Trang bị "đồ chơi" gì khi ta là con nhà nghèo ?

Bác cần tên lửa à. Qua bên Ấn Độ mà mua. Ấn Độ đang chuổn bị bán tên lửa Brahmos cho những nước tin cậy nhất. Tặng bác nào trong đây 1 chai bia nếu chụp được tấm hình tên lửa này ở NC.
Ten Countries Show Interest in Brahmos Missile


(Source: Times of India News network; issued Dec. 14, 2004)
© Times of India News Network


PUNE, India --- As many as 10 countries have shown interest in Brahmos ?" the new generation supersonic cruise missile ?" jointly developed by India and Russia, and have made enquiries about the possibility of acquiring them, a senior official from the defence research and development organisation (DRDO) said, adding that at least three "trusted nations" have been short-listed by both the countries.

When contacted, A Sivathanu Pillai, the CEO and managing director of Brahmos Aerospace ?" the Indo-Russian joint venture company ?" besides being the chief controller (research and development) of Defence and Research Organisation (DRDO), only said the export of Brahmos will be strictly restricted to friendly third-world countries.

"We have received enquiries from some countries, but it won''t be proper to disclose any names at this stage," he said, adding that both the governments would take a necessary decision as deemed fit.

While pointing out that the 290 km-range cruise missile ?" that can be launched from a variety of land, sea, sub-sea or air-based platforms ?" is already proving to be hit amongst many nations, senior DRDO officials said a decision to import will be taken only after seriously considering the security aspects of both nations.

"Both the Russian and Indian governments have decided that only those countries which can be trusted buy both sides will be considered for importing the missile," a scientist working at one of the DRDO labs said.

It may be recalled here that DRDO had recently test-fired the naval version of Brahmos, while efforts are now on to develop a similar version, capable of being launched from an aircraft.

While Brahmos Aerospace already has a tie-up with Russia''s Rosoboronexport State Corporation to globally market Brahmos for both naval and air platforms, officials said a plan on joint export promotion of Brahmos has already been prepared and submitted to both the governments for approval.

The plan was prepared by Pillai and Andrey Beliyaninov, the director-general of Rosoboronexport, besides another senior member," a DRDO official said, adding that the matter was also discussed during Russian president Vladimir Putin''s recent visit to India, and has also been given the go-ahead.

The plan envisages undertaking joint marketing activities, aimed at promotion of Brahmos to foreign countries.

vài bài phân tích về vũ khí của tương lai là máy nhìn ban đêm và thiết bị thông tin
Industry Glances through the Eyes of the Warfighter: Night Vision 2004


(Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued Dec. 7, 2004)


This year?Ts Night Vision 2004 conference started off with a bang as image-intensified and thermally-imaged gun camera footage of Baghdad?Ts ?~Ambush Alley?T and RAF air operations over al-Samarra brought industry representatives a fresh view of the challenges inherent for airborne strike package in Iraq?Ts MOUT-FIBUA environment.

In a civilian-populated urban warfare environment this can be lethal. The ?~blooming effect?T of non-NVD compliant anti-collision and navigational lights on air-to-air refuelling tankers as well as streetlights, domestic lighting and shops reduce the ability of air personnel to positively identify and engage hostiles. Blooming and FLIR limitations were not only on the minds of air personnel ?" US Army Colonel Wade Jost and UK Army Major Simon Nias spoke to the need for a one-to-one night vision capability.

From the US side, the need to have all troops trained in night-fighting was only augmented by the need for more advanced, higher-resolution monocular and binocular devices. Operations analysis of MOUT-FIBUA combat has indicated that to positively identify and engage hostiles, greater resolution is needed. While this is QED from the first Gulf War, current sensor fusion technology may make this a reality.

ITT?Ts ENVG is one of a small number of fused I2/TI devices. While this technology is available at the platform sensor level, it is not yet feasible to lower the costs from some $16,500 to the $1,300-$1,500 range of the AN/PVS-14 commonly used by US Forces.

Currently, for instance the UK is hampered in its deployment capability as the armoured brigade?Ts worth of night vision devices (NVD) in Iraq is only now being replaced with ruggardised, military-standard kit. As this equipment is rotated, it will need to be repaired and brought up to MOD standard, thus removing a large number of NVD units from service. This poses a significant problem as UK policy undertakes an ever-larger number of deployment situations, all of which require the ability to effectively operate in a nocturnal environment.

Polemically, such a reduction in price would only come with substantial uptake by cost-sensitive military procurement agencies. Like a dog chasing its tail, this logic get no where fast. Thus crystal ball-gazing industry professionals and procurement officers would be warned of the risks of investing in this technology.

One solution advocated by DEP?Ts Jan van Spyker is the effective standardization through industrialisation of core technological components. By creating such a ?~core?T or ?~trunk?T, industry would be able to invest such savings in experimental fusion technology. Industrial cooperation in the NATO/EU area does make sense, however it may not be able to offer effective alternatives to cost issues or provide a sufficiently tailored solution to MOD requirements. Sweden, for instance, operates in effective co-determination with Insight Technology, as operations in the far North are complicated by high levels of ambient atmospheric electromagnetic activity (ie, the aurora borealis). By creating such dynamic feedback loop, the Swedish MOD and Insight Technology benefit from the experience and lessons learned from Northern operations and can thus tailor NVD resolution to the environment.

Another solution is simply supplying enhanced Gen II tubes from a country with lower production costs. Thus Canada?Ts Newcon Optik incorporates Russian technology into its product under a special licensing agreement with Rosobronexport. This may prove an intriguing proposition for forces whose financial constraints clash with their doctrinal requirements. Although MODs are obviously keen on sustaining local industry, the combination of domestically produced image intensifiers with imported tubes should more than pique the interest of the cost-conscious procurement officer.

Thus drivers and restraints for NVD acquisition since 1991 are very much unchanged; however Night Vision 2004 has allowed military end-users to throw down the gauntlet to industry for economical NVD solutions.

The major restraint for MOD procurement of leading-edge NVDs remains cost. If smaller producers want *****rvive, costs will need to decline. Thus the question remains how industry will respond ?" by cooperation, co-determination or component substitution. (ends)





Simply Put: "''Comms'' is the Key"


(Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued Dec. 7, 2004)


Vision 2004 brings into relief the need for high-volume, high-density data transmission in the US and UK within the next four years.

To paraphrase the US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence (Advanced Systems & Concepts), military and policy planners need to co-operate to break through the mould of tra***ional thinking and partner with industry to create durable open-architecture solutions for the warfighter.

As US and UK ISTARs (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) programmes are implemented at the formation level, NATO AGS gains steam, and the NATO Reaction Force becomes a deployable reality, the need for sufficient data-transmission means will become a pressing issue.

Fighting in the MOUT/FIBUA environment causes significant problems to the warfighter and his commanders. Indeterminate hostile location, a three-dimensional battlespace and the profusion of non-military actors require a ?~joint?T effort to fuse communications and battlespace sensor data from diffuse sources and provide them to combat commanders in a readily accessible format.

As coalition operations are the sine qua non of present-day military operations differing technologies, different standard operating procedures and communications security standards prove a major obstacle to the effective interoperability of forces. While ?~purple?T or joint operations within one military are often complicated by disparities between combat management systems.

Creating joint ISTARs concepts is a daunting task as service operational requirements may conflict with the imperative for creating a joint and common operating picture. As Patrick Beazley (DPA) explained, creating a common vocabulary between services (and for the services) is crucial to fully integrating command support information systems. As network-enabled capability is set to become a reality by 2010, an information infrastructure has to be established now that will grow with the requirements of advanced C2 and combat systems.

With the current rate of data transfer required for network-enhanced operations in Iraq, the creation of systems that are highly-sophisticated and can create must be con***ioned on the creation of a system ?~open?T enough for less-technologically savvy units to ?~plug in?T. This is attenuated by the need to deal with allies whose level of technological sophistication maybe significantly lower. Systems architects must therefore be wary of the pace at which they seek to evolve, as the risk of creating an interoperability gap between more and less advanced NATO forces.

In this respect, a communications architecture that takes ?~lesser-developed?T allies is the key to interoperability. Speakers at Shephard?Ts Vision 2004 impressed upon the audience that if NATO is to establish itself as a ?~security provider?T into the 21st century, then the need to build in the ability to function with regional coalition partners in out-of-area operations must extend past skeletal liaison operations.

Solutions to the ISTAR challenge are not easy. They require what RAF Air Commodores Chris Nickols and Julian Thompson dubbed a ?~cultural change?T in the understanding of how commanders view the collection and dissemination of information as well as a nuanced understanding of how to guide advanced concept development. In this respect policy planning and military CONOPS development must operate in parallel to provide a joint and combined vision to enable the warfighter to effectively utilise ISTARs to pierce the fog of war and provide greater battlefield situational awareness.

Nevertheless, network-centric aspirations are for naught if force communications capability does not build in sufficient flexibility to inter-operate with advanced allies and in the context of peace support operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and civil defence and emergency, with less technologically adept forces.

vài bài phân tích về vũ khí của tương lai là máy nhìn ban đêm và thiết bị thông tin
Industry Glances through the Eyes of the Warfighter: Night Vision 2004


(Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued Dec. 7, 2004)


This year?Ts Night Vision 2004 conference started off with a bang as image-intensified and thermally-imaged gun camera footage of Baghdad?Ts ?~Ambush Alley?T and RAF air operations over al-Samarra brought industry representatives a fresh view of the challenges inherent for airborne strike package in Iraq?Ts MOUT-FIBUA environment.

In a civilian-populated urban warfare environment this can be lethal. The ?~blooming effect?T of non-NVD compliant anti-collision and navigational lights on air-to-air refuelling tankers as well as streetlights, domestic lighting and shops reduce the ability of air personnel to positively identify and engage hostiles. Blooming and FLIR limitations were not only on the minds of air personnel ?" US Army Colonel Wade Jost and UK Army Major Simon Nias spoke to the need for a one-to-one night vision capability.

From the US side, the need to have all troops trained in night-fighting was only augmented by the need for more advanced, higher-resolution monocular and binocular devices. Operations analysis of MOUT-FIBUA combat has indicated that to positively identify and engage hostiles, greater resolution is needed. While this is QED from the first Gulf War, current sensor fusion technology may make this a reality.

ITT?Ts ENVG is one of a small number of fused I2/TI devices. While this technology is available at the platform sensor level, it is not yet feasible to lower the costs from some $16,500 to the $1,300-$1,500 range of the AN/PVS-14 commonly used by US Forces.

Currently, for instance the UK is hampered in its deployment capability as the armoured brigade?Ts worth of night vision devices (NVD) in Iraq is only now being replaced with ruggardised, military-standard kit. As this equipment is rotated, it will need to be repaired and brought up to MOD standard, thus removing a large number of NVD units from service. This poses a significant problem as UK policy undertakes an ever-larger number of deployment situations, all of which require the ability to effectively operate in a nocturnal environment.

Polemically, such a reduction in price would only come with substantial uptake by cost-sensitive military procurement agencies. Like a dog chasing its tail, this logic get no where fast. Thus crystal ball-gazing industry professionals and procurement officers would be warned of the risks of investing in this technology.

One solution advocated by DEP?Ts Jan van Spyker is the effective standardization through industrialisation of core technological components. By creating such a ?~core?T or ?~trunk?T, industry would be able to invest such savings in experimental fusion technology. Industrial cooperation in the NATO/EU area does make sense, however it may not be able to offer effective alternatives to cost issues or provide a sufficiently tailored solution to MOD requirements. Sweden, for instance, operates in effective co-determination with Insight Technology, as operations in the far North are complicated by high levels of ambient atmospheric electromagnetic activity (ie, the aurora borealis). By creating such dynamic feedback loop, the Swedish MOD and Insight Technology benefit from the experience and lessons learned from Northern operations and can thus tailor NVD resolution to the environment.

Another solution is simply supplying enhanced Gen II tubes from a country with lower production costs. Thus Canada?Ts Newcon Optik incorporates Russian technology into its product under a special licensing agreement with Rosobronexport. This may prove an intriguing proposition for forces whose financial constraints clash with their doctrinal requirements. Although MODs are obviously keen on sustaining local industry, the combination of domestically produced image intensifiers with imported tubes should more than pique the interest of the cost-conscious procurement officer.

Thus drivers and restraints for NVD acquisition since 1991 are very much unchanged; however Night Vision 2004 has allowed military end-users to throw down the gauntlet to industry for economical NVD solutions.

The major restraint for MOD procurement of leading-edge NVDs remains cost. If smaller producers want *****rvive, costs will need to decline. Thus the question remains how industry will respond ?" by cooperation, co-determination or component substitution. (ends)





Simply Put: "''Comms'' is the Key"


(Source: Frost & Sullivan; issued Dec. 7, 2004)


Vision 2004 brings into relief the need for high-volume, high-density data transmission in the US and UK within the next four years.

To paraphrase the US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence (Advanced Systems & Concepts), military and policy planners need to co-operate to break through the mould of tra***ional thinking and partner with industry to create durable open-architecture solutions for the warfighter.

As US and UK ISTARs (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) programmes are implemented at the formation level, NATO AGS gains steam, and the NATO Reaction Force becomes a deployable reality, the need for sufficient data-transmission means will become a pressing issue.

Fighting in the MOUT/FIBUA environment causes significant problems to the warfighter and his commanders. Indeterminate hostile location, a three-dimensional battlespace and the profusion of non-military actors require a ?~joint?T effort to fuse communications and battlespace sensor data from diffuse sources and provide them to combat commanders in a readily accessible format.

As coalition operations are the sine qua non of present-day military operations differing technologies, different standard operating procedures and communications security standards prove a major obstacle to the effective interoperability of forces. While ?~purple?T or joint operations within one military are often complicated by disparities between combat management systems.

Creating joint ISTARs concepts is a daunting task as service operational requirements may conflict with the imperative for creating a joint and common operating picture. As Patrick Beazley (DPA) explained, creating a common vocabulary between services (and for the services) is crucial to fully integrating command support information systems. As network-enabled capability is set to become a reality by 2010, an information infrastructure has to be established now that will grow with the requirements of advanced C2 and combat systems.

With the current rate of data transfer required for network-enhanced operations in Iraq, the creation of systems that are highly-sophisticated and can create must be con***ioned on the creation of a system ?~open?T enough for less-technologically savvy units to ?~plug in?T. This is attenuated by the need to deal with allies whose level of technological sophistication maybe significantly lower. Systems architects must therefore be wary of the pace at which they seek to evolve, as the risk of creating an interoperability gap between more and less advanced NATO forces.

In this respect, a communications architecture that takes ?~lesser-developed?T allies is the key to interoperability. Speakers at Shephard?Ts Vision 2004 impressed upon the audience that if NATO is to establish itself as a ?~security provider?T into the 21st century, then the need to build in the ability to function with regional coalition partners in out-of-area operations must extend past skeletal liaison operations.

Solutions to the ISTAR challenge are not easy. They require what RAF Air Commodores Chris Nickols and Julian Thompson dubbed a ?~cultural change?T in the understanding of how commanders view the collection and dissemination of information as well as a nuanced understanding of how to guide advanced concept development. In this respect policy planning and military CONOPS development must operate in parallel to provide a joint and combined vision to enable the warfighter to effectively utilise ISTARs to pierce the fog of war and provide greater battlefield situational awareness.

Nevertheless, network-centric aspirations are for naught if force communications capability does not build in sufficient flexibility to inter-operate with advanced allies and in the context of peace support operations, humanitarian assistance missions, and civil defence and emergency, with less technologically adept forces.

Tui đưa cái này lên cho các bạn coi;
Vietnam in the arms queue
Meanwhile, Moscow still supplies arms to some of its Cold War Era allies in Asia. For instance, last August Russia clinched a deal to export to Vietnam two S300 PMU1 air defense batteries (or 12 launchers) for a reported nearly $300 million. The S300 PMU is an advanced version of the SA-10C Grumble air defense missile.
Though Vietnam is now fully integrated into the Southeast Asian community, Hanoi still arms its military with Russian weapons. In March 2001, Putin visited Hanoi and announced a new strategic partnership with Vietnam. The Russian leader said that "Vietnam needs not just to maintain its existing weapons bought from the Soviet Union and Russia but also needs modern weapons".
Bilateral military ties are set to go ahead because Hanoi seeks to modernize its half-million strong armed forces, and Vietnam remains an important customer for Russian arms. In 1995, Hanoi bought six Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter jets for $150 million and in 1997 signed a contract for six more planes and spare parts. In recent years, the Vietnamese military also bought six missile boats from the "1241 project" for some $120 million as well as four radar stations in Russia.
The Russians also suggested the Vietnamese purchase more Sukhois and consider buying another jetfighter, the MiG-29, as well as MiG training jets. In December 2003, Moscow and Hanoi reportedly clinched a $120 million deal involving supply of four Su-30MKKs to Vietnam.
Vậy là chúng ta cũng có rađa ngon đó hen

Tui đưa cái này lên cho các bạn coi;
Vietnam in the arms queue
Meanwhile, Moscow still supplies arms to some of its Cold War Era allies in Asia. For instance, last August Russia clinched a deal to export to Vietnam two S300 PMU1 air defense batteries (or 12 launchers) for a reported nearly $300 million. The S300 PMU is an advanced version of the SA-10C Grumble air defense missile.
Though Vietnam is now fully integrated into the Southeast Asian community, Hanoi still arms its military with Russian weapons. In March 2001, Putin visited Hanoi and announced a new strategic partnership with Vietnam. The Russian leader said that "Vietnam needs not just to maintain its existing weapons bought from the Soviet Union and Russia but also needs modern weapons".
Bilateral military ties are set to go ahead because Hanoi seeks to modernize its half-million strong armed forces, and Vietnam remains an important customer for Russian arms. In 1995, Hanoi bought six Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker fighter jets for $150 million and in 1997 signed a contract for six more planes and spare parts. In recent years, the Vietnamese military also bought six missile boats from the "1241 project" for some $120 million as well as four radar stations in Russia.
The Russians also suggested the Vietnamese purchase more Sukhois and consider buying another jetfighter, the MiG-29, as well as MiG training jets. In December 2003, Moscow and Hanoi reportedly clinched a $120 million deal involving supply of four Su-30MKKs to Vietnam.
Vậy là chúng ta cũng có rađa ngon đó hen

Được antey2500 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 22:35 ngày 16/12/2004

Được antey2500 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 22:35 ngày 16/12/2004

Lâu nay cũng hơi lo về tình hình đất nước, đặc biệt là vụ TS, nhưng đọc cẩn thận hết bài các bác thì cũng đỡ được phần nào. Cảm ơn các bác!
Nhiều ý kiến em muốn phản đối trong này, nhưng thôi, giờ em đi ngủ đã.
Ngẫm kĩ thấy dân Nam ta hiền lành, nhiều bạn, giờ lại chủ trương hợp tác, cũng nhiều cái lợi.
Tổ quốc Việt Nam muôn năm!

Lâu nay cũng hơi lo về tình hình đất nước, đặc biệt là vụ TS, nhưng đọc cẩn thận hết bài các bác thì cũng đỡ được phần nào. Cảm ơn các bác!
Nhiều ý kiến em muốn phản đối trong này, nhưng thôi, giờ em đi ngủ đã.
Ngẫm kĩ thấy dân Nam ta hiền lành, nhiều bạn, giờ lại chủ trương hợp tác, cũng nhiều cái lợi.
Tổ quốc Việt Nam muôn năm!

Rất tiếc vì phải xóa bài bác trungson vì không ăn nhập với chủ đề, mong bác sang LSVH tìm topic thích hợp mà post. Đây chỉ nói chuyện vũ khí thôi.