WTO và Việt Nam

Đúng vậy, đây là tiêu đề 1 cuốn sách do Jean Francois Revel viết từ thập niên 70, được GS Nguyễn Khắc Nhân dịch và giảng tại trường QGHC miền Nam . Số lượng ấn hành ít lắm nên không biết có còn tìm được không !
Trong cuốn này, với những suy luận về tiến trình chính trị, kinh tế, tác giả cho rằng đến cuối thế kỷ 20 sẽ có 1 cuộc cách mạng mới và cả 2 đấng có tên trên cuốn sách sẽ mất dần ảnh hưởng, đi vào dĩ vãng .... Nhà thờ ở nước ngoài nay đã vắng con chiên nhiều, vì thế không đủ tiền trang trải chi phí duy trì, nhiều nơi đã đem xây chung cư . Còn ông kia thì chỉ còn 4 nước nghèo đói ca ngợi, trong đó, 2 nước đã thức tỉnh, chỉ còn được các lãnh tụ cầm quyền giả vờ tôn trọng để tại vị và 2 nước vẫn ôm khư khư, chống họi nhập và đói dài .
Bây giờ là lúc VN phải gò lưng ra mà chạy cho kịp gót các quốc gia láng giềng . Tỉnh sớm, khấm khá sớm .

Hehe, "bình loạn" khá nhiều rồi, bây giờ ta tìm hiểu, các bác nhỉ. Trước khi tìm hiểu về Việt Nam (dưới góc độ thành viên của WTO), ta tìm hiểu về WTO cái đã.
1. WTO là cái quái gì mà nước nào cũng muốn tham gia, nhiều nước đã chầu chực hơn chục năm trời mà vẫn chưa được vào? Người ta nói WTO là một tổ chức, nhưng cũng có người nói WTO là một diễn đàn ("diễn đàn WTO"), nói thế nào cho dễ hiểu đây? Có người nói WTO có luật lệ đồ sộ lắm, nhưng nhiều người nói WTO chẳng qua như một cái chợ của nhà giàu, mạnh ai người ấy bán... phức tạp thật!
2. Tổ tông của WTO là ai? Nghe nói trước khi bành trướng ra như hiện nay, tiền thân của WTO khiêm tốn lắm Và với đà phát triển của WTO thì tương lai của nó như thế nào, hậu duệ của nó ra sao?...
Trên Internet có nhiều bài viết nhưng rắc rối, khó hiểu, thậm chí mỗi người nói một phách, ở đây, ta cứ tìm hiểu dần dần thôi, các bác ạ!

Vào đây đọc là đủ rồi ...
http://www.wto.org/
Gatt hay WTO cũng là trò chơi của ... đế quốc thôi mà, hay là để ổn định trật tự hoà bình thế giới bằng kinh tế với các cơ cấu tài chính , luật lệ quốc tế , ai gia nhập thì phải tôn trọng luật chơi để cùng nhau phát triển ... và tất nhiên là Mỹ cầm chịch, chửi Mỹ thì ai cũng chửi nhưng chơi thì lại cũng thích chơi là vì trong các cường quốc, Mỹ cũng là nước ít đểu nhất , buôn bán với Mỹ không được cơm cũng được cháo mà lại an toàn , nói chung là khá công bằng, tôn trọng luật lệ. Tiếng là world trade nhưng mà chủ yếu cũng là Mỹ thôi .
Còn các cơ cấu như IMF, World bank ... cũng lại là Mỹ chủ động, thời buổi này, trò chơi xâm lược bành trướng hết thời rồi, chỉ đạo cả thế giới bằng những cơ cấu này có vẻ cùng có lợi , nhẹ nhàng hơn và cũng khó thoát hơn.
Ấy, tụi Mỹ nó cũng điên lắm, qua VN mua quần áo thì lại đi đếm toilette của công nhân , xem công nhân ăn uống ra sao, Cty nào dại dột đưa bảng lương công nhân ra thấp quá, hay là có vụ trừ , phạt vào lương công nhân là nõ không mua ... Vào họp mà văn phòng có mạng nhện nó cũng nhăn mặt, không biết khó tính thế để làm gì nhỉ ? hay là nó dùng kinh tế như 1 vũ khí để xây dựng dân chủ , nâng cao đời sống người nghèo khắp thế giới không chừng .

Ờ. Bác kể chuyện thằng Mỹ nó điên chừng nào thì em cũng góp chuyện tý.
Trước em có làm ở 1 công ty của Mỹ. Có thằng cha, là sếp to nhất, mua 1 cái xe và cần đăng ký cái biển số. Nó giao việc này cho chú lái xe.
Khi làm thủ tục, mấy chú công an thấy là cty nước ngoài thì cũng ham nên hoạnh hoẹ chú lái xe hơn người khác 1 tý. Khổ thân chú lái xe, bị hành lên hành xuống mấy ngày. Sếp thấy vậy thì cũng chỉ biết lắc đầu. Bị bó giò, bó cẳng đi lại khó khăn, cũng tức lắm, nhưng Sếp vẫn phải chấp nhận. Còn chú lái xe thì hằng ngày vẫn đến chầu chực cửa quan từ sáng đến trưa, từ trưa đến chiều. Chiều vẫn chưa được tích sự gì, đành nhăn nhó về cty kêu khổ.
Cuối cùng, thì chú cũng đành thỏ thẻ với Sếp:
" Sep, I am very tired. But I am powerless"
"Why? What''s matter?"
"Because...because...They want our money"
"Oh... I see. But I don''t accept. Never."
Thông điệp đã rõ. Thằng Mẽo nó không chấp nhận tham nhũng. Và vì cái sự văn minh ngu dốt của nó, chú lái xe nhà em đã mất 2 tuần chỉ có Lavie và bánh mì cả ngày chầu trực ở cơ quan công an. Và cái thằng cha Sếp ương bướng, chịu thiệt hại 2 tuần khó khăn, chỉ vì ko chịu móc ra vài trăm bạc.
Chuyện này em nghe chú lái xe kể lại, xảy ra sau khi bỏ cấm vận 1 thời gian ngắn các bác ạ.

TỚ chỉ muốn thông báo với đồng chí là bác Jean Francois đã qua đời cách đây chừng một tháng. Ở đây tớ có bản tiếng pháp của quyển sách này. Ông này là một tác giả rất nổi tiếng ở pháp.
Tớ thấy cái case study về vn ở trên trang WTO, các bạn đọc chơi nhé
To bạn Quangdinhnhat: bạn à, nếu bạn muốn nghiên cứu (và làm việc) trong lĩnh vực kinh tế quốc tế, bạn phải chịu khó đọc tài liệu bằng tiếng anh hoặc tiếng pháp, mình nói thẳng bạn đừng giận chứ trong ngành này không có ngoại ngữ không làm việc được đâu
MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION: CASE STUDY 45
Preparation by Vietnam?Ts Banking Sector for WTO Accession
Phan Van Sam and Vo Thanh Thu*

I. The problem in context
This paper focuses on showing how Vietnam will meet its trading partners?T expectations that it will liberalize its economy through commercial legislation and regulatory changes and, more specifically, will liberalize its financial institutions and markets by the time of the country?Ts planned accession to the WTO in 2005.
Since 1975 until recently, Vietnam has maintained an almost isolationist economic policy. It has not, as a result, had much success in improving the efficiency of its commercial sector in a way that contributes to significant or consistent economic growth. Vietnam is now a country clearly wanting closer connections with the rest of the world, but policies to promote and finance international trade or to attract adequate foreign investment have lacked direction. As the country progresses towards joining the WTO, economists are debating how to improve the country?Ts investment efficiency, especially through financial market reform.
In this context, the BTA (US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement) exposed the lack of competitiveness of the Vietnamese banking sector. Vietnamese enterprises that have tried to improve their competitiveness in world markets (such as the fishing industry) have found that the lack of banking competitiveness and competence has held them back. They fear that this will continue to happen when the Vietnamese market is opened up as a result of WTO membership.
The Vietnamese banks themselves realize (partly as a result of the BTA) that they have to reform or lose even more business to foreign banks and financial institutions. They understand that the WTO or the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) does not require Vietnam to open up its banking market (unlike the BTA, for example, which does have such provisions), but they can see that this is likely to happen in future because their own customers ?" who will face competition in their markets after WTO accession ?" will be demanding to use foreign banks. Vietnam is considering liberalization of its banking system for its own purposes, so that its companies and its banks can survive WTO-enforced trade liberalization.

Some analysts have also expressed concern about the falling proportion of foreign capital in the country?Ts private investment structure and the increasing levels of state investment, sometimes considered to be associated with inefficiency or misallocation. This topic is still being debated, but some economists consider that increasing investment by state-directed or state-owned companies might be associated with Vietnam?Ts import substitution and protectionist policies which in turn negatively affect resource allocation.
The world economy generally has seen changes in trading practices aimed at reducing protectionist policies. Lower protection translates into better use of internal resources. But in Vietnam, in contrast with more developed economies, the policies needed to ensure higher levels of economic growth include not only the more efficient use of internal resources but also financial and banking laws that will attract more external resources.
For example, there appears to be a need to raise or even remove the 30% ceiling on foreign investors?T stakes in listed business organizations. When the government first opened its doors to foreign investment some twenty years ago there were many restrictions concerning where foreign investors could invest their money. Back then, Vietnam wanted to attract foreign capital to areas and activities where capital was needed most without threatening Vietnam?Ts national interests. This policy, to some foreign investors, protected the capital of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and locally owned private enterprises rather than effectively encouraging the development of overseas and international business. Over time, banking restrictions have also prevented the owners of local enterprises from realizing the true value of their investments because they were unable to access global capital markets.
The opportunity for foreign-invested companies to undertake bigger commercial activities in Vietnam is now more widely recognized.
The local press claims that this is something which is compulsory under the BTA and other international commitments Vietnam has made; they also suggest that a government decision to lift the cap on foreign participation in local business was to be made in 2004. However, as of the time of writing nothing has happened. Is this the old Vietnamese comment, ?~maybe tomorrow?T? However, liberalization of the restriction on investment will encourage and facilitate a more specialized domestic production schedule which would flow on to changed international trading patterns, replacing Vietnam?Ts previous focus on import substitution.
Warwick Cleine, a senior partner of the international consultancy firm KPMG, is among those foreign analysts who felt greatly encouraged when they heard that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was considering proposing that the government raise or even remove the investment 30% cap. ?~It doesn?Tt make sense to restrict foreign capital in the domestic sector. If they do not remove the cap, private local companies will suffer over timê?T, he says.(1)
Since the State Securities Commission (SSC) was transferred to the MoF?Ts management earlier this year, the MoF has understood that its task of developing the fledgling stock market ?" which has only twenty-four listed firms with a total capitalization of less than 10 billion dong ($US 634 million) ?" has become more urgent than ever.
Adjustments of the investment cap would, however, require many changes to both the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) and the Enterprise Law. There is clearly a role for Vietcombank (the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam) in this area.
According to Tony Foster of the Freshfields law firm, the government has distinguished between the FIL and the Enterprise Law in order to make sure that foreigners invest under the control of the FIL: ?~If foreigners could invest more than 30%, the FIL would lose importance ?" which may happen when the FIL and Enterprise Law are merged next year anyway. That is why I assume the government is considering lifting the ceiling now.?T(2)
In general, foreign analysts believe that the government has slowly been moving towards a unified legal system for foreign-invested and domestic enterprises. This is a natural part of Vietnam?Ts intended integration into the world economy: the source of the capital is not important, but rather the use to which it is put. ?~This means government policy will become more focused on how enterprises invest their money rather than how the enterprise raises its capital?T, says Cleine of KPMG.
The most important action for the MoF is to work with industries to adjust its Decree 58. Once this decree is adjusted, the regulations will define in which business sectors the state can hold a 100% stake and which can be invested in by foreign companies, translating into a liberalization of the investment banking system.
These developments indicate slowly changing thinking within the government about their regulations and their operation of the previously state-controlled financial and banking system. It also reflects an increasing acknowledgement of a need for Vietnam to join the ?~world economy?T.
Financial institutions are now realizing that GATS did not force administrators, particularly in developing countries, to liberalize their financial system to encourage further investment. However, if these state institutions cannot update it is unlikely that they will be able to compete with other private financial companies within Vietnam.
For example, Dong a Bank, a private commercial bank, was established fifteen years ago. Its capital has increased ten times and, in foreign exchange transactions, accounts for 70% of total foreign currencies in Vietnam; Vietcombank ?" the largest state-owned bank ?" has not achieved this. The BTA agreement with the United States has induced the government to undertake that, by 2010, US banks will operate without any constraints in Vietnam. Under competitive pressure for survival, institutions must restructure, adjust and change operational procedures, and even change their form of ownership to assist in the country?Ts economic development. The financial system clearly needs overhauling to achieve these objectives.
According to the BTA, Vietnam has to liberalize its financial and banking services for US banks in compliance with the ?~road map?T agreed by the two parties. Vietnam must comply with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) ?~road map?T for tariff removal, implement the BTA guidelines for banking services, train banking staff, and apply information technology (IT) and other technologies in banking services so that Vietnamese banks can compete in the future.
Vietnam has to implement its road map in the following terms and in the 2001-10 time framework, including allowing insurance services to become more effective: US investors can set up joint services ventures and there will not be any constraints in penetrating the market by US insurance companies. Other major developments so far have been that
all US financial providers (except banks and leasing companies) have been entitled to set up joint ventures with Vietnamese partners in providing their financial services in Vietnam;

from December 2004 US-owned banks will be entitled to expand their commercial services;

from 2009, US financial institutions will also be entitled to issue cre*** card facilities and enjoy the national treatment policy. They can receive deposits in Vietnamese dong; and

from 2010, US banks will be entitled to set up 100% US-owned banks in Vietnam, and to set up joint venture banks in Vietnam, but the US capital contribution shall not be lower than 30% and not exceed 49% of joint venture registered capital.
Clearly, all these development changes and procedures are progressive and longer term, but there is a distinct role for and need for the reform of Vietnamese banks in this process.


II. Challenges faced by the Vietnamese banking sector back to top
During this integration process, the Vietnam banking system will be heavily influenced by the international financial market in terms of exchange rates, interest rates and foreign currency reserves, while they must simultaneously carry out international obligations and commitments. Competition will probably become much stronger when foreign banks expand their scale and scope of operations in the Vietnamese market. Vietnamese commercial banks will need to cope with many difficulties in expanding their banking activities in the world and competing with foreign banks.

As noted earlier, the BTA exposed the lack of competitiveness of the Vietnamese banking system. The Vietnamese banks came to realize that they had to reform or lose more business to foreign banks and financial institutions. Liberalization became of interest to both Vietnam?Ts commercial and banking sectors to assist in surviving WTO-enforced trade liberalization (although not specifically liberalization of the banking sector).
Historically (some fifteen years ago), the Vietnamese government still operated a centrally planned economy; Vietcombank was one of the three banks entitled to undertake international payments. With its monopoly in this external financial relationship, Vietcombank played an important role and obtained a large market share of international payments, albeit in a relatively small market. In general, its business operation was advantageous at that time, but not now.
There was also a low development level in technology, organization, management and professional skills in the Vietnamese banking industry. Hence the speed of opening up the economy remained low, as was the ability to mobilize internal capital with the country?Ts underdeveloped strategies for expanding into the international market. Some of this bureaucratic ?~overseeing?T remains.
Related to this, Vietnam?Ts legal system still operates restrictions in quantification, and there is confusion in relation to finance and cre*** which is contrary to some requirements of GATS and the BTA. The State Bank still has not met the operational requirement of a unified banking system; banking policies remain uniformed and do not create a competitive business environment.
One of the major challenges now facing Vietnamese banks is the role of foreign banks. The foreign banks?T strength of capital, technology, services and global operational scale provide them with potential advantages. For example, in Ho Chi Minh City, the biggest finance centre in Vietnam, the foreign-invested banks have a high growth rate, leading to a high percentage of the market share in the finance business, while the state commercial banks?T percentage share has now fallen
A further problem exists with the Vietnamese (in)ability to provide adequate capital for economic development, and this is also in comparison to other countries in the region. The registered capital of leading state commercial banks only accounts for 3-4% of the total capital of all commercial banks; their financial capacity is too low to meet the country?Ts economic development requirements. Capital provision is also over too short a period for the longer-term nature of many commercial projects.
There is also an increasing amount of overdue commercial debt, as summarized in Table 4. There are debt problems between commercial business and state-owned banks, often resulting from inexperience in dealing with secured commercial lending. The Vietnamese banking system must improve commercial practices, including the renunciation of delinquent claims. The EPCo and Tanimex Companies are two typical cases where the owners are insolvent and unable to repay loans to Vietnamese banks.
There are some signs of gradual banking reform. In 1998, the Committee for Banking Reform was established (Decision No. 337/QD-NHNN) and implemented in 2001. A major objective is to ensure that the commercial banking system is both effective and sustainable; for example, the commercial banks must deal effectively with secured commercial lending from a sound financial management team.
One main objective of any central bank is to maintain the soundness and security of its country?Ts financial system as an aid to economic development. This work requires specialized knowledge of controlling a sound monetary economy devoid of obvious politics. The Central Bank of Vietnam has to establish requirements and procedures for the establishment of improved financial institutions. Their activities should be limited to fields in which they have certified competence and the central bank must supervise and monitor financial institutions on an acknowledged financial/accounting basis.
In short, the Central Bank of Vietnam must set standards for the establishment of financial institutions to ensure that applicants have enough resources and adequate systems in place.

The impact on import-competing industries back to top
In the country?Ts own interest, Vietnam needs to reform its banking and financial sector so that its import-competing food and manufacturing sectors will have the support they need to become globally competitive in the markets being opened to the world by the WTO. Some examples in support of this point follow.
Nguyen An, director of Seafood Processing Enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City, the largest economic centre in Vietnam, mentions his difficulties in borrowing a large amount of capital from Vietcombank for investment in his company. He says, ?~Access to Vietcombank for a bank loan was a difficult task. Vietcombank?Ts monopoly made it difficult for me to access sources of foreign currencies.?T(3)
To Kien Hanh, the owner of a business manufacturing electric fans, cookers and so on, said, ?~Although my company has the need to borrow money from banks, I have not borrowed such money since my company?Ts establishment seven years ago. When I need capital for production and investment I just mobilize capital from my relatives and my friends.?T(4)
Nguyen Van Tuyen, director of a company providing labour protection devices, said that he had already approached the bank but had been refused due to his lack of mortgage property.
Tran Trong Tuong, director of an export company of wooden furniture, is in a more favourable situation as he has a big house for collateral and could get a bank loan. However, he complains that the bank?Ts collateral valuation is only equal to half the market price of the house and the bank loan is only for 70% of their collateral valuation. This cannot meet his company?Ts financial needs.
There are many other reasons why small enterprises cannot persuade banks to lend to them, and for security banks often impose tighter measures to prevent commercial enterprises from accessing banks.
Duong Phuc Hau, a director of Fosta Enterprises, specializing in anti-absorbent materials, expresses his objective opinions on (these) bank restrictions and, also, that business enterprises should provide more binding obligations.


III. Facing the challenge of liberalization back to top
The Vietnamese banking system has so far been partly reformed but is still weak. The state-owned banks still dominate the banking system; the overdue loan rate is increasing; Vietnamese commercial banks have limited lending capacity, and so the story continues.
Coupled with this, and sometimes due to inadequate banking and foreign investment laws, most Vietnamese-owned enterprises are under-capitalized. Once Vietnam liberalizes its trading economy many industries will have to compete with foreign entrants to the Vietnam market, maybe for the first time. In such a situation, their competitive strength in their own market will depend a lot on better access to more economically competitive banking services.
In April 2004 there were nearly 40, 000 small and medium-sized enterprises in Vietnam. According to a recent survey conducted by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2004) these enterprises cannot clearly realize the constraints of the integration process and the banking industry, although they understand well the problems their private enterprises can have with current banking services in Vietnam. Resolving the difficult situation of small and medium-sized enterprises by effectively accessing their sources of capital and therefore gaining more commercial benefits is a current problem.
With over 90% of Vietnamese enterprises falling into the small or medium-sized categories and people generally having low incomes, the current capacity for capital mobilization by banks is limited. If the banking system is permitted to be equitized and to sell stocks widely to foreign markets, ad***ional foreign capital is likely to increase and help boost the country?Ts economy and economic development.
To reform the banking sector and facilitate the liberalization of the commercial process, the government of Vietnam has announced the Internationally Integrated Programme of the Banking Industry, and is committed to implement it when Vietnam joins the WTO. Vu Viet Ngoan, managing director of Vietcombank, has observed that ?~The Programme of Integration into the international economy initiated by the Vietnamese government has created opportunities and challenges for Vietcombank.?T(5)
This is reflected in other comments. Banking operations will be expanded, especially with a view to attracting investment capital. Ngoan also said ?~the securitization project of Vietcombank shall be deployed ?ofavourably? because Ms Le Thi Bang Tam, Vice Minister of Finance, has submitted to the Vietnam government ?othe plan? allowing Vietcombank to sell its stocks widely to investors in foreign countries. If and when this happens, then the mobilization of long-term capital for Vietcombank will be easier, and the funding capacity for big commercial projects can be increased.?T(6)
He added that ?~Joining WTO can help Vietcombank, a large foreign trade bank, to have more opportunities to co-operate in banking fields such as monetary planning and risk management, and, through this, Vietcombank?Ts prestige will likely be improved in the fields of international financial transactions.?T(7)
In sum, several things are needed to achieve this.
The Vietnamese banking industry must mobilize capital, access new technology and retrain its management and staff to match the development requirements of other financial markets.

With tougher competition, Vietcombank must further specialize in professional banking skills to enhance the efficiency of enterprise capital usage.

New banking services need to be developed and made more rapidly accessible. In this way Vietcombank can exploit and more effectively apply its (developing) banking services to contribute to economic growth and an increased share in both the international and domestic financial markets.

Vietcombank can take advantage of its wide network of branches to match the managerial and business styles of foreign banks.

Internationally integrated banking operations can help support these reforms and also increase the transparency of the Vietnamese banking system to meet the needs of integration and implement the commitment to (other) financial institutions and the WTO.

When Vietnam joins the WTO, foreign-invested and private banks will have better operational con***ions there. Vu Viet Ngoan further stated that ?~besides submitting the plan of the bank?Ts securitization to mobilize more capital, Vietcombank must improve its competitiveness by all the measures?T (speech given at the Vietnam Banking Conference, April 2004).

Banking services techniques and technology must be improved and service charges reduced to attract more customers.

Staff professional skills must be improved so that Vietcombank (and other banks) will be both a currency trader and an investor, thus helping commercial enterprises to develop. The growth of these enterprises should become a foundation for banking development.


IV. Lesson from Vietnam?Ts experience back to top
To achieve its successful planned economic/financial integration, Vietnam needs also to fill the development gap with other countries in the region. Vietnam is carefully opening its market step by step to maintain some sustainable development.
Because of the requirements of the BTA, Vietnam is opening its financial and banking market and therefore making WTO access and further developments more feasible.
Being a WTO member will bring some well-defined obligations requiring more open markets. But the WTO does not tell individual economies what they need to do *****cceed. They have to adopt some practices and procedures that go beyond WTO requirements. In Vietnam, the liberalization of banking and financial services is going beyond GATS requirements, but this seems to be necessary to make an economic success of WTO membership.
Development and practical changes as a result of macro thinking are sometimes slow in Vietnam. However, it is possible that some developing countries can benefit from the Vietnam experience. Now that guidelines have been set out for joining the WTO, it will be interesting to watch developments in 2005 and beyond.
NÓi WTO là diễn đàn là vì hoạt động của WTO tập trung ở các vòng đám phán (round), các nước đàm phán với nhâu, đưa ra các offers về tự do thương mại.
NÓi là tổ chức thì bạn nào cũng hiểu rồi. Trước WTO, Gatt chưa được coi là một tổ chức quốc tế theo đúng nghĩa của nó.
Thôi tớ phải đi làm bây h đây.

Cảm ơn bạn Talking_blue, tui không giận bạn đâu, tui rất thích được góp ý thẳng thắn.
Đúng là cái WTO này rất "xương", tiếng Anh thì có hạn, mà tiếng Pháp thì mù tịt, đọc hoài mà vẫn chưa hiểu hết nên chui vô đây muốn được cùng trao đổi với các bác. Một số vấn đề trong WTO rất mập mờ, mà tui thì thích cái gì cũng phải rõ ràng ra tấm ra món, ra môn ra khoai cho nó dễ hiểu. Mà dễ hiểu nhất là thảo luận bằng tiếng Việt.
Cái Case 45 bác post lên chưa đầy đủ lắm thì phải, tui tìm thấy Case này trên trang web của WTO: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case45_e.htm
Rất cảm ơn các ý kiến đóng góp của bác!

Cho em hỏi có phải WTO ra đời năm 1995 sau khi hiệp ước WTO được ký kết . Việt Nam đã xin làm quan sát viên của WTO từ năm 1995, và bị gẫy cầu năm 2000 ( vì một cú lừa chính trị ngoạn mục => bác nào biết kể em với ! ) , và đến bây giờ thì gia nhập WTO khó khăn hơn rất nhiều, đúng không nhỉ ?
Việt Nam gia nhập WTO được lợi nhiều cái lắm, em thấy rõ nhất ttrong vấn đề pháp lý ...

Đúng là WTO ra đời vào năm 1995 bằng một hiệp định đa phương có tên là: Hiệp định thành lập WTO, và Việt Nam đã nộp đơn xin gia nhập WTO từ ngày 1/1/1995. Trải qua 11 năm đàm phán liên tiếp và hơn 4.000 cuộc họp, gặp gỡ, đến nay như em đã thấy, chúng ta đã "bước được một chân vào WTO"
Tui rất tiếc là không tìm thấy (hoặc không biết) tài liệu về sự kiện "gẫy cầu" năm 2000 vì một "cú lừa chính trị ngoạn mục" nào đó. Tui chỉ biết là năm 2005, Việt Nam đã lỡ chuyến vào WTO bởi vì mặc dù Việt Nam vào thời điểm đó đã kết thuc đàm phán song phương với 16 nước, nhưng khi đàm phán với một số đối tác quan trọng, có tính quyết định để vào WTO như Hoa Kỳ, New Zealand... thì lại không kết thúc được. Nguyên nhân chính là do một số yêu cầu của các đối tác đưa ra tương đối cao nên Việt Nam phải kiên trì thuyết phục, như Việt Nam là nước đang phát triển ở trình độ thấp, yêu cầu phải có thời kỳ quá độ để các doanh nghiệp chuẩn bị trong giai đoạn mới.
Vào WTO, "lợi thì có lợi, nhưng... nhiều răng không còn", cũng đau lắm chứ chẳng chơi