Việt Nam năm 1979

(tiếp)
In effect, the activities of the PLAAF in the Chinese Communist "punitive" war against the SRV were largely cosmetic. They provided the Chinese Communist military authorities the opportunity to photograph the Chinese-built MiG-21 in flight and release photographs of the air-to-air Atoll missile apparently featured on some aircraft in the war zone.
Such propaganda opportunities may have been purchased by significant manpower losses on the part of the ground troops of the PLA. Without effective air support the troops of the PLA suffered heavy casualties, estimated to be from 20,000 to 40,000 men. At one time during the campaign there may have been as many as 250,000 PLA troops (about 21 infantry divisions from 8 army corps?"the 41st, 54th, 42d, 43rd, and 55th of the Kwangsi Command, as well as the 11th, 14th, and 13th of the Yunnan Command) engaged in the fighting. Without air support *****ppress enemy fire and neutralize strongpoints, the ground forces of the PLA were compelled to absorb the full impact of the enemy?Ts firepower. Chinese Communist ground control apparently ordered the air units of the PLAAF not to engage any enemy aircraft (generally the technologically sophisticated MiG-21s and possibly the MiG-23 of the air force of the SRV) or attack ground positions which were defended by tough SAM defense systems supporting the Vietnamese army.12 There is more than a suggestion that the Chinese Communist command had little confidence in the effectiveness of the air-to-air ordnance available to PLAAF combat pilots, so rather than lose expensive major military equipment and trained pilots (in very short supply from the lapse in pilot training that occurred during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) the aircraft of the Chinese Communist air force were just not committed to combat.
The decision not to commit Chinese Communist air units to air combat or troop support was a consequence of something other than a disposition to confine the conflict. That decision was the consequence of a clear recognition of the inferiority of PLAAF air combat and ground support equipment in ad***ion to the political constraints and general strategic concerns of the PRC. The MiG-17s/19s/21s of the PLAAF would have been at critical risk in any engagements with the air units of the SRV. The bombing and attack aircraft of the PLAAF, the Il-28s and the F-6bis, would have been at similar risk in the air defense environment created by the SAMs and interceptor capabilities of the SRV. Any significant losses in major air combat and ground support craft which might have resulted would have revealed major weaknesses within the PLAAF, so the Chinese Communist military command apparently opted not to disclose these deficiencies.
All this has implications for any future role the Chinese Communist military might be expected to play while undertaking or contemplating forceful actions along its southern and eastern periphery. While the defensive capabilities of the numerically large PLAAF are generally recognized, it is equally evident that relatively small air forces in the region, when supported by reasonably sophisticated air defense systems, are not at the present time threatened by the air force of the PRC. So, given its present capabilities, the PLAAF cannot be expected to influence any military operations in Southeast Asia to a significant degree. For example, should the PRC choose to oppose a military attack by the SRV on Thailand, only the intervention of the ground forces of the PRC could be expected to make a telling impact. It is likely that assistance to Thailand in the event of determined SRV attack could only come in the form of major troop involvement rather than supplying military hardware (already in short supply in the PRC) or providing tactical air support. PRC air units alone would probably be singularly ineffective. Given its present inventory, the Chinese Communist air force is likely to be at grave risk in any attack role in a sophisticated air defense environment, whether Western- or Soviet-equipped. Against the nations of Southeast Asia or the Pacific littoral, the PLAAF can perform satisfactory defense functions but could hardly be an effective instrument for any offensive actions. It is evident that against the small nations of the Southeast Asian region, as well as the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan and Japan, the Chinese Communist air force at the moment can make little pretense of effective offensive capabi1ity.13
Against the modern aircraft of the SRV, the air units of the PLAAF are thought to be largely ineffective. Even against the few advanced Mach 2 fighters of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan, the Chinese Communist air units would have *****ffer serious attrition before they could prevail. Similarly, against the F-5Es on Taiwan, PLAAF units would suffer grievous losses before the depletion of ordnance, and aircraft attrition would eventually neutralize the air command of the ROC.
The PLAAF can hardly serve even in a defensive capacity on its northern and western borders. Its aircraft are hopelessly outclassed by the more than 2000 advanced machines of the Soviet Air Command deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. Given its current capabilities, it is quite unlikely that the PLAAF will constitute anything more than a modest obstruction to any major military moves by the Soviet Union. Moreover, for the foreseeable future, it would hardly be possible to modernize the air arm of the PLA sufficiently to make it an effective anti-Soviet fighting force. The shortage of foreign exchange precludes large-scale purchase of up-to-date aircraft and equipment by the PRC. No nation is prepared to allow the PRC the billions in grants or cre***s required to upgrade its air force to the level of an effective anti-Soviet instrument. The absence of effective research and development similarly precludes the real possibility of indigenous design and construction of modern interceptor and bombing aircraft for the foreseeable future. The Chinese Communist aircraft industry has the capability of design and production of relatively simple machines (such as the Yun-11 utility aircraft) that do not involve advanced avionics or high-thrust engines.14 Any of the advanced military aircraft so necessary to upgrade the PLAAF would have to be purchased from the Soviet Union or the industrialized Western nations, or coproduced under license. It is unlikely that Communist China will be in a position to do either in sufficient measure in time, quantity, or quality to offset its present air power deficiencies. In its competition for limited resources, the PLAAF will probably enjoy limited expansion and technological upgrading with the ad***ion of some substantial numbers of a Chinese Communist variant of the MiG-23 Flogger (designated the Shenyang F-12 in Chinese Communist nomenclature),15 but it is most unlikely that such enhancements will not markedly improve the defensive capabilities of its air arm.
In Chinese Central Asia the arid, open terrain will continue to afford the Soviet Air Force maximum advantage for the foreseeable future.16 To alter the force levels of the PLAAF sufficiently to offset this advantage?"other than to provide dense antiaircraft cover?"would require funds, the availability of large numbers of trained personnel, and logistic capabilities far beyond the current purchasing, production, and training capacity displayed by the PRC.
Any marginal upgrading of force levels of the air arm of the PLA on the other hand would succeed in altering the regional balance of forces in the Taiwan Strait and Southeast Asia?"circumstances clearly not in the interests of the United States. Any military adventures by the PRC in those regions could destabilize the strategic circumstances in much of the Pacific basin. The United States has conveyed its concern with respect to regional stability in the area in a number of ways but most unequivocably with respect to the peace and security of the Taiwan Strait. The government of the United States has embodied its commitment to the stability of the Taiwan Strait region and the peace and security of the Republic of China in Public Law 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act.17 Section 2 of the act asserts that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means" would be considered "a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. . . ." To protect its interests and offset any disposition that the PRC might entertain to resolve its differences with the ROC by military force, the United States has committed itself to the provision of "defensive arms" to Taiwan that would provide for its "sufficient self-defense capability."18
Given these commitments and the present force levels available to the PRC and the ROC respectively, what might constitute "sufficient self-defense capability for the Taiwanese military" would be a function of the capabilities available to the mainland Chinese. Any attack on the island of Taiwan by the armed forces of the PRC would necessarily involve the PLAAF. As long as the air force of the Communist Chinese is incapable of launching a successful air attack against the island of Taiwan in support of a combined amphibious assault or in providing effective air cover for a surface or submarine investment of the Republic of China, the United States can meet its moral and strategic commitments in the region by maintaining the present force levels of the ROC air command.19 The small air force of the ROC (approximately 315 combat aircraft) presently enjoys some measure of qualitative superiority over the PLAAF in terms of effective air-to-air ordnance and superior firing platforms in the shape of the F-5E Tiger, which is at least marginally superior to the MiG-19s that constitute the bulk of the fighter forces of the Chinese Communist air force.
The indisposition of the PRC to commit air units to combat in the "punitive" war against Vietnam suggests that there would be a similar indisposition at present to commit any similar major military equipment to an attack on Taiwan. The fighter aircraft (however few) available to the ROC are as sophisticated as those deployed by the SRV. The air defenses on the island of Taiwan are equally sophisticated. In fact, the Hughes Air Defense Ground Environment system has been operational on Taiwan for several years. Similar to the air defense system employed by NATO forces in Europe, it would exact considerable toll from aggressor units of the PRC. Given the current force levels available on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, unless the PRC were prepared to involve much of its air force and absorb oppressive losses, it is unlikely that Mainland China would attempt a military solution of the Taiwan question at the present time.
It is in the interests of the United States that these circumstances not be altered. Any enhancement of the force levels of the PLAAF could only destabilize the military balance along the eastern and southeastern borders of the PRC without significantly affecting Communist China?Ts ability to resist any determined moves by the Soviet Union?"given Russia?Ts overwhelming air superiority. It may be in the strategic interests of the United States to upgrade defensive ground force and antiaircraft capabilities of the PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union?"thereby tying down major Soviet ground and air units?"but it is not in those interests, nor has the United States the resources, to enhance significantly the capabilities of the Communist Chinese air arm. Any upgrading of the force capabilities of the PLAAF would make the nations of Southeast Asia and the littoral states more vulnerable to pressures from the PRC and introduce a dangerous level of regional instability in the entire Pacific basin.20 In fact, as the Communist Chinese enhance their air capabilities, it would be in the interests of the United States to ensure similar upgrading of the air forces of the smaller nations that border the PRC. The Taiwan Relations Act commits the United States to the provision of an adequate self-defense capability for the Republic of China in Taiwan. Since tactical air superiority over the Taiwan Strait is essential to the integrity and defense of the ROC, the implications are evident. Should the PLAAF deploy an air superiority fighter with the capabilities of the MiG-23, the United States is obliged to provide a similar aircraft to the defense forces of Taiwan and, by entailment, the defense forces of the non-Communist states of Northeast and Southeast Asia.
At the moment, the United States seems prepared to meet such an obligation. The Department of State has approved the sale of air superiority fighters to the Republic of Korea and Japan and has begun negotiations with the Republic of China on Taiwan in order *****pply it with a similar air defense asset. Calculated self-interest in the regional stability of the entire theater recommends such a course, and the lessons of the Communist Chinese attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam support it.
Rockville, Maryland
and
University of California, Berkeley
Notes
The assistance and support of the Institute of International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, and of the Pacific Cultural Foundation are gratefully appreciated.
1. Cf. Ti Tsung-heng, "Ch?Tao-hsien chan-ch?Tang-shang ti Chung-kung k?Tung-chun" [The Chinese Communist Air Force in the Korean Battlefield], Ming Pao Monthly, June 1978, pp. 20-26.
2. See Richard Bueschel, Communist Chinese Air Power (New York, 1968).
3. See the discussion concerning pilot training and machine disabilities in Fan Yuan-yen, Question and Answer: A Testimony by a Chinese Communist Pilot (Taipei, 1978), pp. 45-48.
4. Bueschel, pp. 54-55; Edwin Snyder, A. James Gregor, and Maria H. Chang, The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China (Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies, 1980), pp. 46-47.
5. "The Military Balance: China, 1978/79," Air Force, December 1978, p. 98.
6. Bill Sweetman, "The Modernization of China?Ts Air Force," in The Chinese War Machine, e***ed by James E. Dornan, Jr., and Nigel D. Lee (New York, 1979), p. 138. For a recent discussion of the F-6bis, see "Qiang-5," Dragon (Hong Kong), April 1980, pp. 26-33.
7. See Harlan Jencks, "China?Ts Punitive?T War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment," Asian Survey, August 1979, pp. 804-5.
8. The data on aircraft deployments derives from a mimeographed report, "A Brief Account of the Sino-Vietnamese War," by Kuo Tung-hua for the Conference on a New Foundation for Asian and Pacific Security, Pattani, Thailand, in December 1979. The discursive "fill" embodied in the report apparently originated in Thai and Nationalist Chinese intercepts of radio communications between Chinese Communist ground control and PLAAF aircraft. This document was obtained in Taipei, Taiwan, the Republic of China in June 1980.
9. See Snyder, Gregor, and Chang, pp. 35-36, 41; Zeev Shiff, "The Israeli Airforce," Air Force, August 1976, pp. 31-41.
10. Jencks, p. 809; see also I. Kuang, "Ch?Tien-shu ch?Tiang-chi-chi ti hung-cha fang-fa" [A Brief Account of the Attack Aircrafts?T Bombing Methods], Hsien-tai chün-shih [Conmilit: The Defense Monthly], February 1, 1980, pp. 44-46.
11. Guang Jiao Jing, Hong Kong, No. 78, March 16, 1979, p. 81.
12. In discussions with officials of the Nationalist military intelligence agencies in Taipei, James Gregor was informed that intercepted radio communications between PLAAF ground control and Chinese Communist air units during the conflict confirmed just such a contention.
13. See Sweetman, p. 142.
14. See "China Develops Yun-11 Utility Aircraft," Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17, 1979, pp. 75-77.
15. Dornan and Lee, pp. 115-16. See the discussion in Franz J. Mogdis, "The Role of the Chinese Communist Air Force in the 1970s," in The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970?Ts, William W. Whitson, e***or (New York, 1972), pp. 253-66.
16. See Edward N. Luttwak, "After Afghanistan, What?" Commentary, April 1980, p. 49; Harlan Jencks, The Politics of Chinese Military Development 1945-1977 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978), pp. 466-569.
17. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Document 35 in China and the Taiwan Issue, e***ed by Hungdah Chiu (New York, 1979), pp. 266-75.
18. Taiwan Relations Act, Section 3 (a).
19. See James B. Linder and A. James Gregor, "Taiwan?Ts Troubled Security Outlook," Strategic Review, Fall 1980.
20. See comments by Parris Chang, Taiwan: One Year after United States-China Normalization (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 16, 23.
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Contributor
Rear Admiral James Linder, USN (Ret), (USNA) was Commander of the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command during the normalization process between the People?Ts Republic of China and the United States in 1978 and ?~79. His previous assignments included the command of a Sixth Fleet Battle Group, Attack Carrier Commanding Officer and Director of Naval Administration. Admiral Linder is a graduate of the Naval War College and has made contributions to Strategic Review and the Institute of International Studies.
A. James Gregor (B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University), Professor of Political Science a the University of California, Berkeley, was recently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. He was a Guggenheim Fellow in 1974 and is the author of numerous books, including The Taiwan Relations Act and the Defense of the Republic of China (1980). Dr. Gregor has also published monographs and more than sixty articles in Strategic Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, World Politics, etc.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Hôm nọ đọc lại chuyện "Mặt trời bé con của tôi", chuyện đã dựng thành phim, cậu bé sau này vào bộ đội đã hi sinh khi chặn hậu cho đồng đội do bị rơi vào ổ phục kích TQ. Các bác nào đã từng đi lính, đánh nhau thật thì truyền lại ít kinh nghiệm đánh giặc, trinh sát, thoát hiê?m để sau này nếu có tẩn nhau với Tàu thì bọn em sẽ biết đường mà thịt tụi nó. Em đang học vof Ta?u đây, bác na?o biết chuyện đánh vof tay không giưfa ta va? Ta?u ơ? biên giới thi? kê? em nghe với. Hô?i em học lớp 3 cứ tươ?ng chi? năm 88 nó đánh Trươ?ng Sa la?m chết anh em nha? mi?nh(báo đa?i đăng â?m â?m pha?n đối ba?o 1 CS ta giưf lá cơ? bị nó đâm lê AK va?o lưng), hóa ra năm 89 nó co?n đánh. Ma? năm 90 thă?ng Lý Bă?ng đaf chêfm chệ la?m quan sát viên trong các ki? đại hội Đa?ng rô?i.

Chà?o cĂc bĂc, 'ặc bi?t lĂcho Em gửi lời chĂo chĂn trọng nhất 'ến cĂc BĂc cựu chiến binh 'Ă trực tiếp tẩn Tầu 'f bảo v? non sĂng.
Đọc bĂi cĂc BĂc viết, Em mĂ quĂ, bỏ dY cả vi?c nhĂ nư>c mĂ khĂng thấy tiếc. Đọc bĂi của cĂc BĂc lại thấy mĂu lĂnh trĂng n.i lĂn (chẳng nhẽ lại xin tĂi ngũ), hừng hực lắm.
Em lĂ dĂn sinh ra trong thời kỳ cĂc bĂc cĂn 'ang chiến 'ấu (80) nĂn cũng rất mu'n cĂc BĂc cho biết thật nhiều về cuTc chiến nĂy. Học sử Y nhĂ trường thĂ 'ả 'Tng vấn 'ề nĂy khiĂm t'n quĂ.
ThĂi b< sếp gọi 'i lĂm r"i, chĂo mọi người nhĂ

Hề hề! Lôi cái này lên vậy. Chứ để vài tuần nữa mà nó biến mất thì phí quá.

Những ngôi sao nhỏ trên lá cờ TQ là tượng trưng cho : công nhân, nông dân, quân đội, giai cấp trí thức và giai cấp như kiểu như là thương nhân ( chẳng biết nói thế nào cả ). Ngôi sao lớn là Đảng cộng sản TQ. Đấy là nhờ thằng bạn người TQ giải thích. Rất có ý nghĩa đấy chứ, tất cả thuần phục một ông vua là ĐCS.

Những năm 78-90 là những năm VN bị cô lập nhất, gần như rất ít bạn, mà lại nhiều thù.
Quả là rất tai hại.

đâu phai ng Tàu vươt biên khg thôi, mà ng Nam-Vietnam cung vượt biên.
KT

Hôm nay tự dưng lạc vào cái box này, em ngồi đọc liền từ đầu đến cuối. Em rất muốn tìm hiểu về cuộc chiến bảo vệ Tổ quốc, nhưng đọc trong SGK chỉ được vài dòng, lên đây biết được nhiều thông tin bổ ích, rất cảm ơn các bác. Về phần chiến đấu, em thấy đã nhiều, vậy có bác nào đã kinh qua thời kỳ đó, kể thêm cho em về không khí chống giặc của nhân dân ta được không ?

đọc 1 mạch hết 48 trang.,,,đến giờ mới biết tại sao vn còn nghèo đói.thanh niên vn chỉ ham thích chiến tranh,bàn luận chiến tranh mặc dù đã xảy ra vài chục năm rồi.
sao chúng ta khg nghỉ tới 1điều nếu khg có trung quốc sản xuất xe gắn máy giá rẻ thì 1 bộ phận người lao động có thu nhập thấp mới có khả năng mua được.tới đây các các tầng lớp trung lưu còn có thể vi vu bằng xe hơi trung quốc(với giá xe của các liên doanh hiện nay rất đắt)....mà TQ cũng là khách hàng lớn thu mua các loại nông,thuỷ hải sản của ta.
chiến tranh xảy ra thì thằng thắng cũng như thằng thua đều tốn kém.

Bác nào còn suy nghĩ rằng Tàu chỉ muốn dằn mặt ta, sau khi đánh thắng rút quân về nước thì em nghĩ bác ấy ngây ngô trong sáng quá. VÌ lịch sử của thằng Tàu luôn luôn có tham vọng bành trướng chi phối. Nó chả dại gì mang máy chục ngàn người để bộ đội ta lia tiểu liên, viên nào cũng dính , mà chẳng được lợi ích gì, chỉ để dạy ta bài học. Bác nào cũng nghĩ như thế là nguy to. Gì chứ chơi với bọn tàu này phải cẩn thận, lịch sử chống Tầu nói lên điều ấy rất nhiều rồi mà các bác cứ hay quên.
Còn như nói Tầu rút quân về nhờ LX thì may ra còn có lý.
mà em thắc mắc là tại sao phải thay tướng nhỉ ? cái đó cho thấy tình trạng của Tàu lúc ấy!
Đến đây kể chuyện này cho các bác thư giãn: Em được kể là bọn tàu lúc đó tràn qua sông gì gì đấy, nó đông như kiến, thế là mấy bác nhà ta nghĩ ra kế kéo dây điện ( hay cắt đứt ) ra sông thế là xong , chả phải tốn viên đạn nào cả. Chết như mực cả đống . Bác nào xem cảnh ngườita châm cá bằng điện mới thấy các bác nhà ta chơi ác thật .NGhĩ cũng vui thật!