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Is Iraq becoming a new Vietnam?

Timothy Carney

Not all Iraqis see the coalition as saviours. Recent history drives Shiite doubts about American staying power. These doubts exacerbated by the inevitable cultural insensitivity and tactical clumsiness of a foreign occupying force could coalesce into passive resistance at a minimum and active armed struggle as the worst-case

During a meeting in early June between a senior American official in Baghdad and some 150 Shaykhs representing different Iraqi tribal groups, one leader rose and asked the question on everyonê?Ts mind. He wondered whether the coalition was a ?oliberation? force as President George Bush proclaimed or rather an ?ooccupation? force. My then-colleague hemmed and hawed, finally conceding the presence was an occupation. Uproar followed. A senior Iraqi civil servant told me later, with considerable understatement, that this was ?onot a very clever reply.?

The answer fanned the Shaykhs?T worst fears about Coalition intentions and sparked a nationalist response questioning the legitimacy of what is, in international law, an ?ooccupation.? The key issue in Iraq today is this: How long can this massive foreign presence, whatever its intentions, continue and persuade enough Iraqis to transform this ancient land into a 21st century pole of modern economic and political attraction for the Middle East? Can the Coalition convince Iraqis that it is in their interest to work together to achieve this important goal?

So far, we have not done a good job of addressing most Iraqis?T concerns. The Coalition has been clumsy and played into the hands of its opponents who include die-hard Saddam Hussein loyalists as well as Islamists with their own agendas. The recent appointment of a Governing Council is an important step in recognising the need for partnership with Iraqis. However, to be successful, the Council must overcome deep-seated Iraqi concerns by both having real power and being seen to have real power.

The powerful anti-coalition feelings are rooted in Muslim rage at what they perceive to be uncritical US support for Israel. This anger has translated in*****spicion of American intentions towards the Muslim world and fear that the United States seeks to undermine Islam through a combination of direct military action, cultural imperialism and Christian proselytising. As a result some Shiite Muslim leaders demanded the departure of US troops as soon as the regime had been overthrown.

The extent to which this Islamic dynamic plays into the strategy of Hussein loyalists is unclear, but worrisome. Do Shiite Muslims tolerate Saddam Hussein?Ts continuing successful evasion because they oppose the presence of foreign troops? Do they believe that if Coalition forces were to leave, Iraqis could achieve what they failed to for more than 35 years and put an end to Saddam Hussein?

The armed anti-Coalition opposition itself has clearly taken heart from Saddam Hussein?Ts escape. By early July a broad, though fairly small scale, armed opposition to the Coalition led some pun***s to wonder if a coherent resistance was coalescing. Military analysts, hearing reports of the clandestine organisation called ?oThe Return? (of Saddam Hussein) are suggesting that the movement has increasing command and control capabilities. The US Central Command and senior Defense Department officials continue to caution against leaping *****ch conclusions, but the longer Hussein remains at large, the greater the possibility that his supporters could inspire a controlled and disciplined resistance. Saddam Hussein?Ts death or capture would eliminate much of this potential.

Some suggest that the Coalition will soon find itself in a Vietnam-style guerrilla war. In late March, British journalist and author William Shawcross (Evening Standard, 25 March 2003) anticipated these fears. He argued, however, that two vital elements of the Vietnam situation are absent in Iraq. First, Iraq?Ts opposition cannot count on external support. Iraq has neither a reliable rear area such as the one that Beijing provided for Hanoi, nor a major financial backer like the Soviet Union. Second, Shawcross argued that Iraq lacks a nationalist and sufficiently popular indigenous authority that would oppose coalition forces. He noted that Saddam Hussein ruled by fear and people may still be intimidated by Hussein loyalists.

However, not all Iraqis see the coalition as saviours. Recent history drives Shiite doubts about American staying power. These doubts exacerbated by the inevitable cultural insensitivity and tactical clumsiness of a foreign occupying force could coalesce into passive resistance at a minimum and active armed struggle as the worst-case scenario. Armed opposition might initially benefit from widespread frustration with a Coalition that has not delivered security and basic services such as water, electricity, communications and waste disposal. If average Iraqis also feel alienated from the political and economic process, they might ally themselves with any group promising to drive out the occupiers.

To forestall such a resistance, the coalition must implement a three-pronged strategy in partnership with a broad spectrum of Iraqis. First, coalition forces must enforce security but must refrain from overreacting to military provocations. Overreaction could unite what is a politically fragmented Shiite Muslim community to the detriment of the goal of creating a secular 21st century Iraq. A secular Iraq can use its diversity and plurality to advance towards broad prosperity and thus serve as a model in the region. To establish security without alienating important elements, the Coalition must internationalise non-military operations. Iraq needs more local police trained to maintain civil order and investigate civilian crimes. The coalition must accelerate the formation of an Iraqi police force and an Iraqi army. These organisations require equipment and advisors. The bomb attack that killed seven at a police graduation ceremony in early July suggests that Hussein loyalists recognise the threat posed by an independent Iraqi police force and army.

Second, the Coalition must quickly place authority into Iraqi hands. The creation of the Governing Council is a positive step in this direction. However, it is vital that this Council visibly bear an important share of responsibility for developing Iraq?Ts economic and political policies. Thus, the Council must have not only a major role in budgetary planning, but also specific control over resources essential to rebuilding. Only such action can counter arguments that the Coalition is a mere occupation force.

Third, the Coalition?Ts relatively anaemic media effort needs to be expanded and enhanced. As initially conceived, the Coalition?Ts Iraqi Media Network had too narrow a vision. Daring talk of transforming Iraq?Ts information ministry into a national public broadcasting service along the lines of the US National Public Radio or the BBC must be realised. L. Paul Bremer?Ts vision of a prosperous, modern Iraq with a representative political structure needs a broad audience across the nation, on radio, on TV and in print.

These three elements require Coalition personnel able to work cooperatively with Iraqis. The international press is full of reports illustrating who can work in Iraq and who cannot. The American officer who backed his troops away from a major Shiite shrine and ordered them onto one knee with their rifle muzzles on the ground to calm angry crowds deserves the same medal as the British officer who instructed his men, on entering Iraq, that no Coalition flags would be planted. Against these fine examples are stories of Coalition soldiers who are barely civil to Iraq police trainees and who clearly fear any interaction with the populace. The Coalition and its public servants must never forget that Iraq belongs to Iraqis and that its citizens deserve our respect.



Timothy Carney worked as Senior Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals under Jay Garner and then L. Paul Bremer from mid-March to mid-June 2003. Now a consultant, he retired in 2000 after 32 years in the US Foreign Service.

This article appeared in YaleGlobal Online (www.yaleglobal.yale.edu), a publication of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, and is reprinted by permission. Copyright (c) 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

Vietnam''s painters profit from copying craze
REUTERS
Monday, Jul 21, 2003,Page 10

Painters copy works of famous artists at a shop in Vietnam''s commercial hub Ho Chi Minh City. Afters years of proverty and isolation from the West, many peoiple in the communist country regard art as a bourgeois extravagance. But art sales, driven by a fast-growing middle class with a taste for decorative furnishings, are taking off. While tra***ional Vietnamese art is making inroads in galleries and private collections in London and Paris and can command thousands of dollars, a less ingenious form of art reproduced from great masters has gained admiration at home.
PHOTO: REUTERS

As a child, Nguyen Thanh Tung was always fascinated by the beautiful paintings of Renoir.
Now a prosperous real estate dealer, the 30-year-old can finally afford to own some of the work by his favorite artist, even if they are only copies by Vietnam''s skilled masterpiece painters.
Years of poverty and isolation from the West led many in communist Vietnamese to view art as a bourgeois extravagance. But now that has all changed.
Art buying is taking off, driven by a fast-growing middle class with a penchant for decorative furnishings.
While Vietnamese art is getting more space on the walls of galleries and private collections in London and Paris and individual paintings can command thousands of US dollars, at home it''s reproductions of great masters that are winning admiration.
"For less than a thousand dollars I can turn my whole house into a replica of an impressionist museum," gloated Tung, admiring the sun-bathed landscape of Renoir''s Le Mont Sainte Victoire in a Hanoi shop.
Esthetic cravings
Hundreds of shops and studios have sprung up in Vietnam''s big cities to cater for the esthetic cravings of the emerging moneyed classes.
Tucked behind a murky cafe in southern Ho Chi Minh City, Ngo Dong''s gallery doesn''t much resemble Renoir''s 19th century Paris studio but his works recall those of the impressionist master.
Waving his brush between a half-finished canvas of Renoir''s La Grenouillere and a wooden palette of exotic colors, the 49-year-old painter said his copies have sold well, not just because of his skills, but also because of his deep empathy for the masters.
Demand for look-alike masterpieces is so great that Dong has to turn away "vanity" clients who want their portraits done.
On average, Dong''s studio of six workers churns out 400 pieces a year with about half sold locally and the rest exported.
Prices are calculated on a basic rate of US$50 per square meter and US$20 extra for paintings with more than one face due to "more intricate copy work", Dong said.
The same reproduced painting is offered for as much as US$200 on eBay, the popular auction site.
French connection
"Vietnamese painters are much better at copying Western arts compared with painters in other Asian countries," Dong said.
Modern Vietnamese painting started in the 1920s, when the French colonial government established Ecole des Beaux-Arts de l''Indochine (Indochina School of Fine Arts).
It trained a generation of painters from across Indochina. The French influence explains why Vietnamese art appeals to Western eyes and the special skills of the painters.
Dong, a laureate of the People''s Army Fine Art Award, also harbors ambitions to be famous for his own creations.
Wiping the dust off a large painting of three young girls facing a deep blue ocean, he said the only reason he was a prolific copier of other artists'' works was *****pport his dreams of painting his own.
If that succeeds, Dong may be granted another wish -- to see, for real, Renoir''s paintings in Paris.