Tranh luận với thành viên Nguyentin1

Dù?ng tà?i liẶu mà? phà?n biẶn 'i chứ bàc, chì? trìch màt sàt cà nhĂn tĂi mà? là?m gì?... càc bàc thàch thức tĂi trưng tà?i liẶu ngoà?i tà?i liẶu 'iẶn tìn TC thì? tĂi 'ang trưng tà?i liẶu Mỳf 'Ắy thĂi...nẮu khĂng ưa nhưfng lơ?i mơ? 'Ă?u giới thiẶu cù?a tĂi thì? xin tù?y tiẶn 'òc nguyĂn bà?n càc 'oàn trìch dĂfn liĂn hẶ bf?ng tiẮng Anh hay và?o 'òc tròn tà?i liẶu Pentagon Papers mà? tĂi cho link trực tiẮp mà? và?o xem xèt lẮy... xèt theo ngưf cà?nh chung cù?a toà?n bẶ tà?i liẶu, chứ 'ư?ng bf́t bè? vf̣t vàfnh tiĂ?u tiẮt... tĂi khĂng chù? trương thuyẮt phùc, chì? trưng dĂfn cho thẮy mà? thĂi...cò?n vĂfn khĂng thẮy thì? tĂi chìu thua 'Ă?u hà?ng vĂ 'iĂ?u kiẶn...sơ? sơ? ròf tò? như ban ngà?y mà? vĂfn khfng khfng mẶt mực khĂng chìu thẮy thì? cò dù?ng hòc thuẶt lỳ luẶn siĂu 'f?ng nhẮt cùfng vĂ dụ̀ng 'Ắn phà?i bò tay mà? chìu thua thĂi, thưa bàc theroyal...
Được nguyentin1 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 19:03 ngày 09/12/2007

Pentagon Papers nhận xét trong tuâ?n lêf mặc ca? cuối cu?ng cu?a hội nghị Geneva, Trung Cộng to? ra quan tâm đến quyê?n lợi riêng nhă?m ngăn chận Myf nha?y va?o Đông Dương hơn la? quyê?n lợi riêng cu?a Việt Minh la? gia?nh giựt thêm lafnh thô?.
D. THE FINAL WEEK OF BARGAINING
The minuscule progress made on settling the Vietnam problem loomed large in comparison with the seemingly unbreakable log jam that had developed over Laos and Cambodia. Since the major Communist concessions of mid-June, which had at least paved the way for separating Laos and Cambodia from Vietnam for discussion purposes, virtually nothing had been accomplished toward cease-fires. Debate on Laos and Cambodia occupied the spotlight again on July 9 when, from the remarks of the Chinese delegate (Li K''''''''e-nung), it quickly became apparent that for all their willingness to discuss the withdrawal of ********* troops, the Chinese remained greatly concerned about possible Laotian and Cambodian rearmament and alignment. Simply put, the Chinese were negotiating for their own security, not for ********* territorial advantage.
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent8.htm
Được nguyentin1 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 03:21 ngày 09/12/2007

Pentagon Papers nhận xét chắc Trung Cộng pha?i du?ng ca? "cây gậy " răn đe dọa dâfm lâfn "cu? ca? rốt" khuyên lơn hứa hẹn khi thuyết phục Việt Minh bo? ý riêng muốn thống nhất ngay lafnh thô? đê? chiê?u theo ý kiến Trung Cộng ho?a hoafn với Myf, Pháp va? Anh.
Chinese Objectives
Peking, moreover, was made clearly aware of the dangers inherent in continued fighting. At the conference, Eden used the implied threat of American involvement against Chou in much the same way as Chauvel had used it against Kuznetsov. During late May, for example, Eden warned Chou "again" of the dangers in the Indochina situation; unpredictable and serious results could come about. When Chou said he was counting on Britain to prevent these from happening, the foreign secretary replied Chou was mistaken, since Britain would stand by the United States in a showdown. Furthermore, with the Eisenhower-Churchill warning of June 28 that unacceptable demands made against France would "seriously aggravate" the international situation, with Dulles'''' perceived pressure on Mendès-France at the Paris meeting of mid-July, and with the return of Smith to the conference table, the Chinese were given unmistakable signs that Western unity had finally been achieved and some kind of coordination worked out on the settlement. At that juncture, the outstanding issue for Peking was not how much territory the DRV would ultimately obtain, but how far Cambodia and Laos could be pressed before the July 20 deadline passed.
The argument here is, in summary, that the Soviet Union and Communist China were less concerned with the specific terms of the settlement than with attaining it once their basic objectives had been achieved. A settlement along lines that would satisfy the ********* need for territory, give France the satisfaction that it had not sold out, go far toward fulfilling Chinese security requirements and political ambitions in Southeast Asia, and reduce the possibility of a precipitate American withdrawal from the conference was, to Moscow and Peking, acceptable and even desirable. They saw advantages to themselves in an early equitable agreement that clearly conflicted with ********* terms, but not with their own objectives.
Precisely how Chou and Molotov reasoned with Ho Chi Minh - by threat, persuasion, or a combination of the two - will likely never be known; but it seems reasonable *****ppose that, given the precarious political situation in South Vietnam, the multitude of armed sects and other groups hostile to the Saigon government, the continued exacerbating presence of the French, and the economic and social vulnerabilities of a society wracked by war, Peking and Moscow could argue convincingly that South Vietnam would never cohere sufficiently to pose a viable alternative to the DRV. It may thus have been the Communists'''' expectation that the DRV would as likely assume control of the entire country by default as by an election victory in 1956. The Chinese, to be sure, accepted the notion that the Geneva accords had, temporarily at least, created two Vietnamese governments rather than simply divided the country administratively. [Doc. 64] But it is improbable that either they or the Soviets anticipated that even an American-supported South Vietnam could survive. Put another way, the possibility of a prospering, anti-Communist South Vietnam may simply not have been a serious, and certainly was not an immediate, concern for either Communist power. The Geneva Conference had created French goodwill for Moscow and added security for Peking; what might happen in South Vietnam may, in 1954, have seemed inconsequential.
Được nguyentin1 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 19:18 ngày 09/12/2007

Cụ Tín ơi cho em hỏi: Tại sao cụ cứ dịch mấy từ nghi vấn của nước ngoài thành mấy từ như chân lý đúng rồi thế ạ? Hay là vốn từ của cụ chỉ có thế?
Em không ở Mẽo như cụ nhưng khi đưa gốc + bản dịch của cụ cho 1 tay người Mỹ biết tiếng Việt (học tiếng Việt 3 năm, biết ăn thịt chó chấm mắm tôm) , hắn tý sặc vì cười và hỏi "What the f*** is this crazy guy thinking?" và "Thằng này học tiếng Anh ở đâu vậy?"
Mong cụ trả lời em chứ dừng lờ lớ lơ đi nhé.

Tôi có dịch gi? gi? đâu bác, trích nguyên văn ba?n tiếng Anh ma?...
Được nguyentin1 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 09:46 ngày 10/12/2007

Anh em đề nghị không hỏi han làm bác Tín mất tập trung nhé! Đợi bác Tín ị bô cho đủ 100 trang sẽ khóa topic.

Thế bác không có gi? pha?n biện a?...

Pentagon Papers nhận xét sau khi đặt bút ký hiệp định Geneva, phái đoa?n Việt Minh to? ra bất mafn vi? bị các đô?ng chí TC va? LS ép uô?ng, cho việc chịu lấy lă?n ranh tại vif tuyến 17 la? một thất bại vê? mặt chiến thuật, vi? tin tuơ?ng mi?nh có thê? đánh bại Pháp tại Bắc Việt đê? tiến tới đánh xuống miê?n Nam.
********* Objectives
...
Despite these protestations of satisfaction and confidence, Tillman Durdin''s report from Geneva that members of the ********* delegation were sharply disappointed by the results and vexed at pressure applied by their Chinese and Russian comrades seems on the mark. The ********* command evidently believed--and no French authority on the spot doubted this--that they could eliminate the French from Tonkin with one major offensive and proceed from there against a weakened, demoralized Franco-Vietnamese army in Annam. Surely Ho Chi Minh must have considered the possibility of American intervention--although this concern does not emerge as clearly from ********* public commentaries as it does from the official Moscow and Peking organs. But the ********* looked to the Korea experience as having demonstrated that fighting and talking simultaneously was, as put by a mid-May VNA broadcast, a tactic they could pursue for two years (like the Chinese during the Panmunjom talks) in order to maximize territorial gains. Whether the ********* ultimately envisaged the conquest of all Vietnam before reaching agreement with the French to cease fire is debatable; at the least, they, like the French, probably regarded maximum control of population and territory as insurance against future elections. Thus, to the *********, a settlement at the 17th parallel could only have been regarded as a tactical blunder in violation of the guerrilla war theory and practice they had mastered.

Tại sao người ta hay chọn geneva để đàm phán thế nhỉ?

Có bác nào biết đoàn VN tiêu tốn hết bao nhiêu tiền cho cuộc đàm phán 1954?