Viễn cảnh QĐND NC vào năm 2015 và tầm nhìn đến 2025

Hồi mấy con xe chở tượng đài Điện Biên em có chứng kiến,phải công nhận bọn nó rất khoẻ, nhưng tốc độ thì chỉ hơn rùa bò 1 týĐánh nhau mà chờ hội này chở tank mặt trận thì không khéo chiến tranh kết thúc mất rồi

Thì mấy anh em đang bàn chuyện dùng xe công để chở tăng chạy đường bằng trong thời bình mừ

Nếu thế thì cứ quẳng cho tank nó tự chạy, lo gì hở bác !

Chẳng thằng nào làm như thế cả?
Còn tại sao? Thì phải cho biết bạn mấy tuổi anh em mới giải thích được.
Được ov10 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 22:05 ngày 02/05/2007

Chổ xe tăng thì vô tư [ về tải trọng] nhưng là trên đường quốc lộ,còn trên đường đất đồi gặp trời mưa liệu có đi được không? Bác đă bao giờ đă phải nhận xe xi măng, thép vào công trường mà hôm trước trời mưa thì mới thấy không dùng để chở xe tăng được .

Bất cứ loại tank nào cũng có giới hạn quảng đường hoạt động,tốc độ tối đa,nếu mà để nó tự chạy vài trăm km liên tục thìBởi thế nên người ta mới cất công chế xe chở tank,rồi tàu hoả chở tank chứ bácBác xem mấy phim tài liệu về chiến tranh phìm nào chẳng có cảnh xe tải hai tàu hoả chở tank.

Thế thì đã may. Ngày xưa ta còn tháo ra vác bộ vào chiến trường kìa.

Thế cái tháp pháo thì bác định vác kiểu gì??

Lang thang trên mạng tìm được thông tin về nước VN khá chi tiết, trong đó có phần về quân sự từ trang 53-65.
Trong này chưa thông kê su-22 và Tank T-72 mình mới mua.
Các bác xem xong có thể liệt kê ra cho anh em cùng bàn về QSVN 2015-2025 nhé.
http://www1.apan-info.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2006/06/060630-P-Vietnam.doc
xem dạng HTML:
http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:Yxp4KpCvtXcJ:www1.apan-info.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2006/06/060630-P-Vietnam.doc+www1.apan-info.net/Portals/45/VIC_Products/2006/06/060630-P-Vietnam.doc&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=jp
Em xin phép copy ra để mọi người dể xem và bàn luận quân sự NC

Armed Forces Overview
TOTAL STRENGTH
489,000


Vietnam''''s armed forces maintain three regular services, supported by a multi-million strong militia. The army is the dominant service, reflecting its historical and political role in the three conflicts that have defined the country''''s efforts to gain independence from France, unite the country under communism and defend national sovereignty against China.
The army''''s status is enshrined with the revolutionary mandate of the Communist Party of Vietnam to govern and will therefore not be challenged by the air and naval services. However, as Vietnam''''s strategic environment becomes more complex due to China''''s precipitous strive towards becoming an Asian hegemon and the steadier build-up of military capabilities among regional powers, greater emphasis can be expected to fall on the country''''s ability to define and protect its often distant offshore claims.
Efforts to meet this air and naval-based requirement are now clearly evident, though financial constraints and other priorities mean the moves are often little more than symbolic. Further, the army leadership is unlikely to watch with equanimity if it considers that it is not receiving the material and financial support its position within the national pantheon merits. For this reason, the present army priority of maintaining disproportionately large regular and militia forces will prevail and air force and navy capabilities will remain limited.
Men and women become eligible for military service at the age of 18. Nearly a million men reach military age each year. However, the competing demands of the country''''s economy, the growth in tertiary education and a marked reluctance by many young people to serve up to four years in the military has greatly reduced the number of potential recruits. This has been partially offset by inducting more women into the military, but the long-term solution will require the armed forces'''' leadership to accept that the age of mass armies has given way to smaller, well-equipped and highly-motivated establishments.
Chain of Command
Commander in Chief President Tran Duc Luong
Minister of National Defense General Phung Quang Thanh


The military is slowly bringing forward officers into senior field command positions who were too young to have fought in the Vietnam War. The 30th anniversary of the end of the war in April 2005 may serve to accelerate this process. The absence of an immediate land-based threat and the recognition that armed forces modernization is essential for long-term defense needs will place a far greater emphasis on the country''''s naval and air forces and their attendant requirement for technically adept commanders.
However, this reform process can be expected to be resisted by elements within the political and military establishments, notably the army.
Doctrine and Strategy
Vietnam''''s military doctrine is rooted in the principals of Soviet and Chinese doctrine acquired by Vietnam''''s commanders during the anti-colonial and civil wars that combine guerrilla and main force strategy and tactics. A considerable effort was made by General Giap in the 1970s to move Vietnamese doctrine away from emphasizing guerrilla operations and toward territorial defense, as reflected in the successful campaign against the Chinese in 1979. Ongoing territorial disputes with China along their land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, has also accelerated the development of a more comprehensive combined-services approach.
Strategic Weapons
Vietnam has no strategic weapons and is unlikely to be able to afford them in the near future. Any decision by Vietnam to develop and build indigenous short- and medium-range weapons will depend on cost and an assessment of its long-term strategic relationship with China.
Declared Policy
It is unclear whether or not Hanoi has a declared policy of non-use or non-development of strategic weapons. However, it is certain that it has not yet exercised the option to pursue strategic weapons programs.


Ballistic Missiles
In April 1999 it was reported that Vietnam had acquired a number of ''''modified Scuds'''', thought to be Scud-Cs, from North Korea to complement its existing stock of Russian-made SS-1/Scud-Bs. The purchase agreement for the missiles was signed in the mid-1990s and was part of a USD 100 million package for defense equipment which also included midget submarines. NO further information has been forthcoming as to whether Hanoi intends to buy more SSMs from Pyongyang, but bearing in mind North Korea''''s willingness to sell, Vietnam''''s previous interest and the reasonably close political ties between the two countries, it remains a distinct possibility.
Vietnam is thought to now favor cooperation with India, with reports that New Delhi is assessing whether to provide Hanoi with its Prithvi surface-to-surface missile. However, such a move may reflect India''''s desire to put pressure on China over its Myanmar policy, which has led to the deployment of Chinese forces close to key Indian strategic bases in the Andaman Islands, rather than a serious offer to upgrade Vietnam''''s ballistic missile forces.
Nuclear Weapons
It is thought possible that Vietnam is attempting to develop a nuclear capacity, although there is no hard evidence *****ggest this is actually the case and the country is a signatory to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is therefore believed that this attempt has gone no further than a desire expressed by elements of the political elite. With Vietnam''''s desire
to be a more ''''mainstream'''' country it is highly unlikely this desire will ever come to fruition. Furthermore, the country has no civilian nuclear generation capability.
In 2000 a number of Japanese companies (Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Toshiba) announced their intention to set up a joint operation in Vietnam to bid for the construction of its first nuclear power plant. The proposal is believed to be undergoing scrutiny by the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission.
Vietnam''''s civilian nuclear ambitions became apparent in November 2000 when the country''''s Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment signed an agreement with South Korea''''s Power Corporation to further develop their co-operation in the fields of nuclear power, the operation of the country''''s research reactor in Da-lat, nuclear law, and the use of nuclear material in medicine.
In January 2002 local media reported that the Ministry of Industry and Electricity (EVN) planned to build the country''''s first nuclear power plant by 2020. However, a pre-feasibility study acknowledged the problems such a project would entail, ranging from environmental factors to the country''''s lack of trained nuclear scientists and technicians, and accepted that it could not be undertaken without extensive foreign expertise and support.
Biological Weapons
Vietnam signed the signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1980. There is no evidence of the country currently possessing biological weapons.
Chemical Weapons
A party to the Geneva Protocol, Vietnam has no proven history of the use of chemical weapons, although it has been accused of their usage in Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam signed the Chemical Weapons Convention upon its opening in January 1993, and deposited its ratification in 1998. Police units are equipped with non-persistent anti-riot irritants.
Assessment of Covert Programs
Vietnam has the technical capability to build some types of weapons of mass destruction but lacks the required funding and infrastructure to undertake such a project, as well as any obvious military necessity. The experience of the Vietnam War, when the Vietcong resistance and regular Vietnamese units were able to confront and ultimately prevail over the technologically superior United States military, suggests that Vietnam has the potential to master other asymmetric capabilities, such as information warfare and computer-hacking.
While there is no indication Vietnam has conducted research in this area, in 2002 the military indicated its potential ambition by making inquiries to Israel Aircraft Industries over the acquisition of military communications satellites. The system apparently discussed was the Amos communications satellite, sold to China earlier the same year at a cost of around USD100 million each. There is no indication that this project has moved beyond the enquiry stage.
Inventory: Strategic Weapons
Vietnam holds an unknown number of North Korean Scuds and may be seeking Indian-built short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. .
Source: Jane?Ts Information Group
Được su_30 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 09:10 ngày 04/05/2007
Được su_30 sửa chữa / chuyển vào 09:16 ngày 04/05/2007

Có 1 dự án mua 100% nhà máy sx xe tải nhãn hiệu SAMSUNG của hàn quốc. xe này dùng máy của Renault. nhà máy này mình mua cả móng đem về tinh Thanh Hoá thì phải