of these two projects reached $1.6 bln.
The fourth and the largest ($2.2 bln) contract was signed on November 13, 1991 for the licensed production in Iran of 1000 T72S tanks and 1500 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as ammunition and delivery of parts not licensed for production until 2011. Russia built the tank factory, which began production on July 8, 1997 in Dorud (Lurestan province),1 and the BMP-2 factory, which started work in 1998, in Tehran.2
Uralvagonzavod delivered 100 T-72S tanks to Iran in 1994 and another two in 1996 to fulfill an agreement signed in 1993,3 and from 1996 to 1999 delivered 300 T-72S kits to Dordud. The assembled tanks were first brought into service in July 1998.4 The Kurgansk machine building plant sent 80 BMP-2 in 1993 and another two in 1996, and then delivered 331 kits for licensed assembly in Tehran. Thus, from 1993-2000, Iran received 422 T-72S tanks and 413 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles for a total cost of $668 mln.5
There were only a few other miscellaneous projects following the collapse of the USSR. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, 115 Iraqi military aircraft were flown to Iran, where they were at first interned and then confiscated. It is thought that Russian companies delivered new engines and spare parts, and that Russian specialists were involved in the repair of the Soviet-made aircraft. In 1994 the Kazan helicopter plant delivered 12 Mi-17, and the Ulan-Ude aviation plant delivered five Mi-171 helicopters in civilian configuration from 1999-2000 in fulfilment of a contract signed in 1998.6
The Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum
The US objected to these sales from the start and aggressively lobbied the new, ?odemocratic? Russian leadership on this issue from 1992 onwards. The campaign was successful, and in May 1995 Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed on a plan whereby Russia would undertake to fulfill agreements already signed with Iran by the end of 1999, at which point it would cease all deliveries and servicing and would sign no further agreements on arms trade. This bilateral agreement took the form of a secret but infamous ?omemorandum? signed by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and US Vice-President Al Gore on June 20, 1995. The memorandum outlined further details regarding Russiâ?Ts obligations before the last delivery of military arms and equipment to Iran on December 31, 1999. For its part, the US agreed to respect the confidentiality of the agreement, to prevent the unsanctioned delivery of American arms from states of the Near and Middle East to Russiâ?Ts neighbours and to ramp up cooperation with Russia in the sphere of defence technologies with the goal of opening new markets for the products of both countries. 7
Thus, in exchange for important and concrete concessions, Russia received only a vague and empty declaration. In pursuing this unprecedented agreement, it appears that Yeltsin?Ts main objective was to secure US support for the forthcoming Presidential elections in 1996.
By the time the memorandum was signed, Russia had fulfilled only the first of the Iranian contracts: the one of November 5, 1989 for the delivery of aircraft and AD missile systems. The other three Soviet-Iranian agreements were annulled, as stipulated in the memorandum, by 2000, such that the total sum of deliveries under all four contracts was less than $3 bln. The November 1991 contract for the licensed production of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of was only 30% fulfilled: arms and equipment not sent included 578 T-72S and 1087 BMP-2 kits, technical documentation relating to the license, equipment, ammunition and services with a total value of over $1.5 bln. 8 The contract for the construction of submarines and docks was only about half-finished. Thus Russiâ?Ts total financial losses resulting from the memorandum exceeded $2.2 bln, while large factories like Uralvagonzavod and Kurganmash were deprived of large and, by the standards of the day, guaranteed orders that could have kept their workers busy until 2005.
The damage to Russiâ?Ts interests arising from the Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum was clear even to Yeltsin?Ts government, which sought immediately after the 1996 elections to revise its terms. In 1997 the President signed off on a comprehensive plan to renew arms trade cooperation with Iran, which included among other things a directive to engage the US to enlarge the framework of the Memorandum and eliminate limitations on arms trade cooperation with Iran. 9
It should be noted that the Americans soon provided Russia with very good legal grounds to revise their agreement, insofar as the US showed no interest whatsoever in increasing its cooperation with Russia in the area of defence technologies or helping Russia gain market access. With the departure from the political scene of the Russian initiators of the Memorandum, and after its existence was disclosed during the course of the US presidential campaign in 2000, Russia announced on November 3, 2000 that it intended to withdraw from the agreement and resume deliveries of military arms and equipment to Iran as of December 1, 2000. After some informal discussion, the Americans agreed with this decision while calling on Russia to display restraint in its deliveries of conventional arms to Iran. 10 One might conclude that the formula of ?orestraint? signals a more detailed modus vivendi reached between Russia and the US on this issue.
The Current State of Arms Trade Cooperation with Iran
The demise of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum led the Russian media and expert community to offer extremely optimistic scenarios for the renewal of arms sales to Iran. The figure of $7 bln in potential orders, first mentioned by the current chair of the Duma defence committee, was cited over and over again. Following Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev?Ts visit to Tehran in December 2000, the press reported on alleged Iranian interest in aviation and air defence purchases.
However, these expectations were disappointed, and not because of any America plotting, but by the Iranians themselves. From the information currently available, it seems that deliveries of kits for the licensed production of T-72S tanks and BMP-2 combat vehicles never did resume. There was a report in early 2003 of a new contract for the delivery of 300 BMP-2 from Kurganmash to Iran in 2004, 11 but these deliveries have not in fact occurred to the present day. Thus the chapter of Russiâ?Ts arms trade cooperation with Iran that began with the late-Soviet period agreements seems to be finished.
The signing of an agreement on Arms Trade Cooperation between the defence ministers of Russia and Iran on October 2, 2001 did not lead to the breakthrough that some people in Moscow wished so badly to see. For the past five years Iran has limited its purchases to a few inexpensive aviation products. In April 2001, Iran agreed to purchase 21 Mi-171 transport helicopters from the Ulan-Ude aviation plant and these were delivered in full by January 2002. 12 In late 2001 - early 2002, reports of a new contract worth $150 mln for the purchase of 30 Mi-171Sh multi-role military transport helicopters armed with the 9M114 Shturm (AT-6) anti-tank guided missile were published. The helicopters were to be built at the Ulan-Ude aviation plant in 2002-2003. 13 However, in January 2005 a representative of this company said that since 1998 they had delivered to Iran only 38 Mi-171, which, counting deliveries made under the contracts of 1998 and 2001, allows one to conclude that only 12 Mi-171Sh were delivered. At the same time, in 2000-2001, the Ulan-Ude plant began talks on a project to organize the licensed assembly of Mi-171 on the bases of Iranian enterprise IHSRC but these negotiations ultimately failed to produce an agreement. 14 For its part the Kazan helicopter plant delivered three Mi-17V-5 with VK-2500 engines to the Iranian Red Crescent in March 2005. 15
The Ulan-Ude plant delivered three Su-25UBK ground-attack fighter-trainers to Iran in 2003, and signed a contract for the sale of three double-seat Su-25UBT ground attack fighters. 16 Russia has also sent specialists to assist with the development of a few types of aviation equipment.
The civilian space sector is another area that has seen some activity. In October 2005 the first Iranian remote earth sensing satellite Sinah-1 (ZS-1) was launched from Plesetsk. The spacecraft was developed by the Omsk Polyot design bureau and an Iranian institute of applied research on a contract managed by Rosoboroneksport for $8 mln. The Russian research-production association of applied mechanics in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk, is working on the Zoreh geostationary communications satellite. The cost of this project as of January 2005 had already reached $132 mln and is planned for launch at Baykonur in 2007. 17
Table 1. Identified contracts for military and dual-use arms and equipment (not including civilian planes) to Iran from Russia concluded after 2000
Contents of the contract

Producer or supplier

Cost ($ mln)

Date of contract

Schedule of delivery

Notes
21 Mi-171 transport helicopters

Ulan-Ude aviation plant

100 (estimate)

April 2001

Late 2001 ?" Early 2002


12 Mi171Sh military transport helicopters

Ulan-Ude aviation plant

60 (estimate)

End of 2001

2002 ?" 2003

By some accounts, delivery of 30 helicopters was planned.
Development and launch of the Sinah-1 (ZS-1), a small remote earth sensing satellite

Polyot research production association,

8 (development)
+
1.6 (launch)

2001

Launched in October 2005


3 Su-25UBK ground attack fighter-trainers

Ulan-Ude aviation plant

30 (estimate)

2003

2003


Krasnopol 155 mm laser-guided artillery shells

Tula Instrument Design Bureau

*

*

2003 (?)

Reports of delivery denied by officials.
3 Mi-17B-5 medical helicopters

Kazan helicopter plant

15 (estimate)

*

March 2005

For the .
Development of the Zohreh, a geostationary telecommunications satellite

Research Production Association of applied mechanics, Zheleznogorsk

132

January 2005

Launch planned for 2007


3 Su-25UBK ground attack fighter trainers

Ulan-Ude aviation plant

*

2005

2006

Possible that what really is in question is the Su-25UBT, rather than the Su-25UBK.
Repair and modernization of 3 Project 877EKM submarines for the Iranian Navy

Zvezdochka shipbuilding plant, Severodvinsk

*

2005 (?)

Work in on one submarine began in 2005

The subs reportedly may be equipped with the Club-S system.
29 Tor-M1 air defence missile systems

Kupol electromechanical plant, Izhevsk

700

December 2005

2006

According to other sources, 32 systems.
Repair and modernization of MiG-29 and Su-24 fighters for the Iranian Air Force, and the delivery of an escort cutter

*

700

December 2005

*


In other sectors, military sales to Iran to the end of 2005 were limited to deliveries of spare parts and ammunition, the servicing and repair of previously sold equipment, as well as the negotiation of a few insignificant contracts that are rarely mentioned in the press. Thus, in August 2003, the US announced that it was introducing sanctions against the Tula Instrument Design Bureau for providing Iran with 155 mm Krasnopol-M laser-guided artillery projectiles. The Russian company denied the accusation,18 and a highly-placed source from within the Russian Arms Trade Cooperation Committee then said that ?oRussia currently has not a single contract with Iran.? 19 News spread in the summer of 2005 that work to repair and modernize Iranian Project 887EKM submarines equipped with Club-S missile systems (probably with 3M54E1 anti-ship missiles SS-N-27) would take place both in Russia and Iran. According to some reports, the repair of one ship has already begun in Iran with the participation of the Russian Zvezdochka shipyard. One might suppose that the contract for the other two submarines would be given to the Admiralteyskie Verfi shipyard, but no information is yet available. 20
The total value of contracts concluded with Iran from 2000 to 2005 can be estimated at approximately $300-400 mln (not counting the space contracts), and even then the bulk of this sum is due to the delivery of principally dual-use helicopters. This rather stagnant scenario was suddenly interrupted on 2nd December 2005 with news of a contract for the delivery of 29 Tor-M1 (SA-15) low-to-medium altitude air defence missile systems for about $700 mln. Reportedly, 19 of these systems had already been prepared for an option held but not realized by Greece, and the rest would be built from scratch. It was also affirmed that Iran had contracted for 32, not 29 air defence systems: 16 self-propelled (from among those destined for Greece) and 16 towed (a modification developed to Iranian specifications). Russia will also reportedly deliver a patrol cutter to the Iranian Navy, and modernize the Iranian Su-24MK and MiG-29 fighters for a total price of approximately $1.4 bln. 21
At first it was announced that the Tor-M1 systems would be delivered to Iran in 2009. However, by the end of December a Russian Defense Ministry representative said that deliveries would begin in January 2006 and conclude within a year. 22 ARMS-TASS reported that pre-contractual discussions had also touched upon possible deliveries of the S-300PMU1 (SA-10) air defence missile systems and the Nebo, Kasta, Gamma and Polyana air-defense radars. Iran also reportedly showed an interest in acquiring T-90S tanks and the Nona-K 120 mm towed gun. 23
By the middle of December 2005, citing to a source within the Federal Agency for Arms Trade Cooperation, the press noted an agreement for the sale to Iran of the Pechora-2A air defence missile system, a radical modernization of the old S-125M (SA-3), adding that deliveries could begin as early as the second quarter of 2006. The source also asserted that the Iranians ?oare determined to renew negotiations on deliveries of the S-300.? 24 However, by early 2006 Russian officials had repeatedly and firmly refuted reports of any negotiations with Iran for the delivery of the S-300PMU1. 25 In any case, for fear of spoiling relations with the US, the Russian government would hardly sell such modern and high-altitude systems like the S-300PMU1, especially in view of the current crisis over Iran?Ts nuclear program. And so for this reason the Iranians were offered either the short-altitude Tor-M1 or the Pechora-2A, essentially the improved version of an obsolete system. Thus, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russiâ?Ts arms trade cooperation with Iran has to a large degree been determined by the position of the US and undermined by inability of the ?onew Russiâ? to conduct a truly independent foreign and defence policy. In hindsight, Russiâ?Ts exit from the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and the limited renewal of defence contacts with Iran that followed (always with a sideways glance to the US), is not so much a demonstration of independence, as the Kremlin was keen to emphasize at the time, but rather a graphic demonstration of the real limits of that ?oindependencê?. From this point of view, Moscow?Ts measured and restrained approach to military sales to Iran is indeed an appropriate response to the political realities of the times.