Topic phục vụ việc dọn dẹp box KTQS

Em tìm hiểu lại thì hình như không phải MiG-29 đâu các bác ạ ! Có nhiều khả năng con MiG " mới " mà ta nói ở trên chỉ là loại MiG-21 93 thôi, loại update của MiG-21 ấy ! Nhưng con này cũng ngon hơn MiG-21 cũ nhiều.

Đâu mà!
chương trình nâng đời mig 21 lên mig 21-93 thực hiện xong lâu rồi, từ đầu năm ngoái thì phải!

Giả sử có như thế thì từ lúc nâng cấp xong đến lúc đưa vào trực chiến {vào ban bay ý } cũng rất lâu và như thế thì phù hợp với thông tin trên quá còn gì hả bác ?

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<Kanwa news May 2nd 2004> The first 956EM DDG that the Russian Severnaya Verf Shipbuilding Plant built for China was launched on April 27, 2004. At the launching ceremony, all western reporters were refused to cover the event. Kanwa information Centre has released the exclusive photos of 956EM DDG under launching.
In Kanwa Information Centre''''s "Report on Russia-China Cooperation in Naval Technology" released in June 2003, Kanwa exposed for the first time that 956EM DDG would be fitted with the 240km-ranged 3M80MBE upgraded version SSM.
Recently, Kanwa had an exclusive interview with an authority from the Russian Federation military industry. The source iterated that as a member of western democratic countries, Russia has been abiding all the international laws and agreements in its military cooperation with China. At the same time, Russia also gave sufficient consideration to the significance of maintaining regional strategic power balance. For Russia, the military cooperation programs with China were all business deals in nature, similar to its cooperation with other countries. There was no secrecy whatsoever. It was China that demanded Russia to keep the secrets concerning all the military cooperative projects between the two countries, and Russia respected the positions of its clients.
When talking about Russia''''s reservations in its sales of some of the weapon systems to China, he stressed that as mentioned above, Russia had to give sufficient consideration to the significance of maintaining regional strategic military balance. In ad***ion, all western powers have their own reservation in similar deals with other countries, and they would not sell the most cutting-edge technologies and arms to other countries. So is it with Russia, even if it is India, a country who is tra***ionally a friend of Russia. However, he also reiterated that the outside world exaggerated Russia''''s reservation in its arms sales to China. As a matter fact, he said, "3M80MBE is a best example. This is the SSM system for export with the longest range except the BRAHAMS SSM jointly developed by Russia and India, and the naval version BRAHMA SSM is not yet in effective service. Meanwhile, China is also the first country to obtain naval RIF SAM". He stressed that with the rapid progress in military technologies, the overall technological standard of Russia''''s export arms to China will rise even further.
On the other hand, sources from the Chinese and Taiwan military industries also told Kanwa on different occasions that due to the complexity of the current international situation and the existing strengths and realities of the two sides, there were indeed areas of military cooperation with foreign countries which were not transparent to the world. Both China and Taiwan would appreciate the understanding of outside world.

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Nghe các bác nói về Brahmos này nhiều quá, không biết NC đã có được thứ này chủa nhỉ ?
Nếu có thứ này, đặt trên mấy cái đảo ở cát dài mà ngắm nghía thì... bố thằng nào dám vác Sovremenny ra đó để làm bia cho NC ngắm bắn.
Hehehe

Topic phục vụ việc dọn dẹp box KTQS

temp

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4473
Both Southeast Asia and the US have to adjust to China''s rising star
''LET him who tied the bell on the tiger take it off - whoever started the trouble should end it.'' That was how China''s ambassador to Singapore recently asked his host country to repair the ties damaged by a Singapore leader''s visit to Taiwan.
Although Singapore has maintained unofficial ties with Taiwan since it normalised relations with Beijing in 1990, the Chinese ambassador said he was ''shocked, disappointed and baffled'' by then deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong''s unofficial visit to Taipei. Mr Lee was about to take over as Prime Minister.
In the larger scheme of things, this may prove to be a passing cloud, but the incident puts in sharp relief a remarkable transformation of Chinese power in the region.
How China will be wielding its newly acquired power in the coming months and years will be keenly watched in South-east Asia. Will China''s rise be as peaceful as Beijing claims, or will it give in to the temptation of throwing its weight around?
Ever since South-east Asia emerged out of the tumultuous post-World War II decades, it has had to deal with problems of development, ethnic strife, and the threat of Maoist insurgency. Yet since the 1980s, the region has also emerged as a dynamic economy, and a reform-minded China has grown into an economic dynamo and the region''s potential great power.
Over the last 15 years or so, China''s gross domestic product has grown at annual rates of around 9 per cent, with a large swathe of the coast from Hainan to Shanghai producing rates that are even higher.
This, in turn, has supported annual double-digit increases in military expen***ures. Growing armed forces budgets have been broadly committed to a programme of military modernisation and professionalisation, with a heavy emphasis on modern technology and personnel sufficiently educated to use it.
Expert observers foresee a Chinese military capable of projecting force on a sustained basis beyond China''s coastal periphery within 10-20 years. By any measure, China has emerged with startling suddenness as a regional great power still in the early stages of its ascent.
It is an axiom of realpolitik that policy and strategy must be based on the capabilities of other actors - particularly rivals and potential adversaries. While any precise measure of China''s national capabilities will be elusive, the trend and the potential are quite clear. China''s capabilities are multi-dimensional: economic, military, and increasingly diplomatic and political.
The days of rigid, ideologically strident Chinese ''diplomacy'' have long since been superseded by a cosmopolitan sophistication that would do the late Zhou Enlai proud. The growth of Chinese power assumes added significance from the fact that for the first time since the height of the Ming Dynasty, China is without any threat from its tra***ional strategic rivals: Russia and Japan.
Beijing has the strategic luxury of exerting power to its south without fearing for the security of its northern, western and eastern borders. Finally, for South-east Asia, Chinese power has an ad***ional potential dimension - the presence of large (and economically potent) ethnic Chinese populations in almost every major urban centre.
Capabilities are one thing; intentions are another. Here the crystal ball suddenly becomes very murky. Chinese officials have been very insistent that China''s intentions towards South-east Asia are entirely benign - nothing other than to join with the region in a common endeavour of economic development and regional peace and security.
Beijing has energetically pushed trade and investment ties, including a centrepiece China-Asean free-trade agreement. Bilateral framework agreements for cooperation on multiple fronts have been negotiated with every South-east Asian government.
Political and diplomatic interactions at all levels have become a regular, even daily, feature of the news. Also Beijing has made clear its desire to extend cooperation into the security sphere.
China has become a primary supplier of economic and military assistance to Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. Meanwhile, Chinese officials and scholars seek to allay unease by noting that the tra***ional tribute system of China''s imperial past was, by Western standards, quite benign.
Nevertheless, doubts arise on several grounds.
First, history strongly suggests that when new great powers arise, the implications for smaller or weaker nations on their periphery are not always pleasant. Examples include Germany and Central Europe, Japan and East Asia, Russia and Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the United States and Latin America.
It remains to be seen whether China is uniquely immune to the temptations of state power.
Secondly, as Maoism and Marxism have lost their ideological appeal, the Chinese leadership has turned to nationalism to legitimise authoritarian rule. This has included a comprehensive programme of state-sponsored patriotism in the schools and mass media nurturing a sense of Chinese victimisation (''a hundred years of humiliation'') at the hands of the West.
In recent years, these powerful emotions have focused on Taiwan and the notion that the US and Japan allegedly stole China''s national patrimony.
Territorial irredentism is a potent political force, and there are growing fears that Beijing, against all sane counsel, could actually resort to force against Taiwan. In 1992, the Chinese People''s Congress codified in legislation Beijing''s claim that the South China Sea is rightfully the sovereign territory of China. Since the flare-up in the Mischief Reef dispute in the mid-1990s, China has soft-pedalled its claims. But it has not disavowed them and continues to strengthen outposts in the Spratley Islands.
Another sign that Beijing is concerned with more than economic growth is the hawkish language used by Chinese academics. Officially-sanctioned Chinese scholars characterise US strategic intentions towards China as ''encirclement'' and ''strangulation''. They identify South-east Asia as the weak link in this chain and the point where China can break through and defeat American-attempted ''containment''.
In private, Chinese diplomats have been known to use the Churchillian phrase ''soft underbelly'' to refer to South-east Asia.
On yet another front, China''s ambitious programme for harnessing and exploiting the Mekong River will have an important side effect, intended or otherwise: Downstream states, like Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, will be hostage to Chinese decisions concerning water flow. The Mekong is as much the economic life-blood for these nations as the Nile is for Egypt.
Finally, the very agreements and linkages with South-east Asia that Beijing cites as evidence of benign intent may also be seen as a web designed to tie these states to China. Contemporary Myanmar comes close to fitting the profile of a Chinese client state. When Mr Lee visited Taiwan, a semi-official commentator from Beijing promised that Singapore would pay ''a huge price'' for such temerity.
What emerges from this picture is a multifaceted strategic challenge to South-east Asia.
Chinese diplomats have worked assiduously and successfully to portray that challenge as opportunity and not threat. Recent public opinion polling shows clear evidence of their success. China registers favourably with people throughout most of South-east Asia. This coincides with a precipitous drop in favourable opinions of the US since the advent of the Iraq war.
The durability of these sentiments is a question. What is certain, however, is that growing Chinese power must be at the centre of any regional security strategy formulated by the South-east Asian states - and by the US.
Marvin Ott is Professor of National Security Policy at the National War College in Washington, DC. The views expressed are the author''s and not necessarily those of the United States Department of Defense.